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POLITICAL CULTURE APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago dissatisfaction with the state of studying Middle East politics may well have led one to believe that to a very large extent, the shortage of scholars qualified in the esoteric languages, elaborate traditions, and long history of the area was to blame.[1] In fact, at the time there was a good deal of justification to speak of an expected shortage of experts in Middle Eastern studies, to the point where importing such scholars from abroad was considered as an alternative. Today, the problem seems to be more to find positions for fair numbers of fresh Ph.D.s in Middle Eastern history, sociology, and politics. The dissatisfaction with the state of the field, however, remains intact.

The breakaway of the 1960s from traditional Orientalism had a lot to do with the emerging prestige of the social sciences. As a result, high hopes were attached to the possibility that area studies utilizing the tools and approaches of the various social sciences would produce significant results both in terms of contributions to our understanding of the areas and contributions to the theoretical body of knowledge in the social sciences involved. The number of graduate students combining Middle Eastern studies with political science, in particular, increased spectacularly. Yet the results, I believe, have been disappointing, in many ways.

Needless to say, the blame cannot be put entirely on Middle East specialists. The state of the field in comparative politics as such is unsatisfactory in terms of available, universally agreed-upon theories, and the interplay between macrotheories and empirical research in various areas of the world is minimal.[2] This means that it is hard to see the contributions of empirical work from the Middle East to the ongoing body of knowledge in comparative politics and its theories, while at the same time it is just as hard to find evidence of utilizing that body of knowledge for purposes of research on Middle East politics.

The consequences of this hiatus are unfortunate indeed. It brings about a good deal of inefficiency in terms of wasted time and duplicated efforts simply as a re-

[1] Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples," *World Politics*, 15 (Oct. 1962), 108–122.

[2] Joseph La Palombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (Oct. 1968), pp. 57–78.

sult of lack of cooperation by various scholars on account of their failure to address themselves systematically to a common theoretical framework. It inhibits creative dialogues between scholars in the field, as well as outside, again because of the lack of agreement on methods and purposes of the most fundamental nature. It leads to a situation where standards are not readily available, thus causing serious difficulties in evaluating work in the field. It tends to encourage research of overly individualistic and even idiosyncratic nature which leads to a situation in which scholars talk *at* each other rather than *to* each other.

The reasons for this sad state of affairs are not difficult to find. Apart from the lack of many good theories or at least theoretical frameworks in comparative politics, the very nature of the profession as a highly individualistic enterprise; the nature of the Middle East as a large, diverse, and complex area; the political and technical difficulties of research in many of its countries; the scarcity of the data in certain respects; the lack of a historiographic tradition comparable to that in other areas of the world; and the rapidly and constantly changing nature of volatile Middle Eastern politics are only a few that readily come to mind.

The theoretical aridity of the study of Middle East politics is all the more lamentable in the light of the fact that the region is in fact a naturally given "laboratory" for the purposes of comparative study. It is sufficiently characterized by a variety of common features to be treated in many respects as a whole,[3] whereas the tremendous diversity within its bounds makes it susceptible to intra- as well as inter-region comparisons. Yet those comparisons are rarely made. In a recent conference at Princeton University the questions were raised as to the usefulness of social science in general and comparative politics in particular to the study of Turkish affairs, and conversely the contribution of Turkish studies to the social sciences. There was conspicuous unhappiness on both counts, although the participants seemed to agree that the state of Turkish studies is far better than that of the Arab countries or Iran.

To be sure, most scholars writing on Middle East politics feel obliged for the most part to make some reference at some point to theory, but all too often this is clearly but lip service and the theory mentioned in the introduction is never utilized in the work itself. While there are notable exceptions, as in the field of elite studies,[4] for one, on the whole this statement does not seem to be unfair. In the light of all this can we expect drastic change in the foreseeable future?

Clearly, it is not likely that revolutionary new theories will appear so attractive to researchers as to bring about fundamental changes in their attitudes to

[3] Raphael Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Continent," *Golden River to Golden Road* (Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 13–72.

[4] E.g., Marvin Zonis, *The Iranian Political Elite* (Princeton, 1971); William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954–1958* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite – A Study in Segmented Politics* (New York, 1970).

this research. Nor is it likely that great improvements will take place in relating empirical findings to theoretical frameworks, unless efforts are exerted to demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of this, in addition to the need to do so. In order for such attempts to have a relatively good chance of success, the proposed theoretical orientation must be clearly relevant to the conspicuous problems of Middle East politics, it must have a common framework supplying an initial area of agreement among scholars while being sufficiently open and flexible for development and refinement, it must have a clearly demonstrable connection with the work being done by the mainstream of the profession, and its costs must be reduced to a minimum in terms of the proposed departure from prevailing views. In what follows in this paper I argue that these conditions hold for a proposed political culture approach to Middle East politics.

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

The concept of political culture is a systematic attempt to apply the insights of social psychology to the study of comparative politics. While attempting in the 1950s to develop a structural framework for the study of politics, scholars emphasized the inadequacy of structural theories if they did not take into account the attitudinal environments of the political structures. Thus Gabriel Almond argued in 1956 that "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action . . . the political culture."[5] In a later work Almond and Verba speak of political culture as ". . . the specifically political orientations—the attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."[6] Still later, Verba defined political culture as "the subjective orientation to politics" or "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place."[7]

The modern concept of political culture has come to replace widely, although often implicitly, held notions about national character,[8] modal personality and habits, temperaments and customs of political communities.[9] The tremendous

[5] Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics,* 18 (1956), 395.

[6] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, 1963), p. 13. Chapter 1 of this book lists many relevant works from the fields of social psychology and anthropology.

[7] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture" in Lucian W. Pye and Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), p. 513. For the sociological origins of many of these conceptions see the "theory of action" in Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York, 1964), pp. 45-53, 56–58, and chapters 8, 9.

[8] "National Character in the Perspective of the Social Sciences," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 370 (March 1967); Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," in Francis L. Hsu, ed., *Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality* (Homewood, Ill., 1961), pp. 72–208.

[9] For a good, short survey among these lines see "Political Cultures" in Peter H. Merkl, *Modern Comparative Politics* (New York, 1970), pp. 148–232.

importance of these to the analysis of political behavior has been always rather obvious, but they lacked a systematic treatment. In order not to become a catchall bag containing everything that could not be explained otherwise, it was necessary to work out precise and measurable dimensions of political culture. These dimensions then could be related to other—structural—variables.

Such an ambitious undertaking was attempted in the 1963 study by Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*.[10] The authors of that study expressed interest in the cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations of a sample of American, British, West German, Italian, and Mexican citizens to (1) the political system in general; (2) the input activities of the citizens, that is, their participation; (3) the output activities of government, that is, administration and regulation; and (4) the self as a participant in the political system. Utilizing these variables—although not always making consistent distinctions among them—the authors point to three orientations, or three pure types of political culture: (*a*) parochial —low on cognitive, affective, and evaluative attitudes toward all four; (*b*) subject—aware of the political system, on the output but low on input and the self as a participant; and (*c*) participant—high on all four, aware, and positively involved. A further division is that of *allegiants*, *apathetics*, and *alienated*, according to awareness of political objects and to positive, negative, or indifferent feelings toward them in terms of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations.

Almond and Verba were interested in finding out the characteristic political culture of democracy, the civic culture. They argue, on the basis of their findings, that this is a mixed political culture, in which the participant culture is superimposed on, but does not replace, parochial and subject orientations. This finding is hardly surprising to those who recall Aristotle's *The Politics*, but the entire work opened up a whole range of possibilities in terms of looking at a host of problems in researchable ways. While Almond and Verba were criticized for choosing an unsatisfactorily representative sample in some cases, and for neglecting internal differentiation in the various countries—regionally and otherwise, although they did mention role subcultures—clearly the more important problem is theoretical, in the sense of relating political culture to political structure. It was not clear just how strong the correlation is between the civic culture and the democratic form of government: Is one a condition of the other? Does one lead to the other?

The theorists of political culture argue that attitudes are not innate but are learned and transmitted through certain channels, the process of political socialization. The study of political socialization, therefore, may yield crucially important clues as to attitude formation and eventual political behavior. Lucian Pye studied the case of Burma[11] and attempted to close the gap between political macroanalysis and psychological microanalysis by getting at the set of political

[10] This paragraph is based on Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, chapter 1.

[11] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, 1962).

attitudes and the way they are transmitted in a set of important politicians and administrators. He came up with an explanation of the weakness of cooperation among institutions caused by the lack of mutual trust stemming chiefly from the anxieties and uncertainties of the process of political transitions. Pye's theoretical argument, and especially the deductive power of his thesis have been questioned,[12] but the value of his contributions is undoubted.

One dimension of political culture—patterns of authority—serves as a basis of a sophisticated theoretical approach to the stability of rule, that developed by Harry Eckstein.[13] This theory specifies the need for a certain degree of congruence between authority patterns in government on the one hand, and those in other social units on the other hand, especially the patterns more directly relevant or "adjacent" to the government. While in this theoretical approach there is no pretension to develop a full-fledged theory of political culture, there is an attempt to utilize a key dimension of it and the processes of its learning and transmission as an independent variable to which stable rule is related.

One much criticized deficiency of the Almond-Verba book was its treatment of entire national bodies which lacked adequate internal differentiation. This deficiency is remedied by Linz and de Miguel in an article dealing with Spain,[14] where the conclusion is that there are in fact "eight Spains." The authors argue that cross-national comparisons make much more sense if variables such as degrees of modernization and urbanization within the various nations are held constant. The article then goes on to utilize some ten categories, and according to the various combinations eight Spains emerge: "Proletarian Spain," "Gentry Spain," "Bourgeois Spain," and so on.

We therefore, now show, considerable improvement and progress in studying political culture, especially where survey research and aggregate data are fairly readily available. The theoretical outcome, however, is still not as impressive as one might have expected, thirteen years after the appearance of *The Civic Culture*. The earlier rigorous attempts to pursue research within consistent and systematic categories have been mostly abandoned, not only because of the lack of willingness on the part of other scholars to enter into dialogue on terms worked out by somebody other than themselves, but also by the initiators themselves. In 1965, two years after the publication of *The Civic Culture*, appeared the collection by ten scholars on ten countries including Egypt and Turkey entitled *Political Culture*

[12] See, for instance, Robert E. Holt and John Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 24–34.

[13] Harry Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," reprinted in his *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* (Princeton, 1966).

[14] Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations* (New Haven, 1966); see also Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Eric Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 291–341.

and Political Development,[15] which was widely uneven; some of its contributors had read the manuscript of the earlier volume, some had not; some had had access to *The Civic Culture* data, and some had not.[16] The volume includes a variety of good ideas and insights, some of which come close in theoretical framework to the Almond-Verba effort, some of which have very little to do with it, and some of which seem to have nothing to do with any systematic definition or conception of political culture. And in the very introductory essay Pye mentions a number of themes in political culture that came out clearly and frequently in the volume: trust *vs.* distrust, hierarchy *vs.* equality, liberty *vs.* coercion, and particularism *vs.* national loyalty, but no attempt is made to link this with available data in a rigorous manner.[17]

Perhaps even more surprisingly, only three years after *The Civic Culture*, Almond, in a major attempt to build a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of comparative politics, seems to have abandoned his earlier conception of political culture. The definition of political culture is consistent with the earlier formulation,[18] but the major dimension of political culture, seen in a developmental perspective, is secularization, "a process whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action."[19] There is no good connection in the book between this developmental aspect of political culture and what we know from the earlier works. No wonder that in all too many textbooks[20] of comparative politics, political culture again begins to suffer retrogression to the point where it *does* become a catchbag for all kinds of mysterious psychological aspects of politics that are otherwise not susceptible to treatment within the bounds of the approach utilized in the book.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: WHERE WE STAND NOW

Twenty years ago, Leonard Binder cautioned students of Middle East politics that "the political institutions of the Middle East are less important for what they

[15] Pye and Verba, *Political Culture*.

[16] Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in ibid., pp. 3–26.

[17] Ibid., pp. 22-24.

[18] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, 1966), p. 23.

[19] Ibid., p. 24.

[20] For a partial and fairly unsystematic utilization of the concept of political culture in a textbook, see Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government* (3d ed.; New York, 1958); Political culture in this book is treated in the following way (p. 33; italics in the text): "Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially concerned with *how* government ought to be conducted and with *what* it should try to do. This sector of culture we call political culture. As with the general culture of a society, the principal components of the political culture are *values, beliefs*, and *emotional attitudes*. In turn, within each of these we can distinguish between elements that emphasize means and those that emphasize ends—between *conceptions of authority* and *conceptions of purpose*."

are, than for what they were, and what they will be. At present they are simply changing, and the final issue is very much in doubt. We may be sure of one thing, and that is the continuing influence of earlier regional experience."[21] In the midst of so much change and instability, in a situation where books analyzing parties or regimes may well be out of date even before they are off the press, scholars instinctively have felt that it is more worthwhile to concentrate on the underlying, stable environment of institutions and personalities. Accordingly, we do have a good deal of information on Middle Eastern political culture, but in a scattered and unsystematic way.

If there is any sense in talking about the Middle East to begin with, it is so because it is "a culture area," as Patai has convincingly demonstrated.[22] But is it also a "political culture area"? Many writers assume that this is so, even when they do not consciously analyze political culture. Since, however, practically all authors of general region-wide works discuss political attitudes, we may summarize the argument by breaking down its level of generalization into three components which seem to justify talking about region-wide attitudes; the Islamic heritage, the Ottoman heritage, and for the major part of the Middle East, the Arab Heritage.

Surprisingly enough, in the large number of books dealing with the question "Whither Islam?"[23] which occupied for a long while some of the best-known orientalists, the political implications of Islamic heritage do not receive an adequate treatment. To be sure, we are told time and again that Islam is not merely a religion, but a way of life; we are told something about the Caliphate; and we have good analyses of Islamic law. The centrifugal tendencies of the Islamic political structure are also discussed, along with certain questions on the origins of rulers and ruling classes.[24] But the questions "How did Islam shape the fundamental ways of thinking about politics, and to what extent did such influences filter down to various levels of political activity?" remain largely unanswered. Perhaps the one major exception to the above statement is the "decline, decadence,

[21] Leonard Binder, "Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Middle East Governments," *American Political Science Review*, 51 (Sept. 1957), reprinted in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York, 1963), p. 686.

[22] Patai, "Middle East as a Culture Continent"; idem, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," *Middle East Journal*, 6 (Winter, 1952), 1–21.

[23] As the best among these, we probably should mention H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1946), and W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), as well as G. E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam* (New York, 1964).

[24] The best in "conventional wisdom" on these is to be found in the works quoted in the previous note, and in Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (New York, 1964); idem, *The Middle East and the West* (New York, 1964); G. E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* (Chicago, 1954); H. A. R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston, 1962); idem, *Mohammedanism* (London, 1968); and Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964).

and cynicism" thesis,[25] which is highly unsatisfactory and has been lately challenged to its very core.

The thesis mentioned above has one important point worth pursuing, and that is the question of the relationship between ideal models and practical behavior.[26] Going beyond what the literature tells us, we may well ask whether the acceptance of the gap between ideal and real in politics is specifically Islamic? Is the degree of this discrepancy different from that elsewhere in this period? Were there significant differences on this score among the various components of Islamic society, both geographically and functionally? Was this a matter of coming to terms with reality or else a deep-seated attitude that survived particular realities? If so, what are the implications for present-day politics in Islamic countries? If we could arrive at the answers to some of these questions, the impact of Islam could be made more explicit and applicable.

A head-on attack on the question of the impact of Islam on politics was made in 1942, in a little known but very important article by Arthur Jeffrey, aptly entitled "The Political Importance of Islam."[27] The importance of the article lies in the direct connections that are made between the tenets of Islam on the one hand, and widely held political attitudes by Muslims on the other—a connection that is not only rare but also significant if we bear in mind that most Muslims may have always been either ignorant of religious dogmas or opposed to them as articulated in the orthodox way, but that they had enough in common as Muslims as members of a political community[28] to have held certain attitudes in common. It is this idea—the membership in a political community, rather than Islam as a comprehensive system—that serves as the starting point for his important article.

Having surveyed the origins of the Islamic political community, Jeffery goes on to analyze the implications of this concept for the attitudes toward non-Muslims and the idea of the holy war (*jihad*). Arguing against a sophistic interpretation of the *jihad* and against the division into the world of warfare and the world of Islam, the author links this tradition with attitudes toward the divine right of occupation, solidarity, Pan-Islamism, and elections; above all, he attempts to use all these attitudes as variables explaining some of the contemporary political events in which Muslims were then involved. While Jeffery's article is rather sketchy and preliminary, it suggests a series of attitudes prevalent among Muslims that can be traced directly to Islam and which are of obvious political relevance.

Yet another series of points worth making has to do with the characteristic ways of thinking in Islam which are dealt with mostly from the point of view of

[25] As in von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam.*

[26] This point is made repeatedly in the aforementioned literature.

[27] *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 1 (Oct. 1942), 383–395.

[28] For an interpretation of Islam as a "charismatic community" see W. Montgomery Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society* (London, 1961).

theology, philosophy, and art, but which could be made relevant to political conceptions of the most fundamental nature. H. A. R. Gibb,[29] G. E. von Grunebaum,[30] and others make a number of scattered remarks about the tendency toward atomistic ways of thinking in Islam, one that lacks an idea of causation and leaves the connection between sequences of phenomena to the ever-renewed grace of God. Similar remarks are made in regard to the Islamic tendency for cultural borrowing, assimilation and synthetizing, and the particular Islamic way of creativity, that is, the limited effort invested in pursuing new frontiers of knowledge, and what is referred to as a tendency toward fatalism. Again, the political implications of all these points are not developed in any great detail except on the very general level of the "decline-cynicism-tyranny" thesis. And again, there is not much effort to establish the degree of generality or differentiation of all these features throughout the Islamic world, in time, space, or social standing.

The heritage of the Ottoman Empire has not fared much better. It is surprising, in fact, to find how little attention has been paid to political attitudes that may have crystalized throughout the four centuries of Ottoman rule in the region.[31] Here again we have a highly generalized thesis of tyranny, lack of penetration, ethnic differentiation, and so forth. These theses, whatever their degree of accuracy, mostly describe the structural character of the Ottoman Empire, and they tell us relatively little about the political attitudes held by the various groups of the population.[32] We do have a good deal of informative material about the various forms of interaction among the Ottoman authorities, the local notables, and tribal forces in the various provinces, but no systematic treatment of the underlying attitudes surrounding such interaction.[33]

Yet it is clear that very different political notions originated among the various groups in the Ottoman period. For instance, it appears that in later periods Turkish political development differed substantially from that of the Arab countries or Iran, and one central reason for the more structured, stable, orderly, and institutionalized political life in Turkey is the survival of the earlier notions of the

[29] *Modern Trends in Islam*, passim.

[30] *Medieval Islam*, passim.

[31] For a catalogue of what we know – and how little we really know – about politics in the Ottoman period, see H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. I, *Islamic Society in the XVIIIth Century*, Parts I and II (London, 1950–1957). The main theoretical source of the book, Albert H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, 1913) must be read with the modifications suggested in Norman Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica*, 16 (1962), 73–94.

[32] A possible exception to this statement is Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition," in Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*, pp. 171–198. Like most other essays in that volume, Rustow's paper is full of interesting and suggestive ideas, but clearly does not fit into any systematic, theoretical framework.

[33] For a few suggestive ideas along such lines, see Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 42–63.

state as an entity in its own right, worth preserving and defending at all cost, and which has standards of its own as well as a relatively autonomous sphere differentiated from its component groups. This notion, which appeared, for instance, in the recent conference at Princeton University dealing with Turkey in the mirror of the social sciences, helps account for a variety of differences between Turkish politics and that of the other countries in the Middle East.[34] Nevertheless, an adequate treatment of the various attitudes toward the "state" among the Ottomans, the Sunni Muslims, the Shii Muslims, and the various minority groups as well as among functionally different strata is still a task to be accomplished.

There are, then, significant differences between Turks and Arabs, for one. And indeed, writers dealing with the "Arabs"—variously defined—have put forth a series of values and personal attitudes. For instance, Morroe Berger in his book *The Arab World Today*,[35] which deals with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan puts forth a list of personality traits and values common to the inhabitants of these countries.[36] Berger relies heavily on available research results from the field of social psychology, on the few works dealing with attitudes in the Arab world, and above all on Sania Hamady's *Temperament and Character of the Arabs*.[37] While he does not explicitly relate the values and attitudes to politics and neglects to make much needed distinctions, Berger comes up with a long series of relevant and valuable insights, which have obviously important political implications. He tells us that "the Arabs display the double effect of wounded pride—self-exaltation and self-condemnation," and that among them "the individual rivalry that is manifest in bombast and sensitivity is itself engendered by the values of the groups . . . to which each individual owes allegiance and his very being."[38]

Berger goes on to mention the sense of individual insecurity among the Arabs, a sense of "negative individualism," "virtual obsession with oral functions," the infatuation with the language—previously researched by E. Shouby in his article "The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs"[39]—suspiciousness, a certain kind of extremism, and excessive hostility alternating with excessive politeness. Berger points to the existence of "a large reservoir of free-floating hostility", and the resulting efforts to keep conflicts suppressed or at least manageable. He mentions data indicating the significantly high degree of feelings as hostility toward others, mistrust, secretiveness about the self and curiosity about others, the unpredictable and arbitrary patterns of parental relations with children, and the resulting wish to ingratiate oneself with those in authority. Further traits of interpersonal relations mentioned by Berger are encouragement

[34] A most intriguing question in this context, of course, is that the existence, role, and impact of political parties seem to fare so much better in Turkey than in the Arab countries.

[35] New York, 1962.

[36] Ibid., chap. 5 and parts of chap. 2.

[37] New York, 1960.

[38] Berger, *Arab World Today*, pp. 136–137.

[39] *Middle East Journal*, 5 (Summer 1951), 284–302.

of sibling rivalry, intense competitiveness, the lack of trust and weakness of cooperation outside the family or other primordial units, formality and rigidity, political quietism—that is, the acceptance of fate in life in general and in politics in particular—authoritarianism, disinclination to look into the unknown, and the tremendous gap between the ideal and real being accepted, much more than in other societies.[40]

While Berger deals with "the Arabs" in general, some authors have been concerned with specific Arab countries, and Egypt in particular. Leonard Binder, in his contribution to the volume *Political Culture and Political Development*,[41] emphasizes the tremendous importance of the family as the primary agent of political socialization, along with the school, where the former influences more the attitudinal structure of the individual and the latter more his external behavior, particularly among what Binder terms the middle classes, or more revealingly, "the political class." Binder argues that the key dimension in understanding attitudes among Egyptians is the discrepancy in the roles of the father and the mother in the family.

> The father dominates the household. He enjoys unlimited authority, commands the respect of all, distributes the rewards and dispenses punishment, and stays aloof from the children for the most part. His commands must be obeyed by wife or children equally. He is supposed to be a man of forceful personality, but his own success is measured in terms of maintaining the family's status rather than in economic or other forms of achievement.[42]

> The status of the mother not only is a reflection of the lower status of women in society at large but also appears to have contributed to that lower status. The mother is in nearly all things the opposite of the father. She is not a guardian of the family's prestige but its point of greatest vulnerability. She is not wise, forbearing, generous in friendship, and terrible in retribution. She is generally considered, at least in traditional circles, as concerned with trivia, a weak personality, permissive, somewhat dishonest, a dissimulator, and incapable of controlling her emotions.[43]

Binder argues that the children grow up in a highly permissive atmosphere when they are under the supervision of the mother as youngsters. At a certain point before adolescence they come increasingly under the father's supervision and strict judgment. The resulting ambivalence is further enhanced by the fact that the mother is often willing to sacrifice herself for the good of the children, whereas the father remains aloof and distant.

From his analysis of family patterns socialization Binder derives seven conclusions of importance for the political culture of Egypt:

> In the first place, the kind of society which Egyptians want is one which reflects the virtues taught in the family and one which understands the essence of the national community in family terms. Second, all persons in positions of authority tend to be assimilated to the role and character of the father, or in rare cases to that of the mother. The individual who finds himself in a position of authority has already internalized the model of the father as the goal to which

[40] All the points mentioned here are taken from Berger, *Arab World Today*, chap. 5.
[41] "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution," in Pye and Verba, *Political Culture*, pp. 396–449.
[42] Ibid., p. 409.
[43] Ibid., p. 410.

maturation and achievement of adult status will lead him, but he may find that the strategies of the mother are more helpful in subordinate roles. Third, equalitarian relations cannot be conceived of outside a framework of keen rivalry. Fourth, formalism and prestige are still rated higher than achievement. Fifth, authority and power are thought to be aspects of personality and not attributes of certain roles. Sixth, matters of personal feelings, social adjustment, and sex are all associated with the idea of shame. Seventh, sharing of confidences and especially lifting the veil of secrecy from any of the symbols of shame are grave and stupid mistakes which can only weaken the individual in his social dealings.[44]

Binder then goes on to explore the role of the school system in political socialization, although, of course, this affects a smaller number of people and with less intensity than the more fundamental and pervasive influence of the family. Even so, the educational system has a critical role in socializing people into the Egyptian political system, which is "administrative-bureaucratic. . . . Its processes involve hierarchical and co-optative practices." Therefore, "Educational practices emphasize the authority of the teacher, role learning, formal curricula, uniformity, discipline and routine."[45] Binder then explores further the means used by the educational system to indoctrinate the students with the specific values of the regime, but this is clearly less important than political socialization creating political attitudes of a lasting and general nature.

The social anthropologist Hamed Ammar, author of the extremely revealing *Growing Up in an Egyptian Village*,[46] notices a certain personality type prevailing among Egyptians which he labels "the *Fahlawi Personality*."[47] Such a personality is characterized by quick adaptability to expectations, resulting in flexibility as well as a tendency to untruth and lack of commitment to words and behavior; egocentrism and a tendency to "show off," stemming from a lack of security, a refusal to evaluate situations realistically, a sense of inferiority, and the inability to face new situations; avoiding responsibility and trying to fix the blame on others; preference for individual over collective action; and a tendency to do something in the easiest and shortest rather than the best way, a characteristic that leads to daring and enthusiasm in certain cases, but also to lack of patience and persistence in others.

The juxtaposition of these characteristics and history have led to a number of complexes from which Egyptian society, according to Ammar, suffers. Of particular interest to the student of political culture are those having to do with authority and "verbal thinking." The authority complex means that the constant concentration of power in single hands has led to a logic unique to the situation of authority, a logic that is parallel to the extent of power that is concentrated. The imposition

[44] Ibid., pp. 410–411.

[45] Ibid., p. 413.

[46] London, 1954.

[47] The following citation of Ammar's ideas from his *Fi Binaa al-Bashar: Dirasat fi'l Taghyeer al-Hadari wa'l: Fikr al Tarbawi* (On Building Human Beings: Studies in Cultural Change and Educational Thought), first published in Lebanon in 1964, and republished in a new edition in 1971, is taken from the review by Nissim Rejwan, "Culture and Personality: Building the New Egyptian Man," *The New Middle East*, 41 (Feb. 1972), pp. 16–18.

of power that is concentrated. The imposition of power on others then results in a situation in which "the individual tries constantly either to avoid authority and keep away from it or to appease it, remonstrate with it, and sometimes even to beg mercy from it and humiliate himself before it."[48] The authority complex brings about a situation in which the wish to gratify anyone in authority is the primary motivation for patterns of behavior vis-à-vis government, and in which anyone in a position of authority accepts the prevailing way of exercising power, and proceeds merely to protect his position.

The second complex has to do with the gap between "verbal thinking" and "effective thinking." Ammar argues that in Egyptian society there is a tendency to remain content with constant repetition of formal, verbal images of solutions to problems rather than attempting to penetrate the detailed, complex nature of problems and the resulting concrete implications. As a result, even perfectly legitimate and useful frameworks for action remain in the nature of mere slogans, and instead of inspiring and guiding people to action, they become substitutes for action.

In addition to Egypt, we have a few more examples of Middle Eastern countries which have been analyzed in political cultural terms, even more explicitly than Egypt. For instance, Quandt in his book on the Algerian political elite[49] shows the impact of differential and discontinuous political socialization on groups and generations within the Algerian leadership, and the resulting problems of factionalism and cleavages. Perhaps even more to the point is his observation that the Algerian elites hold two sets of contradictory, or at least clearly inconsistent, orientations to politics: "a high level of mistrust" and "an expectation that reciprocity and equality will be respected"; and including at the same time "a strong statist orientation"; and a "genuine popular orientation."[50] It is not quite clear to what extent this state of affairs is peculiar to Algeria or to a regime inheriting a successful revolution, but the explanatory power of the political culture approach in this case appears to be impressive.

John Waterbury's study of the Moroccan political elite[51] is also concerned with patterns of conflict and factionalism. And again, the reader cannot help wondering to what extent the state of affairs, or rather attitudes that he describes, is peculiar either to Morocco or to the particular regime prevailing there. As Clement Henry Moore points out in his review of the book,[52] despite the argument of the book to the effect that Morocco can be compared with Algeria more fruitfully than with Iran, for instance, the kind of factionalism described in the study may apply equally well to Iran where similar attitudes to power and authority exist. Bearing this point in mind, the utilization of the study of political attitudes in order to explain struc-

[48] Ibid., p. 17.
[49] Quandt, *Revolution.*
[50] Ibid., p. 280.
[51] Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful.*
[52] "On Theory and Practice among Arabs," *World Politics*, 24 (Oct. 1971), 106–126.

tural realities is again striking. In Morocco, "political groupings are ever on the verge of waging war amongst themselves or against the Palace. . . . Yet in the end nothing happens. Tension goes hand in hand with stalemate, and the recognized need for action is paired with a pervasive lack of initiative. It is my contention that this state of affairs can be explained by a common Moroccan attitude towards power and authority."[53]

What are these attitudes, which, according to Waterbury, are to account for this "continued propensity for factional tension and stalemate," which are also observable in Syria and Egypt?[54] Above all, Moroccans exhibit a constant concern for building alliances, all the while assuming that others are doing the same. This effort starts with the family, and extends from there to other spheres, based on obligations and debts of mutual nature, financial or moral. Other features include mistrust: "Covert machinations, dissimulation and trickery are accepted as the fact of political life, and a man's ostensible motives for a given action cannot be trusted."[55] As a result, a complex game of alliances and counteralliances ensues, in which one of the rewards is the joy derived from playing the game well.

The power game of alliances, however, is well within accepted bounds of scope and stakes. The conflict is zero-sum, but never decisive to the extent of placing one of the actors permanently out of the game. In this sense, the stakes of the game are marginal, since the outgroups are but temporary, and they may well be tomorrow's ingroups or their allies. Therefore, there is a great deal of ambivalence on the part of the members of any given alliance-system: ". . . their enemies and allies being chosen according to their own advantage in a particular system. This makes for (although of course never achieves) value neutrality regarding group membership with an often-ignored ease of movement of individuals among groups. . . ."[56] This trait, although derived from the elite-study of a single country, is interpreted by Moore as "a major cultural barrier against practical ideology among Arabs."[57] The implications of such an argument for understanding the style and setting of politics in the Middle East are momentous; clearly, much more can and should be done to develop this facet of the political culture approach to the study of Middle East politics.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The survey of the scattered pieces of research on political culture in the Middle East seems to indicate convincingly that there now exists a substantial body of

[53] Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful*, p. 5.
[54] Ibid., p. 321.
[55] Ibid., p. 77.
[56] Ibid., p. 66.
[57] Moore, "On Theory and Practice among Arabs," p. 120.

knowledge on political culture, a body that shows signs of providing at least preliminary explanations to some of the more intriguing problems in the study of Middle East politics. Despite the unsystematic character of most of the research so far, and despite the very incomplete, disjointed nature of the hitherto available evidence, it seems that in the Middle Eastern, as well as other, cases the future development of political culture studies may well be one major solution to the problem of linking macro- and micro-analysis, grand theory and the politics of individuals and groups.[58]

In any case, it is quite evident that in many, if not most, works on Middle Eastern politics the reader is cautioned that things work differently in this part of the world, that the centuries of Islamic and Ottoman traditions condition politics in a different way, and that Western concepts, therefore, may not apply to the study of politics in the region. Sometimes this observation, or some variation on its main theme, is made more or less explicitly and left at that, and sometimes it appears between the lines as an implicit, more or less subconscious bias or prejudice. It seems that political culture can make a major contribution by making implicit assumptions, biases, and prejudices not only explicit, but systematic and researchable. Now the question is what are the most promising avenues of research in terms of scope, data and methods?

In very general terms we may state the banal truth that the best fundamental guideline is to look for the political cultural traits that on the one hand characterize the region as a political culture area, and on the other differentiate various regions and groups within it. For instance—and this clearly has to be a salient feature of Middle Eastern political culture—we are told time and again that a fundamentally negative attitude exists toward government in the Middle East. Yet this statement is in need of refinement, development, and clarification. Is this as true of one country as it is of another? Significantly, why is the attitude of the Shiites[59] more negative than that of the Sunnis, if this is indeed the case? Is this attitude more or less negative among other minority groups? Why does this seem less of a problem among Turks than among Arabs? What sort of distribution exists on the imaginary scale of negativism toward government among various strata of the population? Can we handle intuitively a fairly obvious hypothesis such as that among Syrians[60] the negative attitude toward government is more likely to be active and violent than among Egyptians?

Next to the question of basic attitudes to government, one is curious partic-

[58] These were indeed among the original purposes for developing the political culture approach. See chap. 1 of Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*.

[59] In general, the political theory and attitudes of Shiites and other minorities have been relatively neglected and are clearly in need of much more research.

[60] Such a hypothesis almost inevitably emerges even at the reading of a single recounting of contemporary Syrian politics, e.g., Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria* (London, 1965), or a general history as A. L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria* (New York, 1969).

ularly about mistrust, individualism, and interpersonal cooperation, which are of first-rate political significance. Can we hypothesize in a sophisticated manner about the causes of the weaknesses of institutions and institutionalization in the Arab world, with the resulting difficulties in building political parties, industry, military forces, and so on?[61] Can we account in this way for the differences among various countries in regard to the cultural factors in the level of institutionalization? Can we make fruitful comparisons between Turks and Arabs?

It seems that handling the first two questions raised above would necessitate relying on the accumulated data, which is heavily concentrated on elite groups, however defined. More systematic differentiation between the various elites is clearly necessary, but in order to make real progress, it is necessary to go now beyond elite studies, and research the political attitudes of various other groups in the population.

One major obstacle to the shift from elite studies to research oriented toward the population as a whole is of course the difficulty of conducting survey research in the Middle East, both because of political factors and cultural differences that seriously bring into question the value of some survey research done in the past in the region. This obstacle can be overcome in a variety of ways. First of all, there is the possibility of reviewing the available scarce data with a different set of questions in mind. For instance, the data used in Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society*,[62] even though badly out of date, seems to be quite relevant to a number of important questions raised by a political culture approach, and the very difficulty experienced even at the time of the original collection and interpretation of the data indicates that perhaps different interpretations are in order indeed. This appears to be true, although perhaps less so, with other data as well.

There is no need, however, to accept the "fact of life" that seems to be at the heart of the Almond-Verba effort, namely that survey research must occupy an almost exclusive place as the tool of analysis in the study of poltical culture. Indeed, Middle Eastern specialists could make a significant methodological contribution if they were able to utilize the limitations of survey research in order to develop alternative methods that are more realistic in terms of the Middle East today. A major source with almost infinite, challenging possibilities is the literature, oral and written, in the Middle East today. Following the cue of McLelland, who investigated the achievement orientation of peoples in order to test his psychological theory of economic development in his *The Achieving Society*,[63] we should make an effort to code and examine systematically textbooks, fiction and nonfiction, the press, oral traditions, and folklore for evidence of attitudes toward politics.

[61] Cf. one of the leading contemporary approaches to the study of political development, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968).

[62] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York, 1958).

[63] David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, 1961).

McLelland and his associates relied on children's books and stories which they found universally available, comparable, and most revealing in terms of fundamental attitudes.[64] There is no reason why a similar approach to Middle Eastern data would not yield very valuable information about political culture in the region.

The methodology that is different may well yield material that cannot be conveniently or fruitfully discussed under the categories developed by Almond and Verba. If so, a major theoretical contribution to the discipline as a whole is again a possibility by adding, refuting, developing, and refining the framework previously employed. This would be an example of the creative interplay between general theory and empirical research at its best. Even a casual observation of the available literature on Middle East politics would suggest a series of dimensions of variance not exhausted by the Almond-Verba categories.

Apart from the neglect of subcultural differentiation and the lack of an adequately dynamic orientation to continuity and change, the relationship between politics and other spheres of life was not sufficiently explored. A number of scholars observed that in the Middle East power leads to wealth, and not vice versa.[65] Does this mean that the conception of the relationship between politics and economics in the Middle East is a common, distinguishing feature of the region? How does this compare with other areas of the world? Does this mean that politics is more or less salient there than elsewhere? What is the relationship between this fact and the tradition of Islam as a total, embracing social system? Does this cultural trait help explain specific problems of political structure in the region?[66]

Another crucially important point is that raised by Ibn Khaldun centuries ago, namely the question of solidarity.[67] A thorough survey of written sources and oral traditions may help answer questions such as: Are there differences in time and space in the conceptions of solidarity-creating groups? What are the lines of cleavage in attitudes to factionalism, who is to be a part of a faction, who is to be excluded, and what is to be the basis of the faction enabling it to function as a solidarity group? What are the limits of the solidarity of various kinship groups in various areas and periods in terms of attitudes to the family as a group claiming the loyalty of the members in matters of authority and political significance?

[64] On this see also the shorter version of McClelland's book, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change* (New York, 1966), pp. 139–156.

[65] E.g., Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, 1963), p. 46, and Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and other Middle Eastern Essays* (London, 1970), chap. 12.

[66] Many relevant, but scattered remarks on the connection between cultural background and contemporary politics in the Arab world can be found in Arnold Hottinger, *The Arabs* (Berkeley, 1963), and Jacques Berque, *Les Arabes D'hier à demain* (Paris, 1969). For more systematic, if less consciously "cultural," remarks see Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change*, and Kedourie, *Chatham House Version*.

[67] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah* (New York, 1958); Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1964), chap. 5.

Some scholars, and most frequently probably E. Kedourie, make the point that class analysis in the Middle East makes sense only to the extent that there are only two classes, the one in power and the one that is not.[68] This indicates a fundamental political cleavage of ubiquitous nature set against a background of relative social fluidity. Can we find evidence for such a two-class hypothesis in the study of attitudes? Are the attitudes on this point changing? What are the lines of differentiation along such lines? What are the implications for the chances of various forms of ideology, forms of government and rule now discussed and experimented with in the light of such a fundamental cultural trait?

Another crucially important cultural question is that of protest and rebellion. We are told by some scholars that rebellion in Islam has been frequent and system-maintaining.[69] In Morocco, rebelliousness has even been institutionalized in the "land of insolence."[70] The legend of the "docility" of the Egyptian peasant has been refuted convincingly by Gabriel Baer.[71] Throughout Islamic history we have multiple examples of protest-movement sects which show great adaptability and potential to survive in hostile and harsh environments. Yet the patterns of resistance to unpopular authority range from running away temporarily to major religious heterodoxy and action. One would like to know a good deal more about this variation, its nature and causes, particularly in terms of the attitudes producing it and the attitudes produced by it.

The overwhelming importance of primary socialization through the family has already been emphasized by several writers, as has the interrelated discrepancy in the roles of the mother and the father, or men and women. All this is intimately intertwined with honor and shame, which is quite a common characteristic of Mediterranean societies,[72] and which also accounts for a number of other features in the politics of the area. This sensitivity to honor and shame is a trait of political culture, and of the greatest importance. One would like to know again much more about the features common and alien to various parts of the region as far as honor and shame and their political implications are concerned. In this a *machismo* culture in the sense in which Scott analyzed Mexican political culture?[73]

A key aspect of politics is participation[74] in its various forms. We have already

[68] Kedourie, *Chatham House Version*, p. 384.

[69] Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change*, chap. 1.

[70] See the excellent book *Politics in North Africa* by Clement Henry Moore (Boston, 1970), chap. 1. This work uses in a modified, partial way the Almond scheme of comparative politics, and has much of value to say on North African political culture.

[71] "Submissiveness and Revolt of the Fellah," in his *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago, 1969), pp. 93–108.

[72] J. G. Peristiany, ed., *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (London, 1965), and Julian Pitt-Rivers, ed., *Mediterranean Countrymen* (Paris, 1963).

[73] Robert E. Scott, "Mexico, The Established Revolution," in Pye and Verba, *Political Culture*, pp. 330–395.

[74] Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process" in Leonard Binder et al., eds., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 159–204.

touched upon the views of the scholar to the effect of cynicism, passivity, and fatalism making for lack of political participation. At the same time we do not yet have a good systematic treatment of the problem of attitudes toward participation, its legitimacy, extent, forms, and limits in a general, comparative manner. To what extent is this connected with the trend of personalism? To what extent are political attitudes in the Middle East today in tune with the observation that in traditional Islamic societies leadership was seen as a personal attribute rather than as residing in certain roles? Is this true in the Middle East much more than elsewhere? How does this affect the conceptions of the role of the leader among the elites and other groups? What impact does this have on the subject of charismatic leadership?

Intimately intertwined with the previous point is that of clientelism.[75] This concept of asymmetrical relationships has proven its utility in contemporary social science, and it is quite clearly ubiquitous in the Middle East as well. Yet again we can witness fundamental differences in the way it operates. In some cases patrons and clients can only be kinship groups, while in some cases they are powerful individuals or religious saints. A study of the attitudes to the scope, limits, and membership of patron-client systems ought to be extremely useful in studying politics in the region. In general, we may state that the last two points involve the fundamental images of the political process, its center, character, limits and dramatic impact. Such images were brilliantly, but somewhat impressionistically explored in *Islam Observed* by Geertz.[76] Perhaps we could make a more systematic effort to do the same on a more extended scale.

The image of politics held by participants—and, for that matter, nonparticipants—involves those aspects of personality that are relevant to politics. One cannot help being impressed by Ammar's previously quoted effort to describe and analyze the so-called *Fahlavi* personality prevalent in Egypt. Can we agree on the existence and significance of this type of personality in Egypt? Do such personalities exist elsewhere in the Middle East? What other alternative personalities exist in the Middle East? How can we account for such differences? Do they have a behavioral impact of major explanatory significance? Or does the personality type put forth by Berger[77] and Hamady[78] better represent much of the Arab world? Are the two descriptions compatible?

Many of these questions perhaps require a new approach to the study of political culture. Many of them, however, require merely a more disciplined effort at a dialogue with work already done in the field, that is, at least a partial acceptance of some comparative framework for purposes of attempting to build some minimally general body of knowledge in this field. In fact, I would argue that given the present

[75] For a good review of the literature on patron-client relationships see Rene Lamarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Political Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics*, 4 (Jan., 1972), pp. 149-172.

[76] Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed* (New Haven, 1968).

[77] Berger, *The Arab World Today*, chap. 5.

[78] Hamady, *Temperament and Character of the Arabs.*

state of the field even the limited endeavor of working out a Middle Eastern counterpart to the American-European oriented *Civic Culture*—despite its flaws, some of which have been mentioned—would constitute a significant step forward.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been partly a statement of dissatisfaction, partly a catalogue of important trends, and partly an exhortation. The dissatisfaction is with the present disjointed, unsystematic, and often confusing state of the field of Middle East politics; the catalogue is that of the major trends of what we know or *suspect* and would like to *know* about political culture in the region; and the exhortation is to attempt to concentrate on the various forms of the political culture approach possible to the study of Middle East politics.

One cannot overstate the importance of attempting to distinguish between the important, useful, and long-range subjects on the one hand, and the relatively trivial, passing, and temporary phenomena on the other. It appears that specialists in Middle East politics, partly because of the subject-matter, have often been caught up in studying the temporary and particular rather than the lasting and the general.[79] While the Middle East is in considerable turmoil and institutional-personal change, it seems that the political attitudes that underlie political life are of long-standing and of extreme importance, as newcomers to the field are rightly warned. Since the study of such political attitudes in the mainstream of political science has had some systematic, theoretically oriented beginnings, and since such study helps place cases in the Middle East in a general, comparative, and theoretically significant perspective, the fruitfulness of the approach, I have argued, ought to be recognized and acted upon.

I have also argued that it may be necessary to engage in the dialectical creative process of utilizing parts of existing theoretical and methodological approaches, while changing, modifying, and developing other categories and methods, in the best tradition of dynamic scholarship. Parts of the paper deal with the possible substitution of certain textual-analytical methods to survey research that may not be a practical way of researching political culture in the Middle East. Again, it is hoped that the possible development of such new, imaginative methods will contribute creative insights from empirical area studies to general theory.

What are the chances of such changes of emphasis and approach to the study of Middle East politics? If dissatisfaction exists to the extent here argued, new, more systematic, comparative, and theoretically oriented approaches ought to have a fairly wide appeal. Some scholars in the field have removed their research from the ongoing mainstream to the point of developing general theories of human

[79] This was also the case ten years ago, according to Halpern, "Middle Eastern Studies."

relations,[80] a conception influenced by political culture, if broadly defined. Most students of Middle East politics, however, clearly tend to look for problems more closely related to the ongoing concerns in the discipline. The case for a limited but still significant move toward a political-culture approach rests on the conviction that it answers the call for parsimony in selecting problems in the study of politics, in that it directs attention to problems that are blatantly political, and of obvious contemporary relevance,[81] and much more. If the argument of this paper is correct, the political culture approach is not only parsimonious, but also practical in selecting researchable targets.

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[80] Manfred Halpern, "Dialectics of Continuity, Change, Collaboration, Conflict, and Justice in Traditional Muslim Societies," paper delivered at the plenary session of the second annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Austin, Texas, November, 1968. See also his forthcoming *The Dialectics of Transformation in Politics, Personality and History* (Princeton University Press). Halpern's original and provocative approach has much to offer also to the "conventional" study of political culture in the Middle East.

[81] In order to accomplish this, of course, there is need to go beyond the somewhat formalistically oriented scheme of reference of constitutional arrangements in Maurice F. Flory and Robert Mantran, *Les Regimes Politiques des pays arabes* (Paris, 1968), pp. 130–157. Even that limited series of observations, however, has something relevant to offer, particularly in terms of symbols and images of leadership.