Warning, learning and influencing -

In my view, the purpose and goal of Intelligence is to Alert, to Develop Knowledge and to Influence

The deep and dramatic changes in the last few years obligate the business of intelligence to adapt new tools.

Adapting new tools including new methodologies should improve our ability to be more relevant and deliver our mission: to warn, to develop knowledge and to influence.

 #2

This understanding led us to direct and adjust the way we “do intelligence” and therefore we are in an ongoing process of re-organizing.

#3

During this process we understood that the old challenges still exist alongside with the new and rapid changes.

#4

I will now present to you the old, new and future challenges in the Israeli point of view.

#5

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#6

Because of our **trauma** from the war of 73, in which the Israeli Intelligence **failed to alert from War** on time, my organization has been in a **race to improve its ability to alert** from war;

 #7

 however my claim is that we have **neglected many other aspects** that we should have learned from that war. The most important lesson is that the intelligence **failed in developing the proper knowledge** for decision makers and operative thinking.

#8

We lacked in our understanding of the **strategic and operative shift** in the Egyptian leadership in which Saddat led the Egyptian Army to **a limited strike;**

Andwe lacked the knowledge of the **new anti-tanks capabilities**.

The Israeli intelligence sh**ould have enable and enrich** the Israeli policy makers and the IDFs commanders **discussions** while thinking of war.

In other words, not just warning but also **strategic intel**. Information on **new capabilities** and **enriching the operative thoughts**.

#9

In retrospect I think that the more important lesson is that we **failed in imagination and misconception**.

#10

In many ways, I believe that these two aspects were the cause of the 9/11 and the case of CBW in Iraq intelligence failure

#11

Now I'll say few words concerning the changes and its challenges.

#12

One of the **most important phenomenon** which we are facing these days is what we call the **upheaval in the M.E**.

I claim that we are facing a **much more complicated situation**. In other words, I believe we are in a kind of **upheaval in the surrounding strategic and operative environment**.

#13

**Rumsfeld square**

Therefor the intelligence **should be more aware** to this dramatic change and due to that, should be **more modest**.

Today we **know that we don’t know**.

#14

The changes in the Middle East are in 4 main fields:

Reginal upheaval

Global changes

Nature of war changes

And the information revolution.

#15

I'll start with the upheaval implication.

#16

The dramatic changes in the Middle East are what we call the “upheaval” which depicts the cultural and political “earthquake”.

The upheaval is under a kind of evolution and till now we can count 4 maim stages, and in our understanding, this phenomenon cause many new challenges to the intelligence business.

In the **first stage**, the known regimes were toppled and replaced by unknown organizations and people. So now we had to deal with **new players**. And the **known players** are **in a new situation.**

By the time we got to know these “**new comers**”, they were **replaced by others**. And these **new players are not the same** like the old known players which we supposed to know.

In the mean time, we had to deal with the **evolution of the terror** phenomenon. **New types** of terror organizations **emerged** and flourished in **ungoverned areas.**

And more than that,along side with the terror, many **red lines of known warfare tactics that were broken (CBW, arm deliveries).**

Today, we are facing the **4th stage** which include the **fragmentation** of states, **struggles of ISIS** (the new **coalitions**, the **Russian** presence..).

All that new subjects, **weren’t on the Israeli intelligence priorities**.

#17

In the **past**, all we had to do was follow the l**eadership** and the **military**. Today, we have also to know and understand (in much more details) the **public role** in the political arena, **the economy** and **demography**, the **social ties** (tribal connection) and the impact of **the media**.

#18

For example, in order to understand the ME or to explain the basics routs of the deep trends we realized that we need to give more attention to the new generation, and to find new methodologies in this field.

It is **not a typical mission** for intelligence, mainly not to young officers who want to be involved in special operations..

#19

This another way to analyze the public and its impact.

#20

Global changes

#21

Today, it is much **more challenging** to understand the **international interests** **and its impact.**

The world was a multi-polar world; than it shifted into a bi-polar world (the cold war); following the collapse of the Soviet Union it shifted to a uni-polar world. Today we are in a kind of non-polar world or maybe we are in a bi-polar struggle in a non-polar world.

Maybe it's a little bit **complicated**, but maybe this is **the complexity of doing intelligence in this time.**

#22

We realized that we need to **give attention to many other non- state players**, so the professionality of doing intelligence on state and even terror organizations is not enough.

#23

I can show you the complexity of understanding the global interests and the various treaties through the next two slides slide.

#24

The various battlefields in which all the actors are fighting for their own interests. We as intelligence have to know and understand each battlefield and all the interests.

#25

To summarize the new subjects that we as intelligence must be aware of, we can count the: new organizations, the "residents", refugees, the arm deliveries, the enemies in the new context' the fragmentation, the UGAs, the blurred borders, the old and new struggles, and the new battlefields.

#26

#27

The nature of war is under a long time change.

#28

Due to the technological advances, today we need to know many **more capabilities than in the past**

#29

#30

One of the most challenging phenomenon is the “**disappearance**”. Our enemies are using civilian facilities as shields.

This challenge demands very **accurate intelligence**

and its **targeting approval** is very difficult because of the **collateral damage**.

#31

Global Jihad – despite our great experience with Terror, it seems that the **Global Jihad is a new challenge**. This is mainly because its **ad-hoc collaboration** with **many local groups**, and the problem to build against it an **alerting model**.

More than that, in my understanding, the new terror which we are facing these days, is **less motivated by deep ideology** and **more connected to the combination of young generation**, **poverty, frustration** and other deep trends in all over the globe, and the **new media**. (the next slide)

#32

**Information revolution -**

**#33**

Cyber –

I am not a professional on this specific matter (i am not sure there is some one like this) but as a person whom most of his professional life has been in the world of analysis i can tell you that there is **a need to re-think our basic understanding on how to “do” intelligence.**

 I'll try to give you some examples: **The job of the analyst vs the collector -**  should they be separated or maybe they should look for new methodology. Needless to mention the **world of alerting and CT**. there is a need to deal with **new questions** such as **what is “defeat”** in this era? What is **defense or attack?**

**The media** has a **role in shaping the environment** but also can be a great **intelligence provider** – **social media and the abundance of information** (Big Data). Cyber, is a total new game that challenges all of our methodology

#34.

Looking at all the changes, we understood that we are in times in which we have to deal with questions that are not only **Secrets or riddles** (the answer is known) but also with **mysteries** (there is no one answer)

#35

secrets

#36

Mysteries

#37-38 – **warning 360**

In the past we had to deal in 4 main scenarios of warning…

Today we have several new scenarios…

#39

#40

**To summarize this presentation**:

This era of change and uncertainties brings great challenges to the business of intelligence. There are **constant new players** to get to know with and new **methodologies and tools to do so**. It is up to us to make sure we learn the right lessons from our past and make sure we are not under conceptions.