|  |
| --- |
| **Israel Defense Forces** INDC & The Military Colleges |



**INDC (46th Class) Southern Tour**

**October 26-28, 2018**

**Reviews and Background Material**

1. The Gaza Strip
2. Bedouins in Southern Israel
3. Refugees, Illegal Immigrations
4. Egypt - Israel Relations
5. The Negev
6. IAF
7. Jordan – Israel Relations
8. Challenges to the Maritime Security in the Gulf of Eilat

**The Military Threat in the Gaza Strip**

In the last decade, the State of Israel has had three highly intense conflicts. All of them were facing the Gaza Strip and the main enemy in the area – Hamas. In each of the confrontations, Israel's military superiority was clear and Hamas suffered severe casualties, but despite this, Hamas entered the next round stronger, more organized, and more dangerous.

**What are the sources of Hamas' power? What tools do they have and what are they planning for the next campaign? These questions will be briefly discussed in this chapter.**



First, a brief reminder: The Islamic Resistance Movement is a religious movement affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt. The movement was established in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip and spread during the first intifada to Judea and Samaria. In the 1990s, the movement was an opposition - violent and stubborn - to the process of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and carried out a long series of terror attacks against the civilian population in Israel in an attempt to "derail the process".

The peak of Hamas' terrorist activity came in the so-called second intifada in the early 2000s, when the Hamas movement led the Palestinian organizations to carry out severe and deadly terror attacks against the civilian home front. Simultaneously, the Hamas branch in the Gaza Strip began its efforts to expand its arsenal of weapons and began to acquire guerrilla capabilities and semi-military capabilities (such as high-trajectory weapons, anti-missile weapons, explosive tunnels), with weapons smuggled mainly from Iran through Sinai and smuggling tunnels into the Gaza Strip.

In 2006, Hamas participated in the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and won a majority. In 2007, when Israel was no longer present in the Gaza Strip, Hamas carried out a coup against the PA in view of its recent refusal to implement the election results. The meaning of this is that for the first time in history, an organization created by the Muslim Brotherhood had become a de facto sovereign over a territory.

From the military perspective, the takeover of the Gaza Strip was a significant turning point in Hamas. From an oppositional terrorist organization, it became an "army" with the purpose of protecting the movement's strategic achievement and preserving the Strip. In the decade following the takeover of Gaza, the Hamas movement underwent rapid evolution, demonstrating significant learning capabilities, both from the Hezbollah model and from the ongoing friction with the IDF, and developed, in concepts and capabilities, into a significant semi-military organization.

**What is the source of Hamas' strength?**

****Hamas's main sources of power are not inherent in military force but rather in two "soft" components - its radical fundamentalist ideology and its assimilation into the Gaza Strip: above ground, underground and among the population. The combination of a mobilized movement, motivated by religious and national fervor, which views patience ("sabra"[[1]](#footnote-2)) as valuable, and operates within a largely sympathetic civilian population, provides Hamas with an a-symmetric opposite of Israel's military might.

**What Tools are Available to Hamas?**

1. Hamas has **more than 20,000 active fighters during emergencies**. The military force is organized in five regional brigades, according to the area cells in the Gaza Strip (the northern Gaza Strip, Gaza City, the central camps, Khan Yunis and Rafah). Most of the fighting force of Hamas consists of operatives from the ground forces, whose job is to defend a given area and to hit maneuvering forces that will try to conquer it.
2. In addition to the ground forces, Hamas has several thousand fighters in special units: the elite forces (Nachba force) which is a highly capable force, two thirds of which support the defense effort, while about one third is intended for offensive activity penetrating Israel (via the underground or the subterranean medium). In addition, Hamas has an offensive Naval force whose purpose is to carry out sea raids against targets in Israel, and Air forces, whose purpose is to attack Israeli aircrafts, and whose capabilities are limited.
3. **Tunnel infrastructure** - Hamas in the Gaza Strip has been using the tunnels for many years as a tactical tool. Over the years, the tunnels were used mainly for terror attacks (from the explosion of the Hermit outpost to the abduction of Gilad Shalit), the smuggling of weapons and equipment from Sinai to Rafah, and the survival of local forces in recent years. To put it simply, Hamas has turned the underground into a fourth combat medium, alongside land, air, and sea, and Hamas's tunnel system, which is now built as a "metro", is dozens of kilometers long, and may be roughly classified into three groups :
4. **Offensive tunnels** – tunnels dug out of civilian infrastructure on the outskirts of the built-up area of Israeli territory. These tunnels are intended to enable Hamas to carry out raids on IDF forces and near-fence settlements and, in some cases, to penetrate deep into Israeli territory, and double the "accumulation of assets" in the form of abductees who can be transferred to the Gaza Strip With a high cognitive effect that will influence public opinion in Israel and the region.
5. **"Defensive" Tunnels** - Most Hamas tunnels are located deep inside the built-up area of the Gaza Strip and are not intended to cross into Israel. These tunnels are intended to enable a number of purposes: moving forces in secrecy and immunity between sectors; attacking maneuvering forces from underground; supplying weapons and other means, granting immunity to the military command and control, and launching rockets and mortars. In fact, this is the infrastructure which Hamas is relying to function on, in the next war.
6. **Smuggling tunnels** - tunnels from the Sinai to Rafah, intended to transport raw materials and weapons into the Gaza Strip. In recent years, as a result of intensive Egyptian activity, the number of smuggling tunnels has been greatly reduced, but these remain a vital lifeline for the military industry in the Gaza Strip.
7. Hamas's other strategic array along the tunnels is **high-trajectory weapons**. In fact, this is the main tool Hamas has to attack the State of Israel. Hamas currently has thousands of rockets. In view of the effective defense system in the hands of the State of Israel, headed by the Iron Dome system, Hamas' ability to carry out large-scale lethal launch attacks into Israel has been significantly reduced.   
   In light of this, Hamas' fire doctrine now includes two main purposes:   
   disabling the routine of life in all of Israel, including in the Dan region and in northern Israel. This is in order to harm the Israeli economy and to influence the consciousness of the Israeli public. In addition, Hamas uses short-range lethal launches against IDF forces and in the vicinity of the fence-related communities, in the range in which Iron Dome does not operate.
8. Alongside the tunnels and the rocket array, Hamas has a few dozen unmanned aerial vehicles, some of which are intended for attack, as well as unmanned naval vessels for attack purposes.

**How does Hamas envision a future campaign in the Gaza Strip?**

1. In Hamas's view, it is preferable that a future campaign in the Gaza Strip be initiated by Hamas, which will enable it to realize the "surprises" it is planning, before the IDF's defense system is thickened: Hamas's "opening strike" is expected to include raids from the underground medium and / or naval forces, whose purpose is to achieve achievements (kidnappings and moral) at the opening stages of the war.
2. At the same time, the war will begin with fire, which will include launches of dozens of rockets a day at the Israeli home front and the border area (forces and settlements). The shooting is planned to continue throughout the fighting, in order to maintain continuity and serve the purpose of disrupting the daily routine. At the same time, Hamas will continue to try to carry out   
   offensive activities inside Israel (from the ground, from underground, from the air and from the sea).
3. Hamas will prepare for defense based on the underground infrastructure and the built-up civilian area. Hamas is aware of its inability to stop an Israeli maneuver, but its purpose is to delay the maneuver and collect a heavy price (casualties and kidnappings) that will affect the Israeli public's consciousness and Israel's willingness to further expand the maneuver.

To complete the picture, it should be noted that in this chapter we dealt with the main threat from the Gaza Strip, which is Hamas. It should be remembered that alongside Hamas there are a number of other armed groups operating in the Gaza Strip, but their threat posed to Israel is reduced.

Among them is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a movement funded by Iran, which has a number of thousands of operatives, and in particular a wide rocket array, which is no smaller (but at the same level) than that of Hamas. In addition, the organization has a limited number of offensive tunnels, and its ground forces are less equipped than Hamas.

Alongside them, there are a number of small and medium-sized organizations (from the Salafiyeh Jihadiyya to the military wing), whose capabilities are limited to short-range rocket attacks.

**The Disengagement from Gaza - September 2005**

**Outline**

The disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria, which took place in September 2005, was initiated by the Government of Israel, headed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In this review, prior to the international tour of the south, we will focus only on the disengagement from Gaza.

The disengagement was a strategic move that affected all the national security arteries in southern Israel: security, political, social and economic-wise.

In the disengagement, all Jews, some 8600 in number, were evacuated from 21 settlements, and all IDF forces and military bases were evacuated (see Appendix 1). By the end of the operation, the State of Israel positioned itself on the Green Line borders.

**The Goals and Rationale of the Disengagement[[2]](#footnote-3):**

1. There is no Palestinian partner with whom it is possible to advance in a bilateral peace process. The stagnation inherent in the present situation is harmful. In order to emerge from this stalemate, Israel must initiate in an action that will not depend on Palestinian cooperation.
2. The plan will lead to a better security situation, at least in the long term.
3. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria will minimize the argument with the Palestinian population and has the potential to improve the condition of Palestinian entity and the Palestinian economy.
4. The disengagement will negate the validity of the claims against The State of Israel regarding its responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
5. A letter was received from President Bush, in which he pledged to support Israel's position on the following issues: denial of the right of return, leaving the settlement blocs in Israel's hands and failure to carry out a political process with the Palestinians before the liquidation of the terrorist organizations.

**Results of the Disengagement**

  Security Echelon

* Change in borders and in settlements requiring protection. After the evacuation of all the Jewish settlements and all IDF military bases from the Gaza Strip, many points of friction with the Palestinians were removed.
* The internal Israeli legitimization of the use of force vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip increased, as demonstrated by the intensity of the large operations and the conduction of the campaign between them. Israel refrained from using these forces before the disengagement, despite high numbers of Israeli casualties.
* After the disengagement, rocket launches and terrorist attacks continued. These led Israel to attack the Gaza Strip in a number of major operations: 'Summer Rains' (after the abduction of Gilad Shalit), 'Hot Winter', 'Cast Lead', 'Pillar of Defense' and 'Protective Edge'. The Strip is under land, sea and air blockade.
* High-trajectory fire: Prior to the disengagement, the rocket launches hit mostly Israeli communities inside the Gaza Strip, in adjacent communities and in the city of Sderot. During the second intifada, more than 500 rockets and 6,000 mortar shells were fired at the settlements in Gaza, Israeli settlements and IDF outposts[[3]](#footnote-4). After the disengagement, the firing range was significantly increased, hitting more cities in southern Israel (Beer Sheva, Ashdod, Ashkelon and Netivot), as well as Gush Dan, Jerusalem and even Haifa. Ben-Gurion Airport was shut down following launches from the Gaza Strip. Between the disengagement and 2014, about 12,000 rockets and 6,000 mortar shells were fired. See Exhibit 3.2[[4]](#footnote-5) and Fig. 4[[5]](#footnote-6). After Operation Protective Edge, in which the southern communities suffered a lot of damage, the government launched a project to protect residential apartments in the communities adjacent to the Gaza Strip, within a range of up to 7 kilometers from the border of the Gaza Strip (Prime Minister's Office website, 28.7.2016).
* After the Hamas takeover, there is no security coordination as there is with the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria.
* Subterranean capabilities: In the first years of the intifada and until the disengagement, the tunnels built by the terrorist organizations were used to carry out infiltration and bomb attacks in an attempt to attack IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. After the disengagement, with no Israeli presence in the strip and few operations carried out, the Hamas substantially increased its subterranean capabilities. A substantial "underground" area of ​​tunnels dug along the border with Egypt, through which thousands of kilograms of explosives and standard weapons such as Grad rockets were smuggled and fired – in mid-2008 – towards Ashkelon and Netivot. In addition, underground launching sites and a network of bunkers used for hiding and storage were constructed as well[[6]](#footnote-7).
* Intelligence capabilities within the Strip were harmed. An example is the failure to locate and rescue Gilad Shalit for 5 years.
* Casualties: Between 1967 and the 2005 disengagement, 230 Israelis and 2600 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza Strip, an average of six Israelis killed each year[[7]](#footnote-8). In the ten years after the disengagement, 125 Israelis were killed, an average of 12.5 deaths a year[[8]](#footnote-9). From 2001 until the disengagement, during the second intifada, 113 Israelis were killed in the south as a result of the fighting in Gaza - an average of about 25 a year[[9]](#footnote-10). From the disengagement to 2014, about 3,300 Palestinians were killed in the three major operations.
* In addition to the fatalities, after the Disengagement, Gaza suffered extensive damage to infrastructures and the destruction of thousands of houses.

Political Echelon

* + One of the defined goals - promoting the peace process - was not realized. Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in the 2006 elections and in a military coup in 2007. The peace process did not advance in Judea and Samaria as well.
  + The implications of a unilateral move without an agreement - an agreement that could have included a commitment to demilitarize the Gaza Strip, an international commitment, a return from the Palestinians, and more - were the weakening of Israeli deterrence.
  + Israel has not achieved international legitimacy despite the withdrawal to the 1967 borders. For example,
    - The Goldstone report after Operation Cast Lead.
    - Continued perception of Israel as responsible for the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip due to the closure.
  + Bush's commitments in his letter to Sharon, received in exchange for the disengagement, were not honored by the Obama administration, which replaced the Bush administration[[10]](#footnote-11).
  + The Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip and its implications for the Palestinian Authority, the deterioration of relations with Turkey (The Mavi Marmara flotilla for example), Egypt (terrorism leaking from Gaza to Sini for example) and other international bodies.

**Social Echelon** – THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

***Israelis in Gaza Envelope Protest Deteriorated Security Situation***

Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman has accused his fellow ministers of failing to fight Hamas in the Gaza Strip and declared his support for demonstrators against the policy, complaining that the government's policy is helping Hamas consolidate its rule. Lieberman said: “There is no possibility to negotiate with Hamas. Without having to apply a heavy blow to Hamas, the strongest impact we can, we restore calm in the south”.

The majority of Israelis in towns surrounding Gaza are considered opposition parties and tend to search for a radical solution to the conflict and stop the waiting policy. They complain about the current tension, the "return marches" and what accompany them of incendiary balloons and kites. In a related development, thousands of Israelis from the Gaza envelope area, which refers to the region of Israel surrounding the Gaza Strip, demonstrated on Sunday against what they called “**the deteriorating security situation” and raised signs reading that “the lives of the envelope residents are not cheaper than the lives of Tel Aviv residents”.** Asked about the demonstrations, Lieberman said: "Gaza border communities' are 100 percent right. This situation has been going on for seven months. We've exhausted all options. Nevertheless, some 40 rockets were launched at southern Israel over the past weekend, and this clearly cannot continue.”

Source: <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1442941/israelis-gaza-envelope-protest-deteriorated-security-situation>

***A new day in the Gaza Envelope***

“Rather than harvesting our wheat when it is most appropriate agronomically, our farmers borrow harvesters from other communities – because the quicker they harvest, the less chance they have of losing their field to incendiary kite fire. Rather than buckling their kids in on their bikes or in cars when taking them to child care, mothers leave the kids unstrapped, so they can pull them out to safety more quickly if there is a red alert. Hamas decides when there is quiet in the area and Hamas decides when there will be escalation. WE, for lack of clear long-term strategy, knee-jerk.”

**I trust the IDF totally**. With my life. I appreciate all they do to keep us safe. However once again, our current government has proven itself to be reactionary rather than proactively making changes that can improve the lives of all of us here in the western Negev. Once again, our leaders have put us in the position where rather than our governnent deciding what our daily lives will look like, Hamas is pulling the punches.

Source: <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1442941/israelis-gaza-envelope-protest-deteriorated-security-situation>

***Resilience: Reflections of a teacher from the Gaza envelope***

It starts with a metallic crackle as the opening chord, a female voice, padded by an eerie echo. It whips you out of your chair or bed or car, wherever you are, and catapults you to your nearest safe haven (if you are lucky enough to have such a spot nearby). There, you wait to hear the explosion. You try to calm your breathing. You check that your loved ones are also safe (providing you had the wherewithal to grab your phone first) and then you try to get back to what you were doing, before you had to run for your life.

In retrospect, following through with it despite our exhaustion, despite our concerns that the cease fire would not hold: it was the best thing we could have done. It was the most excellent, educational and emotional gift we could have given our students. **Returning to routine as quick as possible following trauma, is the healthiest thing one can do.** In this case, we provided a routine of sorts: the students were able to be with their friends, rather than being stuck at home on their own or with family. But it was not really routine, since the learning was done through puzzles or trivia games or a Druze tents or theater games, just to name a few. They learned English but also had the opportunity for an emotional outlet, in a familiar, safe environment, with peers and adults who understood what they had just been through.

Source: <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/resilience-reflections-of-a-teacher-from-the-gaza-envelope/>

***Perspective of a young mother in the Gaza Envelope***

From the child who was born here. The one who has been aware and afraid of the possible dangers since she was young — since any of us really worried about infiltration. From MY baby: The perspective of a young mother in the Gaza Envelope:

“Last night the piercing alarm of the incoming rocket warning jolted me from my sleep, flooding my body with so much adrenaline that I couldn’t get back to sleep again. Today, Ziv, who understood that something bad was happening to us, lay in the safe room so frightened that she simply “shut down.” Her body understood that a 3-year-old should not have the ability to deal with a battlefield, so she just fell asleep.

“**This is NOT the life we deserve. And this is CERTAINLY not the life our children deserve.”**

Source: <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/perspective-of-a-young-mother-in-the-gaza-envelope/>

**Economic Echelon** – A HELPING HAND

***Sderot and Gaza Border Communities Factories Receive Helpful Economic Boost***

The Ministry of Economy Investment Center, headed by Nahum Itzkowitz, has authorized a string of financial benefits for industrial plants, companies, and corporations in the town of Sderot and the “Gaza envelope” communities.

The financial benefits, totaling a NIS 20 million, include significant financial leniencies that are part of a strategic multi-year program for the development of Sderot and Gaza border communities that were hard hit by Hamas rockets during the recent summer war. Companies within 7 kilometers of the Gaza border that were financially hurt by the war are now permitted to delay financial obligations to the Investment Center and submit aid plans at a later date as well.

According to the Ministry of Economy, the leniencies involve obtaining authorization letters for active plans, for which the security situation during Operation Protective Edge affected the factory’s ability to meet the targets and limitations as defined in the authorization letters. The decision will apply to plans approved by the administration from January 1, 2010 and onwards.

The leniencies will apply for 24 months from the day of the administration’s authorization of the decision, so as to allow the factories enough time to act and put the authorization letters into effect after the end of the security incidents, which affected the communities of southern Israel and the production plants’ ability to meet the targets of the authorization letters.“We promised to take care of the residents of southern Israel and we are keeping that promise,” emphasized Minister of the Economy, Naftali Bennett.

“**Business owners form the backbone of life in the region and we will continue to provide them with all the help they need to succeed**, through the Investment Center, and with the aid of all the other bodies and relevant units at the Ministry of Economy,” added Bennett.

Source: <https://www.breakingisraelnews.com/24490/sderot-gaza-border-communities-factories-receive-helpful-economic-boost/>

**COGAT (Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories)** - The Coordination and Liaison Administration to the Gaza Strip

​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Assistance to the Gaza Strip entails constant calculated risk management. On the one hand, Israel provides humanitarian assistance to the residents of the Strip. Simultaneously it contends with the terrorist organization Hamas, which controls the territory, and attempts to exploit the aid intended for Gaza’s civilian residents.

The Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) for Gaza is responsible for the implementation of the civilian policy of the Israeli government towards the Gaza Strip. The CLA has two branches located adjacent to the Strip. These offices facilitate the daily traffic of goods and people into and out of Gaza. The northern branch neighbors Erez Crossing, which serves mainly as a terminal for pedestrian traffic between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The southern branch is located at Kerem Shalom Crossing, which an entry and exit point for various goods. On a daily basis materials including food, furniture, medical equipment and medicines, electronic appliances, building materials, etc. are transferred into Gaza. Additionally, in order to assist the local economy, the goods produced inside Gaza are exported through the crossing. Exports include agricultural produce, textiles, iron, among others and are sold in the Judea and Samaria region, in Israel, and around the world.

The Gaza CLA works to assist the local Palestinian population in a wide range of areas. This includes importing and exporting goods, coordinating passage of residents to Israel and abroad (primarily for commercial and medical purposes) facilitating passage for international delegations and aid workers, promoting projects under the leadership of the international community (e.g. building schools, medical centers, community centers, housing), , and assistance in the fields of agriculture, transportation, industry and commerce. The CLA coordinates with all the relevant Israeli actors, including the Israel Defense Forces, the Land Crossings Authority in the Ministry of Defense, the Tax Authority, various government ministries, security forces, and others.

Unfortunately, since the terror organization Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, they have systematically attempted to exploit humanitarian assistance designated for civilian residents. Stealing humanitarian materials and taking advantage of aid programs to tighten their control over the population and expand their terrorist infrastructure poses a real and significant threat to Israel's security.

**Sderot**

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sderot>

Sderot is a western Negev city and former development town in the Southern District of Israel. In 2017 it had a population of 25,138.

Sderot is located less than a mile from Gaza (the closest point is 840 m), and is notable for having been a major target of Qassam rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. Between 2001 and 2008, rocket attacks on the city killed 13 people, wounded dozens, caused millions of dollars in damage and profoundly disrupted daily life. Although rocket fire subsided after the Gaza War, the city has come under rocket attack on occasion since that time. Notable for its many bomb shelters, some of which are built in the form of children's play areas in school playgrounds, Sderot is infamously referred to as the "Bomb Shelter Capital of the World."

In 2010 the city had a population of 21,900. The national makeup of the city was 94% Jewish, 5.5% other non-Arabs, and Arabs less than 1%.

In 2012, the government approved nearly $59 million worth of economic benefits for Sderot to strengthen the economy, boost employment and subsidize psycho-social programs for the city's residents.

In 2010, after a decline in charitable donations, the municipality revealed that it was on the verge of bankruptcy.

**Rocket fire from Gaza**

Sderot lies one kilometer (0.62 miles) from the Gaza Strip and town of Beit Hanoun. Since 2001, during the beginning stage of the Second Intifada, and more so since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, the city sustained constant rocket fire from Qassam rockets launched by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The city continued to suffer from rocket fire until the Gaza War's end in 2009, which brought an end to regular rocket fire aimed at the city. However, the city has still suffered from rocket fire on occasion ever since. Despite the imperfect aim of these homemade projectiles, they caused deaths and injuries, as well as significant damage to homes and property, psychological distress and emigration from the city. The Israeli government installed a "Red Color" alarm system to warn citizens of impending rocket attacks, although its effectiveness was questioned. Citizens were only given 7–15 seconds to reach shelter after the sounding of the alarm.

In May 2007, a significant increase in shelling from Gaza prompted the temporary evacuation of thousands of residents. By November 23, 2007, 6,311 rockets had fallen on the city. Yediot Ahronoth reported that during the summer of 2007, 3,000 of the city's 22,000 residents (consisting mostly of the city's key upper and middle class residents) left for other areas, out of Qassam rocket range. Russian billionaire Arcadi Gaydamak organised a series of relief programs for residents unable to leave. On December 12, 2007, after more than 20 rockets landed in the Sderot area in a single day, including a direct hit to one of the main avenues, Sderot mayor Eli Moyal announced his resignation, citing the government's failure to halt the rocket attacks. Moyal was persuaded to retract his resignation.

In January 2008, British journalist Seth Freedman of The Guardian described Sderot as a city of near-deserted streets and empty malls and cafes. In March 2008, the mayor said that the population had dropped by 10–15%, while aid organizations said the figure was closer to 25%. Many of the families that remained were those who could not afford to move out or were unable to sell their homes. Studies found that air raid sirens and explosions have caused severe psychological trauma in some residents. According to a study carried out at Sapir Academic College in 2007, some 75% of residents aged 4-18 were suffering from PTSD, including sleeping disorders and severe anxiety, in the wake of rocket attacks on the city, and 1,000 residents were receiving psychiatric treatment at the community mental health center. From mid-June 2007 to mid-February 2008, 771 rockets and 857 mortar bombs were fired at Sderot and the western Negev, an average of three or four each a day.

**Appendices:**

Photo 1 - Gaza Strip before the Disengagement

Gaza

Egypt

Israel

The territory of the Gaza Strip was conquered by Egypt and then by Israel. Since 2007, the Gaza Strip has been under control of Hamas.

Mediterranean Sea

Image source: Wikipedia

Photos 2, 3 - Mortar shell and rocket launchings after the disengagement (summary of 2015, ISA website)


2014-2016 Mortar shells launched before "Operation protective Edge"

2014 - 16 mortar shells launched before Operation Protective Edge



2014 - 205 rockets launched before Operation Protective Edge

Figure 4: Rocket ranges from Gaza by type of weaponry and year (Mida website, 25.8.2016)



**Bedouins in Southern Israel**

**Outline**

The Bedouins are Semitic tribes originating in the Arabian Peninsula. In the mid-1940s, there were between 70,000 and 90,000 Bedouins in Israel (between 55,000 and 65,000 of them in the Negev), which constituted about 7-9% of all Muslim Arabs in Israel.

Bedouins in Israel can be divided into two groups: the Bedouins in the Negev, where they lead a semi-nomadic lifestyle[[11]](#footnote-12), residing in unrecognized villages and towns, and the Bedouin in the north who live in villages and towns[[12]](#footnote-13). The Bedouin community constitutes about 3.5% of Israel's population, with the entire Arab and Muslim sector in Israel constituting almost 20% of the total population.

The Bedouin natural population growth rate is among the highest in the world. Estimates in the middle of the last decade showed varied increases between 5.5%[[13]](#footnote-14) and over 7%. The significance of these numbers is, at the very least, that the Bedouin population doubled every 13 years or so. Today, estimates suggest a decline in the fertility rate of the Bedouin population, and that as of 2017 some 240,000 Bedouin are living in the Negev. These are only estimates as many Bedouins live in the so-called "Diaspora," i.e., in villages that are not recognized by the state authorities and have not yet attained municipal status. This excludes Rahat or other permanent towns.[[14]](#footnote-15)

**The Negev Bedouin – Customs and Tradition**

The impression is that the problem is about land, because the Bedouins, who live scattered over the area, have built houses on land that belongs to the state without permission or building permits, without general planning or infrastructure. Now the state wants to put matters in order, so questions arise such as how much each Bedouin should receive as part of the arrangement and how much monetary compensation, he will get for the territory that he gives up, despite the fact that no Bedouin has or had any proof of ownership of the land that he claims is his. Until today, all of the Bedouins’ legal claims that have reached the courts have failed because of this, and now the state is interested in solving the matter of illegal Bedouin settlements through legal procedures.

Another problem related to the Bedouins is the problem of polygamy. Approximately four years ago (April 21, 2009), in The Marker, Haaretz’s economic supplement, Meirav Arlozorov published information stating that at that time, 5,829 women were listed as single mothers in the Negev, who had 23,855 children between them. At that time, 155 women had 10 children each, and there were even two women with as many as 17 children each. Anyone can easily understand that these are not single mothers, but each woman is the second, third or fourth wife married, according to Islamic Shari’a, to one man, and living together with him in one household. If this was the situation four years ago, what is the situation today?

The current situation is made possible because of two factors, cultural and economic. The cultural factor is that within the traditional Bedouin culture, a man is expected to marry more than one woman in order to prove his manhood. A man who lives with one woman is thought to be weak and worthless. In addition, a man hopes to expand his family as much as possible so that it will have more economic, social and political weight in the system of Bedouin society. For example: the number of votes in elections to the local council will be greater, so all of the candidates will come to him to solicit his support.

The economic factor in polygamy is that the government welfare institution grants subsidies according to children’s benefits for each woman separately, regardless of whether she reports herself as married or single, so bringing children into the world is a productive business. This year (July, 26, 2013), in the Tzedek supplement of the Makor Rishon newspaper, Yehuda Yifrach publicized the fact that Bedouin families receive hundreds of millions of shekels per year from government welfare programs by means of fictional divorces in Shari’a court, awarding negligible alimony to the “divorcees” (who usually continue living with their husbands) so that the government welfare institution would be obligated to give them supplemental payments.

The entire story of polygamy in the Negev is very puzzling, since polygamy is against the law in Israel. Therefore the question immediately arises: why does the state not enforce this law on the Bedouins, and why does it finance polygamy among them by granting children’s benefits and income supplements? The answer is clear: the state understands that the issue is a cultural matter related to the Bedouin sector so it prefers to pay them, using resources that would have been available to other sectors, just to keep the Bedouins quiet, so they will not demonstrate and not block the roads.

Another matter connected to marriage is unions between relatives. Most couples in the Negev are relatives, and the result is that many children suffer from genetic diseases, some of which are severe and life-threatening. The high rate of infant mortality within the Bedouin sector stems in part from this reason. The state must allocate many resources to care for the children who suffer from genetic defects. Marriage between relatives is also a cultural matter related to tribal conventions.

Another cultural matter related to Bedouins is the matter of honor killing and blood feuds. In this matter as well, the state prefers to close an eye and not see the serious transgressions that are committed within the Bedouin sector, whether because of the difficulty in investigating them – no Bedouin would testify against another Bedouin – or because of the leniency with which the law enforcement agencies (police, state’s attorney, courts, prisons and the mechanism of pardons) relate to these acts of murder. The researcher Manar Hasan exposed this leniency in an important and painful article that was published in the book “Sex, Gender and Politics”, edited by D. Yizraeli.

Additional problematic matters with the Bedouin sector that have come to light in recent years are the culture of “protection money” in building sites and industrial areas, for example: Emek Sarah in Beersheba, and smuggling of drugs, guns, women and foreign workers from Sinai and Jordan. All of these matters – illegal building on state lands, polygamy, marriage among relatives, murder, blood feuds, protection and smuggling – which are connected to the Bedouin sector, prove that rather than being a case of a few isolated incidents, the problem is that the Bedouin culture sees the law of the state as law that is not part of the Bedouin culture. In this, the Bedouins in Israel are no different from the Bedouins throughout the Arab world, who live parallel and separate lives from the rest of the state, and within another legal system – “customs and tradition” – which is based on the sense of “we are here and the state is there”. The group gives them power, because the state – for reasons of convenience – does not deal with each separate Bedouin, but with a consolidated and violent tribe that would not hesitate to take to violence if it feels that its interests are endangered.

Tribal culture is the basis for all of the problems that are connected with the Bedouins, not only in Israel but in the entire Middle East: in Libya, in Iraq, in Yemen, in Syria, in Algeria, in Egypt (Sinai) and in many other places, tribes struggle with the state in order to maintain their culture, their laws, their customs and their traditions, that are usually contrary to the laws of the state and its regulations. The tribe has its own leadership and its own legal system and in many matters it conducts itself as an entity that is independent and separate from the state. Among the Bedouins, the state is considered a hostile entity since it aims to enforce its laws on the tribe.

The situation among the Bedouins of the Negev is not different in principle from the situation of the Bedouins throughout the Middle East. Since the State of Israel was established more than 65 years ago it has not dealt correctly with the matter. Beginning in 1968 the State of Israel has been attempting to settle the Bedouins in towns that were built for them: Rahat, Tel Sheva, Kuseifa, Lakiyya, Hura, Aro’er and Segev Shalom. A significant part of the Bedouins indeed did move to these towns and changed their lifestyle considerably, but tribalism has also moved from the desert to the city: the neighborhoods in the city are usually settled according to the tribal code, and the people’s conduct and behavior still have traditional tribal characteristics: in one of the Bedouin towns in the Negev, a child was run over by a member of another tribe, and every child belonging to the driver’s tribe stopped walking to the neighborhood school, since they had each become a potential murder victim, in revenge for the child that had been run over. They demanded that the state build a special school for them, because the way to the school passes through the neighborhood of the child that was killed, and therefore they can no longer walk to the general school in the community.

Moving to the town does not solve the issue of polygamy, since in the cities as well, there are families in which one man lives with several wives according to Islamic Shari’a, despite its being a transgression of the laws of the state. And many Bedouins in the towns continue to earn their living from illegal occupations. The state hesitates to enforce its laws on the Bedouin sector, and this is obvious in the lack of enforcement of the planning and building laws. Local politics in Bedouin towns is based on the tribe, and inter-tribal conflicts make it difficult for the local authorities to function. In many cases, when a Bedouin town''s council becomes dysfunctional due to endless conflicts between the tribes, the interior minister is forced to disband the municipal council, dismiss the mayor and appoint a committee and a mayor from outside to manage the town.

In conclusion: the basis of the problem with the Bedouin sector is that it has been left behind on the platform as the train of the state has progressed into the twenty first century. Great parts of the Bedouin sector still live tribal lives, according to rules that are contrary to the laws of the state. The tribal lifestyle influences all areas of life – type of housing, education, occupation and family relations – and interferes with the state’s ability to solve the problems of its citizens in the Bedouin sector. The state has never tried to deal with the problem in a holistic way, but has rather tried to solve the problem of housing without regard to dealing with the other problems. This is where the difficulties in dealing with the problem of lands and housing stem from. In the absence of a state policy, the door is opened for the involvement of foreign bodies such as the Islamic movement, which exploits the confusion in the state’s institutions, and conducts a boom of illegal building on state lands in projects that include thousands of people who come from other areas into the Negev for one day for just this purpose.

Source: <http://israelagainstterror.blogspot.co.il/2013/12/mordechai-kedar-bedouin-problem-and.html>

**Settlement and Residence**

In 1951, when military law was applied to all Israeli Arabs, the Bedouins in the Negev were forced to move to the Siyag – the triangle area between Dimona, Arad and Be'er Sheva. The Land Acquisition Law of 1953, which determined that a person whose land was not in their possession by April 1952 lost his right to it, caused the Bedouins to lose their lands outside the Siyag area, to which they could not return. At the same time, land development was taking place in order to establish Jewish settlements, nature reserves, fire zones and military bases. When the military law ended in 1966, the state began building permanent towns and encouraging residents to settle there. Simultaneously, the state had another issue to address; it was competing with the Bedouins, through ownership claims and counter-claims, to register the land in their name. This continued up to 1974, when the state decided to seek a compromise agreement with the Bedouins, though the efforts ultimately failed.

In 2003, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, announced a plan intended to solve the problem of the unrecognized villages. On the one hand, it included recognition of seven new Bedouin settlements, which will be included in the Abu Basma Regional Council, and on the other hand, it increased enforcement of countering illegal construction and land invasion.

In July 2007, the Government established the Authority for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev. Its main functions are: settling disputes of land ownership; regulating permanent housing (including public infrastructure and services, both for existing settlements as for new settlements); assistance in employment integration; coordinating education, welfare and community services.

In December 2008, the Committee for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, headed by retired Judge Eliezer Goldberg, submitted a series of recommendations for the regulation of land ownership claims for the Bedouins in the Negev, and the issue of recognition of the unrecognized villages. The Israeli Government announced the integration of the recommendations, and appointed a team to implement and regulate the Bedouin settlement in the Negev. Ehud Praver, Head of the Policy Planning Division in the Prime Minister’s Office, headed the team. In May 2011, the Implementation Team submitted its recommendations, and in September 2011, the Government approved the **"Praver Plan."**


The government approved a budget of NIS 1.2 billion for the implementation of the program on that same day, aimed at bringing about better Bedouin integration in Israeli society, as well as significantly reduced economic and social gaps between the Bedouin population in the Negev and the rest of Israeli society. The program focuses on developing industrial zones, establishing employment centers in the communities, promoting professional training, and more. Accordingly, resources will be allocated to areas that support employment and primarily education, infrastructure (including public buildings and transportation), society and community, as well as personal security of the residents.

In the field of settlement, it was planned to expand existing Bedouin settlements, to absorb residents of the Abu Basma Regional Council and to establish settlements within the framework of the Be'er Sheva regional outline plan. The nature of each settlement - agricultural, rural, suburban or urban - will be adapted to the nature of the population and will be carried out in cooperation with it. It was estimated that about two thirds of the residents of the diaspora would be settled nearby.

According to the government's decision, ownership claims of the land will be regulated by means of a singular transparent mechanism that will be determined by law, according to which changes in estate and wealth will be given on a large scale. For example, for every approved claim made by a complainant who holds the land, 50% of the claim will be given, compared to only 20% that is offered. The law determines that one who delays the submission of the claim or whose application is not concluded by a determining date will lose their right to it even if their ownership is proven. All who persist on settling the land are expected, according to law, to face legal consequences.

An example of the implementation of the plan is the new Bedouin settlement, Tarabin a-Sana. In the past, the Tarabin tribe settled near the settlement of Omer. After a number of agreements, the entire tribe moved to a new settlement built not far from Be'er Sheva.

The European Parliament criticized the Praver plan and demanded that Israel stop its implementation. In December 2013, demonstrations were held against the Praver program in Haifa, Jerusalem and Hura, and in the same month the minister (at that time) Mr. Begin announced that discussions regarding the plan would cease and that the Prime Minister accepted recommendation to lift the law. This was followed by demolition of structures belonging to Bedouins in the Negev, most of which were demolished by their owners, in order to avoid demolitions by the police.[[15]](#footnote-16)



In early 2016, the government approved another long term plan, in the purpose of fully solving the issues surrounding the entire Bedouin population. In the field of settlements, a population growth analysis was done, and a 20 year construction program, including around 150 thousand housing units, was prepared. As of today, the government has already worked on the construction of 30 thousand housing units, as well as on a reexamination of the compensation programs for Bedouins who submitted land ownership claims. The compensation programs today operate in an "on the spot" method; families with their specific claims and needs are reviewed, and an individual agreement is made accordingly.

Simultaneously, construction schematics are being prepared for 10 new settlements and for expanding existing ones, including regulation of illegal construction arrangements which have already been implemented. Recently, the program is showing early signs of success.

**Socioeconomic Status**

In the past, Bedouin livelihood was based on agriculture: shepherding combined with growing field crops, mainly barley and sorghum. A number of parallel processes have led to a decline in income from agriculture: a worldwide decline in agricultural income, forced urbanization that prevented the Bedouins from farming, loss of grazing lands, which became training zones and were used for urban development, and spraying of field crops on disputed land. The location of the Bedouin in the periphery of the State of Israel, and the lack of infrastructure for industry in the Bedouin towns did not allow them to develop alternative sources of income. As a result of this situation, the Bedouin population in the Negev is ranked last in the socio-economic ranking in Israel. Information on the unrecognized villages was not collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics, but it is assumed that the situation in that area is even worse.

As part of the general 5 year plan, efforts are being made in order to develop large industrial areas, which would help the Bedouin population as well as other populations in the south. Two factories recently opened near Rahat have lowered unemployment rates in the area from 30% to 12%. Moreover, employers who hire Bedouins are entitled for a subsidization of 30% of their wages for two and a half years.

The program even provides enlarged budgets, by tens of millions, to local authorities, under supervision, in the purpose of increasing the services provided to residents in the fields of education and welfare, culture, sports and more. Programs aimed at preventing school dropouts and encouraging higher education with significant subsidization and preparation were added as well.

**The Bedouins' Attitude towards the IDF**

Even though the Bedouins are not obligated to serve in the IDF, since the 1950s, a small number of Bedouins have been integrated into the former minority unit as scouts. Only a small percentage of the Bedouin living in Israel today choose to serve in the IDF.

Recruitment among members of the community is very controversial. Following the outbreak of the second intifada, the feeling of discrimination among many in the sector, and the strengthening of the Islamic movement among the residents, have caused the percentage of Bedouin recruits to drop. However, since 2002 there has been an upward trend in the number of recruits, and it has been stabilized at about 300-400 per year. In 2004, about 1,000 Bedouins served in the IDF, many of them in the standing army. In addition, a few Bedouins enlisted in the academic reserve.

--------

**Refugees, Illegal Immigration**

**Outline**

The government of Israel dealt with the immigrants from Africa first. It has allowed many immigrants to enter and find jobs in hotels and restaurants. However, as their numbers increased, concerns began to rise. In the second half of 2000 there was a significant increase in the number of undocumented workers who arrived from Africa to Israel via the Egyptian border. In 2006, about 1,000 workers were arrested without documentation; in 2007, about 5,000 were arrested; in 2008, approximately 8,700 were arrested; and in 2009 about 5,000 were arrested. In the first half of 2010, the rate of immigration increased, during the first seven months of the year, more than 8,000 undocumented workers were caught.

The total number of undocumented workers is significantly greater than these numbers, because many of them were not caught. The early wave of undocumented workers came mainly from Sudan, while in 2009 most of the immigrants came from Eritrea.

Today, according to various estimates, there are at least 45,000 asylum seekers, half of whom are from Sudan and Eritrea.

After the Supreme Court declared that holding the immigrants in the Saharonim facility for a long period of time (a number of years) was unconstitutional, the government opened Sills - an open facility - in December 2013. According to the facility's features, they were allowed to leave the facility, but were required to sign about three times a day to prove they did not intend to flee and to return before the curfew in the evening.

In September 2014, the Supreme Court overturned the Infiltration Law, which ordered the state to close the sands within 90 days, and also ordered the closure of the facility.

In the past, the law established periods of 20 months, and even earlier, in a 2016 amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, it was held that infiltrators could be kept for up to 12 months.

The facility is still open as of today, it is operated by the Israel Prison Service, and as of April 2017 there were about 2,000 people.

This state of affairs, of legislative amendments that are again and again subject to judicial review, and some are even overturned by the court, emphasizes the tension between the courts and legislators in the State of Israel as a democratic state.

**The Security Aspect**

("de-fence")– From 2010 to January 2013, a 230 km fence along the border with Egypt was built, reducing the problem of illegal immigrants to almost zero.

**The Political Aspect**

After the Supreme Court declared that holding the immigrants in the Saharonim facility for long periods of time was unconstitutional, the government opened Holot, an open facility, in December 2013. About 1,800 residents of Holot were allowed to leave the facility but were required to sign about three times a day, proving they did not intend to flee.

On September 22, 1994, the High Court of Justice overturned the infiltration Law and ordered the state to close the Holot facility within 90 days. The court addressed two issues: (1) limiting the detention of migrants, and (2) closing the Holot facility.

**The Economic Aspect**

Israeli economic commentator Nehemia Shtrasler estimated that illegal immigrants take the place of weaker manual labor workers, causing job losses and wage cuts. He also claimed that they create a burden on the health, welfare and education systems.

According to media sources and reports, the cost of setting up a sands facility is NIS 323 million, and its operation every year is NIS 100 million.

**The Social Aspect**

In mid-2010 a demonstration was held in Eilat against the failure of the Israeli government. The residents claimed that they were afraid to go out in certain neighborhoods at night. Today, African asylum seekers constitute about 0.5% of Israel's population.

The Israeli authorities estimate that between 80% and 90% of unregistered workers live in two main cities: more than 60% in Tel Aviv and more than 20% in Eilat. The rest of the undocumented workers are divided between Ashdod, Jerusalem and Arad.

Most migrants first arrive in Egypt, and from there they often pay up to 2,000$ to Bedouin smugglers to transfer them to the Egyptian-Israeli border.

**Egypt - Israel Relations**

**Outline**

This year marks the 40 year anniversary of Egypt's Prime Minister, Anwar Sadat's, visit to Jerusalem (November 1977), which led to the peace treaty negotiations between Israel and Egypt (March 1979). The peace treaty was considered a dramatic break-through with strategic value to Israel, and reflected the hope of improving Israel's relations with the Arab world. And yet, the cooperation between the states is primarily focused around the security aspect, while when considering the political and social-economic aspects; the potential is disappointing and far from being fully fulfilled.

**The Security Aspect**

The peace treaty from 1979 plays an important role in Israel's national defense, and, once signed, allowed for relative peace in Israel's southern border, less presence of Israeli forces at the border and diversion of much needed security resources to other areas. The treaty also opened up the possibility of relations with other Arab countries, primarily Jordan.

A security appendix that was added to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt detailed the security arrangements between the countries and the arrangements relating to the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula. According to the agreement, the territory was divided into stripes, in which specific demilitarization parameters were delineated including the permitted forces and weapons. Since 1982, the MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) is stationed at the Sinai Peninsula and its purpose is to supervise over the security arrangement between Israel and Egypt, and to do everything in its power to prevent any violation of it. Following the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, changes relating to the presence of Egyptian forces in Sinai were made to the agreement. Such changes have become more apparent in the past few years, as a result of the growing presence of terror organizations in the Sinai Peninsula.

Today, there is higher correlation between the Israeli and Egyptian security-political interests; both states place the Iranian threat and the war against terrorism high on their national agendas. This fact has led to increased security cooperation between the states, relating mainly to the Gaza Strip, exposing tunnels, and preventing smugglers and infiltrators from and to the strip. In this context, it is worth mentioning the shift in Egyptian approach towards the Hamas movement after Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has overtaken power.

**The Political Aspect**

El-Sisi's period is considered a relative improvement with regard to the promotion of political relations between the two countries. This period saw a decrease in statements made against Israel by Egypt, a relative decrease in attempts to bash Israel in the international arena (see UNSC resolution 2334 regarding settlements for example) and el-Sisi's willingness to meet publically with Prime Minister Netanyahu (see their meeting during the opening of the UNGA during last September). But it is important to mention that this relative improvement relates to el-Sisi and does not reflect the public's nor the broad Egyptian establishments' approach towards Israel. It is also worth remembering in this regard that certain parts of the Egyptian public do not accept el-Sisi as their legitimate ruler, and view him as someone who unlawfully overtook the government from the Muslim Brotherhood.

Through the perspective of Israel, the extent of the political relations is still disappointing, and does not reflect the potential and hope of future normalization. Israel and Egypt do not maintain relations to the extent that is expected from neighboring states in peace. This is reflected in many ways, such as the limited political discourse between the states and the prevention of Israeli diplomats' free access to political, cultural and economic factors in Egypt. Another example is Egypt's refusal to take in MASHAV (Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) experts, who could otherwise provide help in fields of agriculture and the war against desertification, and better using water supplies – even though these are all problematic issues for Egypt.

The lack of normalization is due to several reasons, but in their center, for many years, was Egypt's government's attempt to avoid paying additional prices for peace (see Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League between 1979-1989), and maintaining the criticism against Israel as a tool for weakening internal criticism, by the public, against the government. Due to the official and public approach, not many in the Egyptian society are willing to risk any kind of contact with Israel, and those who have done so publically – were forced to pay a high price. A notable example from recent years is the dismissal of Tawfik Okasha from the Egyptian Parliament in March 2016, after inviting the Israeli ambassador for dinner, and being accused of malversation as a result.

**The Social-Economic Aspect**

Culturally, Israel is boycotted in Egypt. Important professional Egyptian unions, such as the journalists and writers unions refuse any kind of cultural dialogue and denunciate anyone wishing to promote normalization, taking away their livelihood in the process. Israeli films are not invited to international cinema festivals in Egypt, and the activity of Israel's academic center in Cairo is scarce. Egyptians studying Hebrew in Egyptian institutions are not in contact with Israel or with Israelis.

Even where positive cooperation does exist – it is limited, and the Egyptian government does not inform the public about it. The QIZ's (Qualified Industrial Zones) are a good example. The QIZ's are industrial areas in Egypt that allow Egypt to make use of the free trade agreement between Israel and the United States in order to boost Egyptian export to the United States. The requirement is that Egyptian products include an Israeli input of 9% to their raw materials. About half of all exportation from Egypt to the United States originates from the QIZ's, which provide work for hundreds of thousands of Egyptian citizens. And yet, very few Egyptians are aware that their livelihood depends on the peace treaty between the two countries and is derived from it. Furthermore, since the 90's, there has been a gradual reduction in Israeli businesses operating in Egypt, as a result of political and security tensions that affect the working environment.

**The Negev**

**Beersheba**

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beersheba>

Beersheba, also Be'er Sheva is the largest city in the Negev desert of southern Israel. Often referred to as the "Capital of the Negev", it is the center of the fourth most populous metropolitan area in Israel, the eighth most populous Israeli city with a population of 207,551, and the second largest city with a total area of 117,500 dunams (after Jerusalem).

With an ancient history dating back to the Biblical period, the modern history of Beersheba began at the start of the 20th century when a permanent settlement was established by the Ottoman Turks. The city was captured by the British led Australian Light Horse during World War I. In 1947, Bir Seb'a, as it was known, was envisioned as part of the Arab state in the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine. Following the declaration of Israel's independence, the Egyptian army amassed its forces in Beersheba as a strategic and logistical base. In the Battle of Beersheba waged in October 1948, it was conquered by the Israel Defense Forces.

Beersheba has grown considerably since Israel's independence. A large portion of the population is made up of the descendants of Sephardi Jews and Mizrahi Jews who immigrated from Arab countries after 1948, as well as smaller communities of Bene Israel and Cochin Jews from India. Second and third waves of immigration have taken place since 1990, bringing Russian-speaking Ashkenazi Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, as well as Beta Israel immigrants from Ethiopia. The Soviet immigrants have made the game of chess a major sport in Beersheba and the city is now a developing technology center. The city is now Israel's national chess center, with more chess grandmasters per capita than any other city in the world.

Beersheba is home to Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. This city also serves as a center for Israel's high-tech industry.

**Demography**

Beersheba is one of the fastest-growing cities in Israel. Though it has a population of about 200,000, the city is larger in size than Tel Aviv, and its urban plan calls for an eventual population of 450,000–500,000. It is planned to have a population of 340,000 by 2030.I n 2010, the National Council for Planning and Construction approved a master plan with the goal of increasing the population of Beersheba and its metropolitan area to 1 million by 2020. Beersheba's 20,000 Arabs represent about 10% of the population.

**Economy**

The largest employers in Beersheba are Soroka Medical Center, the municipality, Israel Defense Forces and Ben-Gurion University. A major Israel Aerospace Industries complex is located in the main industrial zone, north of Highway 60. Numerous electronics and chemical plants, including Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, are located in and around the city.

Beersheba is emerging as a high-tech center, with an emphasis on cyber security. A large high-tech park is being built near the Be'er Sheva North Railway Station. Deutsche Telekom, Elbit Systems, EMC, Lockheed Martin, Ness Technologies, WeWork and RAD Data Communications have already opened facilities there, as has a cyberincubator run by Jerusalem Venture Partners. A Science park funded by the RASHI-SACTA Foundation, Beersheba Municipality and private donors was completed in 2008. Another high-tech park is located north of the city near Omer.

An additional three industrial zones are located on the southeastern side of the city – Makhteshim, Emek Sara and Kiryat Yehudit – and a light industry zone between Kiryat Yehudit and the Old City.

**Local government**

The Beersheba municipality was plagued for many years by an ineffectual leadership, political problems and poor financial planning. Since 2005, attention has been focused on developing parks and infrastructure. A new youth center opened in 2005, and a new cultural centre opened in 2008. In 2006, after many years of financial struggle, the municipality has achieved a balanced budget.

Beersheba is home to one of Israel's major universities, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Beersheba is the central transport hub of southern Israel, served by roads, railways and air.

**Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center**

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon_Peres_Negev_Nuclear_Research_Center>

The Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center (formerly the Negev Nuclear Research Center, unofficially sometimes referred to as the Dimona reactor) is an Israeli nuclear installation located in the Negev desert, about thirteen kilometers south-east of the city of Dimona. In August 2018, it was renamed after the late President and Prime Minister of Israel, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shimon Peres.

Construction of the facility began in 1958 and its heavy-water nuclear reactor went active sometime between 1962-1964. Israel claims that the nuclear reactor and research facility is for research purposes into atomic science. However, the purpose of the reactor is believed to be the production of nuclear materials that may be used in Israel's nuclear weapons. Information about the facility remains highly classified and with respect to nuclear weapons the country maintains a policy known as nuclear ambiguity—refusing either to confirm or deny their possession. Israel had produced its first nuclear weapons by 1967 and it has been estimated to possess anywhere between 80-400 nuclear weapons.

The airspace over the Dimona facility is closed to all aircraft, and the area around it is heavily guarded and fenced off. During the Six-Day War, an Israeli missile shot down an Israeli Air Force Dassault Ouragan fighter that inadvertently flew over Dimona.

**Construction**

Construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance according to the Protocol of Sèvres agreements. The complex was constructed in secret, and outside the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection regime. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalination plant bound for Latin America. Estimates of the cost of construction vary; the only reliable figure is from Shimon Peres, who wrote in his 1995 memoir that he and David Ben-Gurion collected US $40 million, "half the price of a reactor ... [from] Israel's friends around the world."

The Dimona reactor became critical sometime between 1962 and 1964, and with the plutonium produced there the Israel Defense Forces most probably had their first nuclear weapons ready before the Six-Day War.

**Inspections**

When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the site in the early 1960s, the U.S. government demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on the condition that U.S., rather than International Atomic Energy Agency, inspectors be used, and that Israel would receive advance notice of all inspections. Israel is one of three nations not to have signed the NPT (others are India and Pakistan, both of which have acknowledged having nuclear weapons), and alongside North Korea which left the NPT.

Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the illegal manufacture of nuclear weapons, thereby deceiving the inspectors, by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless, due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. By 1969 the U.S. believed that Israel might have a nuclear weapon, and terminated inspections that year.

**Rotem Industries Ltd** is a diversified technology-oriented company with headquarters in the south of Israel. The company specializes in the commercialization of advanced and innovative technologies and science. Founded in early 1980’s, the company has been mandated to implement and commercialize state-of-the-art marketable innovations, reaping the technical harvest of scientific research, for the benefit of research, industrial and commercial communities worldwide.

* Rotem’s business units and subsidiaries are engaged in a wide range of fields:
* Rotem Medical Imaging
* Industrial Safety Equipment
* Environmental Protection
* Radiation Detection
* Crystal Growth (Sapphire)
* Homeland Security
* Metallurgy
* Alternative Energy

**IAF - Nevatim AB**

Following the Yom Kippur War, the expected arrival of the IAI Kfir, F-15 and improved F-16A, as well as the absorption of additional Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft, led the Air Force to establish a new wing.

The initial plan was to establish the base in the Sinai dessert, but following consolidation of a peace treaty with Egypt, it was instead built in the Negev. Rafael Eitan, then Chief of Staff, chose a site near Arad. In 1979 the Commanders' Forum decided on the name "Nevatim", a biblical name.

As part of the cooperation agreements between the Israeli, American and Turkish air forces, Nevatim airbase serves as a strategic base for hosting teams and aircraft from abroad that are deployed in Israel for exercises. The base houses the two double-seater F-16 squadrons which carry out air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

**F-35**

In September 2008, Israel Defense Forces manifested its intention to acquire the F-35 as Security Co-operation Participant (SCP) to the JSF program.

For Israel, the F-35 would be expected to cope with difficult challenges on the future regional battlefield, including both “new” hybrid conflicts with sub-state enemies that have adapted themselves in the evolving environment of the Middle East and cutting-edge technologies possessed by advanced armies that have succeeded in upgrading the concept to the use of force in modern conflicts.

Israel became the first country to select the F-35 through the US government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process when a Letter of Agreement was signed in October 2010. Since then, has purchased 50 F-35s in three separate contracts using Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants from the US. Israel is to install Israeli-made C4 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers) systems in the F-35s it receives, and call these customized F-35s “Adir” (translated from Hebrew as ‘Mighty One’).

As part of the F-35 deal, the US agreed to make reciprocal purchases of equipment from Israeli defense companies (so-called “offsets”).

Israel is still evaluating whether to expand its F-35 order beyond the 50 jets under contract (which delivery is still in progress), taking in consideration also the acquisition of the F-35B variant, or to buy more F-15s.

In December 2010, the US Government offered Israel 20 “free” F-35s in exchange for a moratorium on settlements in the West Bank, but the Israeli government refused this offer.

On 22 June 2016, Israel received the first F-35, marking a major milestone for the future of Israel's national defense by creating real lethality and deterrence, enhancing Israeli capabilities and maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge in the Middle East region for a long time. For this reason, Israel has also vetoed the aircraft’s sale into the wider Middle East region.

The F-35 strategically strengthen the deep and lasting partnership between the US and Israel. As recognized by the US, “the F-35 will help Israel remain a beacon of strength and stability in the region and support a safe and secure homeland for generations to come.”

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) declared its F-35 fleet operationally capable (Initial Operational Capability, IOC) on 6 December 2017, marking the completion of an intensive integration and training effort conducted at **Nevatim Air Base**, with the first nine assigned F-35s. This significant milestone indicates that the IAF possesses the capability to not only operate the IAF fleet in performance of IAF missions, but also to train IAF pilots and maintainers, and support F-35 operations through a robust logistics footprint and support system.

The IAF’s 140 Squadron “Golden Eagles” flies the F-35 from Nevatim Airbase in southern Israel’s Negev Desert, with a second squadron expected to be stood up at the same location and a third likely to be located elsewhere as deliveries continue. Nevatim was expanded in 2008, giving it the longest runway in Israel and the wider Middle East region.

Israeli Air Force has already flown F-35s “Adir” in operational strikes – first combat missions of the F-35 community - against dozens of Iranian targets in Syria. In May 2018, they attacked the T-4 Base from which Quds operated drones against Israel and where they continue to store munitions, including aerial defense capabilities. Israel also attacked north of Damascus long-range missiles and rockets transported from Iran to Syria, among which are “Uragan” missile launchers. The Syrian aerial defense systems fired over 100 SAM (surface-to-air missiles) at the Israeli F-35s using SA-5, SA-17 and SA-22 missile batteries, but they were destroyed in response before achieving any hit. The Adir also destroyed a 20-meter deep Hamas tunnel.

**Jordan - Israel relations**

**Comparative data**

Area in Km squared: Jordan: approx. 89,300, Israel: approx. 20,800.

Population per million people: Jordan: approx. 10.3, Israel: approx. 8.3.

GDP in millions of USD: Jordan 85,650, Israel: 300,600.

GDP per capita in USDs: Jordan: 8,358, Israel: 36,218.

Governmental Regime: Jordan - constitutional monarchy, Israel - parliamentary democracy.

**Review**

The region of Transjordan, known today as the Kingdom of Jordan, has existed since the 16th century under the Ottoman Empire, as part of the Damascus district. With the empire's collapse after World War I, it became part of the British Mandate of Palestine, which was promised to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration. In 1921, following the Cairo Conference, Britain withdrew from the area east of the Jordan River, separating it from the area where the Jewish National Home would be built, and established there an Arab emirate ruled by Abdullah I. The Hashemite kingdom of Transjordan was a separate administrative entity to the Land of Israel, but was under British rule as well, with its demographic composition consisting mainly of Bedouin Arabs. In 1946 it gained independence and became the "Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan" under the rule of King Abdullah.

As the British Mandate in Israel drew to a close, the involvement of the Arab Legion intensified. Jordan occupied much of the territory designated to the Arab state as part of the Partition Plan – an area known as the "West Bank" – as well as East Jerusalem, including the Old City and the Temple Mount mosques, thus weakening the population. Soon the majority of the population in the Jordanian kingdom was of Palestinian origin, who entered in a wave of refugees. Israel's War of Independence ended when the IDF occupied the southern Negev to the northern shore of the Gulf of Eilat. In the ceasefire of May 1949, the Wadi Ara settlements were annexed to the State of Israel, as well as the "Triangle" area and extensive areas from Rosh Ha'ayin and Kafr Qasem in the north to Modi'in in the south. The agreement stipulated that Israelis would be able to visit the holy places in East Jerusalem, including the Western Wall and the Mount of Olives, and that Israelis would be allowed on the Latrun-Jerusalem road, but the Jordanians did not honor this part of the agreement.

In December 1949, the UN General Assembly decided, by a majority of more than two-thirds, to "internationalize" Jerusalem. Both Israel and Jordan opposed.

To achieve peace between Israel and Jordan, secret talks were held between the two countries in December 1949 and January 1950. It seemed that a basis for a peace agreement had been found and a five-year non-aggression treaty was signed by the parties. But the talks were leaked and the Arab League convened in April 1950, deciding to expel any Arab country that would negotiate peace with Israel. Under this threat, the King of Jordan refrained from reaching a peace agreement with Israel, but the secret contacts between the two countries continued. Agreements were reached on limiting the types of weapons in the border areas, along with an agreement signed to prevent infiltration.

In 1950, Jordan formally annexed the West Bank and renamed it part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The annexation created a very long and steady border between the two countries, and Jordan granted local west bank residents Jordanian citizenship.

During the course of 1951, the security situation on the border deteriorated, leading to a multiplicity of reprisals by Israel against the terrorists in Jordanian territory. With the assassination of King Abdullah in July 1951 by radical Palestinians in the Old City of Jerusalem, the prospects for peace between Israel and Jordan evaporated.

Fedayeen operations and the struggle for control of the West Bank within the Arab world led Jordan and Israel to cooperate. Israel deterred foreign Arab forces from deploying within the territory of Jordan, thereby preventing the Iraqi army from entering it. Before the Six-Day War, Jordan was defined as a "security crack" in the complex system between Israel and the rest of the Arab states, and Israel did not want to change the status quo with Jordan during those years.

In 1967, following the unification of forces in the Arab world and Jordan's unwillingness to be isolated, Hussein joined the war against Israel. Within a short time, the Jordanian army was defeated and on June 7 the IDF occupied East Jerusalem and the entire West Bank. Israel decided not to annex most of the occupied territory in order to avoid a foreign relations crisis with Jordan. It also excused Jordan of needing to grant citizenship to residents of the annexed territories. The annexation was convenient to Jordan because it left it with hope to return to the territories, but the construction of the settlements was contrary to its interests. Jordan continued to partially finance state employees in the West Bank, control the Waqf, especially the Temple Mount, and appointed a special minister for the occupied territories. At the same time, Israel did not prevent Jordan's influence on the population of the territories. Shortly after the war, Israel instituted the "open bridges" policy, in which bridges crossing the Jordan River remained open for the passage of people and goods, thus preserving the connection between the Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank. The "Green Line" was also opened to free movement, and the Palestinians were freed of being required to obtain a permit to visit Israel. In this way, an indirect but continuous bond was created between Israel and Jordan.

The results of the Six-Day War made it difficult for Jordan as it brought about the blossoming of Palestinian nationalism and the establishment of armed Palestinian organizations in the kingdom. In 1970, Palestinian groups had started to openly call for the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy - Black September. At the request of the United States, Israel came to Jordan's aid by concentrating IDF forces near the border with Syria, and IAF planes to patrol over Jordan, which helped deter the Syrians and forced them to withdraw from Jordan. After the terrorist organizations were uprooted from his kingdom, King Hussein saw the goal of returning the West Bank to Jordanian sovereignty. He began a series of secret meetings with Israeli leaders, but the Israeli government was not interested in a far-reaching diplomatic move. There was a de facto peace between the two countries; the border crossings were operating and the Jordanian currency continued to be acceptable in the West Bank.

On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, on September 25, 1973, King Hussein warned then-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that a freeze in the regional peace process could lead to war. Under the pressure of the Arab states and the internal pressure of the Jordanian army, Hussein decided to send ground forces to assist Syria in its war against Israel on the Golan Heights front. In April 1974 in the course of the diplomatic contacts after the war, King Hussein proposed a "separation of forces agreement" in which the forces of both sides would withdraw and leave a demilitarized zone in the Jordan Valley as the first step towards a permanent solution. This proposal was rejected by Golda Meir in the last days of her tenure. Meetings with Israeli officials continued, with the participation of the new Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The talks failed to culminate in an agreement due to the differing opinions within the Rabin government, facing post-war rehabilitation (especially the divergence of opinions between himself and then-Defense Minister Shimon Peres). In October 1974, the Arab summit in Rabat decided that the Palestinian people had the right to establish a state in the West Bank and that the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was the PLO. This decision ended negotiations because King Hussein understood that he could not act against the decision and regain sovereignty in the territories lost.

Following the First Lebanon War, the PLO reached a political deadlock that led to the signing of an agreement with Jordan on February 11, 1985. It agreed on the principle of land for peace, which was supposed to strengthen the status of the parties' vis-à-vis Israel by presenting a common position. Unfortunately it failed due to internal difficulties in the PLO and Jordan withdrew from it on 19 February 1986. Another opportunity to promote peace with Israel came in 1987. The National Unity Government in Israel sent Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the line of contacts, which ended for the first time in a written agreement - "The London Agreement". In April 1987, the parties agreed on an international conference to promote peace in the Middle East. The London agreement was not implemented, in light of the firm opposition of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Jordan feared, during the first intifada in 1987, that the terror would spread to its territory. It therefore declared an administrative separation from the West Bank in July 1988, and relinquished any claim to sovereignty in the territories.

Another crisis occurred in 1990, with the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's forces. Jordan again found itself trapped between Iraq in the east- supported by the Palestinian leadership, and Western demands. Ultimately, Jordan supported Saddam Hussein by refraining from joining the war coalition against him, and thus the United States reiterated by imposing economic sanctions. This had a positive effect on Jordan-Israel relations by bringing Jordan closer to Israel in order to benefit from its influence on the United States.

Since Israel was not prepared to negotiate with the PLO, the Palestinians used Hussein indirectly to negotiate with Israel, and so a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation arrived at the Madrid Conference in 1991. Although the conference itself did not achieve its goals, it gave impetus to the peace talks.

The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 between Israel and the Palestinians, gave impetus to negotiations with Jordan. After lengthy secret negotiations, Prime Minister Rabin met with King Hussein on July 25, 1994 in Washington, and in the presence of President Bill Clinton, the two leaders announced an end to the state of war between Israel and Jordan. On October 26, 1994, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed. The agreement included minor border adjustments, agreements on water use and agreement on full normalization between the parties. During the subsequent two years, sixteen more detailed agreements were signed between the parties on various issues. Peace agreements opened the borders and in 1996, a trade agreement was signed with Jordan.

The Likud party came to power on May 29 1996, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. It saw itself committed to the agreement with Jordan and sought to improve relations. However, contemporary events, such as; the events of the Western Wall Tunnels; the construction of the neighborhood in Har Homa; the Naharayim massacre and Israel's attempt to assassinate Khaled Mashal on Jordanian soil, worsened relations.

In the 1990s, King Hussein's health began to deteriorate. Shortly before his death he surprised everyone by deciding to appoint his nephew Abdullah as the heir to the throne instead of his (Abdullah's) father as planned. He came to power with Hussein's death in 1999.

With the outbreak of the second intifada, Jordan refrained from sending its new ambassador to Israel, and it arrived only at the beginning of 2005 in preparation for the disengagement from Gaza.

**Economic Ties**

There are a number of business initiatives, such as: Israeli textile factories, the plan to use the international airport in Aqaba by flights landing in Israel, and other initiatives in the Israeli-Jordan free trade area. With the discovery of Israel's gas reserves in the Mediterranean, Jordan was one of the first countries to sign a gas supply contract. The contract is valued at $15 billion. A large project planned to be built in cooperation with Jordan is the Sea Canal, which will connect the Dead Sea with the Red Sea. The project was completed in February 2015.

**Cultural Relations**

Despite commitments to normalize ties as part of the peace agreement, the Jordanian public, for the most part, is not prepared for any cultural ties with Israel. Over the years, Israel and the Jordanian monarchy have tried to change this situation to barely any avail.

**Intermediate Summary**

It can be said that the relations between the Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel were characterized by a dual relationship from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 to the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1994. Until then, the countries were in a state of official war, and even fought each other during the War of Independence and the Six-Day War. Though there was simultaneous cooperation and informal dialogue between them due to the common interests of both countries.

Today, relations between Israel and Jordan are warm and the border crossings are open, although they are mainly used by tourists, residents of the territories and businessmen.

**The Two Seas Canal**

The Two Seas Canal is a name that encompasses all canal digging projects which will be used to transfer water between the seas in Israel. The suggested projects include the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea, the Arabah, and all surrounding seas: the Red Sea to the south and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Most projects are related to the transfer of water to the Jordan Valley and to the Dead Sea. Transferring the water will be accomplished by different tools: canals, tunnels and pipes.

In the past, the water of the Jordan River Basin was meant to be used as irrigation water for the Negev and the Jordan Valley. Water from the Mediterranean Sea was supposed to be streamed to the Dead Sea in order to stabilize it. Recently, more objectives are being examined, such as: desalination of seawater and raising the surface of the Dead Sea.

Environmental factors point to large environmental risks inherent in the Two Seas Canal projects: the danger that mixing seawaters will cause a dramatic change in the Dead Sea, the penetration of seawater into the groundwater along the route of the sea, and major changes in the Red Sea as a result of pumping water. The environmental risks were examined (in 2009-2012) by experts appointed by the World Bank. Their reports stated: the Dead Sea would not undergo changes with an annual seawater addition of up to 400 million cubic meters; with meticulous planning and construction of high standard means of transportation in sensitive seismic activity areas, it is possible to avoid seawater leaking down to groundwater; no major changes are expected in the Red Sea, due to the relatively limited pumping from the sea.

The establishment of the Two Seas Canal is delayed due to a number of factors: the multiple ideas for the channels, the large number of strong elements supporting and opposing them, the political complexity with neighboring countries and the Palestinian Authority, the partnership in the geographic areas where the channels are supposed to pass, the extent of expenses necessary, the lack of clear funding sources and the dangers entailed in the project.



**The Two Seas Canal – an Aspect of Regional Peace Promotion**

The challenges faced by Israel and Jordan when addressing regional problems and the advantages of combining forces have created the background for seeking joint projects in the Jordan Valley. The political institutions of both countries believed that close economic cooperation in neighboring areas could advance progress towards peace or ensure peace after it is reached. The two sides marked the projects of integrative development in the Jordan Valley as a collective goal. In 1993, a tripartite committee of Jordan, the United States and Israel was established to accompany the preparation and implementation of the plans and projects in the Jordan Valley. In 1994, as part of the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, article 20, dealing with the joint development of the Jordan Valley, was included in the agreement. The tripartite committee prepared a document to examine a developmental plan with 111 projects in the area between the Red Sea and the Beit She'an Valley. The main project was the Two Seas Canal, with a large desalination plant of 850 million cubic meters per year, for which special committees were established, but most of them were delayed and those that were actually implemented were small scale projects.



In retrospect, it turns out that the activity of regional cooperation encountered great difficulties that obstructed the pace and scope of the cooperation. Among the problematic factors are: political aspects, which lack confidence in the peace process and in its necessity; security officials who feared the exposure to risks that accompany economic cooperation processes, or more open borders; interests of employees or entities in industries that were exposed to competition with economic entities across the border; the activities of the government ministries that led the projects; and the activity of the Ministry of Finance, which feared a possible budgetary overruns which usually characterize new projects.

The partners in Jordan were put to a halt by bureaucracy and by influential leaders such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who opposed the peace process and any projects that would promote normalization with Israel before the Palestinian problem was solved.

The integrative development of the Valley of the Jordan and the Two Seas Canal continued to be the subjects of discussions with Jordan and were at the top of the agenda of the Ministry for Regional Cooperation headed by Shimon Peres in 1999-2001. The ministry later continued to promote the subject. In March 2007, Shimon Peres initiated a government decision to promote the "Peace Valley" project, which included the "Peace Pipeline" from the Red Sea, meant to promote regional peace, as well as other projects in the field of transportation, industrial zones and tourism projects. Since 2007, a tripartite committee of Jordan, Israel and the PA has been working to examine the feasibility of the "Peace Pipeline" connecting the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.

On December 9, 2013, a letter of intent was signed between Israel, Jordan and the PA to regulate pending water issues between the countries; the distribution of water from a desalination plant to be built in Aqaba between Israel and Jordan; and laying a pipe to transport the brine of the desalination plant to the Dead Sea - a project that could be the first stage for the establishment of the Two Seas Canal. In February 2015, the letter became an agreement between the parties.

**Challenges to the Maritime Security in the Gulf of Eilat**



**Outline – Geography**

The Gulf of Eilat (Hebrew: מפרץ אילת‎‎) is a large gulf at the northern tip of the Red Sea, east of the Sinai Peninsula and west of the Arabian mainland. Its coastline is divided between four countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

The gulf measures 24 kilometers (15 nm) at its widest point and stretches some 160 kilometers (99 nm) north from the Straits of Tiran to where Israel meets Egypt and Jordan. It reaches a maximum depth of 1,850 m in its central area.

At this northern end of the gulf are three important cities: Taba in Egypt, Eilat in Israel with a population of 48.000 residents and Aqaba with a population of 108.000 in Jordan. They are strategically important commercial ports and popular resorts for tourists. Further south, Haqi is the largest Saudi Arabian city on the gulf. On Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh and Dahab are the major centers.

The Gulf of Eilat has a significant relevance as natural resort for maritime wildlife including a huge variety of maritime mammals.

**Challenges to the Maritime Security at the Port of Eilat**

Israel in particular, more so than its neighbors, faces a high risk of infiltration by terrorists which are related to terrorist organizations resting in the Sinai Peninsula (namely ISIS) and in Jordan. With regards to potential cooperation with Hamas, which has built in recent years considerable underwater capabilities (comparable to navy seals) a credible threat for infiltration cannot be underestimated. The potential damage, next to the threat of life, to the tourist sector caused by a single terrorist attack needs to be considered as severe.

Question: How can maritime surveillance be executed in a way that will provide a reliable picture of the situation underwater?

**Smuggling Weapons into the Sinai Peninsula**

Egypt struggles in controlling the Sinai Peninsula, particularly with regards to radical elements which are related to ISIS. The challenge of securing this crucial area is primary Egypt’s responsibility; however it is affecting directly Israel’s security demands with regards to border control and national security. Furthermore it must be taken into account that Iran is supporting these radical elements; both ideological and material wise. Given the strategic relevance of the Sinai Peninsula it is Israel’s primary interest preventing the provision of terrorists with weaponry, like sophisticated missiles which are able threatening Israel’s vital infrastructure such as Dimona. Therefore it must be ensured that the Gulf of Eilat is secured against weapon smuggling from Iran to ISIS.

Question: With regards to the Shiite Axis and the Sunnite Axis, how can diplomacy support Israeli security demands (e.g. US mediated diplomacy with Saudi Arabia)?

**Room for Maneuvering, Freedom of Navigation and Innocent Passage**

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) freedom of navigation is granted to all maritime vessels including the innocent passage for warships. However; innocent passage restricts warships conducting flight operations or the use of systems which do not support navigational safety (e.g. weapon guiding radar systems). Given the geographic set up in the Gulf of Eilat with the four bordering countries violation of territorial waters (TTW) must be considered as sensitive.

One of the challenges in this regard, is the way to deal with violations of TTW by state and non-state actors. As part of the tour it is worth examining whether there are any Standing Operating Procedures in place which support both freedom of navigation and accepting "violations" of the TTW under certain circumstances.

The unilateral closure of the Straits of Tiran in 1967 by Egypt was the casus belli for Israel beginning the Six Days War. Following the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Mission was established in order to supervise the implementation of security provisions given by the treaty, including the freedom of navigation for maritime vessels heading to and going from the port of Eilat.

As part of Israel's national defense, we must examines the way in which the MFO supports Israel’s security demands and does the current situation reflects Israel’s requirements.

**Sustainability**

The very limited naval port capabilities with regards to maintenance, and the long distance preventing the provision of reinforcements (including the passage of the Suez Canal) challenge the sustainability for naval activities in the Gulf of Eilat. In cases of emergency, either military or humanitarian, which require urgent action the given conditions require prudent pre-planning for those kinds of events.

As part of the national security challenge, the Navy must conduct respective contingency planning, while examining the security related parameters it is based on.

**YouTube References**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSOtzQScaog>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rurpWaRG3lI>

**Eilat**

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eilat>

Eilat is Israel's southernmost city, a busy port and popular resort at the northern tip of the Red Sea, on the Gulf of Aqaba. The city's beaches, coral reef, nightlife and desert landscapes make it a popular destination for domestic and international tourism.

Home to 50,724 people, Eilat is part of the Southern Negev Desert, at the southern end of the Arava, adjacent to the Egyptian village of Taba to the south, the Jordanian port city of Aqaba to the east, and within sight of Saudi Arabia to the south-east, across the gulf.

Eilat's arid desert climate and low humidity are moderated by proximity to a warm sea. Temperatures often exceed 40 °C (104 °F) in summer, and 21 °C (70 °F) in winter, while water temperatures range between 20 and 26 °C (68 and 79 °F). Eilat averages 360 sunny days a year.

There are plans to vacate and dismantle Eilat Airport due to the plans for Ramon Airport, and develop the area. The new Ramon Airport is expected to open in October 2018, 18 kilometres (11 miles) north of Eilat and replace both Eilat Airport and Ovda Airport.

The overwhelming majority of Eilat's population are Jews. Arabs constitute about 4% of the population. Eilat's population includes a large number of foreign workers, estimated at over 10,000 working as caregivers, hotel workers and in the construction trades. Eilat also has a growing Israeli Arab population, as well as many affluent Jordanians and Egyptians who visit Eilat in the summer months.

In 2007, over 200 Sudanese refugees from Egypt who arrived in Israel illegally on foot were given work and allowed to stay in Eilat.

In the 1970s tourism became increasingly important to the city's economy as other industries shut down or were drastically reduced. Today tourism is the city's major source of income, although Eilat became a free trade zone in 1985.

1. صبر Saber is a religious-ideological term that means patience and perseverance. Hamas understands that its goals are far from achievable, and therefore it espouses a comprehensive, long-term effort that changes its methods according to each situation. "The current Zionist onslaught has also been preceded by Crusader raids from the West and other Tatars from the East, and just as the Muslims faced these invasions and worked out plans to fight and defeat them, It is not difficult for Allah if the intentions are pure and the determination is sincere "(from the Hamas Charter). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The Knesset website, 16.4.2004, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Disengagement Plan. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Ha'aretz, 23 August 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Summary of 2015, ISA site. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Mida website. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. ISA website, December 16, 2008, overview of Hamas' use of the underground infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Ha'aretz, 23 August 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Maariv, 21.6.2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. nrg, 14.7.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. nrg, 11.11.2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Work in agriculture during the winter season, and wander with herds of sheep during the summer. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. In addition to these two groups, few Bedouins live in other places throughout the country including some mixed cities (Lod, Ramle and Haifa). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. In a background study conducted by the National Security Council. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Kuseife, Arara in the Negev, Segev Shalom, Tel Sheva, Hura and Lakiya. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. The Ministry of Public Security estimates that the demolitions cause the Bedouins to respond to the proposed arrangements. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)