***The Operational Focus***

**Chapter 4 – Implementation of the theory to state owned military practice**

In previous chapters we defined the theory leading to the operational focus approach, and we pointed out to the significance of tying the policy, military strategy, and tactical action, in order to execute. We went on an explained the approach for tying these aspects, the operational focus approach, that links the strategic value of a military action and the combat worth. In this chapter we will describe the changes needed in the force employment and force design processes in order to implement the operational focus approach.

We will begin by describing the changes needed in the work of the commanding officer and staff, according to the operational focus approach. These changes include a new thought process – in the situation assessment, planning force employment and Command & control. Throughout this chapter and the entire book, we use the term planning in two ways. The first, a complete process of planning force employment, the second, a process that translates the design process to force employment. The first abbreviation will be used usually as “planning” and the second as “practical planning”.

We will continue and discuss structural and organizational changes to the headquarters, and will suggest organizing them into two staff groups, tasked with assisting the commander – the situation assessment group and the situation report (SITREP) group. We will explain the difference between these two groups, and how they individually assist the commander’s action. We will end with two force design visions for the division level – large scale and minor, different from each other in the level of innovation need in comparison to the current IDF structure.

**Force employment according to the operational focus approach**

The situational assessment is the keystone and the ignition for the operational focus, since it determines the core values of the process – the strategic value and combat worth. As such, it forces the commander to see a holistic picture, to have a complete understanding of the situation in hand, and understand the context of the operation/action and it’s strategic needs (the needed strategic value), the capabilities and available operational tools (combat worth). we propose that when the commander conduct a situation assessment, he must include subject manner experts (SMEs) that can address these aspects. Determining the right experts is the first step in the operational focus.

We suggest that the SME should be composed by four groups : military experts to determine the combat capabilities and values (potential) of the force employment components; experts that analyze the opponent on all levels; experts that can put together the broader context of the campaign; experts in strategic planning.

The list of military experts must include operational planning functions for air, land, maritime, special operations, and information operations (including cyber) that have vast knowledge and understanding of the military’s capabilities. The experts that analyze the opponent, on all levels, bring to the commander’s table information needed on the strategic decision making process of the opponent, his military capabilities and the civilian operational environment he is action in. there experts will typically come from the intelligence community and civilian liaison.

Additional participants in the SME group are experts who understand the broader context of the campaign: diplomats, foreign relations personnel who deal with the International and regional arenas; influencers, public affairs and media experts that can analyze the perception context – covert and overt – of the campaign; and experts that help understand and analyze the situation and resiliency of the home front (general and local).

In addition, are the strategic planners – civilian and military service members – that can add comprehensive insights on the intent dimension of the state (i.e. Israel) and the broader national context – diplomatic, economic, social and infrastructure – of the situation. If required and according to the context, an international (i.e. USA) or regional ally (i.e. Egypt and Jordan) should and can be considered. This expert group is a joint – cross organizational, inter-organizational and in some cases international. It has a base of regular participants but can grow and add additional members as the campaign moves forward. This group will compile (with constant feedback and dialogue with the commander) the integrative situational assessment and create the optimal situational awareness for decision making. This group should exist in all levels – the General Staff (Joint level), the commands, corps, division, and brigades, as necessary and relevant to the echelon. This way, the General staff can include an expert to a techno-tactical issue, i.e. an information operations or tunnel neutralizing experts. The brigade echelon can include experts on the broader context of the campaign – strategic context, civilian liaison (when defending a populated area); an expert to U.S armed forces, or the Egyptian armed forces when the brigade is coordinating with or influencing those force.

This idea is not disconnected from other military thought and literature. In his book, *the utility of force*, General Sir Rupert Smith defines the planning process as follows:

*"there are two sets of questions to be asked in making a plan. the first set deals with the context of the operation as a whole, at the political and strategic levels, and the second with the context of its conduct, at the theatre level… the answers to one set must be coherent with the other… the first set it to define the outcome and the effort to achieve it… it must be clear that the answers to the questions lie with a wide range of agencies, of which the military is but one, and maybe only a minor one at that… the true institutional difficulty is in bringing the agencies together to answer all the questions… [[1]](#footnote-1)*

U.S Army field manual (FM) 3-24 (2006) for counter insurgency states:

*“Dialog among the commander, principal planners, members of the interagency team, and host-nation (HN) representatives helps develop a coherent design. This involvement of all participants is essential. The object of this dialog is to achieve a level of situational understanding… The underlying premise is this: when participants achieve a level of understanding such that the situation no longer appears complex, they can exercise logic and intuition effectively. As a result, design focuses on framing the problem rather than developing courses of action”* [[2]](#footnote-2)

Such in fact, the SME group, and their proximity to the commander’s desk, is an idea that is an accepted idea amongst militaries and is awaiting implementation in the IDF. This SME group will be the right hand of the commander for planning a holistic and complete force employment, meaning, a situation assessment that leads to the operational focus – defining the strategic values and combat worth. This group will plan, with the commander, the design and practical planning processes of force employment.

After explaining about the group designated to assist the commander in assessing the situation, we will now discuss the implementation of the operational focus approach in the design, planning and execution phases[[3]](#footnote-3).

**Designing force employment**

The “situational awareness” and “framing the problem statement”compose the knowledge and understanding and the common language between the commander and group of experts, and between the commander and his deputies. The group of experts, conductus dialogue and debate with the commander on the combat worth of actions he can take, and connect them to the strategic value.

This dialogue will lead the commander, after discussing and aligning with his deputies, to define the creative operational idea, or the stratagem he wishes to use, in the core of his force employment. the stratagem can rely on numerous military efforts with high combat worth and strategic values; to plan a military effort to complementing a civilian effort; political-economical-perception led; a combination of military and civilian efforts.

In this fashion, in the design phase of the operations process, the adequate response with the highest strategic and combat worth that can be predicted in the given strategic and tactical context. As such, a unique mix of military and civilian efforts is built in order to achieve the strategic goal. This mix will be reflected in the planning phase and force assignment.

**the practical planning of force employment – force assignment**

a critical component in the approach is understanding that in order to deliver a focused operational response, one that has a high strategic and combat worths, you need to build a completely hybrid division – even if it is built for a particular purpose. The division will operate in a joint, multi-service and multi-organizational headquarters, and will employ various numerous civilian and military capabilities:

1. All types of ground maneuvering forces, including special operation forces from all services (land, air and sea);
2. Subordinate or supporting fire support components from air, land and sea;
3. Subordinate or supporting intelligence capabilities – from the level of a tactical UAV/UAS and POW interrogator to joint and national capabilities - communication intelligence (SIGINT), ISR and imaging (VISINT) and additional capabilities and resources owned by agencies like the FBI and CIA (USA) and SIA (a.k.a SHABAK) and “Mossad” in Israel.
4. Units and/or capabilities in the civilian domain – preserving the lifestyle of the population in the battle front, mistakenly referred to as “humanitarian assistance effort; preserve the lifestyle of Israeli citizens in the home-front and the battle front as part of the defense effort – the active, passive, over ground and over ground subterranean; the ability to communicate with international civilian and military elements in the area of operations; conducting overt and covert influence and information operations (media, PSYOPS, strategic communications, and etc.) in the entire theater;
5. Communication capabilities that connects all the elements in one network and enables command and control on all efforts and operations in the theater.
6. A multi-component and multi-service logistical effort, utilizing resources, and connectivity to higher echelon and cross service capabilities.

This unique mix makes the operations process - the planning, operation order writing, COA selection, force allocation, assignment and issuing of orders – to a much more complicated process, especially when all the forces reach an industrial scale of operation, in all domains. This process forces a more advanced and different staff and headquarters then what we know and utilize these days in the IDF.

**Execution Phase – Battle command/management**

Battle command/Management has always been a complicated concept and requires a unique combination of both professional and personal capabilities. In our current era, the information domain complicates the process, since the information flow is so fast, where the decision makers instantly know what is happening on the battlefield. Strategic and national level events are quickly transmitted to the battlefield and passes through mass-media and social media networks. This phenomenon increases the number of events and decision-making tempo and creates an influx in information that needs to be processed, before a decision can be made. This situation creates near-instant connection between strategic happenings, and the fighting occurring in the battlefield – sort of a superposition[[4]](#footnote-4) - between the strategic and tactical events. In this event, the situational assessment of the expert group with the commander and deputies is non-stop and has to account for real time changes in the battlefield and strategic environment that can impact the unit’s ability to fulfil its mission according to the strategic goal. Such a fundamental change can be presented in any part of the situation assessment: realizing a too-high or too-low combat worth/worth of one of the military effort; adversary’s leadership, military array and population are affected differently by the various types of force employment; the civilian and military measures taken by the adversary influence the initial assessment on our military actions, Israeli home front and the regional and international aspects; in the International, regional and media arenas evolve in a unpredicted way; the perception in the Israeli society and decision makers change in regards to the strategic purpose and desired outcome of the campaign; or, a singular event can influence a couple of aspects.

This kind of analysis changes the situational awareness of the commander and the way he defines the problem statement, a combination of knowledge and understanding of the expert group, in their individual expertise, and a joint learning process among the group. This combination leads us to examine the mutual influence and to reframe the problem in the overall context. The conclusions of the commander and his deputies from the new outcomes can lead to one of the three results: sticking to the current plan and assuming that along the way it’s success will have a positive impact on the evolving context; changing the plan according to the operational focus and adjust the balance between the combat and strategic values; or, re-design the stratagem and draw an updated plan that takes into account the changes in the force and the mix of efforts.

**Headquarter structure and organization according to the operational focus approach**

It seems kike the best place to start this essential change is in the headquarters, in the staff directorates that service and assist the operational units. This statement assumes that the problem, in the context that we are dealing with, is not with the units , weapons or materials – especially in the IDF where we enjoy advanced weapon systems – the problem is directing and merging the military power and force to an action with high military and strategic values. This can be achieved, mainly by the headquarters that assist the commander to focus the force employment.

The statement assumes that in our era there is no problem/shortage of with military power. the western militaries have the most advanced weapon systems in history of mankind – the munition, tanks, personal weapons, aircrafts, and vessels are the best in the military arsenal. Enhancing the capabilities does not mean having the ability to utilize the force better. Utilizing the force is within the scope of force employment approaches for utilizing munition and material, and in our context – through the headquarters.

Within the staff directorates, we first need to deal with the operational core, the motor of the military body: the operations directorate, by having a clear separation between the planners group and the command and control elements (SITREP and operational C2). It seems like a simple idea, but for those in the business it clearly is not that simple. The reason for this is a competition between the current operations personnel and the planners. This competition is not about who is better, it is a professional tension - between those who are experts in planning, creating various and alternative courses of action and conducting analysis according to strategic and combat worths, and between the group that is expert in controlling, organizing and presenting information to the commander. Both groups are necessary to enable the commander and headquarters to produce conclusions and make decisions. [[5]](#footnote-5) These tensions between the groups are even stronger in the new systemic era, due to the complexity in defining strategic values, translating them to combat worths and conducting a situation assessment in their regards.

**Illustration 7: the commander in between planning group and control group**

key player in planning and controlling operations was, and always will be the commander. The commander determines the context, values and worth; he makes the decisions and synchronizes the desired outcomes from the various tasks and efforts. The separation between the planning and operations personnel is an enabler to a better connecting between the tactical and strategic aspects since it forces the commander to position himself in the middle, between the groups. His position will manifest itself throughout the operations process and battle command/management and will force him to an operational focus and joint force employment, conducting coordinated efforts on the civilian and military domains, in the right context and short timelines. The above is based upon the operating directorates adaptation to reality and the need to constantly calibrate them to fulfil the strategic value.

**The planners team –** firstly, the operational focus process is conducted by the commander in dialogue with a team of experts - an operation planning team - and deputies. These experts and their functions were described earlier in the chapter. This team, that deals with ongoing situation assessment and designed the principals of the operational plan, will run on a flexible battle rhythm, based on the campaign, commanders battle rhythm (and schedule) and the commander’s individual and unique approach and methods.

**The Control group –** alongside the planners, an additional staff team is put in place – the situation report team. This team is the commander’s arm for command and control. This team will translate the commanders plans into actionable orders, hold oversight over battle management and execution for control, and will make decisions in order to advance the progress of executing the orders.

Both teams will be led by designated operations officers, when traditionally the chief control officer (J33) will be the senior officer tasked with synchronizing both teams.

The following table describes both teams and their functions:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | SITUATIONAL ASSESMENT TEAM (Planners) | SITUATION REPORT TEAM (Control) |
| Purpose |  |  |
| Battle rhythm |  |  |
| Participants |  |  |
| examples |  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

**Chapter 5 – the era of prolonged/extended conflicts - wars in the five industrial dimension era**

Though war In particular, and force employment in general, is conceived as irrational, they are still state owned / Political , powerful and useful tools. The act of violence, whether goals were achieved, usually derives from the ambition for some sort of political achievement, that can advance the position, or contribute to, the entity employing the force.

This coming chapter will attempt to describe how future wars will look in a time where all the dimension of war are industrialized; where the focal subject will not be the process of industrializing the military tools, but the synergy between various platforms, and the impact on the different levels of the fighting itself – the strategic value and the combat worth.

This discerption is a modest attempt since the focal point of discussion is not to predict the future but an attempt to lay ground for a database / information / knowledge when dealing with changes that are ongoing, or on the verge.

The growing industrialization of the fifth dimension, the Cybernetic Dimension, is already providing indications on the nature of war. It may be hard to see so, as current conflicts and war are being fought in a way that the traditional four dimensions are far more dominant then the cyber dimension, and these wars and conflicts are expected to continue all over the world; The “Yom Kippur” war, conceived as the largest war Israel fought in, the Iraq-Iran war, the First Gulf-War, the conquer phases of the second Gulf war and of course wars fought by non-super-power states. The challenge in learning from the frequency of change is capturing lessons learned from these wars, along with acquiring capabilities and learning from process happening in the present.

The traditional dimensions of fighting will go through a transformation/change, such as the use of directed energy weapons systems, integration of robotics and artificial intelligence (AI), C2 (Command and Control), fire control and targeting system will evolve as well. All these aspects might improve the combat worths and capabilities of the force, yet the challenge will be integrating these tools in the cyber dimension. A significant change/transformation will be in tactical cyber, that will transform the meeting point between cyber warfare to a more personalized/kinetic where the enemies weapons will target itself.

The focus of our discussion is not technological, but theoretical, in from this view we can free ourselves from the technological thought process and address the synergy between the different dimensions and the variety of platforms acting in them.

In order to try and predict how the next war will look like, a war in a time that all five dimensions will be industrialized in high capacity, we need to examine the characteristic’s of the wars pointing in the direction to the sprout Integration between the five dimensions, even if they are not complete. These characteristic’s can be organized in the following eight different ways:

* War in populated areas – most of the warfighting takes place in populated urban areas, in both sides of the conflict. The symmetric side learned how to locate the a-symmetrical side, shielding within the population, in attempt to strike him as accurately as possible while minimizing collateral damage and hurting non-combatant citizens.
* War in the Homefront in conjunction with traditional warfare in the battlefront – most of the war is focusing against the enemy Homefront and not in the battlefield front. The a-symmetrical side continues to seek ways to terrorize the opponent’s citizens. On the other side, the Symmetrical power, uses advanced intelligence and capabilities to employ precision fire on military targets in the civilian and populated area.
* Fighting focused on close range ground combat with fire support – the enemy is organized in a way (focused on coverage and hiding) forcing the “blue” force to close range combat in order to eliminate it. This situation is complex to the extent that the weapons cannot perform to their potential range capabilities. The use of a tank can be used as an example. A typical tank can destroy targets further then 3,000 meters, yet in this era it is impossible to detect targets from such a range in the urban battlefield, thus the tank can only be used in close range combat. This does not lessen the impact and necessity to use armored and mobile assets in the battlefield but raises the lack of utilizing fire power. The phenomenon exists in practically all the weapons systems of the ground forces.
* Operating in hybrid formations – the combination of special forces, conventional power and covert operations. In this context, we assume both sides have covert action wings; In the a-symmetrical side focusing on terror infrastructure and capabilities, while the symmetrical side focused on intelligence and surveillance.
* Operating in flexible conflict borders – this includes various aspects. The first aspect is that each side of the conflict will try to extend it’s support and involvement of supporting countries and organizations supporting their goals, while denying support to the opponent. A second aspect is that the fighting does not happen against an enemy concentrating in one front, but in range of fronts – military, civilian and hybrid; i.e a campaign in the political sphere to define the mandate of peacekeeping force in the context of a larger conflict, a legal campaign against an organization while conducting financial and military warfare.
* Entering the cyber domain - all the actors, in both sides, operate on way or another in cyber domain – from surveillance, gathering information and attacks.
* Managing and fighting for public opinion and media outlets - the battle over public opinion (domestic and international) and pointing out the support base of the adversary is key focal point in the supporting efforts of war. While this is not new, the importance of this subject is growing.
* Striving to de-legitimize the other side and accusing it of violating international law – Israel is in the epic center of stubborn battle to denunciate states and organizations on the a-symmetric side, especially those attempting to develop non-conventional weapons and terror, and on the other side defending the symmetrical side and right for self defense against such actors.

An additional characteristic that has rapidly evolved in a significant way, and a subject for designated discussion, is the learning process. The learning race between the various sides and actors became very quick, mainly thanks to the information transformation that enables learning in a parallel manner (as opposed to traditional serial/lateral learning processes). In the serial each side shares lessons learned with allies and partners. The outcome of this process is advancement after each conflict, even if it took place in a different area.

Examples of serial/ lateral learning, within a group/network, include dealing with IEDs in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan; Sub terrain warfare (Surprise and Hiding) in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and Afghanistan; Targeting and Fire processes – intelligence for precision strikes against key personnel, the fiscal battle against organization and foiling arms transfers; Al-Qaida’s distribution of terror techniques and methods to expose and foil them; and more.

The fact that we live in an era where information flows freely, enables a parallel learning process, meaning cross “sides” learning. It is often when once side prepares for the opponent’s future moves by studying the opponents learning and enhancement process, using open sources.

Examples for parallel learning include tracking websites distributing terrorist information thus preparing a response and countermeasures; taking advantage of the public arguments in democratic societies in order to locate frictions in legitimacy for advantage during war; and more.

The evolution of conflict will continue. Since the industries (especially in the third and fourth industrial revolutions) enable rapid changes and mass production. This means that the current era will exhaust itself in a manner of several decades, and not after centuries as in previous revolutions.

**What will the event that ends the wars under four dimensions dominance look like?**

In attempt to examine the next war in theoretically critical eyes, we must determine weather it will be the “final act” of war dominated in four dimensions, in a similar way the 1973 Yom-Kippur war and the 1991 Gulf war concluded the era of industrial wars, or we might be looking at a new kind of meeting point. We predict that we will encounter one more “concluding” event of the current era (of course, learning processes may prevent or delay this prediction).

In the next event the enemy will attempt to utilize to the fullest it’s operating procedures and capabilities:

1. Usage of precision guided missiles – shooting missiles with the ability to navigate and direct the impact to the desired target is in a way a counter measure to the power of the symmetrical force, and enables the a-symmetrical side to fire at sensitive strategic military targets and to enhance the damage scale and legitimacy. This threat is not relevant only to Israel, but to headquarters, military assets and national infrastructures of members in International coalition groups.
2. Jamming of outer-space capabilities such as GPS, satellite communication and navigation systems that are a substantial part of the symmetrical power and capabilities.
3. Utilizing to the extent cyber attacks and attempts to infiltrate and damage military and national networks (Water, Energy, Finance and etc.).
4. Maximizing the potential of mega terrorism - an attempt to achieve collateral damage of use of extreme Dissent**/** rogue terror groups in order to heavily damage civilian and national infrastructure (i.e. shooting or suicide bombs in energy plants, shopping and trade centers).
5. Use of non-conventional weapons – these capabilities are in the possessions of countries in the a-symmetrical side, and can be used in many way that enable denial or justification. In general, it seems like there is a big question mark on likelihood and potential of the usage of non-conventional weapons due to the fierce and significant retaliation expected by the symmetrical side.
6. Exhausting international law and battle for legitimacy – the outcomes of the maneuvers in the battlefield will quickly translate, and echoed, to media, diplomacy and legal actions by the symmetrical side.

This perspective is helping to accelerate the transition to the next era of warfare, as it is liberating us from the constraints of traditional thinking. Keeping that in mind, we still need an additional theoretical step focusing on the era of five dimensions warfare.

**The next era of warfare – the long conflicts**

What will be the characteristics of the upcoming wars, ones we can already point out to? It seems like the first feature will be extension of the conflict duration, an outcome of the cyber dimension. In the cyber dimension, the war is unclear, it is uncertain how you win or lose the war, the time is endless, and space is unlimited. In this sphere, it is nearly impossible for the decision makers to define victory in the classic approach. The cyber and information dimensions are causing the extension and expansion of conflicts all over the world. the transformation we discussed in this book causes has changed the way we perceive warfare in terms of victory, destruction and surrender. These terms used to be very clear in the dimensions where mankind fought, while today’s battlefield raises ambiguity. the second feature is the transformation happening in a larger scope of the conflict, in four different aspects:

1. prolonging the conflicts between people, countries and entities – long conflicts where one side has a more durability and greater chance of success. This is due to, in my opinion, how fast information flows and a time where things happen so quick, a singular event is not enough to create a strategic change of influence.
2. The conclusion will be in the transformation of one, or both, of the sides – when we talk about a deep-rooted cultural conflict that will change when one of the sides changes drastically or when both sides approach each other and make amends [[6]](#footnote-6).
3. Totality of fighting tools/means – all public and national resources are allocated and are being used for the long conflict. Demographics is one the main tools, using birth rates to tweak the construct of society in a specific year[[7]](#footnote-7), or migration to affect global balance[[8]](#footnote-8). The leading ethos in the world today creates an inversion between land and people – unlike the past, it is no accepted to conquer land, but accept a process of demographical conquer of a population in its land. On the other hand, the fiscal and cultural globalization enables shifts and changes in public opinion to the extent of denying the ability of key and extreme thought leaders to lead. In this kind of environment non-state actors, supported by governments have an important role.
4. The struggle for international legitimacy – a campaign/battle over international values is already underway. A cross cultural network, comprised by Iran, Venezuela and European human rights organizations on an extreme end, in the middle of the spectrum stand China and focal political parties in Europe, pose heavy questions marks on the foundations of the current world order - the exclusive right of super powers to obtain and maintain nuclear weapons; the borders of the war on terrorism and etc.

In the era of extended conflicts, the use of a military force will look like a short earthquake suddenly unleashing a lot of energy. These events will be relatively short and quick - minutes to several weeks - where military force will be employed in great mass, aiming to undercut and de-stabilize the balance created during the long conflict.

The main and most relevant result in these exchange of violence/fire rounds is the effect on the perception/influence, and policy, on the opponent and the International aspect of the conflict. This type of force employment contradicts the way the western world chose to operate in the last decade of long and extended military deployments conducting stabilization operations and a long-lasting battle against violent elements and organizations.

We are already in the era of this type of force employment:

1. The September 11th, 2001 attack (9/11) – was an attempt, by Al-Qaeda to change the balance of power with the U.S and U.S Supporters. The balance of power, along with the vast gaps in the legitimacy, made these actions harmful to the organization’s goals, rather then advancing them.
2. The war in Georgia – in two days of fighting[[9]](#footnote-9), using a much more superior military force, Russia was able to completely shift the internal balance in Georgia between the majority and the minority backed by Russia.
3. North Korea instigation - the North Koreans stay in the International focus by initiating actions every couple of months; nuclear testing, launching missiles and rockets, power maneuvers mainly in the sea against South Korea. By actin in this manner North Korea maintain the acknowledgment of the International community to their claims.
4. The Gaza Flotilla – the joint effort by government (mainly Turkey) and NGOs in June 2010, magnified due to the violent clash with the Israeli Navy, influenced the international balance point and attitude to the Israeli policy towards Gaza.
5. Operation “Defensive Shield” (2002) – in two weeks of power employment, with sufficient international legitimacy, Israel was able to change the power balance fighting terrorism between Israel and the Palestinians.

Force employment in the era of extended/prolonged conflicts have additional characteristics - the need to disperse efforts in multiple military and diplomatic/political fronts in the same time; both sides act with various organizations - Military, Secretive, militias and other civilian security forces, civilian organization and etc.; the battle of nuclear deterrence – weather by acquiring nuclear capabilities or denying adversaries of obtaining nuclear weapons using diplomatic/political means is part of the campaign; and more. Since the end goal of the prolonged conflict is to erode and change the identity of the opponent, a crucial and key milestone is exhaust the opponents military force – hence, denying a military of it’s power is a central tool in order to shift the balance of the conflict to other areas.

**The era of prolonged/extended conflicts – the response**

Some of the key states in the International community and the Middle East have already adopted the prolonged/extended conflict approach – China, Iran, Saudi Arabia – this is driven from their national culture of long term memory, on patience and ability to “wait it out”, predicting and hoping to preserve the current state or it getting better in the long term.

On the contrary,

On the contrary it seems like there is a need for a deep change in the typical western approach of concrete, significant and visible accomplishments on the short term. There are no “magic tricks” to a prolonged conflict, such as a decisive military victory or a regime change. An internal change in the core management of societies will not be a result of a foreign intervention and stabilization operations, but as a result of a long, winding process with foreign/external influence.

Consequently, the goal of the conflict needs to be a long-term transformation of the opponent, based on the following principles:

1. A wide range international consensus on the illegitimacy of it’s actions – there is a need for a consensus that regimes or organizations that deprive human rights, threat their environment and act with terrorism, development of weapons of mass destruction and etc, need to change, and at a certain level muse vanish from the world. There is no escape from creating a clear gap between our conduct and the conduct of the opponents not only in actual deeds but also in semblance. in this context, events, policies or acts that can be conceived as depriving human rights in its confine norm, do not serve, and even harm the goals of the long-range campaign.
2. Striving for self-adjustment (SAD) - reaching a transformation of the opponent is a process of self-adjustment. external factors like financial aids, political isolation and use of military force, can only accelerate the process, but not replace it.
3. Creating an ambience of stability and security - the extreme elements live in an environment of a conflict, therefore there is a need to distance the warfare and allow them to tangle in the variety of identities formed in steady time. There is no substitute for imposing liability and responsibility of security, social and economic welfare on the shoulders of the local powers, in order to moderate illegitimate actors. Security and stability should have greater interest to local population than external powers.
4. Promote the infiltration of globalization and progress – these minimize demographic trends (migration and birth) and strengthen the pressure and influence in the hands of moderate forces. It is very important to help the opponent to merge into globalization and not help him use it for illegitimate needs.
5. The core of the cultural aspect in a broad meaning – the continues influence on the opponents perception and the broader context of the conflict need to lead to a deep cultural change. There is a need to present the core issues and demand and battle the attempts of the opponent and international forces to create a cultural relativism. There are various ways to act in, including a battle for legitimacy on legal grounds; new media and news outlets; a continuous struggle on the commentary of the fighting, after it occurs – immediately and in the time after; and more.

Using these principals, military force employment should be fierce and short lasting, in order to create the time space between military encounters and the conditions for internal process and changes in the opponent’s system. Thus, force employment muse Include a reference to the long-lasting effects, long after the war is over. The achievement or lack of success in the military campaign is measured in a perspective of years, in the price of error is long term. This force the military and strategic planner to have a very dynamic-environment long term thought process, using simulations and war games.

In this situation, the margin is reduced between creating a weak perception and succeeding to create a long-term influence on the other side. Force employment must exist in the narrowing margin. A long military friction like in Iraq and Afghanistan must be avoided, because it fundamentally strengthens the extreme side, and instead focus on strikes and/or a time limited ground incursion. There is a need to find ways to strengthen defense components and foil capabilities in order to enlarge the space and margin for an operation by denying the opponents efforts to expand the perception of weakness.

The understanding that a decisive ending of this conflict stems from the opponent’s transformation, and that the results are measure in the long run and not by short term accomplishments and failures will transform the way we employ military force to better support goals.

Understanding the characteristics of the prolonged/extended conflicts and the ways to employ power in this era, as well as adapting to it, force a change in the methods of Western states, to include aspects of structure, operating procedures and methods, and cross organization and department coordination. The western states have the technological base, and the political, defense and cultural capabilities to conduct their changes and meet the new challenges. In a perspective of net-assessment, they have a clear edge over the opponents, but they will have to go through a deep transformation – a key condition for success.

The era prolonged/extended conflicts will force use more then all to adopt the operational focus method to manage operations. Long wars will force conducting intensive discussion on policy, strategy and enabling tactics. Strategic values and combat worths will not be able to be discussed with a transformation that the military platform is able of allowing itself, but will force reinvention and composing right connections in order to maintain a constant relevancy.

**Chapter Six - Conclusion and Vitality of Change / Transformation**

It may seem like al we showed thus far is not news – leaders deal with forming strategy and the military aspires to move policy and strategy forward via employing military force. We argue that the scope change and it’s velocity in the global and human context, in which the military force is used in a systemic age, ran over Rupert Smith’s question on the value of the power and force, but raised a larger question: what is the essence of force, not just on how the force is organized, not only by analyzing capabilities and available resources, but asking what is the new ethos of the military force? We suggest that the new ethos, in an era of dramatic changes in force employment is based on focusing the military action to a strategic purpose and integrating it with the additional and various efforts conducted by the statesmen. In addition, we offered the operational focus method as a tool to tie the strategic value to the combatant value as a holistic approach, based on theoretical grounds and fits to the construct of the IDF and the actions it will take in the near conflicts.

You must not belittle the question of the ethos of force employment, especially in Western militaries that are under the judgment of public opinion and the review and guidance of the Government. These questions raise tensions in a wide range of national aspects, such as allocation of National resources, prioritization of National efforts, motivation for military service and legitimation of force employment. The questions directly touch in the defense problem set and the National resiliency of each State. A clear and distinct example is the tensions the U.S Armed Forces force employment in Vietnam and Afghanistan when the narrative of the National resiliency aspires to minimize military intervention worldwide due to the high casualty price.

The tensions above emphasize questions on the core of the ethos the defines the construct of a military organization - sacrificing life in combat, protecting your country and interests. If we are to differentiate between the military and other National organizations (i.e police, intelligence agencies, foreign services, etc.) is the deep connection and identification with the organization and national existence. All other agencies and services are conceived as mission support or secondary in importance. This conception is not expected to pass in the foreseeable future, thus the strong correlation between the ethos of military force and the state.

The hefty question mark on the basic effectiveness of the military force to fulfill national objectives, in the new era, calls for the involvement of decision makers and senior military leadership. In our opinion, the change is not needed just for the effectiveness of force employment but is vital to the core existence of a military in a democratic state. The change we offer meets this need

This is where this book ends, but not complete. We are hopeful it will awake the inspiration needed in the highest military and government echelons. This is crucial in order to maintain the state’s capability to fulfill its national security policy with military means. The soft power – the political, economic and diplomatic means, as strong as they might me, history has shown there is not alternative to the state-owned military force – hard power. The military force still constitutes the ultimate capability of any country to fulfil policy, even when alternative means are available. The Inquiry on the change and Implications are critical to the preservation of the states military power, as part of the defense policy defined by the political echelon.

1. Smith, Rupert. *The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world*. Penguin UK, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The US Army, Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 (4-7), 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. We are relying on the accepted terms - design, planning and exe. There are in fact other methodologies for planning, where we will need to determine the role of the situational assessment group [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Superposition is a fundamental principle of quantum theory that states an event where multiple actions happen simultaneously. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. 1 להרחבה ראו יצחק בנבניסטי ומתניה צחי. "המנגנון המסדר או

   המנגנונים המאפשרים: כיצד גנרלים ומפקדות מבינים את ה"מצב"".

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6. Though there is some similarity between this realization and Huntington’s “Class of civilization” thesis, here we are not talking about a fight between types of cultures, but one between people – sometimes from the same culture, or a joint fight in a coalition that is cross-cultural (the connection between Iran and Venezuela as an example). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Creation of a Shiite majority in Lebanon; creating a Palestinian majority in Israel. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Muslim migration to Europe and the change of voting mix and eventually the political decision making in different countries; allocating the smartest people in the world, bringing them to the USA, in order to preserve a technological edge, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The war began on the night between August 7th and 8th  2008, and was formally finished in the cease-fire agreement on August 12th, but the main military maneuvers in the land and sea lasted two days. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)