**Realism.** Pure power driven actions are the hallmark of the realist model of world politics, with states motivated by the selfish desire to gain the upper hand on adversaries when opportunities present themselves. Within the Falklands campaign both Argentina and the United Kingdom demonstrated a realist motivation. Firstly, the Argentines realized the balance of military power had tipped in their favor in the South Atlantic, and the Junta quickly moved to exploit this situation with direct application of military force. It was assumed by the Argentines that the British lacked both the capability, and more vitally the will to counter any aggression so far from the United Kingdom. In addition, the Argentines realized that a successful campaign would bolster the nationalist sentiment within the country, and thereby solidify the Junta's control on domestic politics. The opponents of the new government would be on the losing side with regards to popular perception; thusly negating any political standing the minority parties would have for the next national election. From the British perspective, Thatcher acted as a complete realist in two primary ways. To begin with, the Falkland islanders were British citizens, and as such could not be conquered (captured) by a foreign power. To do so would not only surrender these people, but more importantly it would show the world that British will could be defeated around the periphery. In a Cold War, NATO centric environment, this lack of credibility could lessen the UK's standing within the organization, or more importantly allow for Soviet backed players to chip away at the remainder of British interests globally.

**Operational Art**. Both sides in the Falklands campaign displayed appropriate understanding and application of operational art, with the British doing a superior job linking the different levels of war. First, after establishing initial strategic goals, with an ultimate effort to regain the Falklands, the operational planning began to link resources to strategic endstate across all branches of the Ministry of Defense. A campaign of progressive force escalation was developed with several broad design goals: a. to negate the ability of the Argentine naval forces to interfere with British naval and landing operations in the South Atlantic, b. to stage landing forces in close proximity to the islands in order to either force a negotiated surrender or allow for an amphibious assault "with an aim of repossessing the Falkland Islands," and c. to minimize the role of Argentine shore based aviation assets via UK naval positioning and/or UK air interception capability. Second, these operational plans and actions were flexible and initially provided broad guidance with relatively little detail.

**Strategic Culture.** An understanding of the strategic culture, or the method, mindset, and persistent conditions that inform the national modus operandi of thought and action, is vital to the actions of any state in war. In the case of the Falklands, the culture of each player greatly influenced the method in which the war was conducted, beginning with the Argentine's competitive and non-unified relationship between its branches of the armed services. The animosity shown between the army, navy, and air force affected many components of the campaign, namely the coordination of naval surface and sub-surface units relative to air force actions versus British naval shipping, the lack of clear lines of command and control between the army led ground campaign and the air force acting in support, and the willingness of both the navy and air force to sustain damage was decided at the service level and not linked to a unified political or military goal. Next, the Argentines has a culture of being confident in limited wars and not being proficient or willing to fight larger campaigns or wars. The ramification of this was that while the initial occupation of the islands went well, the military leadership was unprepared to coordinate a larger war against a European power, and as a result, the Argentine military government could not efficiently allocate resources or tie military success/actions to political aims. On the contrary, British strategic culture was based off long traditions of expeditionary naval campaigns. While materially and politically the British had not acted in an offensive nature in some time, the roots of rapidly generated and under-resourced campaigns, across all parts of the earth was deeply ingrained in the psyche of the UK military leaders and common soldiers, and as such led to a willingness to act a true belief in both the merits and inevitable successes of such an expedition. Also, the justice of righting a perceived wrong drove the British. The willingness to sustain even severe casualties in defense of citizens and western ideals had long been a part of British thought and justification for military campaigns.

**Net assessment.** Both Argentina and the United Kingdom conducted a form of net assessment when it came to assessing the strategic state of affairs in the opposing nation. From the Argentine point of view, they were able to make a holistic summary of national, British, and world opinion, as well as an estimate of material means to conduct the war. Areas of concentration were on the political stance and inclinations of the United States, Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations (UN), and members of the UN Security Council with special focus on the United States and Soviet Union. Additionally, British military capability, force positioning and readiness, and British/NATO treaty obligations and focus were considered to gauge possible level of British response. From the British point of view, aspects of Argentine military capability, with emphasis on naval and air forces were looked at, political reactions of multi-national organizations were assessed, and domestic military capability and public sentiment were calculated. These assessments were updated continuously within Whitehall, with the holistic view across the DIME spectrum being modified and understood through series of daily briefings.

**Intelligence Surprise.** In the case of the Falklands, the greatest intelligence surprise came in the initiation of the war by the Argentines against conventional UK wisdom. Up until early 1982 Argentina had routinely stated that it was the rightful owner of the Falklands, and had used repeated actions within the UN to attempt to settle this claim. Occasional military exercises or force build-ups would be undertaken as a semi-provocative action, but in every case those actions would give way to a peaceful endstate due to international and/or domestic political pressure. In the months leading up to the conflict, several of these indicators began to surface within British intelligence. The coup that placed Galtieri at the head of the Argentine government was not the first of its kind in the region or even within Argentina, but what should have been noticed was his significantly more bellicose personality and the clear need to divert domestic attention away from the economic troubles befalling the nation. Next, while British intelligence knew of the shipment of French Exocet anti-ship missiles to the Argentines, it saw these as weapons of strategic defense, and did not assume that this capability would alter Argentine strategic calculus vis-à-vis the naval balance of power in the South Atlantic. Lastly, while Argentina began to perform several tactical shaping actions (additional naval 'surveys' on the Falklands and South Georgia) as an escalation of physical hostility it was assessed that the additional British presence would deter the Junta from action. This miscalculation delayed the appropriate allocation of resources (be them naval or diplomatic) until after the crisis had begun.

**Analytical Biases.** From the Argentinean perspective, the Junta wrongfully assumed that both the United States and OAS would not-support a British (colonial) recapture of the Falklands. This assumption biased most of the decisions that would follow, as aspects such as material and territorial support would not be given to the UK, that a rapid campaign would lead to a peace process that would have US led intervention in the UN ensuring a favorable outcome for Argentina, and that the nations surrounding Argentina (namely Chile) would remain passive (along the border) while Argentina was involved in a conflict with a European nation. From the British side, the most noticeable bias was that the Argentines would not engage in any serious combat with British naval or air forces and that the simple presence of a first world force in the South Atlantic would be enough to ensure the repossession of the islands. This bias, generated from years of Argentine inactivity, and assumption that United States trained and educated Argentine military leaders would not fight a war without heavy material superiority, and a cultural disdain, was critical in influencing the rush to the South Atlantic without a fully formed naval task group, and the amount of risk the British Navy was willing to take in contact with the Argentine Air Force.

**Deterrence.** The United Kingdom executed a policy of deterrence by denial in the placement of both Naval and Royal Marine Forces forward in the South Atlantic with the goal of causing casualties to any Argentine invasion force, thereby souring Argentine domestic support for the war, as well as legitimizing the diplomatic position within the UN. They also used deterrence by punishment with a stated government policy of military response to any aggressive action by a hostile nation, as well as by the clear understanding that the UK would lobby the UN to impose clear economic sanctions on an aggressor nation, as well as by the historical willingness to embark on military actions in defense of British citizens around the globe.

**Adaptation.** The United Kingdom adapted significantly throughout the campaign, beginning with the use of non-traditional amphibious assault ships, the use of a close air support aircraft (Sea Harrier) in an air-to-air combat role, and the use of anti-submarine helicopters to serve as troop and SOF transport. Additionally, the methods of employing surface navy ships as an anti-air platform, was an improvisation driven by failures of certain technology and the need to pair complimentary weapon systems. Additionally, modifications to standing doctrine were made in that amphibious shipping was kept near the landing beaches and inside the opponents air space, out of a desire to use the same restrictive terrain to deny the Argentine Air Force significant time over the target area with which to acquire UK naval targets.

**Wishful Thinking.** The Argentine plan was largely based around wishful thinking. First, there was the belief that the United States would not back its longstanding ally and trading partner to remain neutral or support a South American simply in defense of a now dated policy of Monroe Doctrine proved to be unsound judgment. Next, and along the same line, the Argentines hoped that the OAS would also come to its aid by unifying against the UK in the UN, and by providing material and economic support as needed. Also, there was a hope that the UK, who were in an economic downturn and were committed heavily to their NATO mission, would somehow not seek a military resolution to the conflict. Lastly, there was hope that the USSR would veto all resolutions thereby fragmenting world condemnation of the attack, and allowing the Argentines to negotiate an armistice.

**Offset.** There was a divergence from the status quo as the Argentines saw it, and the strategic reality of the situation with Britain in the South Atlantic. First, the move into power of the Thatcher government had been driven by a move of the British people from a labor and isolationist camp into one of a more nationalistic and conservative flavor. The British people were now willing to once again sacrifice for the edge of the empire, and the politicians, seeking to consolidate there standing within NATO and with the United States were willing to take on a more force-reliant defensive role in world affairs. Additionally, the United States, busy supporting anti-communist regimes in Latin America, had begun to focus more heavily in the defeat of communism via the collapse of the USSR, and as such now paid much more mind to its relationship with European allies, and less with the far southern Latin American states. This shift in opinion by the Argentines was completely missed and drove a poor decision-making calculus.