

INTRODUCTION

THIS BOOK studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. It shows to what extent different strategic cultures—specifically the Soviet, the American, and the Israeli—account for the varying approaches to transformation in the nature of war. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) are the terms used for a radical military innovation, in which new organizational structures together with novel force deployment methods, usually but not always driven by new technologies, change the conduct of warfare.¹ The term “revolution” does not mean that the change will be rapid but implies that it will be profound, making new methods of warfare more powerful than the old.² Consequently, RMAs matter much because they render the existing forms of combat obsolete.³

Most military revolutions have arisen from technological advances. However, RMAs are driven by more than breakthroughs in technology, which in themselves do not guarantee successful innovation. “Technology only sets the parameters of the possible and creates the potential for military revolution. What indeed produces an actual innovation is the extent to which militaries recognize and exploit the opportunities inherent in new tools of war, through organizational structures and deployment of force. It was how people responded to technology that produced seismic shifts in warfare,” argues Max Boot, who inquired into the nature of military revolutions since 1500.⁴ History is full of examples to support this claim.⁵ While the technological component is often an important initial condition, a true revolution depends on confluence of weaponry, concept of operations, organization, and the vision of future war.⁶ According to Andrew W. Marshall, the director of the Office of Net Assessment

in the Pentagon and one of the driving forces behind modern American strategic thought, "the main challenge in the RMA is an intellectual and not a technological one."⁷

The earlier defense experts recognize and understand the discontinuity in the nature of war, the better. Foreseeing an RMA is not a talisman for military victory. That being said, it is highly probable that anyone who anticipates the RMA and transforms their forces accordingly will significantly enhance military effectiveness.⁸ A delay, consequently, will have the reverse effect. The price of mistakes can vary from battlefield ineffectiveness with minor tactical implications to strategic catastrophe with devastating consequences for national security.⁹ There were cases in history when, early on, the significance of unfolding RMAs was recognized,¹⁰ but for the most part RMAs have been acknowledged only after the fact.¹¹ Recognition of an RMA and the concomitant development of a vision of future war is an act of unquestionable importance. The need to anticipate the trends of the next conflict, and not to prepare for the previous one, was adopted by defense analysts as their mantra. The ability to diagnose and to understand the discontinuity in the nature of war—the rapid change in ways and means of fighting—is probably the most critical aspect of defense management. Imagining the future enables defense managers to embark in real time on crafting of what Stephen Peter Rosen calls the "new theory of victory."¹²

THE PUZZLING HISTORY OF THE CURRENT RMA

Since the early 1990s, the US and other world militaries have argued that the most dramatic revolution in warfare since the introduction of nuclear weapons is under way. In mechanical terms, the Information-Technology Revolution in Military Affairs (IT-RMA) integrated long-range, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and information), and RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition) in a form that completely changed the combat environment and altered the way militaries think about the aims and methods of conventional warfare. In terms of basic capabilities, the IT-RMA entails the ability to strike with great accuracy, irrespective of range; the ability to penetrate defensive barriers using stealth technology and unmanned warfare; and the ability to move information rapidly across a joint battle network and exploit the effects of increased joint force integration.¹³

In terms of organizational structures and concepts of operations, classical patterns of advancement along fronts with discernible lines and rear areas

have disappeared; the number of platforms has become far less important than networks and communications; military planning aims at defined effects rather than attrition of enemy forces or occupation of territory; instead of massive forces, precise fire is maneuvered; the sensor-to-shooter loops have been shortened considerably; the role of stand-off and airpower capabilities have increased at the expense of heavy ground formations; and a far smaller, lighter, and more mobile force can operate on a greater range and with higher precision and greater lethality than at any time in human history.¹⁴

The 1990 Gulf War offered for the first time a glimpse at the revolutionary potential embodied in these various combat capabilities. Nearly a decade later, in 1999, Allied operations in Kosovo reinforced the value of so-called information warfare for future military campaigns. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 have demonstrated how conventional wars can be fought using this "high-tech, low numbers" operational approach.¹⁵ The principles underpinning the RMA diffused around the globe and created a consensus regarding the characteristics of a modern conventional military: a small, highly skilled joint force, versatile for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, flexible, rapidly deployable, and using advanced information technology.¹⁶

The roots of this RMA can be traced to the mid-1970s, when stand-off, precision-guided munitions were introduced in military theory and practice in the USSR, the US, and Israel. When the US shifted its attention away from Indochina and back to the European theater, it faced a daunting strategic situation: increasing realization of mutually assured destruction eroded the option of nuclear war; yet, in the balance of conventional forces, the Soviets were predominant. To destroy the menace of Soviet second echelons deep in the rear, the US capitalized on stand-off precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and "over-horizon" sensors, based on state-of-the-art scientific-technological developments in the field of microelectronics.

History knows many examples where the nation other than the inventor of the technology was first to understand its potential and to exploit it on the battlefield.¹⁷ Although it was the US that was laying the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet rather than American military theorists were the first to intellectualize about its long-term consequences. In contrast to the West, which focused on the weapons' narrow implications, the Soviets were pioneers in championing the argument that the new range of technological innovations constituted a fundamental discontinuity, which they dubbed the "Military-Technical Revolution." Beginning in the late 1970s, the Russians produced a significant number of seminal works on the MTR. They actually

predated the West by almost a decade in realizing the revolutionary essence embodied in US and NATO military-technological shifts. The Soviets used the West's scientific and technological superiority as a conceptual starting point for their own doctrinal innovations. For political, economic, and cultural reasons, the gap between MTR conceptualizations and the actual capabilities of the Soviet military forces was never bridged. Later, Soviet theories provided a looking glass for US strategists. From the early 1990s, following almost a decade of Western conceptual disregard, a fundamental Soviet MTR vision was analyzed and adapted by the US. American defense theorists coined the term "Revolution in Military Affairs" after adopting the Soviet variations on that theme. It was by studying the reflections of American military power in Soviet eyes that American strategists fully comprehended in the early 1990s the significance of what they had produced.¹⁸

While the Americans were the first to produce RMA-type munitions, and the Soviets were the first to theorize on their revolutionary implications, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were the first to employ these revolutionary weapons in combat. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the IDF intensified their investment in PGM weaponry, sophisticated "over-horizon" intelligence capabilities, and command and control systems. Although Israel was the first to make extensive use of IT-RMA technology on the battlefield in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in 1982, Israeli defense specialists viewed precision-guided munitions simply as another force multiplier in the IDF's conventional arsenal. The conceptual and doctrinal emulation of the US since the mid-1990s touched off broader changes in IDF thinking, introducing the aspiration to be a "small and smart military," à la RMA.

The intellectual history of the RMA is puzzling because of the diverse paths that led each nation to the same military innovation. At the outset, the US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without realizing their revolutionary implications. No attempt to reconceptualize the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare in futuristic terms was made by the US in those years. Soviet MTR concepts represented a form of theoretical conceptualization that chronologically preceded technological procurement and combat experience. The Soviets were the first to speak of this development as a discontinuity, coined the term "Revolution in Military Affairs," and produced seminal theoretical works without possessing either weapons or technologies. The Israelis utilized the weaponry on the battlefield, but only ten years later, beginning in the mid-1990s, did the IDF start to reform its concept of opera-

tions, force structure, and broader strategic doctrine to fully exploit the opportunities provided by information technology. The first country to extensively use RMA technologies in combat, Israel was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged their revolutionary implications. Similar to the American case, the cultivation of the technological seeds of the Israeli RMA preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones.

This process is counterintuitive; one would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous and simultaneous paradigmatic changes in the perception of warfare. However, in the cases in question, the evidence indicates that this is not necessarily so: enormous variation is evident in the intellectual paths taken toward conceptual innovation. Moreover, the gaps of time between familiarity with the technology and systematic understanding of its potential implications for organizational structures and concepts of operations vary considerably across the cases. How can disparate intellectual behavior of military theoreticians and civilian strategists in the USSR, the US, and Israel with regard to the RMA be explained? Why did the technologically inferior USSR prevail qualitatively over the US and Israel in the conceptualization of the emerging military-technological realities? Why did it take the US defense community close to a decade to acknowledge the accuracy of Soviet assumptions and to translate MTR theoretical postulates into a radical military reform? Why did Israel not embark on the transformation of its military much earlier? The conspicuous variation in intellectual approaches generates two central questions of this book: What explains the different ways in which military innovations, based on similar technologies, develop in different states? How does a "new theory of victory" originate in a certain ideational milieu, and what contributes most to shaping its nature?

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Scholars of military innovations maintain that Revolutions in Military Affairs depend as much upon gaining access to the requisite technologies as on restructuring concepts and organizations. In the last two processes social and cultural factors are critical. This book, which relates to military innovation studies, will elaborate on various factors in the field that have, to date, been identified as shaping innovation. A body of literature about the imprint of cultural attributes on strategic behavior provides the most relevant answers to the questions posed in this book.

Chronologically, the works about the cultural impact on national security policy, which were introduced under the umbrella rubric of "strategic culture," came in three waves. The first generation of scholarship emerged in the late 1970s and focused on the link between national political and military cultures, and the strategic choices that countries made. The literature argued that a deeply rooted set of beliefs and a nation's formative historical experiences create its distinct mode of strategic thinking and particular attitude toward security affairs. The notion that different security communities might think in different ways about the same strategic matters began to gain acceptance.¹⁹ Empirically, the literature concentrated mostly on the distinctive national styles in the superpowers' grand-strategy making and on the cultural roots of the nuclear doctrines of the USA and the USSR.²⁰ The second wave of literature came in the early 1990s and presented strategic culture as an independent determinant of security policy patterns. A variety of case studies sought to prove that "strategic culture" constituted the milieu within which strategy was debated, and if not ultimately driven by the parameters of strategic culture, national security policy had deep cultural underpinnings.²¹ The literature of this period sought research methodology to make the analytical models of the discipline less opaque, vague, and simplistic.²² The third generation of scholarship on the cultural foundations of strategic behavior picked up in the mid-1990s. The constructivist research program, which emphasized the ideational construction of international politics, "devoted particular attention to identity formation, the organizational process, history, tradition, and culture," and provided a far more nuanced picture of security affairs. It took researchers of military innovation deeper within states, organizations, and the process of producing new technology, to account for the role of culture and norms.²³ Constructivists framed the impact of domestic factors on security as a coherent theoretical paradigm to counterbalance the traditional neorealist approach to international security.²⁴ Constructivism views culture as a synthesis of ideational meaning that governs perceptions and actions, defines the situation, articulates motives, and formulates a strategy for success.²⁵

In the last decade, a growing interest in ideational explanations resulted in numerous studies of a variety of empirical and theoretical topics that all appeal to socially, culturally, and ideationally independent variables to explain military affairs. A number of proponents of the cultural approach to IR sought to inquire into the ideational foundations of states' defense policy and concentrated on the interrelation between norms, culture, and strategic behavior.²⁶

Other scholars focus on domestic social structures to explain particular national styles in generating military power.²⁷ The renewed interest in organizational analysis led to an appreciation of the interstate level and to focusing on "figuring out the fighting organizations."²⁸ Scholars paid considerable attention to the linkage between the nature of the organization and the military innovation it produced.²⁹ At the intrastate level, scholars examined how the cultural identities of specific nations shape military doctrines,³⁰ and paid attention to the intellectual dynamics and adaptive learning between institutions from different states that influence the preferred paths of strategic behavior.³¹

Inspired by constructivism, the literature on the impact of culture on military innovations spanned beyond the traditional political science and has been informed by cross-disciplinary linkages to anthropology, historical research, sociology, and psychology. Concurrently, a belief that military reality is socially constructed evolved among historians.³² Social military historians argued that collective memoirs and imagination shape the way nations prepare for, conduct, and experience warfare. They provided useful insights into how collective memory and imagination of war are framed³³ and how this memory and these images shape social identity³⁴ and the state's approach to warfare and security.³⁵ This research draws upon the assumption that "cultural construction" is the best means of understanding the differences between militaries.³⁶ Literature on the social approach to technology studies is another useful source of insight. It envisions technological innovation as ideas shaped by discourse between "interest groups" that view the potential of a given technology differently, in a manner that corresponds to their beliefs, preferences, and vision of what that technology can do for them.³⁷ In this way, military technologies are not deterministic, but socially constructed.³⁸

In his superb review of military innovation studies, Adam Grissom divides the literature of the field into distinct categories according to the focus of analysis. The six avenues of research comprise the civil-military, intraservice, interservice, cultural, top-down, and bottom-up models of military innovation.³⁹ This book refers to several categories of this typology across cases. However, according to Grissom's definition this study would be qualified as part of the cultural school of research, in the context of the major works in the field of military innovation. This work further elaborates on the recent scholarly definition of "strategic culture," which views it as a set of shared formal and informal beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape

collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which influence and sometimes determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.⁴⁰

LACUNAE OF KNOWLEDGE

Notwithstanding the established contributions of the literature, empirical and theoretical lacunae emerge from the existing body of research.

Literature related to IT-RMA in the USSR, the US, and Israel may be broadly divided into two complementary and often overlapping categories: practice-oriented research on the nature of the RMA, and research about the history of the RMA development. The studies belonging to the first category include empirical data and theoretical observations that then guide the community of experts involved in defense transformation policy making. Studies belonging to the second category consist of subjective interpretations and observations of the RMA as a stage in the intellectual development of modern military thought. In each of the three cases under study, the practice-oriented body of literature is considerably larger than the intellectual history of the RMA. Most of the studies that concentrate on the history of the Soviet MTR are a priori deficient, inasmuch as they were produced during the 1980s or early 1990s, when their authors had no access to critical collections of declassified Soviet materials. The American case has been dealt with extensively, but there is still a conspicuous lacuna regarding the role of intellectual emulation of the Soviet MTR and regarding the diffusion of military ideas from West to East and back again. The history of Israeli military thought in the last decades in general, and the history of the IDF RMA in particular, remain, for the most part, unwritten. The few existing sources are full of caveats and lack in-depth perspective.

Though various studies portray how military innovations, and particularly Revolutions in Military Affairs, develop through organizational, doctrinal, or technological processes, the researchers only recently started to focus on the symbiotic relationship between technology, strategic culture, and development of the new theory of victory.⁴¹ Strategic culture literature suffers from an acute deficit of comparative studies. As a rule, scholars focus on the impact of strategic culture on the behavior of one or two actors, while inquiring into a particular issue of international security—usually a nuclear policy. The literature has paid attention mostly and primarily to the American traits of strategic behavior. Relative to the American case, Soviet-Russian strategic

culture has been neglected. With regard to Israeli strategic culture, the literature is completely silent.

A few researchers of strategic culture have utilized social sciences beyond IR.⁴² Anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists agree that culture conditions behavior and thinking style. The latter insight is directly relevant to, but underdiscussed in, security studies. Cognitive style, which is an essential part of a state's strategic culture, remains outside the scope of academic investigation. There appear to be no studies to date that examine military innovations through the lens of cultural psychology and observe the impact of cognitive styles on developing a new theory of victory. While security studies scholars have overlooked the framework of analysis offered by the cognitive style theories, this approach is widely applied in cross-cultural psychology.

To sum up, despite the important pioneering role the USSR, the US, and Israel have played in shaping current military innovations worldwide, there has been no systematic, cross-cultural, comparative analysis of the intellectual history of the RMA in the three countries to date. This book seeks to fill the above-mentioned theoretical and empirical voids. It suggests a cultural explanation for significant incongruence in approaches to this military innovation in the US, the USSR, and Israel.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The book sheds light on the sources of the strategic cultures and portrays the determinants of a conceptual approach to military innovations. It argues that, given the initial and necessary conditions provided by technology, the variation in the military innovation in the USSR, the US, and Israel was ultimately shaped by the impact of each state's strategic culture. The book addresses the cultural and cognitive factors that affected the dependent variable, presents the causal mechanism that sets the relationship between culture and generation of an RMA into motion, and inquires into a host of questions regarding the impact of norms on developing new theories of victory.

The research does not pretend to seek a positivist wisdom that will enable unconditional predictions about strategic behavior of the three countries under study; neither does it attempt to develop a universal explanation that can clarify the impact of cultural factors in all cases of military innovations. However, it seeks to show the persuasive plausibility of the causal mechanism and to improve scholarly understanding of the relationship between culture and

military innovations, capitalizing on the intellectual history of the recent RMA. Using comparative and contrasting cases, this study produces more credible evidence for the influence of cultural factors than can an example in which only one society is being considered. It focuses on the fundamental strategic narratives and traditional military beliefs that shape the intellectual climate of a security-making community and its approach to military innovation. The book shows how thinking styles came about in each case study, and how they set each state's analytical approach to the RMA into motion.

The question of whether strategic culture is the cause or the context of action goes to the heart of the once vigorous theoretical debate. Indeed, the mere act of defining strategic culture as an independent variable remains controversial, and research may border on tautology, whereby sociocultural structures are seen as both reflecting and shaping behavior.⁴³ This book focuses on sociocultural factors to account for the variations of the dependent variable. Yet it echoes the approach of those who see strategic culture as an ideational milieu that frames behavioral choices, and defines it as an intervening variable. It remains true to the claim that culture influences action, "by shaping a repertoire of skills, styles and practices from which people can construct strategies of action."⁴⁴

Ontologically, emerging technologies and strategic culture are not independent of each other but interact in the context of organizational and strategic environments. The relationship between technology and military innovation is not deterministic, but rather socially constructed; national military tradition and professional cultures interact with technology, affecting the course and outcome of military change. The kind of weaponry that is developed and the kind of military that it foresees are cultural products in the deepest sense.⁴⁵ A true revolution in the way military institutions organize, equip for, train for, and conduct war depends on a confluence of political, social, and technological factors.⁴⁶ Each factor is necessary but insufficient for paradigmatic change. An interaction among a number of variables (structural, technological, and cultural) sets off a complex chain reaction that generates military innovation, in a particular chronological order. Structural factors and emerging technologies represent the independent starting point of military transformation. The cultural factor is not, in itself, sufficient for the emergence of the RMA but constitutes the pivotal intervening variable that conditions innovation's path of development. Consistent with this argument, this book chooses the cultural factor as its main focus and takes up the discus-

sion from the point at which the technology has been introduced. Although the breakthrough technology usually constitutes a basic precondition for paradigmatic change, the cultural factor is critical for assessing the causal effects of the hypothesis. "New theory of victory" is a quintessentially cultural-ideational endeavor. Cultural factors explain why, once a new technology is available, certain states translate it into an RMA while others do not, or do it in a different style. Thus, with "knowledge of a technology" held constant across the cases, ideational differences account for variance in the course of the development of a new theory of victory. It follows that states may utilize the same technologies in different ways, in accordance with their sociocultural patterns, and eventually produce different military innovations.⁴⁷

Structural and material factors come to mind as the main alternative explanation of the Soviet, American, and Israeli approaches to the RMA. The proponents of this explanation would argue that the need to survive forced the above three states to prepare for war as efficiently as possible, under the objective material limitations. As Kenneth Waltz sees it, states generate maximum military power using available national potential and attempt to "mimic the military innovations of countries with greater capabilities and ingenuity."⁴⁸ Barry Posen echoes this claim, positing that in any competitive system, successful practices will be imitated.⁴⁹ Thus, according to this explanation, each state responded to changing strategic circumstances, to the changes in threats, and to the balance of power. The USSR, the US, and Israel operated along rational lines, made the best use of available resources, emulated each other's practices, and sought to organize their military forces in the most functional manner. The scope of the military innovation in each country was conditioned by the resources available to each of the innovators.

However, empirical evidence runs counter to this explanation. Behavior of each state seems dysfunctional, if not irrational. Why did the Soviets develop doctrines incompatible with the country's capacity to implement them? Why did the US and Israel produce and utilize the weaponry but not embark on the innovation of their militaries much earlier? Neorealism is weak in explaining this counterintuitive strategic behavior. An ideational approach, which argues that the perception of security interests is a function of a country's cultural environment,⁵⁰ offers a better-suited analytical framework for this task. Cultural analysis is not a substitute for but an effective supplement to neorealism for explaining states' strategic behavior.⁵¹ It does not reject neorealistic claims about rationality or lack thereof of the actors. Instead it argues

that rationality is neither objective nor universal, and that rational behavior is culturally dependent. The actors formulate their preferences not in accordance with a universal logic of efficacy, but according to their own norms, values, and self-image.⁵²

METHODOLOGY

To show how cultural variables form the ideational framework for military innovation, this study draws upon theoretical insights and models of analysis from political science, history, sociology, cultural anthropology, and cognitive psychology. All these approaches have a large measure of validity and are not, for the most part, mutually exclusive, but are reciprocally complementing.⁵³

According to Jeffrey Lantisi, strategic culture research lacks a defined methodological design.⁵⁴ Studies in the field frequently have difficulties in illuminating variables that constitute the universal parameters of "strategic culture." In part this reflects differences among the cases: certain organizational or ideational parameters that play a significant role in one country may play a secondary role in another. The common solution, adopted also by this book, is to choose according to the "lasting nature" of the impact. Features of culture, norms, and ideas that transcend generations and impact continuously upon a state's strategic behavior are chosen as the parameters of the strategic culture in a given case. To keep the research model elastic but not to deteriorate to parsimonious definition, scholars choose strategic culture parameters from three interdependent pools: national-popular culture, characteristics of policy-making mechanisms in security affairs, and "bureaucratic reflexes" and organizational cultures of defense institutions.⁵⁵ In compliance with this methodological approach, and in keeping with the topic of the book, this research includes the following factors under the rubric of parameters of strategic culture: social structure; cognitive style; cultural time-orientation; styles in communication; organizational approach to innovations; preferences in ways of waging wars; structure of the military system and the role of the General Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the General Headquarters in it; approach to the development of military knowledge; the role played by technology in military affairs; and the approach to weapons procurement.

Determining strategic traditions entails a thorough analysis of primary sources.⁵⁶ This book is based on data obtained from archival documents, oral testimony and memoirs of relevant insiders, curricula of military academies, field and training manuals, and leading professional military periodicals. The

Soviet case is constructed using declassified dissertations and scientific studies written by senior Soviet military officers, as well as declassified military periodicals and theoretical writings that formed the basis of the MTR paradigm. In the case of the US, the study utilizes declassified documents produced by the defense and intelligence communities that reflect the adaptive learning and construction of the RMA concept by the American defense establishment. The Israeli history of the RMA is constructed using the curricula of military academies, leading professional journals, and interviews. In the cases of the USSR and Israel, the study is based on primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible. Where no available primary materials exist, the study relies upon secondary sources. These are employed not only as a substitute for declassified records, but as an important means of illustrating the cultural context that shaped the decision-making process.

Following the introduction, the book comprises five chapters: the relationship between cognitive styles and understanding revolutions in military affairs is discussed in the first chapter; the following chapters address the Soviet, the American, and the Israeli cases. Each case study starts with the empirical narrative about the course of the RMA. It is followed by the portrait of each respective country's strategic culture and the cognitive style of its military experts. The conclusion of each chapter analyzes the impact of cultural factors on the course of the innovation and illuminates the causal link between the two. The conclusion of the book synthesizes insights from the three cases and discusses the intellectual history of the RMA from a cross-cultural perspective. As an integrated whole, it summarizes the findings on the RMA's development in each of the three cases; analyzes the role of cultural variables in shaping the variations and the congruencies of the military innovation; highlights directions of future research; and elaborates on policy implications.

Several important questions related to the IT-RMA have intentionally been left outside the scope of the current study. The discussion deliberately refrains from addressing the question of whether the process described actually represented a revolutionary discontinuity in warfare, and it does not examine the efficacy of the IT-RMA-type warfare against asymmetrical threats.⁵⁷ It does not explore the debate brought by the "military reform" movement,⁵⁸ does not deal with the Soviet reaction to the US Strategic Defense Initiative,⁵⁹ and does not discuss the way in which nuclear doctrines are influenced by cultural variables.

Though framed in the context of Soviet, American, and Israeli historical experience, the insights of this book will be of wider importance for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies. The book seeks to make a threefold contribution. Historically, the research bridges the gap between the significance of the IT-RMA for the development of modern military thought and the poorly grounded academic debate on its intellectual history. Theoretically, it generates a set of hypotheses to guide a cultural approach to security studies and provides a fresh, comparative look at theories of military innovation. In practical terms, the cultural analysis presented in this book provides defense managers with tools to assess the weaknesses, strengths, and behavioral inclinations of friends and foes and enables them to understand the foreign lenses through which one's policy is grasped. A thorough understanding of the strategic cultures of others contributes to formulating policy in the fields of deterrence, bargaining, and strategic signaling and increases accuracy during intelligence analysis of foreign operational behavior and strategic intentions.

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COGNITIVE STYLES AND UNDERSTANDING REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION

"Good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology," argued Bernard Brodie in his *War and Politics*.¹ In other words, good anthropology and sociology are tools of great significance for understanding how strategy is crafted and how military experts tailor a "new theory of victory." One can make an argument that variance in strategic behavior stems from differences in strategic cultures. In turn, differences in strategic cultures are determined by, among other factors, the variance in fundamental cultural characteristics.

A national cognitive style is one element in the cultural mosaic that shapes a state's strategic behavior and constitutes the ideational foundation of its military innovation. Empirical evidence gives grounds to assume that experts in the same profession from different cultures think differently about military innovation and produce various types of doctrinal outcomes from the same technological discontinuity. What reasoning traits recur in the intellectual activity of military experts in the frame of a given culture? What factors shape, determine, and guide experts' imaginations and cognition when they conceptualize military innovation? This chapter addresses these questions and portrays how the sociocultural background of experts shapes their style of reasoning. It introduces several fundamental cultural distinctions among societies, with particular focus on the *cognitive style*. This focus aims to present the plausible link between the cultural factors of a given nation and its aptitude to understand revolutions in military affairs. I argue that given certain cultural and cognitive characteristics, a particular professional community may have a greater propensity than others to grasp paradigmatic change in the nature of war.