CHAPTER 8
WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2021

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Abstract
At the beginning of 2021, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 15,166,200—an increase of 89,100 (0.59%) over the 2020 revised estimate of 15,077,100. Both these figures reflect an upward correction of 300,000 following a new study of Jews in the US (Pew Research Center 2021). The world's total population increased by 1.1% in 2020. The rate of increase of world Jewry hence amounted to about half of that of the world's total population. Jews were highly concentrated in two countries: Israel (45.3% of the world total) and the US (39.6%). Nine percent lived in Europe, 5% in other North America and Latin America, and 1% in other continents. Steady demographic increase in Israel was matched by stagnation or decline in most other countries, explained by low birth rates, frequent intermarriage, identificational drift, aging, and emigration. Most Jews are increasingly found in a handful of developed and democratic countries, with tens of small communities below sufficient critical mass needed to sustain viable community institutions. This chapter carefully reviews different approaches to Jewish population definitions and the highly variable availability and reliability of data sources. The critically important Jewish-Arab population balance in Israel and Palestine is analyzed. Estimates are provided for 102 countries with at least 100 Jews each. Detailed analyses are devoted to the two largest Jewish populations in Israel and the US.

Keywords World Jewry, Jewish population, Jewish demography, data sources and quality, age composition, international migration, size and density

CHAPTER 7
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8.1 Assessing Jewish Population

On January 1, 2021, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 15,166,200—an increase of 89,100 (0.59%) over the 2020 revised estimate of 15,077,100 (DellaPergola 2021a). The world's total population increased by 1.1% in 2020 (Population Reference Bureau 2020). The rate of increase of world Jewry hence amounted to about half of that of the world's total population. All Jewish population data in this chapter reflect an upward correction of 300,000 following a new study of Jews in the United States (Pew Research Center 2021, see below). The new adjustment in US, hence world figures, entailed retroactive corrections for several years backward—an exemplary demonstration of the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

Fig. 8.1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in the rest of the world (the *Diaspora*)—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2021. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core Jewish population* concept addresses a human collective whose identification is mutually exclusive with respect to other subpopulations (see below). While this is the main definition of who is a Jew followed in this chapter, evidently the number of persons who carry multiple cultural and religious identities tends to increase in contemporary societies (Josselson and Harway 2012). The adjudication of group identities (without double counts) becomes increasingly difficult as recent Jewish population studies in the US clearly demonstrate. One important issue in the current predicament is whether (Jewish) corporate identities can only be acquired or can also be lost (see below). In any case, from a socio-demographic perspective, unlike the situation in the past, a simple binary division of the world population between Jews and non-Jews is no more possible. Operational decisions must be taken to reasonably estimate current Jewish population size (DellaPergola 2014b, 2015b).

After the tragic human losses of World War II and the *Shoah* (Holocaust), 15 years passed before the Jewish population increased by one million, from 11 to 12 million (DellaPergola et al. 2000). Another 35 years were needed to add another million from 12 to 13. From the 1970s onwards, world Jewry stagnated at nearly *zero population growth* for nearly 20 years but some demographic upturn occurred since the 1990s, mostly reflecting accelerating population growth in Israel. It took about 15 years to add another million from 13 to 14, and about ten more years to add the next million and reach 15 million. This occurred in 2019 according to the revised data reported here. In historical perspective and based on comparable definitions, world Jewish population has not yet recovered its size on the eve of World War II—16.5 million—and it may still take a few tens of years more before that mark is reached.

ABOUT HERE: Fig. 8.1

World Jewish population size reflects a combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the rest of the world—the Jewish Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 and 630,000 in 1948 to nearly 6.9 million in 2021. The Jewish population of the Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable in number until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing, reaching 8.2-8.3 million around 2000 and remaining relatively stable subsequently. The world's total population increased more than threefold from 2.3 billion in 1945 to 7.7 billion by mid-2020. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total

population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.95 per 1,000 currently—or one per every 513 inhabitants in the world.

Two countries, Israel and the US, accounted for over 85% of the 2021 total; 23 countries, each with 10,000 Jews or more, accounted for another 14%, and another 77 countries, each with Jewish populations below 10,000, accounted for the remaining 1%. **Fig. 8.2** shows the size of the 20 largest *core* Jewish populations in 2021.

ABOUT HERE: Fig. 8.2

Map 8.1 shows the geographical distribution of the 20 largest Jewish communities worldwide.

ABOUT HERE: MAP 8.1

Israel's *core Jewish population* reached 6,870,900 in 2021, *not* including 464,800 persons not recorded as Jews in the Ministry of Interior's Population Register but who are members of families initially admitted under the *Law of Return*—out of Israel's total legal population of 9,293,300 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics monthly). The 6,870,900 corresponded to 45.3% of the revised total world Jewry estimate by the *core* definition and represented a Jewish population increase of 97,500 (1.44%) in 2020. Israel's rate of population increase was remarkably slower than in previous years as a direct and indirect consequence of the covid-19 pandemics (see below). In the same year, the total Jewish population of the Diaspora (revised following the 2020 Pew survey of Jewish Americans) was estimated to have decreased by 8,400 from 8,303,700 to 8,295,300 (-0.10%).

For the US, based on the 2020 study (Pew Research Center 2021), we reassessed the *core* Jewish population at 6 million (versus a previous estimate of 5.7 million) constituting 39.6% of world Jewry in 2021. *Core* Jews in the US increased moderately since the year 2000, including an estimated 5,000 increase in 2020 (DellaPergola 2013a). A detailed explanation of the rationale for the new estimate follows below.

Jews in the rest of the world—outside Israel and the US—were assessed at 2,295,300 in 2021 (15.1%% of world Jewry), versus 2,308,700 in 2020. The decline of 13,400 among Diaspora Jews other than the US amounted to an annual loss of -0.58% in the aggregate for those countries. Among the total world population, growth in 2020 was 1.4% in less developed countries versus zero in the more developed countries where most Jews live.

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel hosts the largest *core* Jewish community worldwide. Some different opinions (Saxe and Tighe 2013; SSRI 2019a; Pew Research Center 2021; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume) are mostly based on different definitions of the target population. Since Israel's independence in 1948, demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in Israel, their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, slow, and diverse changes reflecting births and deaths, geographical mobility, and the choice of millions of persons to express or to deny a Jewish collective identification not subordinated to, nor split with other explicit religious or ethnic identifications. At the same time, Jewish majority status in the state of Israel faces a significant demographic challenge facing the growing Palestinian Arab population within the boundaries of the State of Israel as well as in the West Bank and Gaza.

Jewish population estimates are subject to the fundamental demographic equation which holds that population size at a given time reflects an uninterrupted chain of events that may change the size of that population from an earlier to a later date. Of the three possible determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths) where in many countries low Jewish birth rates and an increasingly elderly population generate higher death rates and an overall deficit; and (b) the balance of international migration (immigration and emigration) which can be highly variable across countries. The third determinant consists of identification changes (accessions and secessions)—in this case *passages* to and from a Jewish identity—and applies to all subpopulations defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific

characteristic, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group.

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility and a relatively young age distribution. These two drivers of demographic growth do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example Canada and Australia and, until recently, the US and Germany), and possibly some local natural increase (plausibly in the UK and Mexico, and minimally in Austria and Australia) the total number of Jews in Diaspora countries tends to diminish at varying rates.

All this holds true regarding the *core Jewish population*, which does *not* include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews with family connections to Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters (see further discussion below). The detailed mechanisms and supporting evidence of Jewish population change have been discussed extensively in previous issues of the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and will not be repeated here (see DellaPergola 2015a through 2021a; for a detailed report on Jews in Europe see DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020).

Jewish population size and composition reflect the day-by-day interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola et al. 2005; DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015; DellaPergola 2017a; DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020).

The 2021 Jewish population data reported here were updated from 2020 and previous years in accordance with known or estimated vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. The world and regional Jewish population estimates result from the sum of national estimates. While individual country estimates can be obtained from nationwide sources and sometimes also from the sum of local sources, in the case of the world's total, in the lack of a global population census, there is no alternative to the summation of country figures. In each of the country update procedures, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another in a particular country, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective over the years of our monitoring of world Jewish population. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be quite on target. Where needed, previous estimates were adjusted retrospectively based upon newer, better evidence.

Perhaps more importantly, the research findings reported here tend to confirm a coherent and conceptually robust and articulated interpretation of the trends prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011a). While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2021 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes involving bi-local residences and leading to double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study, special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally and nationally mobile and bi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one religious, ethnic, or cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to the other. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities; hence, Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Quality of the estimates can always be corrected at a later stage, as demonstrated in this chapter.

8.1.1 Definitions

Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact the numbers. A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by several individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population as well as data quality, is addressed at all. This problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework for Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes, it would *not* be acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country, although in the daily conduct of Jewish community affairs such differences do prevail across countries.

In such an open, fluid, and somewhat undetermined environment, the very feasibility of undertaking a valid and meaningful study of the Jewish collective—let alone by the use of quantitative tools—generates debates between different intellectual stances facing Jewish population studies (DellaPergola 2014d). In particular, the study of a Jewish population (or of any other subpopulation) requires addressing three main problems:

1) *Defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;
2) *Identifying* the target group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting those who belong to it from all others. This is primarily achieved by systematic canvassing of populations and directly ascertaining personal identifications—typically through national censuses or representative sample surveys. Identification is also often performed through membership lists, distinctive Jewish names, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
3) *Covering* the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews, by telephone, by mail, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus should be clearly understood that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on *operational* social scientific, not *prescriptive* rabbinical or legal, definitional criteria. The main conceptual aspects, besides being rooted in social theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility—not the least, available research budgets. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as response rates and cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social surveys, namely those undertaken through telephone interviews (Keeter et al. 2017), the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. New field work strategies must be devised all the time so to avoid deterioration in the number and quality of final responses. Response rates for Jewish surveys tend to be better than for general surveys, and Jews are possibly readier than others to respond to surveys generally, but data quality constitutes a topic of growing concern in contemporary social research.

No perfect method exists to counter decreases in response and cooperation rates, or self-selection biases in participation readiness. Therefore, research findings reflect with varying degrees of sophistication only that which is possible to uncover, namely the degree of involvement with or indifference to feeling Jewish by respondents. Something that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be indirectly estimated through various indirect techniques. However, there exist unsurmountable limits to what research methodologies can deliver. For example, large representative samples and small qualitative studies are not interchangeable regarding the answers they can provide to specific research questions. Research methods should be finely tuned to research goals. Beyond that, we enter the world of narratives, beliefs, hopes and fears, myths, and

corporate interests. No perfect methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these biases—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction and non-advocacy studies such as this. Keeping these limits in mind, four major definitional concepts will be considered here to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography worldwide (**Fig. 8.3**):

(a) the **core Jewish population (CJP)**—the group who consider Judaism their mutually exclusive identification framework, including both those who do see and those who do not see religion as a relevant avenue for identification (in **Fig. 8.3**: *Circle 1:* Jewish only, religion; and *Circle 2*: Jewish only, no religion);

(b) the **population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)**—including those who say they are *partly Jewish* because their identity is split between two or more different identification frameworks (*Circle 3*), and those who say they are not Jewish but have at least one Jewish parent (*Circle 4*). Taken together Circles 3 and 4 may also be referred to as the *Jewish-connected* population;

(c) the **enlarged Jewish population (EJP)**—including those who say they have Jewish background but not a Jewish parent (*Circle 5*), as well as all non-Jewish household members who live in households with Jews (*Circle 6*); and

(d) the **Law of Return population (LRP)** (*Circle 7*). The Law of Return is the State of Israel's legal instrument that determines eligibility of Jews and their families for immigration, citizenship, and all related prerogatives.

A further important conceptual development is the **net Jewish population (NJP)** used by the Pew Research Center to define the main research target in their 2013 and 2020 surveys in the US (Pew Research Center 2013, 2021). The **NJP** includes the core Jewish population as defined above plus those who define themselves *partly Jewish* (circles 1, 2, and 3 in **Fig 8.3**). The **NJP** defines a group which is conceptually and numerically intermediate between the **CJP** and the **PJP**. Further discussion of these definitions follows in the **Appendix**.

ABOUT HERE Fig. 8.3

This typology is relevant because not only it does mark-off alternative population definition approaches, but it also delineates different analytic paths grounded on alternative social theories as well as different possible Jewish institutional strategies in designating the respective catchment constituencies. It is important to realize that the categories in **Fig. 8.3** are not static but continuous passages occur across the different circles, from center to periphery and vice-versa, and from the whole configuration outside, and into it. Further definitional extensions (not shown in **Fig. 8.3**) may address those additional non-Jewish persons who feel some degree of **affinity with Judaism**, sometimes because their more distant ancestors were Jewish or because of other personal cultural or social connections with Jews. These forms of affinity arise growing interest in recent years in different regional contexts like Latin America (Torres 2017), Africa (Miles 2019), or the Western countries (Vincze 2020) in the light of attempts to set up organized communities who claim pertinence to Judaism and ask to be recognized as such by various rabbinical or institutional authorities in Israel or in other countries.

Partly in connection, but also beyond these issues, some studies may have reached people whose **ancestors *ever* were Jewish** regardless of the respondents' present identification. Socio-demographic surveys indeed sometimes ask about the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some population surveys *do* ask about more distant ancestry. Historians may wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are descendants of those Jews—for example, *Conversos* who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages, or the descendants of Jews who lived during the Roman Empire, or the Lost Tribes (Parfitt 2002; Parfitt

and Fisher 2016; Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018; Gross et al. 2019). The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010; Carmi et al. 2014; Tian et al. 2015). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.

The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers and by Jewish organizations tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on population estimates beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core Jew population* definition. These decisions may reflect local needs and sensitivities, but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of Jewish populations in different locales at one given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here, historically and geographically. The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, country, and major metropolitan area—unless differently specified—are consistently anchored to the concept of *core Jewish population*. The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any broader definition such as the population *with Jewish parents*, the *enlarged* definition, or the *Law of Return* definition (see detail in the **Appendix**).

All Jewish population estimates presented here refer to the total number in a given geographical unit, *not* only the affiliated or those who are religiously observant.

8.1.2 Data Sources

The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research on current population estimates have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including access to unpublished databases. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates of the number of Jews in the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Schmelz 1981; Ritterband et al. 1988; DellaPergola 2014c, 2014d). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, data users should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of Jewish population estimates.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. These data consist of national population censuses, national population registers, national and international public and private sponsored surveys, and national or Jewish community records of vital statistics, migration, and conversions. Some of this ongoing data compilation is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Avraham Harman Research Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Jewish population projections undertaken by the author in light of available data, also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the ongoing trends. Other existing estimates of total world Jewish population and of its geographical distribution (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012; Johnson and Zurlo 2014; Pew Research Center 2015a) provide findings quite close to ours. Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew comparisons often rely on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. In the latter case, as Jews are usually an extremely small fraction of the total, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affected by large sampling errors. A full list of the types and quality of documentation upon which our Jewish population estimates are based is reported in the **Appendix Table** below.

8.2 World Jewish Population Size and Distribution by Major Areas

As noted, in our current estimates, we corrected previously published Jewish population data in light of new information. In 2021, the most significant correction was an addition of about 300,000 Jews in the US following the 2020 Pew study. This revision generated retrospective revisions of the whole annual series of data for the US, for the total Diaspora, and for World Jewry since 2000. **Table 8.1** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945 through 2020, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book* and as retroactively corrected in the light of augmented information also adjusting all revisions that had been introduced in previous years. These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published by other authors until 1980 and by ourselves since 1981. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* in the past based on the information that was available on each date. It is possible that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

ABOUT HERE: Table 8.1

The time series in **Table 8.1** incorporates the newly revised estimates. It clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally between the 1960s and the 1990s. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 282,000 in the 1990s. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 899,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2020, world Jewry increased by 1,027,000, but Israel's Jewish population increased by 1,069,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish population decreased by 42,000. **Table 8.1** also demonstrates the slower world Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of the world population. In 2021, the share of Jews among the world population (1.95 per 1,000) was 41% of the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

Table 8.2 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population by major geographical regions at the beginning of 2021 as compared to 2020. The originally published estimates from the 2020 *American Jewish Year Book* (DellaPergola 2021) were revised reflecting retroactive corrections due to improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of 289,900 persons in the 2020 world Jewry estimate, reflecting a net increase of 295,000 for the United States, and a subtraction of 4,000 from the previous estimate for Argentina, of 1,000 for Belarus, and of 100 for Latvia (see below).

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Looking first at global trends, the number of Jews in Israel increased from 6,773,400 at the beginning of 2020 to 6,870,900 at the beginning of 2021, an increase of 97,500, or 1.44%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora *decreased* from the revised 8,303,700 to 8,295,300—a decrease of 8,400, or -0.10%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and to a lesser extent from France, South Africa, the small remnants of Jewish communities in Moslem countries, and other countries, and the internal decrease due to an excess of deaths over births typical of the majority of Diaspora Jewry. In Israel, of the total increase of 97,500 core Jews in 2020, 89,500 derived from the balance of births (129,860, about 3,400 less than in 2019) and deaths (40,369, about 1,800 more than in 2019) (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics monthly). Less births and more deaths reflected some of the effects of the corona virus pandemics in Israel (see below). New immigrants to Israel and tourists who changed their status to immigrants diminished by half, from 33,096 in 2019 to 16,696 in 2020. Israel's net migration balance diminished accordingly after factoring-in the balance of returning Israelis, Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time, and Israeli residents who left the country

and had not returned after one year of permanence abroad. Therefore, in 2020 internal demographic change produced most of the total Jewish population growth in Israel.

According to these estimates the Jewish Diaspora's estimated decrease of 8,400 was mostly explained by an aggregate negative migration balance versus Israel. This would leave room for a minimal decrease due to other causes, which quite certainly underestimates the actually negative vital balance in most countries. As a consequence, Jewish population estimates for the total Diaspora might require future downward adjustments. It should be noted however that the total Diaspora balance in 2020 resulted from an assumed increase of 5,000 in the US and a decrease of 13,400 in other countries

Recently, for sure, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia, some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this same phenomenon of return or first-time accession to Judaism occurs throughout Diaspora communities as well, sometimes without a formal *rite de passage*. The addition of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to a minimal fraction of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel (Fisher 2015, 2019; DellaPergola 2017c; Nissim 2018).

In descending order by continents, 45.5% of world Jewry in 2021 lived in **Asia**, overwhelmingly in Israel (**Table 8.2** and **Appendix Table**). Asia is defined herein to include the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asiatic areas of the Russian Federation and Turkey. The Jewish presence in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel which accounts for more than 99% of the continental total. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia account together for less than one-half of one percent of the total. Clearly, the rapid economic development in Southeast Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and especially China, is attracting Jewish professionals, businesspeople, and technicians. The numbers are still small but are growing. As to Muslin countries, Turkey has the larger remaining Jewish community but is included here in Europe since most Jews live on the European side of the straights.

The Americas hold 44.6% of the world's Jews, of which 42.2% in North America. The Jewish population in the Americas, estimated at 6,761,300 in 2021, is predominantly concentrated in the US (6,000,000, or 89% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (393,500, 6%), South America (310,200, less than 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (57,500, 1%). Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in South America, reflecting emigration motivated by recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). Central American countries such as Mexico and Panama were the exceptions and absorbed Jewish migrants from other countries in Latin America. In the Miami Jewish community alone, the number of members of households containing a Jewish adult from Latin American countries increased from roughly 18,000 in 2004 to 24,500 in 2014 (Sheskin 2015b). In neighboring Broward County, the same measure increased from 5,300 in 1997 to 26,500 in 2016 (Sheskin 2017). Between 2001 and 2020 the total number of immigrants from Latin America to Israel surpassed 26,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), including many persons highly educated and highly involved in Jewish life, but also recently converted people (Bokser Liwerant et al. 2015; Torres 2017). Outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism has appeared among real or putative descendants of *Conversos* whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal in the 15th and 16th centuries. Some of these *Converso* communities have been trying to create permanent frameworks to express their Jewish identity, in part locally, in part through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon tends to lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especially in smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries (Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018). Persons with such backgrounds are also migrating to Israel (Torres 2017). A significant downward correction was introduced for Argentina (-4,000) in the light of a new evaluation of Jewish death records for the last several years. Recorded burials covered the main AMIA (mostly Ashkenazi) facility in Buenos Aires, the smaller cemeteries of other Sephardi and non-Orthodox communities, and those Jews whose

choice fell on a non-Jewish cemetery. In addition to this downward correction, Argentina continued to experience a revival in migration to Israel and possibly to other countries, including the US, which contributed further population decline. Steady decline continued in the already much diminished community in Venezuela.

Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounted for 9% of world Jewry (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020). The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,317,500 in 2021, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU). The EU, comprising 27 countries after the secession of the UK, had an estimated total of 785,600 Jews in 2021 (60% of the continent's total). The momentous political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about significant changes in the territorial deployment of Jewish communities in Europe. Revitalization of Jewish community life in the western countries had occurred over the past decades through immigration mainly from North Africa and the Middle East and also from the FSU. But more recently, economic recession and rising perceptions of antisemitism across the continent brought about growing Jewish dissatisfaction and emigration (DellaPergola 2017b; Staetsky 2017; Staetsky et al. 2013; European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013, 2018; DellaPergola 2020b). Total emigration from the EU to Israel, including the three Baltic republics, rose from 13,635 in 2005-2009 to 19,134 in 2010-2014, and 23,098 in 2015-2019. It was 2,876 in 2020, below the yearly average for the last 10 years. In spite of the unifying project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted to create such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013; Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019a, 2020).

The EU's initially expanding format symbolized an important historical landmark and a promising framework for the development of Jewish life. However, in recent years, the EU concept and ideal found itself under major stress, as the UK Brexit was only one of its symptoms. Disagreements about migration policies facing large Muslim population increases in different European locales reflected the unsolved dilemma of defining Europe's own cultural identity and geopolitical boundaries. Other European countries not part of the EU or the FSU, including (from 2020) the UK and Turkey, comprised 330,000 core Jews (25% of the European total, of which 22% in the UK). We revised the Jewish population estimates for Latvia (-100).

The four former Soviet republics in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, excluding the Baltics) had a joint Jewish population of 201,900 (15% of the continental total). The FSU is the area where, in absolute numbers, Jewish population has diminished the most since 1991 (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015; Konstantinov 2007). Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting emigration, a continuing excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high intermarriage rates, and low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease is being alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural, and religious activities supported by American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003; Remennick 2007). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with 14,471 in 2016, 16,122 in 2017, 18,887 in 2018, 24,146 in 2019, and 10,976 in 2020 out of a total of 19,696 new immigrants (56%). Our 2021 assessment of the total *core Jewish population* for the 15 FSU republics in Europe and Asia was 224,500, of whom 210,300 in Europe (including in this number the 8,400 in the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 14,200 in Asia. The many non-Jewish household members created an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly three times as large as the *core* (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011, 2015). The estimate for Belarus was downwardly revised (-1,000) in the light of the last census.

Little more than 1% of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania combined. The Jewish population in **Africa** is mostly concentrated in South Africa whose estimated Jewish population constituted about 92% of the continental total, after a significant downward reassessment in the light of a 2019 survey (Graham 2020). Immigration continued to keep stable the Jewish population in **Oceania** where Australia accounts for 94% of the total (Graham 2021).

Overall, in 2020 Jewish population size increased primarily in Israel and to a modest extent in

North and Central America, and decreased to varying degrees in South America, the European Union, other Western Europe and the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa.

8.2.1 Implications of alternative Jewish population definitions

In **Table 8.3**, we evaluate the Jewish population's world and regional distribution according to several alternative definitions, as also outlined in **Fig. 8.3**. Updated and revised *core Jewish population* estimates (CJP in the table) are presented, along with the total of those who *have Jewish parents* regardless of their current identity (PJP); the *enlarged Jewish population* inclusive of non-Jewish household members (EJP); and the population eligible for the *Law of Return* (LRP). Detailed country estimates are reported in the **Appendix Table**. The main purpose of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate comparisons across countries. In light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it is clear that Jewish investigators and/or community leaders in different countries sometimes follow local definitional criteria that may differ from the criteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US or Canada is evaluated quite differently in this and in other chapters of this volume (Sheskin and Dashefsky; Shahar). In other words, criteria that may be understood or even preferred in one country may not be meaningful or acceptable in another country. But in a global study like this, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently for all countries. The prime choice unavoidably must fall on a minimum common denominator. However, by showing the implications of different definitions for Jewish population evaluation, we offer readers an additional tool to better appreciate ongoing population trends in their countries.

Starting from the *core Jewish population* estimate of 15,166,200 (CJP) worldwide in 2021, if we add persons who state they are partly Jewish and persons who currently are not Jews and have one or two *Jewish parents*, a broader global population estimate of 19,937,600 (PJP) is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, an *enlarged* estimate obtains of 22,626,000 (EJP). Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and spouse provisions of Israel's *Law of Return*, the total Jewish and non-Jewish aliyah-eligible population can be roughly estimated at 25,336,100 (LRP) All these estimates include those who already live in Israel. The US holds a significantly larger *Jewish parents population* (PJP) living in households with Jews or other persons with immediate Jewish background than Israel—9,800,000 million compared to 7,103,300, respectively.

ABOUT HERE: TABLE 8.3

The results, though tentative, provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of those who *have a Jewish parent* (PJP), regardless of their own identification, is 4,771,400 higher than the world *core Jewish population*. The *total number of household members* with at least one core Jew in the household (EJP) is estimated to comprise an additional increment of 2,668,400. Finally, the total eligible for *the Law of Return* (LRP) involves an additional increment of 2,710,100. All in all, the difference between the global Law of Return population (LRP) and the core Jewish population (CJP) is 10,169,900. Of these roughly estimated over 10 million partly Jewish, somewhat Jewish-connected, or otherwise included non-Jewish members of Jewish households, 75.8%% live in North America, 7.2% in the EU, 6.7% in the FSU Republics in Europe and Asia, 4.6% in Israel, 3.4% in Latin America, 1.4% in other European countries, and 1% in the Rest of Asia, Africa and Oceania.

The relative impact of the various population definitions linking the *core* Jewish population (CJP) and the Law of Return population (LRP) is quite different in the three main geographical divisions considered in **Fig. 8.4**: Israel, the US, and the rest of Diaspora Jewry. Since the impact of intermarriage is much lower in Israel than elsewhere, the extensions beyond the core in Israel are quite limited and primarily reflect immigration of intermarried households and, more recently, births

in Israel from these households. In other communities outside the US and Israel, the graphic portrays the significant expansion of population aggregates around the CJP. Note that with the emigration—mainly to Israel—of core Jews, the number of other people connected in some way to Judaism does not necessarily diminish across world Jewish communities. Their propensity to change country of residence may be actually lower than among core Jews, but they remain nonetheless as a more or less submerged and often invisible component of the global Jewish population configuration. On the other hand, with the passing of time, as more core Jews pass because of aging, and more of those directly although loosely related non-Jews pass too for the same reason, the more distant circles may eventually lose awareness of their identificational linkage to the core collective. The lower part of **Fig. 8.4** confirms the growing dominance of US Jewry when the initial *core* Jewish population is extended to the broader identificational circles.

ABOUT HERE: Fig. 8.4

Summing up, it is important to keep in mind that the recent research experience indicates that people may shift their identities over time across the different layers of the *core* Jewish definition, and between different *core* and *non-core* Jewish identification statuses. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary identifying as Jewish and as something else and vice versa in response to the particular context or moment when the question about identity is being tested. At any particular moment, then, there will be a countable Jewish population, which is not necessarily the same as the previous or the following moment.

8.3 Jewish Population Distribution in Major Countries

8.3.1 Socioeconomic development and the Jewish presence

Reflecting moderate growth in global Jewish population accompanied by increasing concentration in a few countries, in 2021 84.9% of world Jews lived in Israel and the US, and 96.6% were concentrated in the ten countries with the most Jews. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determined the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends.

In 2021, 99.1% of world Jewry lived in the largest 25 Jewish communities, each evaluated at 10,000 or more. Excluding Israel, 98.4% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 24 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 72.3% in the US (**Table 8.4**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (Russia); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances toward the Jewish presence.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.4

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by the persistence of a higher share of Jews among the total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be directly related to the country's level of development (**Table 8.5**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2020, in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza) the share of Jews out of the total population was 739.3 per 1000. Israel's population high rate of Jewishness obviously reflects its special positioning in Jewish identity perceptions, but Israel also has become a developed country, and, as such, attractive to prospective migrants. In the US, the *core* Jewish population represented 18.2 per 1000 of total population; Jews

comprised 3.6 per 1000 total population on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.7 per 1000 on average in the other 16 countries with 10,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority (80.2%) of world population.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.5

To further illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, **Table 8.5** reports the latest available Human Development Index (HDI) for 189 countries in 2019 (United Nations Development Programme 2020). The HDI—a composite measure of a society's level of education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics and proximate environments of the members of those Jewish communities. Of the 25 countries listed, five are included among the top ten HDIs among 189 countries ranked (Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Australia, and the Netherlands). Another seven countries are ranked 11th to 25th (the UK, Belgium, Canada, the US, Austria, Israel, and Spain), five more are between 26th and 50th (France, Italy, Hungary, Chile, and Argentina), seven are between 51st and 100th (Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, Panama, Mexico, Ukraine, and Brazil), and one (South Africa) occupies a rank above 100 (114th), pointing to lesser development in the host society. Remarkably, all of the 9 largest Jewish populations, amounting together to 96% of world Jewry, live in countries with HDIs among the top 52. The average ranking of the seven countries with 100,000 to 500,000 Jews was 24th, and the average of countries with 10,000 to 100,000 Jews was 44th. During the last year the country HDI rank somewhat worsened for several countries with the largest Jewish populations: the US passed from 15th to 17th, Canada from 13th to 16th, Argentina from 46th to 48th, Germany from 4th to 6th, and Australia from 6th to 8th. Among countries whose ranking improved, Israel passed from 22nd to 19th, and the UK from 15th to 13th.

Fig. 7.5 demonstrates the relationship that prevails between Jewish population size and the respective countries' human development. The horizontal axis shows the average HDI ranks of world countries regrouped by broad categories of Jewish population size (as in **Table 8.5**). The vertical axis indicates the total Jewish population of the same groups of countries. It appears that a country's level of development allows or stimulates conditions promoting more than proportionally the size of the local Jewish population. The statistical relationship between the HDI and the total number of Jews by type of countries is extraordinarily powerful, as indicated by an explained variance of 84% when including Israel, and 85% when excluding Israel. The slight loss of explanatory power following Israel's inclusion means that the strong Jewish presence in Israel cannot be exclusively explained by the environmental circumstances of high socioeconomic development, and obviously draws on deeper historical, cultural, and religious determinants. But in general terms the relationship between Human Development and Jewish presence certainly works. As a caveat, it is worth repeating that Jewish communities may display social and economic profiles significantly better than the average population of their respective countries. Nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of each individual, Jews included, everywhere. Changes in the quality of life of individual countries foreshadow changes in Jewish population distribution worldwide mostly through international migration. Country ranking shifts in development levels should be monitored carefully as they may critically affect world Jewish population distribution.

ABOUT HERE Fig. 8.5

8.3.2 Time comparisons

The current Jewish population distribution worldwide has resulted from dramatic changes in the geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural profile of world Jewry—particularly since the independence of the state of Israel but also since the June 1967 war. As an illustration of the intervening changes, we report the world distribution of core Jewish population by major geographical regions at four points in time: 1948, 1970, 2000, and 2021 (**Fig. 7.6**).

About here Fig. 8.6

Two opposing trends emerge from this comparison covering more than 70 years: on the one hand, Israel's Jewish population increased from being a small entity in 1948 to being the prime component of world Jewish population by 2021; on the other hand, we see the decline, and in some cases the disappearance of the major Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the FSU in Europe and Asia, and the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Declines of a lesser scale also appear in Latin America and Southern Africa. North America, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, maintained relatively stable Jewish population sizes, although in the latter case through a significant turnaround of immigration and emigration streams. As already noted, the tendency over time was much greater consolidation of world Jewry in the two major centers in the US (here together with Canada) and Israel, versus a much more equally dispersed Jewish population worldwide shortly after the end of World War II.

A more detailed picture of the changes intervening between 1970 and 2021 appears in **Table 8.6**. Here we compare the numbers and ranks for the 33 countries with a Jewish population of at least 20,000 Jews in 1970—based on revised estimates and using the detailed country list that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union (FSU), Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Striking changes occurred in size and global ranking of country Jewish populations during the 51 years between 1970 and 2021. Seven countries had a larger Jewish population in 2021 than half a century earlier. Quantitatively, the most remarkable was Israel's Jewish population more than doubling from 2,581,000 to 6,870,900 (+166.2%). The greatest percentage growth occurred in Germany (+293.3%). Absolute population increases were also recorded in Australia (+81.5%), Canada (+37.6%), Mexico (+14.3%), the US (+8.8%), and Brazil (+1.7%). The other 26 countries witnessed Jewish population reduction, with nine countries losing more than 90% of their 1970 population (Ethiopia, Morocco, and the seven former Soviet republics of Moldova, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania). Five more countries lost 80% to 90% of their 1970 Jews: Iran, Romania, and the FSU republics of Latvia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Other countries that lost more than 50% of their Jewish population in 1970 included Turkey and South Africa. An entirely different ranking of the major communities consequently emerged. The top 5 in 1970 were the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and France; in 2019 they had become Israel, US, France, Canada, and the UK. Ethiopia lost 51 positions in the global ranking of Jewish populations, Georgia lost 33 and Moldova 32. Germany gained 19 rank positions, Switzerland 15, and the Netherlands 13. But while the country ranked 33rd in 1970 (Switzerland) had 20,000 Jews, in 2021 India with the same rank had 4,800.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.6

The geographical realignment of world Jewry reflects past sufferance from political discrimination and persecution and lack of democracy, as well as socioeconomic development lags and inferior economic opportunities in the countries that lost Jewish population. The consequent mass migration from those countries generated large Jewish population declines, mostly in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. On the other hand, countries that offered greater freedom and a wider range of socioeconomic opportunities witnessed steady Jewish population growth or at least stability (DellaPergola 2020b). This amounted at a huge westernization of world Jewry.

8.3.3 Dispersion and Concentration

In 2020, 102 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 8.7**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews (but less than 5,000,000), two had 50,000 to 99,999, six had 25,000 to 49,999, eight had 10,000 to 24,999, seven had 5,000 to 9,999, 28 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 42 had 100 to 999. The 77 communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for less than 1% of world Jewry.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.7

In only five Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1000 (or 0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (22.9 Jews per 1000 inhabitants), the US (18.2), Monaco (17.5), Canada (10.3), and France (6.9). The case of Israel is very different, with a *core* Jewish population that represents 73.9% of the total legal population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 78.9% of the total population. In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population has been decreasing.

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 24 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1000 total population: the US, Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. Ten more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Ukraine, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, Sweden, Austria, and Panama. Six countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1000 total population: South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.

Over the past decades, the basic size-and-density typology of Jewish communities throughout the world did not change as much as the underlying changes witnessed by individual countries. **Table 8.8** shows the configuration of Jewish populations in 2021 as compared to 1984, the first year for which such tabulation is available (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1986). The 1984 data are reported here unrevised and in the original format of the countries and territories that existed then.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.8

The number of countries with at least 100 Jews indeed increased from 74 to 102, following the devolution of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the addition of several countries with very small Jewish communities that reached the 100-person threshold. The greatest increase was in the number of countries with less than 1,000 Jews, from 23 in 1984 to 43 in 2020. At the top of the distribution, two countries in 2020 had more than five million Jews, versus one only in 1984, when two countries had between one and five million Jews: Israel and the USSR. In the meantime, Israel grew and the USSR split into 15 states and lost most of its Jews through emigration.

Countries with between 100,000 and one million Jews comprised 12.4% of total Jewish population in 1984 versus 11.2% in 2021. Of the 15 republics of the FSU, only Russia had more than 100,000 in 2021. Brazil and South Africa had more than 100,000 Jews in 1984, but fewer in 2021. Germany and Australia had fewer in 1984 but more in 2021. France, Canada, the UK, and Argentina were included in the 100,000 and over category for both dates, but the gap between Canada and Argentina had more than trebled, from 65,000 in 1984 to 218,500 in 2021.

Communities between 10,000 and 100,000 comprised 3.9% of world Jewish population in 18 countries in 1984, versus 3.1% in 16 countries, respectively, in 2021. Among the smaller Jewish communities, those with less than 10,000 Jews comprised at both dates less than 1% of world Jewry, but in 1984 they were distributed across 47 countries and in 2021 across 77 countries. The apparent stability of the overall distribution reflected a strong concentration of Jewish population in a few countries at the top and a wide dispersion of very small numbers in many countries at the bottom. The transition from a concentration of Jews in one dominant and two secondary centers, to a configuration based on two main centers reflected the quite revolutionary changes undertaken by world Jewry in the transition from the 20th to the 21st century.

8.4 Jewish Population in Major Individual Countries

In previous volumes of the American Jewish Year Book we provided short profiles of the demographic trends for each of the largest Jewish populations in individual countries or regional areas. In 2020 and 2021 several of these countries undertook a national census, whose results were not yet available at the time of this writing. Pending such updates, and given the generally gradual and slow motion of demographic change, we shall not repeat here the detailed descriptions of sources and patterns that appeared in previous volumes of the *American Jewish Year Book* and refer the reader to those previous volumes (DellaPergola 2021a). In the following, we shall only review in some detail the demographic trends and updates concerning the two largest Jewish populations, Israel and the United States.

8.4.1 Israel

8.4.1.1 Main country

Since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Israel is the country with the largest core Jewish population worldwide. It is also the only one displaying a substantial rate of population growth—1.44% in 2020. With a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of close to 3 children currently born per Jewish woman in 2020, and a relatively young age composition (27.1% under age 15 vs.13.7% age 65 and over), Jews in Israel display the highest fertility among Jewish populations worldwide (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Fertility is largely above generational replacement and continues to sustain a share of children about twice that of the elderly among the total Jewish population. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate is higher than the fertility for the total population in any other developed country (Population Reference Bureau 2021) and twice or more the current average of *Jewish* children among women in most Diaspora Jewish communities (sometimes called the *effective Jewish fertility rate*). This reflects not only the large family size of the more religious Jewish population component, but also a diffused and persistent desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially among the upwardly mobile (DellaPergola 2009c, 2009d, 2015b). A moderately positive international migration balance also helps keeping Israel's Jewish population increase. Information on religion is mandatory in official population data regularly collected through the permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Population and Migration Authority) and published by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).

Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, arrivals to the country including immigrants, departures from the country including emigrants, and changes of religion). In the case of Jews and Judaism, the defining concept is a combination of religion and ethnicity according to rabbinic law (*Halakhah*). At the beginning of 2021, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 6,870,900, as against 6,773,400 in 2020, excluding people who had been missing from the country for one year or more. These figures refer to all Jews who live within Israel's internationally recognized boundaries, in East Jerusalem, on the Golan Heights, and in the West Bank. The core population combined with the addition of 464,800 *Others*—non-Jewish members of households who immigrated under the Law of Return and their Israel-born children—formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 7,335,700 in 2021, of which these *Others* constituted 6.3% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). We assume about half of the members of Jewish households who are not recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate have one Jewish parent. The *Jewish parent* population of Israel is thus estimated at 7,103,300 for 2021.

For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2020, 129,860 Jewish births and 40,369 Jewish deaths produced a net natural increase of 89,491 Jews. This represented 87% of Israel Jews' total growth in 2020. **Fig. 8.7** demonstrates the changes in birth rates and death rates for Jews and Muslims in Israel between 1955 and 2020. The two birth rate lines in a sense mirror each other, with periodical increases and periodical decreases. A major adjustment toward lower natality occurred among Israel's Muslims since the end of the 1990s, accompanied by some increase among Jews. Besides different fertility levels, this largely reflected differences and changes in age compositions and age at marriage of the respective populations (Staetsky 2019a). Death rates tended to be low and decreasing among both populations, but most of the time they were lower

among Muslims due to their much younger age composition. For example, in 2020 the overall birthrate of Jews and others was 18.5 per 1000 population (19.0 for Jews only), versus 21.8 per 1000 for all Arab and other Muslims, Christians, and Druze (23.1 for Muslims only). The death rate was 5.8 per 1000 Jews and others (5.9 for Jews only), versus 3.2 per 1000 for Arabs and others (3.0 for Muslims only). Such differences significantly affected the respective rates of natural increase: 12.7 per 1000 Jews and others (13.1 for Jews only) versus 18.6 per 1000 Arabs and others (20.1 for Muslims only). The consequence—as demonstrated in **Fig. 8.7** particularly for Jews and Muslims—was that in 2020 the Arab population continued to grow at a rate higher by more than 0.5% than the Jewish population.

ABOUT HERE Fig. 8.7

Regarding the whole complex of components of population change, in 2020, of a total of 21,000 new immigrants and immigrant citizens—Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time—arrived in Israel. Of these, 13,000 were Jewish. This means that 8,000 (38%) were not recorded as Jewish. The net balance of Jewish migrants was 11,200 also comprising Jewish Israelis leaving the country and returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad. Therefore, an estimated 1,800 Jews (13,000 - 11,200) joined the pool of those who reside abroad permanently or in the long term. This is a singularly low figure, probably related to the traveling restrictions imposed by the corona epidemics. The total number of Israelis—Jews and non-Jews—permanently residing abroad was estimated at 563,000 to 601,000 at the end of 2018 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2020). Regarding the Others (not classified by religion), in 2020 there were 7,900 immigrants, and the net migration balance was the same, implying a zero net balance between returning and leaving veteran Israeli residents recorded as Others. These data about Israel's international migration balance point to a moderate to low level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to extremely low levels of emigration in historical perspective. In 2020, the total number of new immigrants—*'olim hadashim*, Jewish and non-Jewish, not including immigrant citizens—diminished to 16,696, versus 33,096 in 2019 (see more below).

The number of converts to Judaism remained low and comprised only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants (Fisher 2013, 2015, 2019; Waxman 2013). In fact, the number of *Others* increased from 447,300 in 2020 to 464,800 (+3.9% as against a total Jewish population increase of 1.44%). Israel's Central Rabbinate pursued a rather rigid conversions policy and did not adopt past attempts to develop a unified conversion program that would consensually fit all denominations (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998-99; Nissim 2018). In 2020, the net balance of conversions to and from Judaism was nil (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual). The balance of passages to and from lacking religious status was minimally negative, -700. The beneficiaries were Islam (+600) and Christian denominations (+100). Some religious intermarriages probably stand behind these figures, although in Israel the levels of ethnoreligious marriage were overall quite low (DellaPergola 2017d).

8.4.1.2 Israel and Palestinian Territory

Turning now to the territorial aggregate of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza—WBG), **Table 8.9** reports the numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households *and* Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, as well as foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *Law of Return* definition) in each division is also shown. At the beginning of 2021, of a total 6,870,900 *core* Jews, 6,168,800 lived within Israel's pre-1967 borders; 232,400 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 23,900 on the Golan Heights; and 445,800 lived in the West Bank. The Jerusalem figure was revised in light or updated information (Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2021). Over the years, the pace of Jewish internal migration from Israel's main portion to the West Bank was significantly correlated with levels of unemployment and emigration

from Israel (DellaPergola 2021b). In 2020 for the first time the Jewish migration balance between the West Bank and the main country of Israel was negative: as against 36,000 new entries, 37,900 persons left (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual). There are today as many Jews in the West Bank as in France.

In 2021, *core* Jews represented 74.3% of Israel's total *legal* population of, 9,293,300 inclusive of 1,957,600 Arabs and others, but excluding 197,300 foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and asylum seekers (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly). On 1.1.2021, the 197,300 had diminished by nearly 10,000 versus the previous year, and comprised 98,188 legal foreign workers, 18,136 undocumented foreign workers, 48,600 tourists whose visas had expired, 1,909 refuge seekers, and 30,511 illegal entrants (Israel Population and Migration Authority 2021). Israel's *Law of Return* Jewish population of 7,335,700 in 2021 represented 78.9% of the State's total legal population. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, comprised 21.1% of the total legal population. As shown in **Table 8.9**, the *Law of Return* Jewish population represented 77.3% of total residents within pre-1967 borders (including foreign workers and refugees), 39.9% in East Jerusalem, 49.2% in the Golan Heights, and 14.5% of the West Bank's total population. Since 2005, no Jewish population remains in Gaza.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.9

Regarding the Palestinian population in WBG, in November 2017 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) undertook a new Census which enumerated 4,705,600 persons, of which 1,875,300 in Gaza and 2,830,300 in the West Bank—including 281,200 in East Jerusalem. The Census results were about 250,000 lower than the estimated projection of 4,952,168 available from the PCBS' web site (PCBS 2018). The PCBS Jerusalem's population estimate clearly was an undercount because of their limited access to the city (PCBS 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2018). This would imply an annual growth rate of 1.84% since 2007 in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and 2.84% in Gaza—as against 2.40% for Muslims in Israel (including East Jerusalem) during the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual). These growth rates were much lower than in the past and pointed to significant differentiation within the Arab/Palestine population. The total rate of growth of Israeli Jews was 1.44% in 2020 with immigration, and 1.31% without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in WBG was decreasing as well due to net emigration. According to Israel's IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria (2018), the total of Palestinians recorded in the West Bank population register surpassed 3 million, but this figure did not discount sufficiently for Palestinian residents permanently living abroad. Keeping in mind the data in **Fig. 8.8**, among the Arab population both birth rates and death rates probably continued to be somewhat higher in the Palestinian Territory than in Israel, and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. There was a minor internal migration flow from Gaza to the West Bank, estimated at 2,671 persons as of mid-2019 (Hass 2019), which continued in 2020. In the process, most Christian Palestinians had left Gaza because they felt persecuted (Casper 2020). Our adjusted population estimates for WGB at the beginning of 2021 is 4,668,900, of whom 2,688,900 in the West Bank and 1,980,000 in Gaza. These figures (always excluding East Jerusalem) are lower than the Palestinian census because they discount for persons, students and others, who actually resided abroad for more than one year. The Palestinian CBS displays further contradictory figures for 2020. One results from a population projection amounting at 5,101,100 within their own definition of the total Palestinian Territory (including Jerusalem), of which 3,053,100 in the West Bank, and 2,048,000 in Gaza. The other can be deducted by combining absolute numbers on births and deaths with the reported birth and death rates per 1000 population. This would give a total of 4,331,500, of which 2,851,200 in the West Bank and 1,480,300 in Gaza. Some of the gap may be due to under- or late reporting of vital events, but unquestionably some doubt remains about who is counted: the legal or the *de facto* resident population. Other much lower estimates of WBG population were suggested (e.g. Zimmerman et al. 2005a, 2005b; Feitelson 2013) but rather than ascertained demographic criteria they reflected political narratives (see also Miller 2015).

The Arab population of East Jerusalem (plus a few thousands in the Western neighborhood),

which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 366,900 at the beginning of 2021, and constituted 38.5% of Jerusalem's total population of 952,300 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Choshen et al. 2010 and 2012; Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies 2015; Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2016, 2020, 2021; DellaPergola 2008b). This was amazingly close, with a total error of 0.6%, to a population projection elaborated on behalf of the Jerusalem Municipality in the framework of Strategic Plan 2020 based on 1995 data (DellaPergola 2001b; DellaPergola and Rebhun 2003).

By summing the 1,957,600 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 4,668,900 estimated Palestinians in WBG, a total of 6,626,500 Arabs/Palestinians obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, versus a total enlarged Jewish population of 7,335,700. **Table 8.10** reports the percentage of Jews in column 7 (which is column 3 divided by column 6) according to the *core* and *Law of Return* definitions, out of the total population of the combined territory of Israel and Palestine. Such percent is conditional upon two factors: the definition of who is a Jew, and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment. Relative to this territorial grand total, we demonstrate the potential effect on the existence and size of a Jewish population majority when gradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab/Palestinian population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is gradual growth of the potential Jewish share of total population, along with hypothesized diminishing territorial and total population extents.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.10

A total combined Jewish, Arab, and other population of 14,159,500 lived in Israel and the Palestinian Territory (WBG) at the beginning of 2021, including foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees. The c*ore* Jewish population of 6,870,900 represented 48.5%% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel. Thus, by a rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, the extant Jewish majority not only is constantly decreasing but actually does not exist any longer among the broader aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between the Sea and the River (DellaPergola 2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2011a; Soffer and Bistrow 2004; Soffer 2015). If the 464,800 Others (non-Jewish members of Jewish households) are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *Law of Return* Jewish population of 7,335,700 represented 51.8% of the total population in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a narrow majority. If we subtract from the grand total the 197,300 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations rise to, respectively, 49.2% and 52.5% of the total population legally resident in Israel plus the Palestinian Territory estimated at 13,962,200 in 2021. After subtracting the population of Gaza, the percentages of Jews out of total rise to 57.3% (core) and 61.2% (Law of Return); if subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the Jewish percentages become 57.5% and 61.4%, respectively; if subtracting the Palestinian population of the West Bank, they become 74.1% and 79.2%, respectively; and if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem the percentages rise to 77.2% and 82.4%. Interestingly, the proponents of much lower Palestinian population estimates argue that the percent Jewish (Law of Return) out of the total population of Israel and West Bank combined is 65% (Ettinger 2019), versus our estimated 61.4%. A spirited and aggressive polemic has been extant for several years about a modest 3.6% difference. The reality is that under current demographic trends, the rate of erosion of the Jewish majority is about 0.1% per year. The same data are graphically presented in **Fig. 8.8**.

ABOUT HERE Fig. 8.8

8.4.2 The United States

8.4.2.1 General

In the **US**, in the absence of official census documentation, Jewish population estimates must rely on alternative sources. These are now quite abundant, though of very unequal quality (Goldstein

1981, 1989, 1992; Perlmann 2007; DellaPergola 2013a; Sheskin 2015a). In 2020 the Pew Research Center in Washington, DC, undertook a follow-up study (Pew Research Center 2021) to the 2013 *Portrait of Jewish Americans* (Pew Research Center 2013). The following overview deals with incorporating the new evidence within the general context and main research issues of US Jewish demography.

The quest for US national Jewish population estimates relies on three major strategies:

The **first** strategy, including the two mentioned Pew studies, has been to carry out independent national Jewish population surveys. Since the end of World War II, several major national surveys were undertaken in the US. The Bureau of the Census' 1957 Current Population Survey CPS (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969) relied on a large sample of the total national population. National Jewish Population Studies (NJPS), sponsored by the roof organization of the North American Jewish Federations, specifically targeted national samples of Jews. Three NJPSs were conducted in 1970/1 (Massarik 1974; Lazerwitz 1978), 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991), and 2000/1 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). The earlier one relied on conglomerated Jewish organization lists and on canvassing randomly chosen areas; the two later ones were based on random digit dialing extracted from a broader screening of the total national population. The 1991 and 2008 American Religious Identity Surveys (ARIS) (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin and Keysar 2009) and the 2001 American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001), followed similar procedures. The 2013 and 2020 Pew surveys likewise screened a Jewish sample out of an initial broader national sample and reported a *net Jewish population* of 6.7 million and 7.5 million, respectively. The Pew initiatives should be praised in that they filled the void following the Federations' withdrawal from pursuing systematic Jewish population research. Numerous other national surveys included subsamples of Jews, but the latter were generally small and did not offer a sufficient basis for detailed analyses of Jewish population characteristics. For all purposes, the logic of working nationally to obtain a *national* population estimate is the same by which, since 1790, a national population census (and not a compilation of local or State statistics) was held in the US (US Bureau of the Census). Of the three research strategies, only this one was designed beforehand to determine a nationwide Jewish population estimate. The 2020 Pew results are evaluated below in some detail.

The **second** strategy (see Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume), since the beginnings of US Jewish population studies at turn of the 19th century (*The American Jewish Year Book* 1899, Linfield 1942, Robison 1943), has been to construct a national total from a compilation of existing local Jewish population estimates, and previously the US Censuses of Religious Bodies (Schwartz et al. 2002). Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin and Dashefsky evaluated the US Jewish population at 7.3 million (see Chapter 6 in this volume). While local Jewish community studies still are the most important tool for local Jewish community planning, the methodology of summing local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves conceded (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010, 2017; Sheskin 2008, 2009). Among the main shortcomings are the diversity of databases and definitions, the lack of synchronization in time, and the very uneven quality of the technical procedures followed, including sometimes embarrassing skill gaps across different polling firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates, which as noted local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community summations may risk cumulating significant errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006, Groeneman and Smith 2009). Combined use of these local databases can provide valuable grounds for comparisons and in-depth multivariate analysis (Hartman and Sheskin 2012; Hartman et al. 2017).

The **third** more recent strategy has been to construct a national total through a combined analysis of a pool of national and local surveys periodically undertaken by public and private bodies, each of which include a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Such combined analysis of a large set of general social surveys stands behind the American Jewish Population Project AJPP and represents an innovative and ambitious project conducted at Brandeis' Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) (Saxe et al. 2006b; Tighe et al. 2005, 2009a, 2009b). Jewish population estimates suggested by AJPP, based on a synthesis of surveys conducted between 2012 and 2019

and additional inference, stood at 7.6 million in 2020, plus or minus a margin of error of over 300,000 (SSRI 2019a, 2019b; Saxe 2019; Tighe et al. 2019). Among several caveats concerning the AJPP, probably the most important is that it attempts to estimate Jewish populations based on surveys which include a *Jewish* category as one option in a question on religious identity (Magidin de Kramer et al. 2018; Hackett 2014). A quota of Jews of no religion is then factored in, which must come from other sources or from speculation. In the AJPP analysis, such unknown additional Jewish population was assessed based on the proportion of Jews of no religion in the 2013 Pew national survey. The AJPP estimate, while claiming independence and not necessarily accepting the reliability of national surveys like Pew's, built its own models of the proportion of persons of Jewish origin who declare not to have a religion borrowing the percentages from the same Pew survey (or from a contemporaneous local Jewish population study if available). But at the same time the same research persuasively demonstrated that the percent of persons declaring themselves as Jews of no religion clearly depended on who was the sponsor of a given research project (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). If it was a Jewish organization the proportion escaping a straightforward Jewish self-definition was higher than if it was a government, local authority, or general social survey. The Pew is indeed a general research organization but its national Jewish population surveys can be clearly identified by respondents as *Jewish-oriented*, with all the consequent biases. Moreover, AJPP Jewish population estimates at the county level are obtained through a logistic regression model that predicts the likelihood an adult identifies as Jewish when asked about religion based on other personal characteristics. Factors involved in weighting the model include geographic distribution, sex, age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment. The model is fit using Bayesian multilevel estimation with post-stratification (BMP) (SSRI 2019c). In other words, in many cases Jewishness of an individual is not determined by a direct investigation of the personal religious or otherwise cultural identity of the interviewees and instead reflects a blind statistical iteration based on predetermined assumptions whose margin of error can be substantial. This contradicts a basic tenet in the social scientific study of Jewry that characteristics of Jews and possible differences between Jews and others should be estimated empirically and not attributed a priori based on hypotheses. Even if the *Jews by religion* estimates were accurate, the further attempt to extrapolate the "real" number of Jews from sources that only deal with religion—instead of directly ascertaining the complex nature of Jewish identification—is at best speculative.

8.4.2.2 The 2020 Pew study

With fair disclosure, the 2020 Pew report affirmed that the 2020 data were not really comparable with the 2013 results, because they reflected a different concept and methodology in data collection and weighting, and a different Jewish population definition. Over the seven years between the two surveys one did not expect dramatic differences, and in fact the 2020 overall Pew picture portrayed stability versus the previous survey. Since American Jewry pertains not only to America, but also to a much broader transnational Jewish entity, it should comply with comparable definitional criteria.

The 2020 Pew reported a *net Jewish population* estimate of 7.5 million Jews—800,000 more than in 2013. Before addressing the substantive results, we shall give a look at the methodology of the survey. In 2013 the survey was conducted by telephone, but sharply declining phone response rates (Keeter et al. 2017) suggested a different path. The 2020 data were collected through an Address Based Survey (ABS) involving internet contacts supplemented by mail questionnaires. In 2020, postcards were sent to a national sample of postal addresses with an invitation to fill a questionnaire via the internet or to return it via mail. Each survey mode has advantages and disadvantages. Answering the phone involves a lot of selective bias according to whether or not the telephone number is active and who will answer the call or not. The same degree of incertitude exists regarding materials sent to a postal address: the address may be wrong or not inhabited, and if the addressee exists he/she may ignore the invitation. There is however a difference between telephone and internet/postal surveys. In the former case when a contact has been established, the interviewer has some control over the situation. In the latter case communication is blind and the interviewer does not know what is happening with the respondent. Answering the telephone does not involve much additional skills. Clicking the web and/or carrying an envelope to the nearest

postbox involves much more selective bias in terms of the respondents' technical skills and personal initiative. The extent and direction of this particular bias cannot be assessed, unless the investigating body pursues more actively its target, for example by directly contacting a subsample of non-respondents, and by thus being in control of the process in order to weigh the data accordingly. But this procedure was not implemented this time. **Table 8.11** describes the different stages of the Pew 2020 survey and the distribution of answers via the web and via the regular mail.

About here Table 8.11

The initial national screening survey yielded 68,398 answers at a response rate of 20.1%—better than the expected response rate to telephone surveys. Out of these, a subsample of 5,881 completed the final survey, at a response rate of 82.4%. Combining the rate of success with these two data collection stages provided the effective final response rate of 16.6%.

The general framework used to establish a plausible geographical distribution scheme of the initial postcards inviting to participate in the Pew survey logically focused more on areas with expectedly higher Jewish residential concentrations. Such initial geographical scheme relied on Jewish population distribution estimates supplied by AJPP. It is not entirely surprising, then, if the Pew *net Jewish population* ended up coinciding approximately with the AJPP estimates.

Here the question of representativity of the survey cannot be eluded. As noted, telephone surveys cannot easily adjudicate whether non-response depends on non-connected or non-functioning telephones or on refusals to pick up the phone. In 2020 much depended on the reliability of postal addresses, about which one can raise serious doubts in a country like the US with an overwhelming frequency of residential mobility. The proportion answering by regular mail was not negligible, ranging around one fourth of all effective contacts, but the question of the amount of initiative required of the respondents to participate in the survey via the web cannot be easily dismissed. The problem is that national coverage through the internet is lower than through the telephone. In 2020, 86% of the total U.S. population could access the internet from anywhere via any device (Google 2021). This left 14% of the total population and an unknown—but probably much lower—share of Jews among them out of the possibility to respond via the web.

As clearly noted in the 2020 US presidential elections, internet surveys tend to over-represent medium-high social classes, which is where Jews are highly concentrated. Joe Biden beat Donald Trump indeed, but he was significantly overstated in most pre-election surveys. Jews (most of whom identified with Biden) were abundantly part of that bias. Jews are probably over-represented in general sample surveys because of their higher socioeconomic status and educational attainment, and their relatively lower presence among people difficult to cover like the homeless, those without a functioning telephone or Internet connection, convicts in jails and other institutions, or otherwise unreachable or unable to answer a written questionnaire or a voice interview. By projecting the percent of Jews out of the total population which also includes those uncovered sections, inflated Jewish estimates obtain. In the end, what we have with the Pew 2020 survey is not really a random sample of American Jews, though probably quite better than an ordinary convenience sample (Staetsky 2018).

The existence of such different self-selection biases by response mode were demonstrated through a very useful and innovative experiment acted by the Pew Research Center in 2020. Supplementary answers were collected using in part the older (phone) and in part the newer (web plus mail) survey method. These answers were not included in the main data processing but were reported in an appendix to the main report (Pew Research Center 2021, 239-247). This experiment was a landmark contribution of the 2020 Pew to elucidating both survey methods and the socio-demography of Jewish Americans. The web plus mail 2020 returns indeed brought-in younger, less affiliated, more distant fringes of a more broadly defined Jewish population and community. The phone method generated more elderly, more Orthodox (not unexpectedly considering the reluctance of some Orthodox circles to access the internet), more affiliated Jews, and a less extended population. Some of the differences between the 2013 and 2020 findings are an artifact of the different data collection methods implemented on the two occasions.

Another major change between 2013 and 2020 was the target (Jewish) population definition. In 2013 Pew estimated a 6.7 million *net Jewish population*, including the main option of Jews by religion, as well as Jews without religion, which in turn could be divided between self-identifying Jews and *partially Jewish*. The latter were assessed at 1 million, including adults and children, and could be classified separately from the *core Jewish population* which assumes a mutually exclusive Jewish identity. The 2020 Pew *net Jewish population* was set at 7.5 million, but Jews without religion could not be partitioned between self-identifying Jews and *partially Jewish* as in 2013. The survey definition included all those who still consider themselves Jewish in any way (such as ethnically, culturally or because of their *family background*). Such wider and more flexible definition, but especially the *background* concept covers a broadly *enlarged* Jewish population beyond the *core* concept of individually identified Jews (for an earlier anticipation of the same approach, see Tobin and Groeneman 2003).

In the case of the 2020 survey, in the absence of a clear traceability of self-assessed *partly Jewish*, an alternative (provisional) operational criterion had to be estimated to ensure data comparability with the 2013 data. A 6 million *core Jewish population* estimate in 2013 (versus 5.7 million in 2013—see Lipka 2013; DellaPergola 2015b) was obtained by adding the total of Jews by religion and all those Jews of no religion who had two Jewish parents (see **Table 8.12**).

About here Table 8.12

The number of Jewish adults by religion resulted the same in 2013 and in 2020: 4.2 million—a sign of stability. Jewish children by religion grew by 200,000, to 1.1 m. Adult Jews without religion increased by half a million from 1.1 to 1.6 m.; and children without religion grew by 100,000, to 500,000, after some apportionment to the next category of Jewish background of those holding more than one religion. Jews with no religion and only one Jewish parent in 2020 were apportioned at 1.5 million (1 m. adults and 500,000 children), representing the conceptual equivalent of the 1 m. partly Jewish in 2013 (600,000 adults and 400,000 children).

The apparent total *net Jewish population* increase of nearly 800,000 over a 7-year period between 2013 and 2020, of which 500,000 adults and 300,000 children, had to result mostly from different population definitions, besides the already noted survey method effects. Furthermore, the 3.9 m. non-Jews of Jewish background in 2013 (2.4 m. adults and 1.5 m. children) apparently grew to 4.2 m. in 2020 (2.8 m. adults and 1.4 m. children), but there is one more difference between the two surveys. In 2013 of the 2.4 m. adults with a Jewish background, about one third had at least one Jewish parent. In 2020, all of the 2.8 m. adults with Jewish background were reported as having a Jewish parent or as having been raised as Jews. Of these, 1.5 m. reported some connection with Judaism and 1.3 m. did not. At face value, these persons of Jewish background derived from a Jewish population that had to amount at about 8-9 million at an earlier date. Besides the implicit enormous rate of attrition, such numbers hardly stand to reason. Finally, 1.4 m. persons with Jewish affinity in 2013 (1.2 m. adults plus an estimated additional 200,000 children) grew to 1.7 m. in 2020 (1.4 m. adults plus an estimated additional 300,000 children). The grand total of all those covered by the Pew surveys, Jewish and non-Jewish, amounted to an estimated 12 m. in 2013 and 13.4 m. in 2020, which can be considered a rough equivalent of the *Law of Return population*.

Fig. 8.9 provides a graphical comparison of the two Pew surveys by the definitional criteria outlined here, showing the gradual and expanding transitions from the *core Jewish population*, to the *net Jewish population*, to an *extended Jewish parents population*, and finally to an even more distant *affinity* linkage.

About here Fig 8.9

To better understand the unfolding of the demographic and identificational processes that stand behind these gradual transformations, some supplemental analysis is needed, as illustrated in the following **Fig. 8.10** and **Tables 8.13** and **8.14**. One important issue is the Jewish identificational background of the persons who define themselves as Jews of no religion. Age-wise, out of all Jews

of no religion the proportion of those with two Jewish parents steadily declined from 84% among those 65 or older to 17% among those in the 18-29 age cohort. The same trend plausibly continued among children under 18 (see **Fig. 8.10**). In other words, a substantial transformation occurred in the nature of Jews of no-religion, from a relatively small group of people probably motivated by secular norms and attitudes, into the natural outcome of intermarried couples (see also Phillips 2018).

About here Fig. 8.10

The same trend is confirmed by observing the current marriage patterns among younger Jewish adult cohorts in the US, which are those likely to give birth to the next generation. **Table 8.13** shows the population distribution respectively of Jews by religion and of no religion, by sex, age and marital status for the central ages of family formation and reproduction (18-59). In the first place, within each sex and age cohort, the proportions never married are significantly higher among Jews of no religion than among Jews by religion. Moreover, among those ever-married, the proportions of those married with a non-Jewish spouse are fairly high among the younger adults who are Jews by religion. But those percentages are much higher among Jews of no religion. Consequently, among the total cohorts of Jews of no religion the proportions of those who are both married *and* with a Jewish partner tend to reach extremely low values, between 1% and 12% among men, and between 2% and 4% among women aged 18-59. This predicts an extremely low share of children who will be raised within a recognizably Jewish cultural framework. The operational choice to include many of these among the *partly Jewish* and not within the *core Jewish population* seems therefore highly justifiable.

About here Table 8.13

Table 8.14 further represents the distributions of children by different modes of Jewish or non-Jewish family socialization. Again, the impact of Jews of no religion, and by implication of the *partly Jewish* on the younger part of the Jewish population age pyramid, appears to be very scant. The dominant share of Jewish generational reproduction appears to come from families identifying as Jewish by religion, with 75% of children raised exclusively Jewish by religion and 5% raised as Jews on no religion, with 20% raised differently. Among Jews of no religion, 3% of all children are raised as Jews by religion and 37% as Jews of no religion, with 60% raised differently.

About here Table 8.14

One should concede the somewhat speculative nature of these estimates, given the possibility that when growing up these children will adopt a different and more (or less) engaged Jewish outlook. On the other hand, one should also expose the fallacy of Judaism intended as a religion in the elaboration of population estimates. The widespread assumption seems to be that all American *Jews by religion* have a religion, and therefore those Jews who are secular or agnostic must be found outside the initial definitional framework (the *Jews of no religion*). In reality, the majority of Jews *by religion* actually *do not profess a Jewish religion* and rather hold quite a secular outlook. According to the 2020 Pew survey, 53% of *Jews by religion* said religion is not important to them (versus 91% of Jews of no religion). Less than half of *Jews by religion* (43%) said *being Jewish is about religion*, and 74% of *Jews by religion* do not think religious faith provides them a great deal of meaning or fulfillment. This is not to say that Jews less concerned with religion are less Jewish. The point is that since so many *Jews by religion* in reality *do not profess a Jewish religion*, most of the Jewish seculars are already in. The additional quest for *Jews of no religion* is, in reality, an effort to incorporate many who lack the bravery (or interest) to concede they are *just Jewish*.

8.4.2.3 Plausibility analysis

Jewish population estimates should not only take at face value the available sources (JPPI 2021). To reach more robust conclusions one needs to rely on reasoning and empirical evidence grounded on demographic concepts and research techniques (discussed above and elsewhere in greater detail, see DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2011a, 2012, 2013a, 2014a, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2015b). A meticulous effort should be deployed to coherently link the various independent estimates by considering the intervening factors of population change between one and another point in time. Jews are not like carrots or maize where on a given year the yield was scant, and on a different year you report a good crop. A population, and more cogently a community, results from continuous changes reflecting individual and collective history and societal change. Serious attempts to monitor Jewish population size over time at the national level require a reliable baseline figure and updates based on solid empirical research. One needs to bridge across several different national estimates available over the years by assessing intervening demographic changes: births and deaths, incoming and outgoing international migration, and identification changes such as accessions to and secessions from identifying as Jewish. This is the context within which we should read and evaluate the 2020 Pew data.

In the US the 1990 National Jewish Population Study is usually accepted as a solid and reliable source which provided a national core Jewish population estimate slightly above 5.5 million. Monitoring subsequent Jewish population changes, including immigration, led to an estimated 5.7 million for 2000. The 2000/1 NJPS indicated a much lower estimate around 5.2 million. This prompted a downward revision of over 400,000, but critics (led by Kadushin et al. 2005) argued that the study had missed a significant share of the target population. Some upward adjustment of the lowered estimate was indeed suggested (DellaPergola 2013b), but in the light of the 2020 Pew it appears it was insufficient, making it unavoidable to acknowledge that the original 5.7 million estimate for 2000 was plausible, and the 2000/1 NJPS had missed more people than originally thought. Regarding the subsequent period, in order to support the new 6 million *core Jewish population* estimate for 2020 one needs to bridge the 300,000 increase versus the restored figure for 2000, establishing along the way a reasonable intermediate estimate for 2013. Some Jewish population increase most plausibly occurred but it would be inappropriate to represent growth by a straight line. Furthermore, the question is how plausibly the Pew 6.7 million *net Jewish population* in 2013 could become 7.5 million in 2020.

The suggested more realistic estimate of the US *core Jewish population* US at 6 million—an increase over the 2013 survey—calls for a retroactive upward revision of previous estimates. **Fig. 8.11** demonstrates a reconstruction of US Jewish population estimates as originally published in the annual AJYB's World Jewish population overview, as well as the suggested path followed to connect the new estimate of 6 million core Jews to the existing body of previous estimates. **Fig. 8.11** also shows the pace of growth of the total US population. By this reconstruction, the *core Jewish population* in 2013 would have been 5.9 million, higher than previously estimated but within the limits of the statistical variability that accompanies all sample surveys, old and new, and creates a margin above or below the expressed central value.

About here Fig. 8.11

Several hypotheses about recent US Jewish population growth have been suggested and should be shortly reconsidered:

(a) *Increase of the share and visibility of the Orthodox*: comparing the absolute numbers of *net Jewish population* adults between 2013 and 2020 shows the following distribution by denominations: Orthodox, -8,000; Conservative, +32,000; Reform, +296,000; Other, -86,000; None, +266,000. As such this hypothesis does not hold, although there may be little doubt about some increasing impact of the Orthodox denomination in the allocation of Jewish children (DellaPergola and Rebhun 1998-9; Keysar and DellaPergola 2019; Pinker 2021);

(b) *Continuing immigration*: comparing the Pew absolute numbers of foreign-born we find 938,000 in 2013 versus 750,000 in 2020. The enlarged total including the foreign-born and the US-born

with foreign-born parents shrank from 2.9 million in 2013 to 2.4 million in 2020. This hypothesis falls, pointing if anything to some survey under-coverage;

(c) *Echo effects of the baby boom*: the remarkable increase in fertility and birth rates that occurred after World War II was followed by a period of fertility decline (DellaPergola 1980). This created an alternance of large and scant cohorts of young adults who in turn had children and created a first, and probably also a second echo effect. These fluctuations in the pace of Jewish population growth have become weaker over time, and they have been scaled somewhat differently than among the total US population because of a longer generation span among Jews related to higher age at marriage and postponement of childbearing. But it is not implausible that this is what may have occurred between 2000 and 2020. Such suggested reconstruction also signals the end of growth for the US core Jewish population;

(d) *Higher incorporation of children of intermarriage*: it is remarkable how all past attempts to project the future of the American Jewish population predicted an end of growth followed by slow gradual decline. Various authors set the expected inflection points at different dates: in 1990 (Schmelz 1981), 2000 (DellaPergola and Rebhun 1998-9; DellaPergola et al. 2000), 2002 (Goujon et al. 2012), 2005 (Rebhun et al.), 2010 (DellaPergola 2013b; Pew Research Center 2015a), 2020 (Klaff 1998), and 2023 (Pinker 2021). Such broad consensus reflects the marked population aging of American Jews following prolonged years of low fertility and the non-incorporation of a majority of the children of intermarriage. Aging produces higher death rates, but the Jewish death rate in the US is one of the least investigated topics in Jewish demographic research and it would be a fair priority to try to assess it empirically. The noted postponement of the expected end of growth possibly reflects the lengthening of generations but also a gradually increasing proportion of incorporation of children of intermarriage within the Jewish context, as actually demonstrated by the 2013 and 2020 Pew surveys;

(e) *Shifts in lifetime religious preferences*: it should also be stressed that in American society changes of religion are comparatively more frequent than in other countries. Repeated surveys found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose membership, while Evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the *religiously undefined* (none and not reported) tended to gain (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin et al. 2001; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008; Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Smith 2009; Pew Research Center 2015a; Rebhun 2016). By the Pew 2013 survey, total secessions from Judaism were double the number of accessions; and by the 2015 Pew survey of the US religious landscape, the net balance of changes of religion resulted in a total lifetime loss of 600,000 persons for the Jewish side (Pew Research Center 2015b). In 2020, 90% of Americans raised Jewish by religion and 76% of those raised as Jews of no religion had remained Jewish (Pew Research Center 2021). This confirmed the previous impression of a losing balance.

All in all, it should be remembered that each of the existing sources about American Jewish demography is imperfect, but they do amount to an impressively coherent body of evidence. Beginning with historical assessment (Rosenwaike 1980), the various data sets fit well one with another when performing forward-backward Jewish population projections. High consistency also appears when checking through various sources the profile of the same birth-cohort regarding international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions to and from Judaism (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983 and 1988; DellaPergola et al. 1999, 2000; DellaPergola 2005, 2013a; Perlmann 2007).

Accordingly, the evidence about the recent and current demographic growth of American Jewry should be followed with some skepticism. An increase of 800,000 between 2013 and 2020, as per the Pew *net Jewish population*, would signify a percent growth of 12% over 7 years, as against a 5% growth among the total US population which absorbed large numbers of international migrants (legal and illegal) and whose fertility rate was higher than that of Jews, in spite of a most recent significant slowing down. As to the 30 years since 1990, the Pew's 2020 *net Jewish population* should have grown by 2 million, again faster than the total U.S. population (36% vs. 32%). That is extremely implausible demographically, which should definitely orient the explanation of the increased Pew figures in the direction of changing and expanding definitions.

Unlike the normative framework of Jewish law, the empirical concept of a binary Jewish/non-Jewish partition does not reflect any longer a verifiable social reality, especially so in the United States. Numerous intermediate nuances are observable with significant cutting points which should not be ignored. Where one places those cutting points not only affects the subsequent narratives, but actually directly derives from those narratives (Kaufman 2014). The Pew *net* definition, especially in the case of children, included persons lacking any attachment or interest about being Jewish. If Jewishness becomes a property that once acquired can never be lost, this contradicts the tenets of sociology and demography, neither of which follows a deterministic approach, seeking instead to ascertain facts empirically. Substantively, one had better consider the Jews as *a socially meaningful collective* rather than *a random aggregate of people with an indelibly ascribed trait*.

The 2020 Pew study, likewise its 2013 predecessor and the NJPSs of a previous generation, constituted a serious contribution to Jewish population research. It enriched the possibility for tracing trends, outlining differences, discovering patterns, or disproving existing conceptions. It should be noted that biases in determining the size of groups do not affect to the same extent the distribution of characteristics and opinions among those included. The Pew surveys are, therefore, more useful in assessing a Jewish population profile than its size. The database should be intensively exploited for in-depth analysis and as a background for policy recommendations, keeping in mind that whatever reservations there might be regarding the outer framework of population size estimates, the intimate relationships and interactions between variables tend to be much more robust and reliable.

The major message in 2020 was that Jews in the United States are a stable and solid lot. Their position as a strong and proud component of American society and the fundamentals of their beliefs and behaviors, individual and collective, are coherent and persisting. For example, Holocaust memory along with love for ethics and social justice are far more salient than belief in God (Pew Research Center 2021). This is of great importance in assessing the role of religion as a defining criterion of American Jewish identity. But no less important is the fact that exactly the same value hierarchy appeared in all major Jewish communities worldwide, in Western and Eastern Europe, in Latin America, in Australia, in South Africa, and remarkably in Israel (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2021) underscoring the transnational character of Jewish peoplehood. See Chapter 6 in this volume for more information about American Jewry.

8.5 Major Cities and Metropolitan Areas

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for Jews to live in major metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas, too, Jews often manifested unique propensities to settle or resettle in specific neighborhoods that were more compatible with their socioeconomic status, and/or more attractive to them because of the vicinity of employment or Jewish community facilities (DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015). Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions of urban areas vary by country. The urban areas reported in **Table 8.15** for the US are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), whereas in previous years we reported data for larger Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSAs). Similar changes in the definition of Metropolitan areas affected some of the data for Israel.

ABOUT HERE TABLE 8.15

It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jewish populations in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. Regarding the US Metropolitan areas (MSAs) we use here the data reported in Chapter 6 of this volume. Sheskin and Dashefsky rely mostly on the estimates resulting from definitions used by the local Jewish federations. This often results in

what we define as an extended aggregate of persons currently Jewish, born or raised Jewish—or in other words a population with Jewish parents (PJP)—although in most instances not one that includes non-Jewish members of Jewish households. Their estimates, along with those for other locales not reported here, suggest a total US Jewish population of 7,266,140, as against our *core Jewish population* estimate of 6.0 million and a *net Jewish population* of 7.5 million according to the Pew 2020 definition. To create a more comparable database, we adopted here an extended definition—substantially similar to the Pew *net Jewish population*—of Jews residing in metropolitan areas out of the US as well. For metropolitan areas in Israel, the data refer to an enlarged Jewish population (EJP) including non-Jewish household members. Referring to a broader Jewish population definition raises the number and percent of Jews out of the total local population, but at the same time lowers the proportion in the selected metropolitan areas out the total world Jewish population. This has to be kept in mind when comparing the 2021 estimates with those for earlier years.

Moreover, unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on major urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. Especially in the US, the differences may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. The respective estimates of part-year residents were mostly included in the estimates in **Table 8.15**. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and some may even commute monthly or weekly (Pupko 2013). The case of Israelis regularly commuting abroad for work has also become more frequent.

Beyond any doubts, Jewish populations globally are overwhelmingly concentrated in large urban areas. In 2021, more than half (51.2%) of world Jewry (as defined above) lived in only ten metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). These ten areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York-Newark-Jersey City, Jerusalem, Haifa, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, Paris, Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, and Chicago-Naperville-Elgin (**Table 8.15**). Over 60% of an admittedly rough estimate of family enlarged world Jewry lived in the ten previously mentioned largest areas plus another nine with at least 100,000 members of Jewish households: Boston-Cambridge-Newton, Be'er Sheva, San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, London, Buenos Aires, Toronto, Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta, Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, and San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad.

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and approaching 3.9 million Jews by the *enlarged* definition, largely exceeded that in the New York MSA, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.1 million Jews. Of the 19 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, eleven were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, and Argentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being national or regional capitals, enjoying higher standards of living, with highly developed infrastructures for higher education and hi-tech, and widespread transnational connections. The Tel Aviv area also featured the highest percent of (enlarged) Jews among the total population (94.8%), followed at a distance by Jerusalem (72.3%), Haifa (73.1%), and Beersheba (60.4%), the balance mostly being Israeli Arabs. In the rest of the world, the highest percent of Jews in a metropolitan area was in New York (10.8%), followed by Miami-Fort Lauderdale (8.3%), Philadelphia (6.9%), San Francisco (5.1%), Washington and Los Angeles (4.7% each), Toronto (4.5%), and Baltimore (4.2%).

8.6 Major Determinants of Demographic Change

The changes in the size and composition of Jewish populations outlined above reflect a chain of interrelated factors each of which in turn depends on a complex array of explanatory determinants. We briefly review here only two of these factors—Jewish international migration, and some possible

effects of the covid-19 epidemics on Jewish births and deaths. Both these factors operated differently in each country. Their different developments affected in singular ways the Jewish population in Israel, and ultimately produced a significantly slower growth as compared to previous years.

8.6.1 International Migration

Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migration of Jews is quite imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants as such by single country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of the respective migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit et al. 2010). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2017; Eurostat 2015). Jewish organizations, like HIAS—formerly the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS 2013) in the US or the Zentralwohlfhartsstelle (annual) in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on a yearly basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.

Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948 and 1968, and about 60% between 1969 and 2015 (Amit and DellaPergola 2016). Clearly migration, or rather a migration balance producing a net surplus to Israel, reduced the population of the Diaspora and increased the Jewish population of Israel. Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the FSU opened its doors to emigration at the end of 1989. Of the estimated over 1.7 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2019 including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. The US lost weight as a destination for FSU migrants since the onset of the 21st century, and a decrease in the attractiveness of Germany occurred since 2005. These remarkable increases and decreases reflected the changing incidence of push factors not only in the FSU but in other regional realities as well during times of rapid geopolitical change and shifts in economic opportunities. Migration levels also reflected the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic options in the main countries of destination (DellaPergola 2020b). Indeed, Israeli immigration law (the Law of Return) allows for comparatively easier access and immediate citizenship to Jewish migrants and their families, especially after a new Citizenship law of 2017, but the integration difficulties experienced in Israel by some immigrants may have created a deterrent.

In recent years, the volume of Jewish migration was far from the peaks of the past, due to the increasing concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the rapidly decreasing Jewish population in the less developed countries from which most of Jewish emigration derived. We already noted the clearly negative relationship that prevails between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to stay or to emigrate. More recently, perceptions and experiences of mounting antisemitism or a violent and dangerous environment in some countries, particularly in France, Ukraine, Turkey, and Venezuela, stimulated Jewish emigration.

Table 8.16 shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2019 and 2020. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core Jewish population*, definition (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual, and unpublished data).

ABOUT HERE: TABLE 8.16

In 2020, 19,696 new immigrants arrived in Israel—a 50% decrease versus the previous year and the lowest since 2013. This positively reflected the traveling difficulties and restrictions related to the covid-19 epidemics. Immigrants came from 81 countries and territories, and their number compared with 30,096 in 2019, 28,118 in 2018, 26,333 in 2017, and 25,010 in 2016. In 2020, immigration to

Israel increased from Northern Africa, mostly reflecting small numbers of new immigrants from Ethiopia, as well as from Central and Southern America. There also was a minimal increase from the European Union, close to nil. All other world areas registered negative change, ranging between -6% in North America, and -55% in the European republics of the FSU. Migration toward other countries did not necessarily follow the same patterns of change, but was not expected to be significant.

The Russian Federation was still the main country of origin in 2020 with 6,632, but this represented a 58% decline versus the 15,753 immigrants of 2019 (and 10,474 in 2018). Similarly, immigration from Ukraine declined from 6,177 in 2019 to 2,921 in 2020, a reduction of 53%. Such sharp reduction may be interpreted, among other factors, as a reaction to more stringent rules adopted by Israel's Population and Migration Authority regarding renewal of Israeli citizenship to new immigrants after their first year since immigrating to the country. There is some evidence that, in the past, some people may have immigrated to Israel, taking up the new passport, and leaving shortly after. Immigration from the US declined from 2,471 in 2019 to 2,285 in 2020 (-8%). Immigration from France, after an all-time peak in 2015 (6,627), declined to 4,147 in 2016, 3,160 in 2017, 2,431 in 2018, 2,209 in 2019, and slightly increased to 2,394 in 2020 (+8%). No other country had more than 1,000 migrants to Israel. Among countries with more than 100 immigrants, small absolute increases occurred from Canada (+7%), Mexico (+31%), and Argentina (+33%), probably pointing to economic difficulties in the latter two countries as well as in some smaller ones in Latin America. In 2020 there were 187 immigrants from Ethiopia, versus only 41 in 2019, an increase of 356%. Other countries with at least 100 immigrants in 2020, including Brazil, the United Kingdom, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and South Africa, all recorded significant declines.

To these figures, one should add several thousand immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than many Western countries. This made Israel a reasonably attractive option for international migration until the end of 2019, but much less so in 2020 when unemployment rates skyrocketed due to the corona epidemics. Some of the difference between migration to Israel in 2019 and 2020 are summarized in **Fig. 8.12**.

ABOUT HERE Fig. 8.12

On the other hand, Jewish immigration to the US nearly stopped from the FSU but continued at moderate levels from other countries in Western Europe, Latin America, and, to some extent, other countries in the Middle East and South Africa. Israel—in part because of its small market and the limits this imposes upon employment opportunities—is today probably the main single supplier of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and to other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010; Rebhun et al. 2016, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2020). The evidence for Israelis in the US shows a significant reduction in the influx, largely compensated by returns to Israel (Gold and Phillips 1996, Gold 2002, Cohen 2009, Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010, Rebhun 2014, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). The number of Israel residents who were allowed lawful permanent resident status in the US was 4,324 in 2015, 4,652 in 2016, 4,227 in 2017, 4,009 in 2018, and 4,702 in 2019—a five-year average of 4,383 (US Department of Homeland Security 2017, 2019). Accounting for other Jewish migration to the US, and discounting for the about 2,000-2,500 yearly emigrants to Israel, an annual net migration into the US can be estimated at 5,000 Jews (or slightly more).

Levels of emigration from Israel are overall low, consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of human development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings confirm the primacy of socioeconomic determinants related to both the basic level of development of a country and its current economic situation, along with variations in the stringency of regulations about immigrant admissions. The effects of ideological, security, and fear-related factors such as antisemitism end up as weaker determinants of the volume and timing of Jewish immigration and emigration—namely to and from Israel (DellaPergola 2020b). In 2020, in the context of the covid-19, the level of emigration from Israel, reached a historical minimum.

8.6.2 Some effects of the covid-19 epidemics

In addition to its reducing effects on international migration, the covid-19 epidemics had visible effects on death rates and indirectly also on birth rates. Research on Jewish populations in several countries shows significant differences in the incidence of mortality among Jews in different environments. Regarding the first wave (March-May 2020), three main patterns were detected based on information supplied by local Jewish burial societies (Staetsky and Paltiel 2020). The first pattern involved a much higher incidence of the epidemics among Jews than among the surrounding general population. Regarding European Jewish communities, this was detected in the United Kingdom (London, Manchester, Scotland), Sweden (Stockholm), Italy (Milano), and Belgium (Brussels). A second pattern involved epidemics levels similar among Jews and the general population, such as in France (Paris, Strasbourg), the Netherlands (Amsterdam), Belgium (Antwerp), and Hungary (Budapest). The third pattern involved a relatively lower incidence of the epidemics among Jews, such as in Germany (various regions), Italy (Rome), Austria (Vienna). Similar variation occurred across the American continent with parts of the New York area more severely hit than other US regions, and different incidences in Argentina and Mexico. Remarkably, then, Jewish populations worldwide did not respond uniformly to the epidemics but were highly affected by factors that operated locally. This could involve the efficiency and diffusion of anti-virus inoculation, and the availability and efficiency of health structures. The observation recurred, though, that more closely knit Jewish religious communities were more affected than other sectors of the Jewish population. It also appeared that the negative economic incidence of the epidemics was much more sharply suffered by the lower socioeconomic strata among the Jewish population (Boyd et al. 2020).

More detailed data for Israel's total population (Jews and Arabs together) show the peaks and troughs of the epidemics as a factor of increased mortality, but also as a determinant in the possible postponement of births (see **Fig. 8.13**).

ABOUT HERE: Fig. 8.13

The first wave of the epidemics (March-May 2020) did not cause a visible increase in the monthly number of deaths. The second wave peaked in October 2020, followed by a third wave peak in January 2021. Data for July 2021 indicated the beginning of a fourth wave mostly affected by variant Delta. As to births, contrary to some speculation that it would increase as a consequence of the forced home isolation of millions of adults, they actually diminished. Decline was visible already in July 2020, reflecting pregnancies initiated toward the end of 2019 when the health, economic and psychological effects of the epidemics were still to come. The diminished numbers of births continued all over the second half of 2020 through February 2021. Interestingly, in March 2021 and the following months there was a visible birth increase which must have reflected the initial euphoria after the first wave of coronavirus had supposedly ended in June 2020. The possible consequences of the later waves of the epidemics on the birth rate can only be evaluated with later data, not yet available at the time of this writing.

All in all, the covid-19 epidemics caused a visible increase in the number of deaths, a decrease in the number of births, and a significant reduction in Israel's population natural increase. Along with diminished immigration, this slowed down the pace of Israel's population growth, as well as presumably among most Jewish communities globally.

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the American Jewish Year Book, then under the aegis of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), until 2008. Since 2010, our world Jewish population estimates appeared in the framework of the North American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish DataBank), and since 2012 within the renewed *American Jewish Year Book*. World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009 through January 1, 2011 were prepared for publication but not released in print. The interested reader may consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained (especially Schmelz 1981 and DellaPergola 2015a).

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Appendix

Mechanisms of population change

Jewish population change is determined by a known set of demographic factors which can increase or decrease the number of Jews in the world or in any given country over time. Formally, the fundamental demographic equation reads:

$$P(t) = P(t-1) + (B-D) + (I-E) + (A-S)$$

where: **P(t)** is the population size at any point in time, called **t**, and **P(t-1)** is the population size at a preceding point in time; **B** and **D** stand for the number of births and deaths, respectively, during the same period of time; **I** and **E** stand for immigration into and emigration from a given area by the given population; **A** and **S** stand for the numbers of accessions and secessions, i.e. conversions or other modes of identificational change, into and out of the Jewish community, respectively.

Unfortunately, the demographic data currently available on Jews in most countries of the world are not sufficient to translate this equation into accurate numbers. However there exist abundant and significant indications about the size and characteristics of the major demographic factors involved, and the respective directions of change.

Definitions

In most Diaspora countries, the ***core Jewish population*** (***CJP***—a concept initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews, *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps, but does *not* necessarily coincide, with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria (Jewish only, no religion). Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another identity, and those of Jewish origin who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted. The *core* population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources.

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings, which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

A major research issue of growing impact is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much-debated study—the 2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey-NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in the *core* Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. A further category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).

The 2013 Pew Research Center's A Portrait of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), adopted a new concept, the ***net Jewish population (NJP)***. The Pew survey included in the NJP not only those who responded to the **CJP** definition, but also the previously not empirically tested category of *partly Jewish*—people who stated they had no religion, and who by their own preference qualified their Jewish identity as part of a broader composite cluster of two or more sub-identities. The new and previously untested concept of the *partly Jewish* helped clarifying the socio-demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and the comparison of results between different survey more ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerned the status of the *partly Jewish* as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as different analysts would have it differently. The Pew report included the **partly Jewish** in the ***net Jewish population***. The present report did not include them in the ***core Jewish population***. Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, were included in some total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers including this writer suggested that the *partly Jewish* stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories of *Non-Jews with Jewish background*, or *Non-Jews feeling some Jewish affinity*. This latter assumption was fully supported by detailed data on the behaviors and attitudes of the partly Jewish as against the other components of the broadly enlarged Jewish population aggregate (DellaPergola 2014). In the Pew 2020 survey the category of partly Jewish was abandoned, and instead the broader criterion for inclusion in the **net Jewish population** was identifying as Jewish because of family background.

Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of ***total population with at least one Jewish parent*** (***PJP***) includes the core Jewish population plus anyone currently not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey, the total population with Jewish parents besides the core comprised two sub-groups: (a) persons who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish, and (b) persons who report not being Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013). In the Pew 2020 survey,

The ***enlarged Jewish population*** (***EJP***—a concept initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) further expands by including the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are *partly Jewish*; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish parent; and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most Jews who are identified in the Pew survey as *partly Jewish* or as *PJBs* who are not part of the US *core* Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of *multiple ethnicities,* naturally should be included under the *enlarged* definition. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and

live in exclusively non-Jewish households.

The ***Law of Return population (LRP)*** reflects Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants. Articles 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to *all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren,* as well as to *their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses*. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so-called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998 and 2018).The Law of Return awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return* (Gavison 2009), a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform) who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews with Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law itself does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities—but only for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the *Law of Return*. It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand their reach strategies to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions than to the *core* definition.

Presentation and quality of data

Jewish population estimates in this chapter refer to January 1, 2020. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence some margin of inaccuracy. Corrections also were applied retroactively to the 2019 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2020 estimates. Corrections of the 2020 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident core Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in the **Appendix Table** an estimate of:

1) mid-year 2019 Total Population (including both Jews and non-Jews) (Population Reference Bureau 2020);
2) the estimated January 1, 2020 core Jewish population (CJP);
3) the number of Jews per 1000 total population; and
4) an indicator of the type of source used to derive the Jewish population
5) a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate.
6) Rough estimates of the population with Jewish parents (PJP)
7) Rough estimates of the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of all non-Jewish members in a Jewish household (EJP)
8) Rough estimate of the Law of Return population (LRP).
9) The Core Jewish Population rank.

The rough estimates were derived from available information and assessments on the recent extent and generational depth of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective core Jewish populations, and the data should be taken as indicative only.

Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be better to indicate a range for the number of Jews (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counting. Wherever possible, we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents. (This is similar to the part-year resident, or "snowbird" issue in estimating the US Jewish population in Sheskin and Dashefsky, in this volume.)

Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. We report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of the sources used in this study. In the **Appendix Table** the main types of sources are indicated as follows:

(C) National population census. This in theory would be the best source, but undercounts and over counts do occur

in several countries which need to be evaluated.

(P) National population register. Some countries, besides the periodical census, also keep a permanent population register which is constantly updated through detailed accountancy of individual demographic events.

(S) Survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities, undertaken most often by a Jewish community organization, and sometimes by a public organization.

(J) Jewish community register kept by a central Jewish community organization.

(E) Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organization.

Our estimates reflect these sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily correspond exactly with those indicated in the given sources. When necessary, additional information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates. The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each country's Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the **Appendix Table**, as follows:

(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country during the intervening period.

(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening period.

(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.

(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

The year in which a country's base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtained is also stated as part of the accuracy rating. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2020 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola et al. 2000b; and author's current updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments that occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used findings from these projections to refine the 2020 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

HERE APPENDIX TABLE

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Table 8.1 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2021

Year	World Jewish Population			World Population		Jews per 1000 total population
	Original estimate[a]	Revised estimate[b]	Annual % change[c]	Total (millions)[d]	Annual % change	
1945, May 1	11,000,000	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,303,400	11,297,000	0.57	2,526	1.76	4.47
1960, Jan. 1	12,792,800	12,079,000	0.67	3,026	1.82	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	13,950,900	12,585,000	0.41	3,691	2.01	3.41
1980, Jan. 1	14,527,100	12,819,000	0.18	4,449	1.81	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,810,300	12,868,000	0.04	5,321	1.74	2.42
2000, Jan. 1	13,191,500	13,250,000	0.29	6,127	1.42	2.16
2005, Jan. 1	13,034,100	13,620,000	0.55	6,514	1.23	2.09
2010, Jan. 1	13,428,300	14,049,000	0.62	6,916	1.20	2.03
2015, Jan. 1	14,310,500	14,551,600	0.71	7,336	1.19	1.98
2020, Jan. 1	14,787,200	15,077,100	0.71	7,689	1.09	1.96
2021, Jan. 1	15,166,200		0.59	7,774	1.10	1.95

a As published in the *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some estimates reported here as of Jan. 1 were originally published as of Dec. 31 of the previous year

b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

c Based on revised estimates, except latest year

d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations Population Division (2020), Population Reference Bureau (2020)

Table 8.2 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2020 and 2021[a]

Region	2020 Revised[b]		2021		Percentage change 2020-2021	Jews per 1000 total population in 2021
	Estimate	Percent[c]	Estimate	Percent[c]		
World total	**15,077,100**	**100.0**	**15,166,200**	**100.0**	**0.59**	**1.95**
Diaspora	8,303,700	55.1	8,295,300	54.7	-0.10	1.07
US	5,995,000	39.8	6,000,000	39.6	0.08	18.19
Other	2,308,700	15.3	2,295,300	15.1	-0.58	0.31
Israel[d]	6,773,400	44.9	6,870,900	45.3	1.44	739.34
America, total	**6,757,900**	**44.8**	**6,761,300**	**44.6**	**0.05**	**6.63**
North[e]	6,388,100	42.4	6,393,600	42.2	0.09	17.36
Central, Caribbean	57,400	0.4	57,500	0.4	0.17	0.26
South	312,400	2.1	310,200	2.0	-0.70	0.72
Europe, total	**1,328,300**	**8.8**	**1,317,500**	**8.7**	**-0.81**	**1.58**
European Union[f]	788,700	5.2	785,600	5.2	-0.39	1.76
FSU[g]	209,400	1.4	201,900	1.3	-3.58	1.00
Other West, Balkans[h]	330,200	2.2	330,000	2.2	-0.06	1.80
Asia, total	**6,808,500**	**45.2**	**6,905,300**	**45.5**	**1.42**	**1.52**
Israel	6,773,400	44.9	6,870,900	45.3	1.44	739.34
FSU	14,800	0.1	14,200	0.1	-4.05	0.15
Other	20,300	0.1	20,200	0.1	-0.49	0.00
Africa, total	**56,800**	**0.4**	**56,500**	**0.4**	**-0.53**	**0.04**
Northern[i]	3,300	0.0	3,300	0.0	0.00	0.01
Sub-Saharan[j]	53,500	0.4	53,200	0.4	-0.56	0.05
Oceania[k]	**125,600**	**0.8**	**125,600**	**0.8**	**0.00**	**2.91**

a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2020. Source: United Nations Population Division (2020), Population Reference Bureau (2021)
b Compare with the original in DellaPergola (2021). The corrections reflecting newly available data are for the United States (+300,000), Argentina (-4000), Belarus (-1000), Latvia (-100)
c Minor discrepancies due to rounding
d Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
e US and Canada
f EU Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Not including the UK
g FSU excluding the Baltic countries. Asian parts of Russia included in Europe
h Including the UK. Asian parts of Turkey included in Europe
i Including Ethiopia
j Including South Africa and Zimbabwe
k Including Australia and New Zealand

Table 8.3 Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2021

Region	Core Jewish population[a] CJP	Population with Jewish parents[b] PJP	Enlarged Jewish population[c] EJP	Law of Return population[d] LRP	Difference LRP – CJP		Percent expansion LRP over CJP
					Number	Percent distribution[e]	
World total	**15,166,200**	**19,937,600**	**22,626,000**	**25,336,100**	**10,169,900**	**100.0**	**67**
Israel[f]	6,870,900	7,103,300	7,335,700	7,335,700	464,800	4.6	7
Diaspora, total	8,295,300	12,834,300	15,290,300	18,000,400	9,705,100	95.4	117
North America	6,393,600	10,250,200	12,050,300	14,100,400	7,706,800	75.8	121
Latin America	367,700	504,300	605,200	716,300	348,600	3.4	95
European Union[g]	785,600	1,011,000	1,273,100	1,517,700	732,100	7.2	93
FSU in Europe[g]	201,900	430,800	632,500	843,000	641,100	6.3	318
Rest of Europe[g]	330,000	378,000	425,000	472,100	142,100	1.4	43
FSU in Asia	14,200	25,700	37,100	50,500	36,300	0.4	256
Rest of Asia	20,200	23,900	28,400	32,400	12,200	0.1	60
Africa	56,500	71,700	83,900	97,100	40,600	0.4	72
Oceania	125,600	138,700	154,800	170,900	45,300	0.4	36

a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity

b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent

c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)

d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification

e The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included in the European Union. UK not included.

f Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

g The UK included in the Rest of Europe. The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics are included in the European Union

Table 8.4 25 Countries with core Jewish populations of 10,000 and more, 1/1/2021

Jewish population rank	Country	Core Jewish population	% of total Jewish Population			
			In the world		In the diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	Israel[a]	6,870,900	45.3	45.3	[b]	[b]
2	United States	6,000,000	39.6	84.9	72.3	72.3
3	France	446,000	2.9	87.8	5.4	77.7
4	Canada	393,500	2.6	90.4	4.7	82.5
5	United Kingdom	292,000	1.9	92.3	3.5	86.0
6	Argentina	175,000	1.2	93.5	2.1	88.1
7	Russia	150,000	1.0	94.5	1.8	89.9
8	Germany	118,000	0.8	95.2	1.4	91.3
9	Australia	118,000	0.8	96.0	1.4	92.7
10	Brazil	91,500	0.6	96.6	1.1	93.8
11	South Africa	52,000	0.3	97.0	0.6	94.5
12	Hungary	46,800	0.3	97.3	0.6	95.0
13	Ukraine	43,000	0.3	97.6	0.5	95.5
14	Mexico	40,000	0.3	97.8	0.5	96.0
15	Netherlands	29,700	0.2	98.0	0.4	96.4
16	Belgium	28,900	0.2	98.2	0.3	96.7
17	Italy	27,200	0.2	98.4	0.3	97.1
18	Switzerland	18,400	0.1	98.5	0.2	97.3
19	Uruguay	16,400	0.1	98.6	0.2	97.5
20	Chile	15,900	0.1	98.7	0.2	97.7
21	Sweden	14,900	0.1	98.8	0.2	97.9
22	Turkey	14,500	0.1	98.9	0.2	98.0
23	Spain	12,900	0.1	99.0	0.2	98.2
24	Austria	10,300	0.1	99.1	0.1	98.3
25	Panama	10,000	0.1	99.1	0.1	98.4

a Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
b Not applicable

Table 8.5 25 largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 country's total population and Human Development Indices, 1/1/2021

Jewish population rank	Country	Core Jewish population	Total population	Jews per 1000 total population	2019 HDI rank[a]
1	Israel[b]	6,870,900	9,293,300	739.3	19
2	United States	6,000,000	329,900,000	18.2	17
3	France	446,000	64,900,000	6.9	26
4	Canada	393,500	38,200,000	10.3	16
5	United Kingdom	292,000	67,200,000	4.3	13
6	Argentina	175,000	45,400,000	3.9	46
7	Russia	150,000	146,700,000	1.0	52
8	Germany	118,000	83,300,000	1.4	6
9	Australia	118,000	25,800,000	4.6	8
	Other 100,000 & over	1,692,500	471,500,000	3.6	24
10	Brazil	91,500	211,800,000	0.4	84
11	South Africa	52,000	59,600,000	0.9	114
12	Hungary	46,800	9,800,000	4.8	40
13	Ukraine	43,000	41,800,000	1.0	74
14	Mexico	40,000	127,800,000	0.3	74
15	Netherlands	29,700	17,500,000	1.7	8
16	Belgium	28,900	11,500,000	2.5	14
17	Italy	27,200	60,300,000	0.5	29
18	Switzerland	18,400	8,600,000	2.1	2
19	Uruguay	16,400	3,519,000	4.7	55
20	Chile	15,900	19,500,000	0.8	43
21	Sweden	14,900	10,400,000	1.4	7
22	Turkey	14,500	83,700,000	0.2	54
23	Spain	12,900	47,600,000	0.3	25
24	Austria	10,300	8,900,000	1.2	18
25	Panama	10,000	4,300,000	2.3	57
	Other 10,000 & over	472,400	726,619,000	0.7	44
	Rest of the world[c]	130,400	6,236,208,700	0.0	> 100

a *HDI* The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education, and income (measured as US dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme (2020)

b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights**.** Total population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents and non-Jewish members of Jewish households of the West Bank

c Average HDI rank for group of countries

Table 8.6 Countries with at least 20,000 Jews in 1970, and core Jewish population in 2021

Country	1970	Rank	2021	Rank	% change	Rank diff.
United States	5,515,000	1	6,000,000	2	**8.8%**	-1
Israel	2,581,000	2	6,870,900	1	**166.2%**	1
Russia	807,900	3	150,000	7	-81.4%	-4
Ukraine	777,100	4	43,000	13	-94.5%	-9
France	530,000	5	446,000	3	-15.8%	2
United Kingdom	390,000	6	292,000	5	-25.1%	1
Canada	286,000	7	393,500	4	**37.6%**	3
Argentina	282,000	8	175,000	6	-37.9%	2
Belarus	148,000	9	7,200	25	-95.1%	-16
South Africa	118,000	10	52,000	11	-55.9%	-1
Uzbekistan	102,900	11	2,800	37	-97.3%	-26
Moldova	98,100	12	1,700	44	-98.3%	-32
Brazil	90,000	13	91,500	10	**1.7%**	3
Iran	72,000	14	9,400	28	-86.9%	-14
Hungary	70,000	15	46,800	12	-33.1%	3
Romania	70,000	16	8,800	26	-87.4%	-10
Australia	65,000	17	118,000	9	**81.5%**	8
Georgia	55,400	18	1,400	51	-97.5%	-33
Morocco	45,000	19	2,100	46	-95.3%	-27
Azerbaijan	41,300	20	7,000	29	-83.1%	-9
Turkey	39,000	21	14,500	22	-62.8%	-1
Latvia	36,700	22	4,300	45	-88.3%	-23
Mexico	35,000	23	40,000	14	**14.3%**	9
Belgium	32,500	24	28,900	15	-11.1%	9
Uruguay	32,000	25	16,400	19	-48.8%	6
Italy	32,000	26	27,200	16	-15.0%	10
Germany	30,000	27	118,000	8	**293.3%**	19
Netherlands	30,000	28	29,700	15	-1.0%	13
Chile	30,000	29	15,900	20	-47.0%	9
Kazakhstan	27,700	30	2,400	43	-91.3%	-13
Ethiopia	25,000	31	100	82	-99.6%	-51
Lithuania	23,600	32	2,300	45	-90.3%	-13
Switzerland	20,000	33	18,400	18	-8.0%	15

a Ranked as of 1970. In bold Jewish population that increased in absolute size. The following countries had Jewish populations among the 33 largest in 2020, but not in 1970: Sweden, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Panama, New Zealand, Venezuela, India

Table 8.7 World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion per 1,000 total population, 1/1/2021

Number of core Jews in country	Jews per 1000 total population					
	Total	**Less than 1.0**	**1.0-4.9**	**5.0-9.9**	**10.0-19.9**	**20.0+**
Number of countries						
Total[a]	102	72	24	1	4	1
100-999	42	36	4	-	2	-
1,000-4,999	28	26	2	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	7	5	2	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	8	2	6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	6	2	4	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	2	1	1	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	7	-	5	1	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)						
Total[b]	15,166,200	344,900	1,108,700	446,000	6,395,000	6,870,900
100-999	11,800	8,900	1,400	-	1,500	-
1,000-4,999	66,600	60,500	6,100	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	51,300	37,400	13,900	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	113,300	27,400	85,900		-	-
25,000-49,999	215,600	67,200	148,400	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	143,500	143,500	-	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	1,692,500	-	853,000	446,000	393,500	-
1,000,000 or more	12,870,900	-	-	-	6,000,000	6,870,900
Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population)						
Total[b]	100.0	2.3	7.3	2.9	42.2	45.3
100-999	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	-
1,000-4,999	0.4	0.4	0.0	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	0.3	0.2	0.1	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	0.7	0.2	0.6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	1.4	0.4	1.0	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	0.9	0.9	-	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	11.2	-	5.6	2.9	2.6	-
1,000,000 or more	84.9	-	-	-	39.6	45.3

a Not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews

b Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding

Israel includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

Table 8.8 World core Jewish population distribution, by number of Jews in country, 1984 and 2021

Number of Jews in a country	N. of countries		Jewish population		% of world's Jews	
	1984	2021	1984	2021	1984	2021
Total[a]	**74**	**102**	**12,963,300**	**15,166,200**	**100.0**	**100.0**
100-999	23	42	11,000	11,800	0.1	0.1
1,000-4,999	17	28	41,900	66,600	0.3	0.4
5,000-9,999	7	7	43,800	51,300	0.3	0.3
10,000-49,999	16	14	362,400	328,900	2.8	2.2
50,000-99,999	2	2	136,500	143,500	1.1	0.9
100,000-999,999	6	7	1,616,000	1,692,500	12.4	11.2
1,000,000-4,999,999	2	0	5,046,700	0	38.8	0.0
5,000,000 or more	1	2	5,705,000	12,870,900	43.9	84.9

a Number of countries not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews. Population and percent figures including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700

Sources: Schmelz and DellaPergola (1986); Table 8.7 above

Table 8.9 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2021[a]

Area	Core Jewish Population	Others	Core Jewish and others[b]	Arab population and others	Foreign workers and refugees[c]	Total	Percent of Jews and others[d]
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Grand total	**6,870,900**	**464,800**	**7,335,700**	**6,626,500**	**197,300**	**14,159,500**	**51.8**
State of Israel[e]	***6,870,900***	***464,800***	***7,335,700***	***1,957,600***	***197,300***	***9,490,600***	***77.3***
Thereof:							
Pre-1967 borders	6,168,800	445,600	6,499,400	1,491,100	197,300	**8,187,800**	**79.4**
East Jerusalem[f]	232,400	7,300	239,700	360,900	-	**600,600**	**39.9**
Golan Heights	23,900	1,900	25,800	26,600	-	**52,400**	**49.2**
West Bank	445,800	10,000	455,800	[g]	-	**455,800**	**14.5[h]**
Palestinian Territory (WBG)				***4,668,900***		***4,668,900***	-
West Bank	[i]	[i]	[i]	2,688,900	-	**2,688,900**	-
Gaza	0	0	0	1,980,000	-	**1,980,000**	-

a Revised rounded figures
b Enlarged Jewish population
c All foreign workers, undocumented residents and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders. Source: Israel Population and Migration Authority (2021)
d Column 3 divided by column 6
e As defined by Israel's legal system
f Estimated from Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research (2021)
g Included under Palestinian Territory
h Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction
i Included under State of Israel
Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations Population Fund; and author's estimates

Table 8.10 Percent of core and Law of Return Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2021

Area	Percentage of Jews[a] by definition	
	Core	Law of Return
Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory	**48.5**	**51.8**
Minus foreign workers and refugees	49.2	52.5
Minus Gaza	57.3	61.2
Minus Golan Heights	57.5	61.4
Minus West Bank	74.1	79.2
Minus East Jerusalem	77.2	82.4

a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, Arabs and others of mentioned area are deducted and the percentages are recalculated accordingly
Source: Table 8.9

Table 8.11 Number of completed surveys by mode of participation – Pew survey of Jewish Americans, 2020

	Total	**Via web**	**Via mail**	**Screener via web, extended via mail**	**Web**	**Mail**	**Response rate**
	N	N	N	N	%	%	%
Screening survey	68,398	47,918	20,232	248	70.4	29.6	20.1
Extended survey	5,881	4,506	1,129	246	77.6	23.4	82.4

Source: Courtesy of Pew Research Center. Survey conducted Nov. 19, 2019-June 3, 2020 among U.S. adults.

Table 8.12 Jewish population estimates in the United States, by broad age groups and different definitional criteria, 2013 and 2020 – Millions

	2013			2020			Difference		
	Adults	**Children**	**Total**	**Adults**	**Children**	**Total**	**Adults**	**Children**	**Total**
Jews by religion	4.2	0.9	5.1	4.2	1.1	5.3	0.0	0.2	0.2
No religion, Jewish	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.1
Total Core Jewish Population (CJP)	**4.7**	**1.0**	**5.7**	**4.8**	**1.2**	**6.0**	**0.1**	**0.2**	**0.3**
No religion, partly Jewish	0.6	0.4	1	1.0	0.5	1.5	0.4	0.1	0.5
Total Net Jewish Population (NJP)	**5.3**	**1.4**	**6.7**	**5.8**	**1.7**	**7.5**	**0.5**	**0.3**	**0.8**
Non-Jews, Jewish background	2.4	1.5	3.9	2.8	1.4	4.2	0.4	-0.1	0.3
Extended Jewish Background Population	**7.7**	**2.9**	**10.6**	**8.6**	**3.1**	**11.7**	**0.9**	**0.2**	**1.1**
Non-Jews, Jewish affinity	1.2	0.2	1.4	1.4	0.3	1.7	0.2	0.1	0.3
Grand Total	**8.9**	**3.1**	**12.0**	**10.0**	**3.4**	**13.4**	**1.1**	**0.3**	**1.4**

Sources: Pew Research Center (2013), Pew Research Center (2021). Author's processing by courtesy of Pew Research Center.

Table 8.13 Jewish population in the United States, by religious identity, sex, age, and marital status – 2020

Sex and age	Not married	Married	Spouse Jewish	Spouse not Jewish	% spouse not Jewish	% married *and* with Jewish partner
Jewish by religion						
Men						
18-39	52%	48%	32%	16%	33%	15%
40-59	28%	71%	51%	20%	28%	36%
Women						
18-39	48%	52%	31%	21%	40%	16%
40-59	17%	81%	51%	29%	36%	41%
Jews of no religion						
Men						
18-39	68%	32%	2%	30%	94%	1%
40-59	36%	64%	18%	46%	72%	12%
Women						
18-39	57%	43%	5%	38%	88%	2%
40-59	43%	57%	7%	50%	88%	4%

Source: Pew Research Center (2021). Author's processing by courtesy of Pew Research Center.

Table 8.14 Distribution of children by different types of Jewish family background – United States, 2020

Identity of adult respondent that child lives with	**Proportion of children with given Jewish identity**								
	Total children	**Raised exclusively Jewish by religion**	**Raised as Jew of no religion**	**All other children**	***Raised Jewish by religion and other religion***	***Raised in other religion, Jewish aside from religion***	***Raised in other religion, NOT raised Jewish at all***	***No religion, NOT raised Jewish at all***	***Missing data***
Net Jewish	**100%**	**50%**	**16%**	**34%**	**7%**	**2%**	**3%**	**21%**	**1%**
Jews by religion	100%	74%	5%	20%	8%	1%	4%	6%	1%
Jews of no religion	100%	3%	37%	60%	5%	4%	2%	49%	0%
Jewish background	**100%**	**3%**	**1%**	**97%**	**9%**	**1%**	**42%**	**40%**	**5%**
Jewish affinity	**100%**	**3%**	**2%**	**95%**	**18%**	**0%**	**23%**	**38%**	**16%**

Source: Courtesy of Pew Research Center.

Table 8.15 Metropolitan areas with populations with Jewish parents (PJP) above 100,000, 1/1/2021[a]

Rank	Metropolitan area	Country	Jewish population (PJP)[b]	% Jews out of total population	% of world Jewish population (PJP)[b]	
					%	Cumulative %
1	Tel Aviv[c]	Israel	3,891,800	94.8	19.5	19.5
2	New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA	U.S.	2,109,300	10.8	10.6	30.1
3	Jerusalem[d]	Israel	992,800	72.3	5.0	35.1
4	Haifa[e]	Israel	710,600	73.1	3.6	38.6
5	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA	U.S.	622,480	4.7	3.1	41.8
6	Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL[f]	U.S.	535,500	8.3	2.7	44.5
7	Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD	U.S.	419,850	6.9	2.1	46.6
8	Paris[g]	France	337,600	2.8	1.7	48.3
9	Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	U.S.	297,290	4.7	1.5	49.7
10	Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI	U.S.	294,280	3.1	1.5	51.2
11	Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH	U.S.	257,460	5.3	1.3	52.5
12	Be'er Sheva[h]	Israel	247,600	60.4	1.2	53.8
13	San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA	U.S.	244,000	5.1	1.2	55.0
14	London[i]	U.K.	230,400	2.4	1.2	56.1
15	Buenos Aires[j]	Argentina	230,300	1.4	1.2	57.3
16	Toronto[k]	Canada	219,900	4.5	1.1	58.4
17	Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta, GA	U.S.	119,800	2.0	0.6	59.0
18	Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD	U.S.	117,800	4.2	0.6	59.6
19	San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA	U.S.	100,000	3.0	0.5	60.1

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city
Definitions vary by country. The US metropolitan areas are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined by the US Office of Management and Budget.
See www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/demo/metro-micro/delineationfiles.html
A table of the population of the top 20 MSAs appears in Chapter 5 of this volume. Israel metropolitan areas are defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics
b Several of the US estimates refer to Population with Jewish parents (PJP). All Israel Jewish Populations are Enlarged Jewish Populations (EJP). Data for other countries refer to Population with Jewish Parents (PJP)
c Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, Ashdod Subdistrict, and sections of Judea and Samaria area. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon
Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000
d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of the Judea and Samaria District. Includes Bet Shemesh with over 100,000 Jewish population.
e Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District
f Includes about 55,000 part-year residents
g Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
h Includes Beersheba Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District
i Greater London and contiguous postcode areas
j Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A
k Census Metropolitan Area

Table 8.16 New immigrants to Israel[a], by last country of residence, 2019-2020

Country	2019	2020	% difference	Country	2019	2020	% difference
GRAND TOTAL[b]	**33,096**	**16,696**	**-49.6**	Ukraine	6,177	2,921	-52.7
America - Total[b]	**4,202**	**4,087**	**-2.7**	FSU unspecified	6	6	0.0
North America	**2,688**	**2,517**	**-6.4**	**Other Europe**	**739**	**613**	**-17.1**
Canada	217	232	6.9	Albania	3	0	-
United States	2,471	2,285	-7.5	Bosnia Herzegovina	1	0	-
Central America	**188**	**206**	**9.6**	Gibraltar	0	3	-
Cayman Is.	5	0	-	Monaco	5	0	-
Costa Rica	13	3	-76.9	North Macedonia	1	0	-
Cuba	10	5	-50.0	Norway	2	1	-50.0
Dominican Rep.	1	1	0.0	Serbia	3	7	133.3
El Salvador	1	1	0.0	Switzerland	67	69	3.0
Guadaloupe	0	6	-	Turkey	157	90	-42.7
Guatemala	3	6	100.0	United Kingdom	497	443	-10.9
Honduras	7	1	-85.7	Yugoslavia	3	0	-
Mexico	133	174	30.8	**Asia - Total[b]**	**1,144**	**742**	**-35.1**
Panama	15	9	-40.0	**FSU in Asia**	**1,005**	**627**	**-37.6**
South America	**1,326**	**1,364**	**2.9**	Armenia	15	0	-
Argentina	410	544	32.7	Azerbaijan	191	95	-50.3
Bolivia	6	3	-50.0	Georgia	316	228	-27.8
Brazil	588	508	-13.6	Kazakhstan	199	139	-30.2
Chile	43	76	76.7	Kyrgyzstan	36	13	-63.9
Colombia	44	77	75.0	Tadjikistan	3	6	100.0
Ecuador	7	6	-14.3	Turkmenistan	36	2	-94.4
Paraguay	11	2	-81.8	Uzbekistan	209	144	-31.1
Peru	33	26	-21.2	**Other Asia**	**139**	**115**	**-17.3**
Uruguay	84	65	-22.6	Bangladesh	0	2	-
Venezuela	100	57	-43.0	China	10	5	-50.0
Europe - Total[b]	**7,999**	**6,565**	**-17.9**	Hong Kong	10	14	40.0
European Union[c]	**2,870**	**2,876**	**0.2**	India	28	49	75.0
Austria	23	15	-34.8	Indonesia	1	0	-
Belgium	95	86	-9.5	Iran	67	31	-53.7
Bulgaria	7	6	-14.3	Japan	1	1	0.0
Croatia	1	0	-	Nepal	2	0	-
Cyprus	27	9	-66.7	Pakistan	1	0	-
Czech Republic	14	13	-7.1	Philippines	2	5	150.0
Denmark	6	8	33.3	Singapore	3	6	100.0
Finland	11	6	-45.5	South Korea	0	2	-
France	2,209	2,394	8.4	Thailand	10	0	-
Germany	161	77	-52.2	Yemen	4	0	-
Greece	7	4	-42.9	**Africa - Total[b]**	**463**	**512**	**10.6**
Hungary	42	26	-38.1	**Northern Africa**	**117**	**240**	**105.1**
Ireland	3	4	33.3	Algeria	0	1	-
Italy	70	80	14.3	Egypt	1	0	-
Luxembourg	3	5	66.7	Ethiopia	41	187	356.1
Malta	4	0	-	Morocco	47	23	-51.1
Netherlands	46	44	-4.3	Sudan	6	0	-
Poland	24	6	-75.0	Tunisia	22	30	36.4
Portugal	5	14	180.0	**Sub Saharan Africa**	**346**	**272**	**-21.4**
Romania	3	9	200.0	Guinea Bissau	1	0	-
Slovakia	0	7	-	Ivory Coast	1	0	-
Spain	84	44	-47.6	Kenya	1	0	-
Sweden	25	19	-24.0	Ruanda	1	0	-
FSU in Europe	**4,390**	**3,076**	**-29.9**	South Africa	342	268	-21.6
Belarus	919	622	-32.3	Uganda	0	1	-
Estonia	7	0	-	Zambia	0	1	-
Latvia	80	32	-60.0	Zimbabwe	0	2	-
Lithuania	43	6	-86.0	**Oceania - Total**	**129**	**80**	**-38.0**
Moldova	156	130	-16.7	Australia	129	79	-38.8
Russian Federation	15,753	6,632	-57.9	New Zealand	0	1	-

a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including temporary residents, returning Israelis, and immigrant citizens
b Including country unknown c Not including the Baltic countries Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data

Appendix Table. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2021

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b] CJP	Jews per total 1000 population	Source			Population with Jewish parents[e] PJP	Enlarged Jewish population[f] EJP	Law of Return population[g] LRP	Jewish core population world rank
				Type[c]	Accuracy rating[d]					
WORLD	**7,773,521,000**	**15,166,200**	**1.95**				**19,937,600**	**22,626,000**	**25,336,100**	
AMERICA TOTAL	**1,019,946,000**	**6,761,300**	**6.63**				**10,754,500**	**12,655,500**	**14,816,700**	
Bermuda	65,000	100	1.54	C	C 2016		200	300	400	**83-102**
Canada	38,200,000	393,500	10.30	C	B 2019		450,000	550,000	700,000	**4**
United States	329,900,000	6,000,000	18.19	S	B 2020	X	9,800,000	11,500,000	13,400,000	**2**
Total North America[h]	**368,225,000**	**6,393,600**	**17.36**				**10,250,200**	**12,050,300**	**14,100,400**	
Bahamas	400,000	200	0.50	C	B 2010		500	700	900	**77-82**
Barbados	300,000	100	0.33	C	B 2010		200	300	400	**83-102**
Costa Rica	5,100,000	2,600	0.51	J	C 2020		2,800	3,100	3,400	**43-44**
Cuba	11,300,000	500	0.04	S	C 2013		1,000	1,500	2,000	**67-70**
Dominican Republic	10,500,000	100	0.01	E	D 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
El Salvador	6,500,000	100	0.02	E	D 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
Guatemala	18,100,000	900	0.05	S	B 1999		1,200	1,500	1,800	**61-62**
Jamaica	2,800,000	500	0.18	C,J	C 2010		300	400	500	**67-70**
Mexico	127,800,000	40,000	0.31	C,S	B 2010		45,000	50,000	65,000	**14**
Netherlands Antilles[i]	321,000	400	1.25	C	C 2016		500	700	900	**71-73**
Panama	4,300,000	10,000	2.33	S	C 2012		11,000	12,000	13,000	**25**
Puerto Rico	3,200,000	1,500	0.47	J	C 2000		2,000	2,500	3,000	**53-54**
Virgin Islands	105,000	400	3.81	E	D 2016		600	700	800	**71-73**
Other	31,874,000	200	0.01		D 2020		400	600	800	
Total Central Amer., Caribbean	**222,600,000**	**57,500**	**0.26**				**65,900**	**74,600**	**93,300**	
Argentina	45,400,000	175,000	3.85	S	B 2021	X	260,000	310,000	360,000	**6**
Bolivia	11,600,000	500	0.04	J	C 2000		700	900	1,100	**67-70**
Brazil	211,800,000	91,500	0.43	C	B 2010		120,000	150,000	180,000	**10**
Chile	19,500,000	15,900	0.82	C,S	B 2020		20,000	24,000	28,000	**20**
Colombia	49,400,000	2,100	0.04	S	C 2016		2,800	3,500	4,500	**46-47**
Ecuador	17,500,000	600	0.03	J	B 2011		800	1,000	1,200	**66**
Paraguay	7,300,000	1,100	0.15	C	B 2002		1,300	1,600	1,900	**58**
Peru	32,800,000	1,900	0.06	S	C 2000		2,400	3,000	3,500	**49-50**
Suriname	602,000	200	0.33	J	D 2000		400	600	800	**77-82**
Uruguay	3,519,000	16,400	4.66	S	B 2013		20,000	24,000	28,000	**19**
Venezuela	28,600,000	5,000	0.17	S	C 2020		10,000	12,000	14,000	**32**
Total South America[h]	**429,121,000**	**310,200**	**0.72**				**438,400**	**530,600**	**623,000**	
EUROPE TOTAL	**831,375,000**	**1,317,500**	**1.58**				**1,819,800**	**2,330,600**	**2,832,800**	
Austria	8,900,000	10,300	1.16	C,S,J	B 2019		14,000	17,000	20,000	**24**
Belgium	11,500,000	28,900	2.51	S,J	C 2018		35,000	40,000	45,000	**16**
Bulgaria	6,900,000	2,000	0.29	C,J	C 2011		4,000	6,000	8,000	**48**
Croatia	4,000,000	1,700	0.43	C,J	C 2011		2,400	3,100	3,800	**52**
Cyprus	1,200,000	300	0.25	C,E	C 2012		400	500	600	**74-76**
Czechia	10,700,000	3,900	0.36	C,J	C 2011		5,000	6,500	8,000	**37**
Denmark	5,800,000	6,400	1.10	S,J	C 2018		7,500	8,500	9,500	**31**
Estonia	1,300,000	1,800	1.38	C,P	A 2019		2,700	3,500	4,500	**51**
Finland	5,500,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2015		1,600	1,900	2,200	**56-57**
France	64,900,000	446,000	6.87	S	B 2018		550,000	650,000	750,000	**3**
Germany	83,300,000	118,000	1.42	S,J	B 2018		150,000	225,000	275,000	**8**
Greece	10,700,000	4,100	0.38	J	B 2010		5,200	6,000	7,000	**36**
Hungary	9,800,000	46,800	4.78	C,S	C 2018		75,000	100,000	130,000	**12**
Ireland	5,000,000	2,700	0.54	C	B 2016		3,600	5,000	6,500	**41**
Italy	60,300,000	27,200	0.45	S,J	B 2019		34,000	41,000	48,000	**17**
Latvia	1,900,000	4,300	2.26	C,P	A 2020	X	8,000	12,000	16,000	**34-35**

Lithuania	2,800,000	2,300	0.82	C,P	B 2019		4,700	7,500	10,500	**45**
Luxembourg	600,000	700	1.17	J	B 2010		900	1,100	1,300	**64-65**
Malta	500,000	100	0.20	E	D 2012		200	300	400	**83-102**
Netherlands	17,500,000	29,700	1.70	S	B 2018		43,000	53,000	63,000	**15**
Poland	38,400,000	4,500	0.12	C,S,J	B 2018		7,500	15,300	25,000	**34-35**
Portugal	10,300,000	3,300	0.32	C	B 2011		3,500	4,000	5,000	**38**
Romania	19,200,000	8,800	0.46	C,J	B 2011		13,000	17,000	20,000	**27**
Slovakia	5,500,000	2,600	0.47	C	C 2011		3,600	4,600	6,000	**42**
Slovenia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C	C 2019		200	300	400	**83-102**
Spain	47,600,000	12,900	0.27	S,J	C 2020		16,000	19,000	22,000	**23**
Sweden	10,400,000	14,900	1.43	S	C 2018		20,000	25,000	30,000	**21**
Total European Union 27	**446,600,000**	**785,600**	**1.76**				**1,011,000**	**1,273,100**	**1,517,700**	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,300,000	500	0.15	C	C 2001		800	1,100	1,400	**67-70**
Channel Islands	200,000	200	1.00	S	C 2015		250	300	400	**77-82**
Gibraltar	35,000	800	22.86	C	B 2019		900	1,000	1,100	**63**
Monaco	40,000	700	17.50	S	B 2012		900	1,100	1,300	**64-65**
North Macedonia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C	C 1996		200	300	400	**83-102**
Norway	5,400,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010		1,600	2,000	2,500	**56-57**
Serbia	7,000,000	1,400	0.20	C	C 2011		2,100	2,800	3,500	**55**
Switzerland	8,600,000	18,400	2.14	C	B 2020		22,000	25,000	28,000	**18**
Turkey[k]	83,700,000	14,500	0.17	S,J	B 2016		19,000	21,000	23,000	**22**
United Kingdom[j]	67,200,000	292,000	4.35	C,S	B 2019		330,000	370,000	410,000	**5**
Other	5,800,000	100	0.02		D 2020		250	400	500	
Total other Europe[h]	**183,375,000**	**330,000**	**1.80**				**378,000**	**425,000**	**472,100**	
Belarus	9,400,000	7,200	0.77	C	B 2019	X	17,000	25,000	33,000	**28**
Moldova	3,500,000	1,700	0.49	C	B 2014		3,800	7,500	10,000	**49-50**
Russia[k]	146,700,000	150,000	1.02	C	C 2010		320,000	460,000	600,000	**7**
Ukraine	41,800,000	43,000	1.03	C	C 2001		90,000	140,000	200,000	**13**
Total FSU Republics	**201,400,000**	**201,900**	**1.00**				**430,800**	**632,500**	**843,000**	
[Total FSU in Europe][l]	**207,400,000**	**210,300**	**1.01**				**446,200**	**655,500**	**874,000**	
ASIA TOTAL	**4,541,100,000**	**6,905,300**	**1.52**				**7,152,900**	**7,401,200**	**7,418,600**	
Israel[m]	8,837,500	6,425,100	727.03	C,P	A 2020		6,652,500	6,879,900	6,879,900	
West Bank[n]	3,144,600	445,800	141.77	C,P	A 2020		450,800	455,800	455,800	
Gaza[n]	1,980,100	0	0.00	C,P	A 2020		0	0	0	
Total Israel and Palestine[o]	**13,962,200**	**6,870,900**	**492.11**				**7,103,300**	**7,335,700**	**7,335,700**	
[Total State of Israel][p]	**9,293,300**	**6,870,900**	**739.34**				**7,103,300**	**7,335,700**	**7,335,700**	**1**
Armenia	3,000,000	100	0.03	C	B 2011		300	500	700	**83-102**
Azerbaijan	10,100,000	7,000	0.69	C	B 2009		10,500	15,500	20,500	**30**
Georgia	3,700,000	1,400	0.38	C	B 2014		3,000	5,000	7,500	**53-54**
Kazakhstan	18,700,000	2,400	0.13	C	B 2009		4,800	6,500	9,500	**43-44**
Kyrgyzstan	6,600,000	300	0.05	C	B 2009		700	1,000	1,500	**71-73**
Turkmenistan	6,000,000	200	0.03	C	D 1995		400	600	800	**77-82**
Uzbekistan	34,200,000	2,800	0.08	C	D 1989		6,000	8,000	10,000	**40**
Total former USSR in Asia[h]	**91,700,000**	**14,200**	**0.15**				**25,700**	**37,100**	**50,500**	
China[q]	1,410,600,000	3,000	0.00	E	D 2015		3,200	3,400	3,600	**39**
India	1,400,100,000	4,800	0.00	C	C 2011		6,000	7,500	9,000	**33**
Indonesia	271,700,000	100	0.00	E	D 2016		200	300	400	**83-102**
Iran	84,200,000	9,400	0.11	C	B 2016		10,500	12,000	13,000	**26**
Japan	126,000,000	1,000	0.01	E	D 2015		1,200	1,400	1,600	**59-60**
Philippines	109,600,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
Singapore	5,800,000	900	0.16	J	C 2015		1,000	1,200	1,400	**61-62**
South Korea	51,800,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015		200	300	400	**83-102**
Syria and Lebanon	26,200,000	100	0.00	E	D 2015		200	300	400	**83-102**
Taiwan	23,600,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**

Thailand	66,500,000	200	0.00	E	D 2015		300	400	500	**77-82**
United Arab Emirates	9,800,000	300	0.03	E	D 2020		500	700	900	**74-76**
Other	849,537,800	100	0.00		D 2020		200	300	400	
Total other Asia	**4,435,437,800**	**20,200**	**0.00**				**23,900**	**28,400**	**32,400**	
AFRICA TOTAL	**1,338,000,000**	**56,500**	**0.04**				**71,700**	**83,900**	**97,100**	
Egypt	100,800,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015		200	300	400	**83-102**
Ethiopia	114,900,000	100	0.00	S	C 2015		500	1,000	2,500	**83-102**
Morocco	36,000,000	2,100	0.06	J	C 2015		2,500	2,800	3,100	**46-47**
Tunisia	11,900,000	1,000	0.08	J	C 2015		1,200	1,400	1,600	**59-60**
Total Northern Africa[h]	**359,300,000**	**3,300**	**0.01**				**4,400**	**5,500**	**7,600**	
Botswana	2,300,000	100	0.04	E	C 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
Congo D.R.	89,600,000	100	0.00	E	C 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
Kenya	53,500,000	300	0.01	J	C 2000		500	700	900	**74-76**
Madagascar	27,700,000	100	0.00	J	D 2016		200	300	400	**83-102**
Namibia	2,500,000	100	0.04	C	C 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
Nigeria	206,100,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400	**83-102**
South Africa	59,600,000	52,000	0.87	C,S	B 2019		65,000	75,000	85,000	**11**
Zimbabwe	14,900,000	200	0.01	C	B 2001		400	600	800	**77-82**
Other	522,500,000	200	0.00		D 2020		400	600	800	
Total Sub-Saharan Africa[r]	**978,700,000**	**53,200**	**0.05**				**67,300**	**78,400**	**89,500**	
OCEANIA TOTAL	**43,100,000**	**125,600**	**2.91**				**138,700**	**154,800**	**170,900**	
Australia	25,800,000	118,000	4.57	C	A 2016		130,000	145,000	160,000	**9**
New Zealand	5,000,000	7,500	1.50	C	B 2013		8,500	9,500	10,500	**29**
Other	12,300,000	100	0.01		D 2020		200	300	400	

a. Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2020) and United Nations Population Division (2020). Mid-year 2020 estimates
b Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity
c (C) National population census. (P) National population register. (S) Survey of Jewish population. (J) Jewish community register. (E) Estimate
d (A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial coverage of country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends. (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. The year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2020 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information
e Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent
f Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)
g Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification
h Including countries and territories not listed because fewer than 100 core Jews live in each of those countries and in all of those countries combined
i Including Aruba
j Including the Isle of Man
k Including Asian regions
l Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU
m Including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, not including the West Bank
n Author's revised estimates of total Palestinian population on 1/1/2021: West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,688,900; Gaza: 1,980,000; Total: 4,668,900. The West Bank also includes 445,800 Jews and 10,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, for a total of 455,800 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 3,144,700 includes Palestinian, Jewish, and other residents
o Not including foreign workers and asylum seekers
p Israel's total permanent (de jure) population as defined by Israel's legal system, not including foreign workers and asylum seekers
q Including Hong Kong and Macao
r Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa



Map 8.1 Countries where 99% of world Jewish population live, 2021



Fig. 8.1 World total population and core Jewish population, 1945-2021 – Revised data



Fig. 8.2 Twenty largest core Jewish populations, 2021 – Revised data



Fig. 8.3 Configuring and defining contemporary Jewish populations, 2021 – Revised data

1-2 = Core Jewish population (CJP)
1 to 4 = Population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)
1 to 6 = Enlarged Jewish population (EJP)
1 to 7 = Law of Return population (LRP)
Areas represented are not proportional to actual population sizes



Fig. 8.4 Core and extended Jewish populations in the United States, Israel, and other countries, number and percent, 2021 – Revised data



Fig. 8.5 Major groups of countries by Human Development Index (HDI) and total core Jewish population, 2021 – Revised data



Fig. 8.6 Core Jewish populations by major regions, 1948, 1970, 2000, 2021, thousands – Revised data



Fig. 8.7 Births and deaths per 1000 population among Jews and Muslims in Israel, 1955-2020



Fig 8.8 Percent Jewish out of total population of Israel and Palestine by different territorial and Jewish population definitions, 2021



Fig 8.9 US Jewish population configuration of by alternative definitions – Pew surveys of Jewish Americans, 2013 and 2020



Fig. 8.10 Percent with two Jewish parents among Jews with no religion, by age – United States, 2020



Fig. 8.11 Core Jewish population and total population in the United States, 1990-2021 – Annual estimates as originally published in the *American Jewish Year Book* World Jewish Population chapter, and revised estimates based on the 2020 Pew Survey of Jewish Americans. Author's processing



Fig. 8.12 Percent change in number of immigrants to Israel from major areas of origin, 2019-2020



Fig. 8.13 Influences of the covid-19 epidemics on births and deaths – Israel, monthly data, 2019-2021