



Israel National Defense College
47th Class 2019-2020

Preparatory Booklet Northern Tour

**2040 – Designing the Environment According to
National Security**



Then



Today

November 26-28, 2019



Table of Contents

Part A: Tour Objectives and Schedule + Relevant Maps.....3

Part B: Articles.....11

Part C: CVs.....186



Part A

Tour Objectives and Schedule

+ Relevant Maps



Northern Tour

1. Outline

- a. Between November 26th-28th a National Security Tour of Northern Israel will take place as part of the INDC curriculum.
- b. Participants of the tour include students and staff of the INDC (50 people in total).

1. Tour Objectives

- a. Gaining familiarity with the Northern arena on all components of National Security.
- b. Learning about processes of spacial design and clarifying the connections between them from a national security perspective.
- c. Learning about the relationships between various players and their influence on national security.
- d. Clarifying the role of leadership in shaping the security space and realizing the vision.
- e. Clarifying “what is national in national security” in northern Israel.

2. Secondary Objectives

a. The Political Element

- 1) Learning about border design
- 2) Studying the issue of the territories under controversy

b. The Social Element

- 1) Learning about Israeli Arabs in a variety of contexts
- 2) Learning about the Druze (the Golan Heights and the Galilee)
- 3) Studying the periphery (local government, planning, public health and transportation)
- 4) Studying the issue of struggle over lands

c. The Financial Element

- 1) Learning the issue of barriers and engines of growth
- 2) Learning about industry



3) Learning about the agriculture

4) Learning about tourism

d. The Security Element

1) Studying the issue of settlements on the confrontation line

2) Studying the rival campaign in northern Israel

3) Studying the issue of internal security

e. Relevant Geographic Locations

1) Tour of "Shaarei HaTsafon" - Wadi Ara

2) Tour of Tiberias area: "The Capital of the Periphery? Between the Potential and the Realization"

3) Tour of the Golan Heights

4) Tour of the Upper Galilee- Tefen



3. Tour Schedule:

Tuesday 26.11.19

Hour	Topic	Notes
7: 30-8.00	Arrival and breakfast at Regavim Base	
8.00-8.30	Drive to the Ar'ara Council	
8.30-10.30	A talk with Mr. Muder Yunes, Head of the Coucil and Knesset Member Osama Saadi	Ar'ara Regional Council
10.30-10.45	En route to an observation post	
10.45-11.30	Observation post – Mr. Avi Cohen, Deputy Director General of the Finance Ministry	Mei Ami Area
11: 30-12: 30	En route to Tiberias	
12.30-14.30	Lunch Coffee & processing	Hadex Restaurant
14.30-15.30	Briefing In view of the periphery - Director of "Poria" Medical Center, Dr. Erez On	Hadex Restaurant
15.30-16.45	Boardwalk tour with Mr. Eli Meiri, CEO of Local Authorities and Ron Kobi, City Mayor	
17.00-18.00	Panel - "Tiberias between potential and actualization" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Modrated by Mr. Eli Meiri - City Mayor Ron Kobi - Local Authorities Chairman Mr. Yoram Karim - Hotel Association Chairman, Mr. Avi Zandberg - City Council Member Raphael Treblasi - City Council Member David Ohana 	Hadex Restaurant Light snacks
18.00-18.30	En route to Hamat Gader	
18.30-21.30	Challenge - "Where the INDC stops, limits will be set". A tour of the Ahijazi train	Optional
21.30-23.00	Dinner And night swimming in Hamat Gader	
23.00-00.00	Travel / Accommodation	



Wednesday 27.11.19

Hour	Topic	Notes
7.00-7.30	Breakfast	
7.30-8.30	En route	
8.30-9.15	Participants reviews	Mt. Bental / Nafach
9.15-10.30	A talk with Mr. Eli Malka - Vision Realization in the Periphery - Agriculture	Mt. Bental / Nafach
10.30-11.00	En route to Majdal Shams	
11.00-12.00	Conversation with Sheikh Taher Abu Saleh	Majdal Shams
12.00-14.00	Lunch Coffee & processing	Majdal Shams
14.00-15.30	En route to Biranit Observation point, Prof. Yossi Ben Artzi	
15.30-17.00	Visit to the Ramia tunnel	
17.00-17.30	En route	
17.30-19.00	Briefing by Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate	Birnian Discussion Room
19.00-19.30	En route to Ma'alot	
19.30-20.30	Dinner	
20.30-21.30	Team Processing Activity	
21.30	Mr. Yotam Regev	
23.00	Spending the night in Ma'alot	



Thursday 28/11/19

Hour	Topic	Notes
7.30-8.00	Breakfast	
8.00-9.00	En route to ISCAR ltd.	A multinational metal cutting tools company
9:00-10:00	Review – "Vision and Reality" Mr. Arie Cohe, Deputy Director General, Ms. Lala Mendelbaum	
10:00-11.00	Visit to the factories	
11.00-11.30	Break	
11.30-12.45	Panel on 'The Struggle for Space' <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Directed by Mr. Avi Cohen, Deputy Director of the Finance Ministry- Mr. Moti Dotan, former Head of Council- Attorney Ron Rogin- Deputy Director of the "Hashomer Hatzair"- Head of the Arabic Comittee	
13.00-13.45	Lunch	
14:00-15:00	Conversation with Brigadier General (res.) Amal Assad	
15:00-17:00	Aerial tour by helicppter	Bus (optional)
17.30	End of tour	



Ara'ra Regional Council




Area of Hamt Gader





The Golan Heights





Part B

Articles:

The Galille, Israel: Self-Evaluation Report.....12

**Development of the Negev and Galille for Jews only? A
Proposal for Equal Development for Jews and Arabs in the
Negev and Galilee.....90**

Syria-Israel: The Golan Heights in Perspective.....125

Wadi Ara Umm Al Fahm Residents Warn Haaretz.....174

Please cite this paper as:

Council for Higher Education (2009), “the Galilee, Israel: Self-Evaluation Report”, OECD Reviews of Higher Education in Regional and City Development, IMHE, <http://www.oecd.org/edu/imhe/regionaldevelopment>.



OECD Reviews of Higher Education in Regional and City Development

The Galilee, Israel

SELF-EVALUATION REPORT

John E. Golub



Directorate for Education
Programme on Institutional Management
in Higher Education (IMHE)

©2009 The Council for Higher Education of the State of Israel

All rights reserved.

This report was prepared by John E. Golub for the Council for Higher Education in collaboration with a number of higher education institutions in the Galilee as an input to the OECD Review of Higher Education in Regional and City Development. It was prepared in response to guidelines provided by the OECD to all participating regions. The guidelines encouraged constructive and critical evaluation of the policies, practices and strategies in HEIs' regional engagement. The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Council for Higher Education, the OECD or its Member countries.

Contents

1	Overview	7
1.1	Geographic background	7
1.1.1	Description of the project region	7
1.1.2	National context	9
1.1.3	Accessibility and deployment of HEI's	10
1.2	Demographic Background	12
1.2.1	National Overview	12
1.2.2	Regional Features	13
1.2.3	Internal migration	15
1.3	Economic and Social Base	16
1.3.1	Social and cultural characteristics of the region	16
1.4	Governance Structure	16
1.4.1	No regional government	16
1.4.2	Local government	17
1.4.3	National government	18
2	Characteristics	20
2.1	Overview	20
2.1.1	Enrollment	20
2.1.2	Demographics	21
2.1.3	Research and teaching missions	22
2.1.4	Management structure	23
2.2	Access	23
2.3	Regional dimension	24
2.4	Regional higher education system and governance	26
2.5	HEI's in the Project Region	27
3	Research	28
3.1	Framework conditions	28
3.1.1	The national investment in civilian research and develop- ment	28
3.1.2	Labor participation in research and development	29
3.1.3	Rates of patenting and scientific publication	30
3.1.4	Intellectual property ownership	30

3.1.5	Venture (Risk) capital	30
3.1.6	Office of the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor	31
3.1.7	Law for the Encouragement of Investment (1959)	36
3.2	Responding to regional needs	36
3.3	Technology transfer	37
3.4	Conclusions	37
4	Teaching/Learning	39
4.1	Localizing the learning process	39
4.2	Recruitment	40
4.3	Access	41
4.3.1	Pre-academic preparatory institutes	41
4.4	Supply chain	43
4.4.1	Academic Training	43
4.4.2	Vocational Training	44
4.5	Lifelong Learning	45
4.6	Changing forms	46
5	Social/Cultural	47
5.1	Social development	47
5.1.1	<i>Perach</i> mentorship program	47
5.1.2	Other community service programs	48
5.2	Medical Care	50
5.3	Conclusions	52
6	Capacity Building	53
6.1	Mechanisms	53
6.2	Impact	54
6.3	Capacity building	55
6.4	Organization culture	55
7	Conclusions	57
7.1	SWOT Analysis	57
7.1.1	Strengths	57
7.1.2	Weaknesses	57
7.1.3	Opportunities	58
7.1.4	Threats	58
7.2	Conclusions	59
A	References	61
B	Tables	63
C	Figures	68

List of Tables

B.1	Populations of cities and towns in the Project Region	64
B.2	Driving distances in kilometers to the Central Region.	64
B.3	Bus travel times to the Central Region.	64
B.4	Population by religion in various districts.	64
B.5	Population growth between 1995 and 2007.	65
B.6	Hospital beds per thousand population by location.	65
B.7	Students by HEI type and degree.	65
B.8	HEI's in the Galilee.	66
B.9	67
B.10	National expenditure on civilian R&D.	67

List of Figures

C.1	State of Israel: division into districts	69
C.2	The Project Region, its districts and main cities and towns . . .	70
C.3	Rural vs. urban settlements in the Project Region	71
C.4	Rural settlements in the Project Region by type	72
C.5	Urban settlements in the Project Region by size	73
C.6	Types of municipalities	74
C.7	Types of municipalities by government type	75
C.8	Business innovation programs of the Office of the Chief Scientist	76
C.9	Investment model of the BIRD Foundation	77

Chapter 1

Overview of the Galilee Region

1.1 Geographic background

1.1.1 Description of the project region

1. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of the State of Israel defines the following seven geographic districts:
 - Jerusalem District
 - Tel Aviv District
 - Central District
 - Southern District
 - Northern District
 - Haifa District
 - Judea and Samaria.

The Haifa District is further subdivided into two sub-districts:

- Haifa sub-district
- Hadera sub-district

The map of Israel and its divisions into districts are shown in Map C.1.

2. This study covers the northern portion of Israel comprising the Northern District and Haifa Sub-district. This territory, taken together, shall be known as the *Project Region*, the *Galilee* or, simply, the *Region*. Statistical data for the Project Region has been obtained by aggregating data for the Northern District and Haifa Sub-District.

3. 6. For purposes of comparison, this study will also refer to the *Central Region* of Israel. By that term, we mean the Tel Aviv and Central Districts (in aggregate) comprising the greater Tel Aviv area including the coastal cities from about Rehovot in the south to Netanya in the north. Statistical data for the Central Region has been obtained by aggregating data for the Central District and Tel Aviv District. To be clear, districts and sub-districts are terms defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics; regions and sub-regions are terms defined in this report.
4. The Region, shown in Map 1.2, covers an area of approximately 7,000 square kilometers or about 700,000 hectares. It is bounded in the south by the broad Jezreel Valley and in the north by the political boundary with Lebanon. It runs from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Golan Heights massif and the Jordan River in the east with Syria and Jordan beyond. The Region comprises the following sub-regions:
 - Haifa
 - Lower Galilee
 - Upper Galilee
 - Galilee Panhandle
 - Golan Heights
5. Haifa lies on the Mediterranean Sea at the western boundary of the Region. It is geographically unique in Israel as the only place at which the mountains meet the sea. It is, by far, the largest city in the Region and an educational, cultural and economic anchor. Two towns lie north of Haifa, also on the coast: Acre and Nahariya. South of Haifa, the economic compass turns very quickly south toward the greater Tel Aviv area. Therefore, areas south of Haifa were not included in this study.
6. Moving inland from Haifa, one finds a region of rolling hills and low mountains—the Lower Galilee. The hill country of the Lower Galilee is cut by a number of valleys that run generally east-west. The southernmost of these is the broad Jezreel Valley, the breadbasket of the country. On the northern edge of the valley, the terrain climbs sharply into the mountains of the Lower Galilee with its principle city Nazareth.
7. Continuing north, the mountains subside into a second agricultural valley—the Beit Natofa Valley. Here, there is no principle town; instead, a large number of small agricultural towns and villages dot the perimeter of the valley. Further to the north, the Beit Hakerem Valley forms the northern boundary of the Lower Galilee zone. The valley lies along the main east-west road connecting Acre with Tibereas and its principle town is Carmiel. North of the Beit Hakerem Valley, the hills rise quickly into a highland region that continues unabated to and past the Lebanese border. This highland region is the Upper Galilee and its principle town is Safed, located toward the eastern limit of the highlands.

8. At the eastern edge of the Lower Galilee zone, at 210 meters below sea level, lies the Sea of Galilee, the only significant freshwater lake in Israel. The principle city in this area is Tiberias, a small resort town. To the east of the lake, the massif of the Golan Heights rises rapidly to heights of between 500 meters and 1,000 meters above sea level. The principles towns on the Heights are the towns of Katzrin and Masade.
9. The Golan in the east and the Upper Galilee in the west form the natural boundaries of the narrow, north-south running Hula Valley. The Hula, together with a narrow strip of mountains at its western boundary, protrudes northwards and forms the Galilee Panhandle. The principle town of the region is Kiryat Shmona.
10. As throughout the eastern Mediterranean basin, the climate is dominated by hot, dry breezes from the inland desert during the summer months; and by wet, cool westerlies from the ocean during the winter months. Rain is uncommon between May and September (inclusive) each year.
11. During the winter months, westerly winds bring saturated, wet air from the ocean to the eastern rim of the Mediterranean. Forced to higher altitudes by the mountains, the air cools and decompresses, leading to precipitation. Rates of precipitation are therefore strongly influenced by altitude. Being mountainous, the Galilee receives much of Israel's rainfall. Areas above about 700 meters receive snow. The average annual rainfall in the Region is 682 mm in about 70 rainy days.

1.1.2 National context

12. Jerusalem, the capital city of Israel and home to about 10% of Israelis, is the seat of the national government and a destination for tourists and pilgrims from around the world. It is not, however, the economic center of the country. After the government, its largest employers are the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital system.
13. The greater Tel Aviv area is the economic and cultural engine of the country and home to over 40% of its population. The ground zero of Israel's hi-tech and financial industries, Tel Aviv has witnessed a surge in commercial real estate building. Where twenty years ago most buildings in Tel Aviv were 4 - 6 stories and the highest was 14 stories, today the sky-line is dominated by a number of 60-story buildings and dozens over 30 stories.
14. The remainder of Israel comprises two areas known together as Israel's periphery: the Negev wilderness in the south and the Galilee in the north. Though different in many ways, these two regions share two important characteristics: they are remote from the Central Region and its thriving economy.

15. The Galilee is a verdant region of rolling hills and rich agricultural valleys. Its vistas are dotted with vineyards, olive groves, and orchards; picturesque villages, towns, and kibbutzim. Its people are Jews and Arabs in nearly equal numbers with Druze and Circassians as well. The position of the Galilee has been remarkably stable over the last 20 years. Most demographic comparisons (e.g., Galilee vs. Center, Jews vs. Arabs) have not changed significantly despite overall population growth. For most Israelis, the Galilee is a vacation destination and the most beautiful part of Israel.
16. The main cities and towns in the Project Region and their populations as of the end of 2007 are shown in Table B.1. Three of the four largest (Haifa, Acre, and Nahariya) lie on the Mediterranean coast where they have access to rail transportation *inter alia*. Of the towns in the interior, the largest are Nazareth, an Arab town, and Upper Nazareth, a Jewish town. Beyond these, the size of towns in the interior quickly drops off. Of the Jewish towns, lake-side Tibereas is largest at 39.7 thousand followed by Safed (28.5 thousand) and Kiryat Shmona (22.1 thousand). Of the non-jewish towns, Arab Sakhnin in the Lower Galilee is largest followed by the Druze town of Carmel in the mountains by Haifa.
17. 1.748 million people live within the Project Region. Table B.1 shows that only about one-third of them live in towns and cities of 20,000 or larger. The remainder lives in the hundreds of towns, villages, and kibbutzim that dot the countryside. Figure C.3 shows that of 438 settlements in the Region, 345 (79%) are classified by the Central Bureau of Statistics as rural and only 93 (21%) urban. Figure C.4 breaks down the rural settlements by type and shows the preeminence of the agricultural communities (kibbutzim and moshavim) in the region. Figure C.5 breaks down the urban settlements by size. Over half the urban settlements have populations under 10,000.

1.1.3 Accessibility and deployment of HEI's

18. With most of the population of the Region living in small towns and villages, accessibility—both intra-regional and between rural and urban areas—is challenging. The area is serviced by the Egged Cooperative, the dominant bus provider, as well as by smaller bus companies. However, the hilly terrain together with the large number of villages requiring service means that bus travel can be time-consuming.

Car

19. The distances in kilometers from various towns in the Region to the two main cities in the center of the country are shown in Table B.2. In practice, a car trip to the center requires between two and three hours of driving each way.

Bus

20. The nominal trip duration for bus travel from various towns in the Region to the two main cities in the center of the country are shown in Table B.3. Travel from/to smaller towns or villages may require two buses and a correspondingly longer trip. In practice, bus travel from the Region to the center required between two and five hours.

Train

21. Train travel from the coastal cities of Haifa, Acre, and Nahariya to the center has be-come available. Travel times are approximately 33% faster than express bus. An increasingly common mode of travel is to travel by car or bus to one of the three cities mentioned and to continue by train to the center. The Israel Railway Authority has plans to expand train service into the interior of the Galilee.

Air

22. A number of towns of the Region are serviced by small airports. Currently, this mode of travel is not a significant factor in the region.
23. The 17 HEI's within the Project Region include 2 major universities:

- Technion-Israel Institute of Technology
- University of Haifa

7 academic colleges:

- Emek Yezreel College
- Kinneret College
- Mar Elias College
- ORT-Braude College
- Safed College
- Tel Hai College
- Western Galilee College

6 academic colleges of education:

- Arab College for Education
- Gordon Teachers College
- Ohalo College of Education
- Oranim-The School of Education of the Kibbutz Movement
- Sakhnin Teacher Training College

- WIZO-College of Design and Teacher Training
- and 1 private research institute affiliated with a college:
- Migal-Galilee Technology Center.
24. Six of these HEI's—including both universities—are in Haifa at the western edge of the Region. The next largest, Tel Hai College, is located in Kiryat Shmona at the northern extreme of the region. Another large college, Emek Yezreel College, lies at the southern edge of the Project Region. The remainder is distributed about the interior.
 25. Notable for its absence is Nazareth: The largest city in the interior of the Galilee region has no accredited college or university. However, there are plans to relocate Mar Elias College to Nazareth.

1.2 Demographic Background

1.2.1 National Overview

26. At the end of 2007, the population of the State of Israel was 7,243,600 of which 5,478,200 (75.6%) were Jews; 1,450,000 (20.0%) Arabs; and 315,400 (4.4%) others—mainly new immigrants not registered as Jews. In addition, some 110,000 foreign workers resided in Israel with legal work permits. The population lives in 2,051,600 million households. Of the Jewish population, 70% were born in Israel and 30% are immigrants. One in seven Israelis today was born in the former Soviet Union. (CBS-05).
27. Israel is a young society compared to the western economies. 28.4% of the population is in the 0-14 year age group (vs. 17% average for western countries). Similarly, 9.7% of Israelis were at least 65 years old at the end of 2007 (vs. 15% average for western countries). A primary driver for this age structure is the high fertility rate in Israel.
28. Approximately one quarter of Israelis live in one of the five cities with population of at least 200,000: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Haifa, Rishon Letziyon, Ashdod. 44% live in one of the 14 cities of at least 100,000. 41% of the population lives in the Central Region (Tel Aviv and Central Districts combined). For Jews, the portion living in the center of the country is 49%. 45% of the Arab population lives in the Northern District versus only 10% of the Jewish population.
29. Traditional nuclear families are the most common mode in Israel. Of 1.694 million families in Israel at the end of 2007, 64% include a married couple and children; 23% include a married couple without children; and 12% are single-parent families. In 57% of single-parent families, the parents are divorced. Rates of divorce and childless families are lower among Arabs than among Jews.

30. In 2007, the population grew by 1.8% or approximately 127,000 people. Most of this growth (*ca.* 111,600) was natural (151,679 births minus 39,813 deaths) while the remainder (*ca.* 15,400) is the net impact of immigration. The growth rate among Jews was 1.6% compared to 2.6% among Arabs. Among Moslems, the growth rate was 2.8%, down from 3.8% for that group in 2000.

Did you know...

- Israel is a young society with median age 29 years and a high level of tertiary education.
- With 44% Jews, 46% Arab, and 8% Druze, the Northern District is the most diverse in Israel.
- Anchored by Haifa on the coast, the interior of the Galilee is a verdant region of rolling hills and rich agricultural valleys.
- 25% of Israelis live in the Galilee.

1.2.2 Regional Features

Ethnic Landscape

31. The ethnic make-up of the Project Region differs markedly from that of the Center and is, by far, the most diverse in Israel. While the Center is over 90% Jewish, the Project Region as a whole is only 55.1% Jewish. 34.0% of the Region are Arab (Moslem and Christian combined) and another 6.8% Druze. Further breakdown of the Project Region into its component sub-regions shows that the Region is far from homogeneous. While the population of the coastal Haifa Sub-District is 81.7% Jewish, the interior Northern District is more nearly equally Jewish (43.6%) and Arab (45.5%, of these Moslem 38.1% and Christian 7.4%) with an additional 7.9% Druze. 40% of all Israeli Arabs live in the Project Region. Table B.4 compares the population breakdown by religion of the Central and Project Regions.
32. The 119,000 Druze of the Project Region (7% of the Region's population) are religiously and ethnically distinct from the Arab population and maintain an extremely strict code of conduct to assure non-assimilation. Circassians, Moslems who immigrated to Israel from the Caucasus Mountains in the 18th century, similarly marry only within the sect. Nearly all Druze and Circassians in Israel live within the Project Region. The Region also includes a small number of Bedouin. Druze, Circassians, and Bedouin serve in the Israeli Army.

Age Structure and Population Growth

33. The age structure varies with type of locality as the rural population tends to have more children and a younger age structure. Thus, the median age in the Haifa Sub-District (35.5 years) is comparable to that of the Tel Aviv District (33.7 years). However, the median age in the interior Northern District is markedly lower (25.9 years) (CBS-03). Similarly, children aged 0-17 constitute 36.4% of the population of the Northern District compared to 25.1% in Tel Aviv and 33.2% nationwide (CBS-07).
34. Although natural increase is the main source of population growth in the Project Region, migration-both internal and international-plays a role in shaping the demographic and socio-economic landscape. Table B.5 shows the population change in the two sub-regions of this study between 1995 and 2007 together with national data for comparison.
35. Population growth in the rural Northern District mirrors the national trend and largely reflects natural increase. However, there is also significant population loss to the center of the country through internal migration balanced by new immigrants to Israel who settle in the district. In 2007, 2,400 persons left the district. According to some sources, skilled graduates frequently leave the region to pursue careers in the Center.
36. Population growth in the Haifa Sub-District over the same period was sharply lower. Data on sources of population growth is not available at the sub-district level. However, data for the Haifa District suggests that a high rate of emigration and low rate of immigration are significant factors.

Health and Wellbeing

37. Israel has a superb public health system including universal insurance coverage. Coverage is provided by five sick funds and health insurance premiums vary with the individual's level of income. Mobility between the sick funds, guaranteed by law, creates competition between providers. Despite these positive features, there is significant variability throughout the country in the public health landscape, in medical infrastructure and in the accessibility to medical services. According to one expert (BIS-01), there are three important differences between health care and wellbeing in the Northern Region compared to the country's center.
 - Whereas public health in the center of the country is similar to that of other industrialized western countries (low infant mortality, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, etc.), the picture in the Galilee contains also elements found in the third world (higher infant mortality, infectious diseases, brucellosis, hepatitis, etc.).

- The hospital infrastructure in the Galilee is inferior to that of the Center. For example, Table B.6 shows between 2.50 and 2.70 beds per 1,000 population in the major cities but only 1.58 beds per 1,000 in the Galilee. In certain areas such as rehabilitation, the difference is even more extreme.
 - Accessibility to medical specialties is inferior to that found in the Center. Often, residents have to travel to Haifa for specialized care.
38. In light of the above, it is important to note that the State of Israel is planning to open a new medical school. According to a recent decision by the government (PMO-01), Israel's fifth medical school will be located in the Galilee city of Safed. This project, should it be realized, is intended not only to improve medical care in the Galilee, but to stimulate capacity building and economic growth throughout the Region. The new medical school and its regional implications are discussed further in Section TBD.

Levels of Deprivation

39. According to Israel's National Institute of Insurance, poverty levels in Israel are significant and have significant geographical and demographic variations. Whereas in the Center, 13% of people (and 20% of children) live below the poverty level, the corresponding numbers are 18% (31% children) in Haifa and 32% (45% children) in the Galilee (BTL-01). Arabs tend to have higher rates of poverty than Jews. In the Northern District 16% of Jews are poor versus 51% of Arabs according to the National Institute of Insurance.
40. Several factors may mitigate this profile of deprivation in Israel in general and the Project Region in particular.
- There is significant undeclared and in-kind income (BOI-01).
 - Universal health insurance means that even the poor receive health care.
 - Income maintenance allowances usually assure that the poor do not become destitute.
 - Home ownership, multi-family living, and a social structure based on extended families provide a further safety net against destitution.

1.2.3 Internal migration

41. The rate of internal immigration was positive in the Central District alone among Israel's districts. In all other districts-including the Project Region-internal immigration was negative, i.e., more people moved out of the region than moved in. More than 500,000 residents (7% of the population) changed address in 2007. Most (52%) moved within their town while less

than half (48%) moved to a different town. 88% of those who changed towns were Jews while only 6% Arabs. Among people who relocated to a new town, 42% remained within the same district. In the Northern District, the figure is 51%. Among Arabs who relocated in 2007, 68% remained in the same district versus 42% for the general population.

1.3 Economic and Social Base

1.3.1 Social and cultural characteristics of the region

42. The region is a rich patchwork of different social and cultural traditions spanning the spectrum from very traditional societies to modern, western modes of living. This richness is further enhanced by lifestyles that vary from urban to village and from private to communal.
43. Among the traditional, rural populations, an important characteristic is the low mobility. For example, in the case of the Druze, young people almost always return to the village after army service and/or tertiary studies. Among other reasons, Druze must live in the village in order to marry. Consequently, private sector work opportunities for young Druze are limited to the vicinity of the village. Since these opportunities are few, and since the Druze are valued in the security services as loyal citizens and native Arabic speakers, many Druze men pursue careers in the army, police, and border police. The low rate of internal migration among Israeli Arabs indicates that similar considerations may apply to this group, as well. The higher rate of internal migration among Jews in the Northern District may indicate an increased ability/willingness to relocate in pursuit of career.
44. Thus, the region appears to suffer from at least two problems relative to its educated population: a brain drain as educated people move to the center of the country in pursuit of careers; and educated local people who seek work below their qualification level due to scarce demand for knowledge-based jobs in their area.

1.4 Governance Structure

1.4.1 No regional government

45. Israel has a central (national) government system and a local government system. There is no regional government. Within the national government, there is a ministry for the development of the peripheral regions (Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee). Within this

ministry, there is an authority for the Galilee (Galilee Development Authority).

Did you know...

- The Galilee is not a state or administrative region; there is no Galilee government.
- There are approximately 50 city, local, and area councils in the Galilee.
- At the national level, the Galilee Development Authority is specifically tasked with regional development.

1.4.2 Local government

46. There are three forms of local government. Cities are governed by a city council. Towns are similarly governed by a local council. Regional councils aggregate several small towns and villages. With only a handful of exceptions, councils are either wholly Jewish, Arab, or Druze, etc. In total, there are 251 local governments in Israel. Their different types in relation to one another are shown in Figure C.6 and Figure C.7.
47. Local government is funded through a combination of local taxes and national funding. Local revenues vary greatly depending on the socioeconomic level of the population. At the high end, local revenues of Tel Aviv-Jaffa constituted 85% of total income in 2007. In Shagur, an Arab town in central Galilee, only 30.8% of total income was derived from local sources. The balance is provided by the national government. In 2007, 43% of local authorities reported operating deficits. Thus, local government is substantially—often critically—dependent on funding from the national government (CBS-02).
48. Responsibility for primary and secondary education is similarly divided among four stakeholders. The Ministry of Education is responsible for overall policy including curriculum and matriculation examinations. Schools are administered locally; however, teachers may be employees of either the local authorities or the Ministry. In addition, there is a strong teacher's union and a system of life-long tenure. These factors, coupled with a chronically low rate of teacher pay, contribute to a negative trend in primary and secondary education throughout Israel.
49. Local authorities have no formal influence over the provision of tertiary level education and research and development. Nevertheless, there are

numerous examples of interaction and responsiveness among the parties. For example, Tel Hai College recently introduced a program on viticulture in support of the local wine industry. However, there is no formal channel or mechanism through which local authorities affect such initiatives. The influence of local authorities over higher education policy is mainly a matter of direct contact with HEI management or lobbying the CHE and PBC for desired changes. Influence on research pro-grams is non-existent as research is driven from the bottom up and assessed based on excellence.

1.4.3 National government

50. The primary national stakeholder in regional development is the:

- Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee

within which there operates the:

- Galilee Development Authority (GDA).

Other national stakeholders include

- Ministry of the Interior;
- Ministry of Infrastructure;
- Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor;
- Ministry of Education;
- Ministry of Science and Technology; and
- Prime Minister's Office - Desk for Arab Affairs

In addition, one ministry is tasked with development of the non-Jewish populations. Since nearly half of these reside in the Project Region, this ministry has a special interest in regional development. It is the:

- Ministry for Minority Affairs.

To this list, we must add the two bodies responsible for planning and implementation of higher education policy. They are the:

- Council for Higher Education; and
- Planning and Budget Committee.

There is no single forum to facilitate planning, coordination, or communication between these bodies. However, once per year, the GDA organizes a national conference attended, typically, by ministers and high-level stakeholders.

51. Israel's national commitment to development of the Galilee region is driven by several factors. Among them:

- Desire to wisely exploit a major land reserve in a small country;
- Desire to improve Israel's economic position;
- Desire to reduce socio-economic disparities and share opportunities within Israel.

It is widely agreed by stakeholders that higher education can and should play a role in development of the Galilee region. However, regional development has mainly entered higher education policy-making in relation to the decision if/when/where to open new institutions.

Chapter 2

Characteristics of the Higher Education System

2.1 Overview of the Israeli national system of higher education

2.1.1 Enrollment

52. As of 2007, 219,157 students were enrolled in 62 HEI's in 7 universities, 27 academic colleges, and 27 academic teachers colleges in Israel (CHE-01). Their breakdown by degree program and HEI type is shown in Table B.7. In addition, 40,006 students were enrolled in the Open University and 6,705 in Israeli branches of 10 foreign universities. (CHE-01)
53. Overall, the number of students enrolled in HEI's increased by 1.8% in the 2006/7 academic year compared to an annual growth rate of 8.4% between 1989/90 and 1999/2000.
54. The clearest trend is the rise to prominence of the academic colleges. In 2006/7 the enrollment in first degree programs at the academic colleges increased by 8.7%, down from an annual rate of 24.7% between 1989/90 and 1999/2000. By contrast, first degree enrollment at universities dropped by 0.7% in 2006/7 (compared with an average annual increase of 4.8% over the previous decade). In academic colleges of education, there was also a decline of 3.0% in first degree students in 2006/7 compared to an average annual increase of 18.8% during the 1990's. (CHE-01)
55. The gain of market share by the academic colleges is similarly reflected in data on second degree enrollments. The number of students enrolled in second degree programs at universities declined by 3.2% between 2005/6 and 2006/7 compared with an average annual increase of 6.5% during

the previous decade. By contrast, second degree enrollment is up at the academic colleges: In 1998/99, academic colleges began granting second degrees and in 2006/7, 4,120 students were enrolled in second degree programs at those institutions—an increase of 11.1% compared with 2005/6. At academic colleges of education, enrollment of second degree students increased by 69.9% over the past year.

56. Academic colleges now grant more first degrees than universities in Israel. In 1989/90, the number of students enrolled in first degree programs at universities was five times the number enrolled in academic colleges and academic colleges of education. By 1999/2000 only 56% of first degree students were at universities. And in 2006/7, the university percentage dropped to 45%. Consequently, academic colleges and academic colleges of education are now the dominant provider of first degrees in Israel.
57. There are important differences between the colleges and the universities with regard to field of study. In the 2006/7 academic year, the academic colleges and academic colleges of education captured 92.2% of education students, 80.6% of law students, and 84.1% of students of business and management studies. By contrast, the universities dominate in the arts and sciences: humanities (73.6%), social sciences (85.2%), medicine and related fields (100%), mathematics, statistics, and computer sciences (96.5%), physical sciences (79.1%), biological sciences (100%), agriculture (100%). The students in these fields constituted 72.8% of all first-degree students at universities.

Did you know...

- As of 2007, 219,157 students were enrolled in 62 HEI's in Israel.
- Overall, the number of students enrolled in HEI's increased by 1.8% in the 2006/7 academic year compared to an annual growth rate of 8.4% between 1989/90 and 1999/2000.
- Academic colleges now grant more first degrees than universities in Israel.

2.1.2 Demographics

58. Women constitute 55.7% of all students: 54.8% at universities, 47.1% at academic colleges, 54.9% at the Open University, and 80.9% at colleges of education.

59. One-third of all Arab students in first degree programs were enrolled in colleges of education and approximately one-third at universities. Arab students constitute 11.2% of the student population at universities, 5.7% at academic colleges, and 30.9% at colleges of education.
60. Nearly half of students live in the Central District or the Tel Aviv District; 27.9% of students at HEI's live in the Haifa and Northern Districts; 12.4% in the Southern District; 8.2% in the Jerusalem District; and 4.5% elsewhere.
61. Half of all students lived in localities with high socio-economic clusters: 7 – 10. By contrast, 29% of students lived in localities at the low end of the spectrum: 1 – 4.

2.1.3 Research and teaching missions

62. The stated mission of the seven research universities is excellence. According to the CHE annual report,

“The research universities shall maintain and develop scientific excellence; create knowledge at an international scientific level; create focal points of scientific knowledge and infrastructure; train the scientific reserve of Israel; train academic staff for a growing higher education system; train professional leaders at the highest level in engineering, medicine, law, and management; train teachers at the highest level; maintain and develop a culture of the arts and sciences.” (PBC-01)

63. Teachers at the academic colleges and academic colleges of education teach longer hours than university staff. This difference reflects the Council's desire that the colleges fill first and foremost a teaching mission. Moreover, colleges receive no PBC funding for research infrastructure. Nevertheless, college teaching staff perform independent research. In fact, research activity and excellence is an important factor for college staff to advance in academic rank as for the tenure process.
64. The CHE decided against the creation of a new research university during the five-year plan that began in 2006. (PBC-01, Ch. 2, pg. 3)) However, on May 2, 2005, the Government decided in principle on a research university in the Galilee. This decision reflects in part the positive perception surrounding the expansion in recent years of Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel's southern periphery. A desire to replicate the successful experience in the Negev was clearly one factor in the Government's decision.

2.1.4 Management structure

65. Whereas primary and secondary education is handled by the Ministry of Education, the government sought to achieve a degree of insulation of the higher education system from the political process by creating a Council for Higher Education (CHE). The Council is chaired by the Minister of Education and composed of 25 members appointed by the President of the State of Israel. Two-thirds of the Council members are senior figures in the academic community; the remainder comes from outside the academic system. In a further effort to avoid conflicts, the government created a committee of the Council called the Policy and Budget Committee (PBC) whose responsibility it is to plan and administer funds. The PBC is uniquely authorized to determine and administer funding policy for HEI's. It negotiates a lump-sum funding level for the entire system with the Treasury and then allocates funds to HEI's according to its policies and formulae. In recent years, the PBC's total funding was approximately NIS 6 billion, about 2% of the total budget of the State of Israel.
66. HEI's are funded according to a formula that is based mainly on head-count. Approximately 75% of costs are covered by PBC funding while 25% of costs are collected through student tuition fees of about NIS 10,000 per year, comparable to one monthly gross salary or two monthly net salaries.

2.2 Access

67. Admission to an HEI is based on a weighted average of scores on three sets of examinations:
 - National matriculation examinations;
 - High school grade point averages;
 - National psychometric examinations.

Admission is on a per-department basis with each HEI and each department setting its own acceptance threshold based on a weighted average of scores.

68. In its most recent report, the PBC lists the following reasons for low enrollment rates in Israel's northern and southern peripheral regions:
 - Low motivation due to psychological barrier or low self-esteem;
 - Fears due to concerns about direct and opportunity costs;
 - Many young people from the periphery believe that higher education is beyond them or that they are not suited for higher education;

In response, the PBC in collaboration with the Hesegim program a program to encourage enrollment. The program began working in 2003 and operated in 31 communities as of 2006. The program provides information and advisory services through a series of community centers. Each community has a community program leader who is tasked with locating potential students and counseling them throughout the enrollment process and the entire degree.

69. Most HEI's run pre-academic preparatory study programs. These programs are meant to increase access by providing students an opportunity to improve grades and meet admission requirements.
70. The CHE and PBC have recognized a trend toward higher education in the ultra-orthodox population. In response, they have funded several pre-academic institutes tailored to the cultural needs of this population and located in centers of the population. In the project region, the Technion has recently opened a pre-academic program for ultra-religious. The importance of providing access to a segment of the population that has been historically under-represented in Israel's hi-tech economy cannot be overstated.
71. In 2000, the PBC created a budgeted framework to encourage enrollment by Arab students. The relevant steering committee, chaired by Prof. Dan Amir, solicited projects in the areas of:
 - Support courses for Arab students directed at reducing the drop-out rate;
 - Mentorship programs;
 - Arab-speaking advisorship;
 - Arab-speaking pre-academic institutes;
 - Information centers in the Northern District;
 - Scholarships for Arab doctoral students.
72. Alternatively, a student may be admitted to second year university studies by successfully completing a first year at the Open University. Each HEI and each department sets its own requirements for study at the Open University.

2.3 Regional dimension within the national higher education policy

73. The primary mechanism through which national education policy makers have influenced regional development is through the decision to open new HEI's. In the Galilee, this has been a two-step process. Initially, a number of colleges were opened in the interior of the Galilee as branches of

established universities. Subsequently, the colleges became independent, degree-granting, accredited institutions. In this way, there have been a number of new colleges added to the Project Region in recent years. These new additions seek to increase the geographical footprint in the Region. They also address demand for Arabic-language programs. Noteworthy in that respect are Sakhnin College for Teachers and Mar Elias College.

74. As indicated above, there has been a government decision to create a new, fifth medical school in Israel and to locate it in the Galilee. The decision to place the school in the Galilee is manifestly an attempt to repeat the success achieved in the southern Negev region through the opening of Ben Gurion University of the Negev and a major hospital in the city of Be'er Sheva. While the government has taken the decision in principle to create the school, the project has not yet been funded, nor is there a committed schedule.
75. In light of the anticipated fifth medical school, the Council has taken a decision to prioritize and encourage the development of study programs in related fields. Safed College, located in proximity to the anticipated medical campus, has applied for programs in health, social work, and medical imaging. The new medical school intends to pioneer a new, community-based approach to health care. Safed College, consequently, anticipates a need for workers trained paramedical workers who are comfortable in the Galilee's highly diverse cultural landscape.
76. A critical component in the incentive system for faculty members is the promotion process. In all HEI's—colleges as well as universities—applications for promotion to professor rank (Associate Professor or Professor) or for tenure are handled centrally by a committee of the CHE. A main criteria are excellence as measured by quality and quantity of publications, it being understood that the output of a college faculty member will be less than that of university faculty because of the difference in teaching load and research infrastructure. Thus, in the colleges as in the universities, academic research is the essential measuring rod for advancement.
77. There have been several attempts to encourage collaboration and enhance competitiveness nationally. The Israel Export Institute offers information, workshops, and training to enhance the transition from local to international trade. It has opened a branch office on the campus of ORT-Braude College in the Galilee. The new MALMOP program of the Ministry of Science intends to serve as a clearinghouse to encourage business-to-business collaboration in areas of relative strength. Similarly, the Israeli Technology Transfer Organization presents, in a single website, information about commercialization of technologies developed in Israeli universities. However, none of these programs has a regional dimension and only the MAL-MOP program, now in its infancy, addresses collaboration of any kind.

Did you know...

- HEI's in the Galilee include 2 universities, 8 academic colleges, and 5 academic teaching colleges.
- 28% of Israel's HEI students live in the Galilee.
- Nationwide, women constitute 55.7% of all students: 54.8% at universities, 47.1% at academic colleges, 54.9% at the Open University, and 80.9% at colleges of education.
- Nationwide, Arabs constitute 11.2% of the student population at universities, 5.7% at academic colleges, and 30.9% at colleges of education.

2.4 Regional higher education system and governance

78. Higher education in the region is provided by two major research universities (Technion and University of Haifa) that form the flagships of the system and an additional 14 colleges. About half of these—including both universities—are on the coast and the remainder in the interior. Five of the colleges (Oranim, Sakhnin, Arab, Kinneret, Safed) began life as teacher's seminars and grew to become accredited academic colleges in recent years. Others began as branches of large universities in the center of the country and grew to become independent institutions.
79. Historically, the University of Haifa has produced many of the region's leaders and educated elite in areas of social and political science. The University's focus on these areas (it defers to the Technion in science and engineering) together with its location make it a regional hub for non-technical higher education.
80. The Technion is a magnet for the best science and engineering students in the north as throughout the country. Its role is primarily national and international. However, there exist historical ties to the region and a tradition of practical engineering research and development using the Haifa and Galilee regions as laboratories.
81. The former teacher seminars have a long history of supporting the region by providing trained teachers. The region suffers a chronic shortage of

teachers compared to the center of the country. The particular requirements of a career teaching in the Galilee—multi-lingual, multi-cultural—explain in part the unique connection these institutions have with the region.

82. As at all publicly funded HEI's in Israel, approximately 25% of costs are covered by students through tuition payments. The remainder is funded at the national level. There is no funding or management at the regional level. Similarly, there are no NGO's or other regional organization with strategic responsibilities or interests in the higher education system.

2.5 HEI's in the Project Region

83. The 17 HEI's in the Project Region are shown in Table B.8.

Chapter 3

Contribution of Research to Regional Innovation

3.1 Framework conditions for promoting research and innovation

84. Since the early 1990's, Israel, a small country poor in natural resources, has pursued an economic strategy based on exports driven by technical innovation. As of 2007, Israel exports 43% of its GDP led by diamonds, pharmaceuticals, electrical apparatus, aircraft parts, and electronic integrated circuits. 13.9% of its workforce is academic professionals. Of the 332 non-US companies traded on the NASDAQ in 2006, nearly one in four were Israeli (NAS-01).

3.1.1 The national investment in civilian research and development

85. Israel invests heavily in civilian research and development (CBS-11) and, since 2001, has been recognized as the world leader in civilian R&D investment measured as a percentage of per capita GDP. The national investment in R&D by operating sector and financing sector is shown in Table B.10. In 2007, the total investment in R&D was NIS 29.5 billion or 3.9% of GDP compared to 2.1% for an average of OECD countries. By comparison, other countries with small populations, a GDP comparable to Israel's, and that have attained high economic development had lesser rates of R&D investment as of 2007: Ireland (1.29%), Denmark (2.55%), and Finland (3.44%).
86. Most of Israel's R&D is carried out by the business sector—76.5%. An additional 14.2% was carried out within the higher education system. In-

vestment in civilian R&D grew between 1995 and 2007 at an average annual rate of 8.3%. During that period, the national R&D investment grew-both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total-in every year except 2003.

87. Most of Israel's R&D is funded privately—75.5%. Only 17.7% of the national R&D investment comes from government sources. By comparison, 64% of R&D is funded by the private sector in OECD countries, on average, and 70% in Japan and Finland, countries with innovation-driven economies.

Did you know...

- National framework conditions for innovation are highly developed.
- Israel leads the work in civilian R&D investment measured as a percentage of *per capita* GDP.
- 76.5% of R&D occurs in the business sector; 14.2% within the higher education system.
- 75.5% of Israel's R&D is privately funded.
- Israelis received 1,496 US patents in 2008, 208 patents per million inhabitants.
- Israel was ranked 3rd worldwide in scientific publications with 1,334 per million inhabitants.
- In 2008, Israeli high-tech companies raised \$2.08 billion in venture investments.

3.1.2 Labor participation in research and development

88. As of 2005, approximately 47,000 people worked in R&D (exclusive of HEI staff) corresponding to 6.5 per 1,000 population, comparable to Sweden, Finland, and Japan. By comparison, OECD countries have an average of 3 researchers per thousand inhabitants.
89. The Israel Defense Forces have traditionally been a supplier of highly skilled engineers to the R&D labor force. Many soldiers emerge from three years or more of army service as trained and experienced engineers before even entering the higher education system. Others combine extended military service with a bachelor's degree. The army creates a steady stream

of personnel skilled in electro-optics, radio-frequency engineering, computer science, information technology, cryptography, applied mathematics, industrial management, human resources, system integration, project management, and more.

3.1.3 Rates of patenting and scientific publication

90. Rates of patenting are also indicative of framework conditions for research and innovation. In 2008, the US Patent and Trademark Office issued 1,496 patents to Israeli inventors, corresponding to 208 patents per million inhabitants. By comparison, OECD countries patent at a rate of 43 per million inhabitants per year. (The comparison neglects patents issued in Europe and Japan to Israeli inventors.)
91. Rates of scientific publication are similarly indicative of framework conditions for research and innovation. According to a 2003 report by the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI), Israel is ranked 3rd (after Switzerland and Sweden) with 1,334 publications per million inhabitants.

3.1.4 Intellectual property ownership

92. Under Israeli law, the intellectual property rights in any invention are held by the inventor's employer. That is, inventions by an employee are treated as "works made for hire." Thus, HEI staff must commercialize their inventions through the HEI technology transfer organization. Each HEI has its own policy and formula regarding profit sharing. According to a typical arrangement, revenues from the commercialization of a university-developed technology are divided in three equal parts to the inventor, the inventor's research laboratory, and to the institution.

3.1.5 Venture (Risk) capital

93. Israel has a thriving venture (risk) capital community. According to the Global Competitiveness Report, Israel is ranked 2nd worldwide (after the United States) for availability of venture capital. In 2008, Israeli high-tech companies raised \$2.08 billion in venture investments according to the Israel Venture Association (IVA-01).
94. The Technion (along with other major universities outside the Project Region) has created a seed investment fund to facilitate commercialization. The Technion also operates a technology incubator where qualified early-stage companies get office space, mentorship, and support.

3.1.6 Office of the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor

Overview

95. The primary state vehicle for driving innovation is the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor. The OCS operates under the Law for Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development (1984). The OCS has two primary missions: local innovation and foreign co-operation. The OCS offers a stunning array of programs to support innovation, collaboration within industry, collaboration between academia and industry, collaboration with foreign industrial partners, technology transfer, and participation in international programs. A chart showing the OCS programs is shown in Figure C.8.
96. OCS programs are divided into two areas: international and local. Local programs are further subdivided into *competitive R&D* and *generic R&D*. Competitive R&D comprises innovation programs targeting a visible business opportunity. Generic R&D seeks to provide a competitive position for Israel's industry with regard to state-of-the-art technologies of global interest. International programs are administered by MATIMOP–Israeli Industry Center for R&D and include an array of bi- and multi-national funds and co-operation agreements including full participation in the European Union's Framework Program for R&D; and other international activities.

Best practice...

- The Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor offers a stunning array of programs to support and encourage innovation, commercialization, technology transfer, and international partnership.
- Most programs offer soft loans based on collaborative innovation.
- In 2006, the OCS's *R&D Fund* derived \$132 million from project royalties and reinvested it in the fund.

Local OCS programs—competitive

97. The *R&D Fund* is the main support channel of the OCS, in terms of budget, and it is open to all Israeli registered firms wishing to engage in

technology research and development. Proposals are evaluated by experts and approved finally by the Research Committee chaired by the Chief Scientist. The annual budget of \$250 million is spent on about 800 projects undertaken by 500 companies. Grants are provided as a percentage (up to 50%) of the total approved R&D expenditures. The grants are structured as a conditional loan: in case of commercial success, it is subject to royalty payments of 3% - 5% of sales; in case of non-commercialization no repayment is required. Royalties received are returned to the R&D Fund. In 2006, the OCS derived \$132 million from project royalties.

98. The *Technology Incubator* program was introduced in the beginning of the 1990's, in response to a wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union. Its mission is to support the earliest stages of technological entrepreneurship and to prevent the waste of commercially viable ideas due to lack of resources. The incubators, with an annual budget of \$30 million, are supportive frameworks that enable novice entrepreneurs to establish their own company and translate their innovative concepts into commercial products. Currently, there are 24 Technological Incubators in Israel, 15 of them located in peripheral areas, with approximately 200 R&D projects being carried out at any given moment. In 2002, the program initiated a privatization process and since then, many investment groups and venture capital firms (foreign and local) have invested in, and taken ownership over, the incubators. The R&D grant provides 85% of the approved R&D expenditures (budget of \$350,000 - \$600,000 for two years), with the remainder to be invested by the incubator itself. The grants are, in effect, soft loans to be repaid by the incubators in case of commercial success only. As of July 2007, the total cumulative private investment in incubator companies surpassed \$1.8 billion. Moreover, in recent years, incubator projects have raised privately more than twice the initial investment made by the government within two years of their admission into the program.
99. The *Tnufa* program supports technological innovation by assisting individual entrepreneurs and start-up companies during the pre-seed stage. Support includes assistance in evaluating the technological and economic potential, patent disclosure preparation, prototype construction, business plan preparation, establishing contact with the appropriate industry representative, and attracting investors.

Local OCS programs—generic

100. The *MAGNET* program is intended to provide a competitive position for Israel's industry with regard to state-of-the-art technologies of global interest. The new technologies are developed in a cooperative venture between industry and academic scientific research institutions and provide the basis for new high-tech products and processes. Funded programs must be

part of a broad spectrum of common technologies, components, materials, design, and manufacturing methods and processes, standards and protocols which have wide ranging applications in numerous industries. The MAGNET program initiates about 12 consortia annually, each active for 5 years. A consortium includes several industrial companies and academic institutes. Grants of up to 66% of the approved budget are available with no royalty payments due. MAGNET's annual budget is about \$50 million.

101. The *MAGNETON* program promotes technology transfer from academia to industry via the mutual cooperation of individual companies and specific academic research groups. A project period is up to 24 months and budget is up to \$800,000. Grants of up to 66% of the approved budget are available with no royalty repayments.
102. The *NOFAR* program aims to bridge the gap between the basic research and the applied research—a problem that characterizes biotechnology and nanotechnology. NOFAR funds basic research but sets a 12-15 month deadline to meet an industry-driven milestone. 90% of project costs are carried by NOFAR and 10% by the industrial partner. The maximum grant is approximately \$100,000 per project and no royalties or repayments are required.
103. The OCS supports research institutes with clear links to industry. Support is used to strengthen their technology infrastructure and develop technologies and products for commercialization. A research institute eligible support must be an independent legal entity, employ a team of experienced researchers, have equipment for conducting and testing R&D in industry, and earn 30% of its revenue from industry. The program covers up to 90% of approved budget for up to two years. At least 10% of the budget must be provided by industry.

International OCS programs

104. International programs are administered by MATIMOP–Israeli Industry Center for R&D.
105. MATIMOP manages a number of bilateral innovation programs of which the oldest is the Binational Israel Research and Development program—*BIRD*. BIRD supports new product development by Israeli companies in partnership with American companies. The foundation pays up to 50% of approved R&D costs and this investment is repaid conditionally upon commercial success. The BIRD investment model is shown in Figure C.9.
106. MATIMOP has bi-lateral funding agreements similar to BIRD in Europe (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, Turkey, United Kingdom), North America (Canada,

State of Maryland, USA, Commonwealth of Virginia, USA), South America (Argentina), and Asia (China, India, Taiwan, State of Victoria, Australia, Singapore, South Korea).

107. The *Global Enterprise R&D Cooperation Framework* encourages cooperation in industrial R&D between Israel and multi-national companies. Joint R&D projects between multi-national companies and Israeli companies, authorized by the OCS, are entitled to financial assistance of up to 50% of the Israeli company's R&D approved costs. Direct investments in joint R&D project with Israeli companies will be credited with 150 percent of the value of such investment for "Buy-Back" liabilities.
108. The *US-Israel Science and Technology Commission* seeks to catalyze progress by identifying and removing impediments and building the bi-national infrastructure for mutually beneficial economic and technological cooperation.
109. Israel is the only non-European participant in the EU Framework Program for R&D. The Office of the Chief Scientist has established the Israel-Europe R&D Directorate (ISERD) to facilitate participation in the Framework Program by Israeli companies. Participation is facilitated and encouraged by the Israel-Europe R&D Directorate (ISERD), an inter-ministerial directorate established by the Ministries of Industry, Trade and Labor, Science and Technology, Foreign Affairs and Finance, and the Planning and Budget Committee of the Council for Higher Education. More than 2000 Israeli entities participated in various R&D projects, in the 4th, 5th, and 6th Framework Programs.
110. Israel is a member of *EUREKA*, an initiative by nearly 40 European governments and the EU to create a pan-European network for market-oriented, industrial R&D. EUREKA is the largest European platform for industrial innovation projects that are funded through national and regional schemes in the participating countries. In Israel, the Office of the Chief Scientist supports Israeli companies participating in Eureka projects. Over 40% of Eureka project participants are SME's. Among Eureka's activities are the Eureka Clusters, industry-led thematic initiatives in a particular area of strategic interest for transnational, cooperative R&D. Cluster projects are initiated by major companies which first develop road-maps to lay out future directions for industrial R&D in selected areas. Most clusters are active in ICT fields and among their initiators are Philips, Siemens, Alcatel, Thomson, Ericsson, Nokia, France Telecom, Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom, and other market leaders. Israel is among the most active Eureka members and currently Israeli Companies participate in more than 10% of all Eureka projects and in more than 20% of all Eureka Cluster projects.
111. The Eurostars Programme is the first European funding and support program specifically dedicated to SME's and start-ups. Eurostars projects can

address any technological area, but must be market-driven, have a civilian purpose, and be aimed at the development of a new product, process, or service. A Eurostars project is collaborative, meaning it must involve participants from at least two different participating countries. The main participant must be a R&D-performing SME from one of these countries. Eurostars is jointly operated by the EUREKA network and the European Commission and projects are funded through dedicated national funding schemes, which are topped up by the EU.

112. Galileo and SESAR are niche programs directed at satellite and aerospace.
113. The Israeli *Innovation Relay Center* (IRC Israel) advises primarily small businesses on technology and innovation. Each Relay Center is an independent office backed by funding from the European Union's Innovation Program. Through each center, companies and institutions establish links to many other relay centers located across Europe. The primary goal of all Innovation Relay Centers is to create an ex-change of information between organizations across Europe. This gives the organization a direct link to partners and potential buyers of the technologies developed, or potential sellers of the technologies the company may need.
114. HEI-industry partnerships are handled naturally through the mechanism of directed research contracts. To the researcher, this arrangement provides welcome funding and a way to keep up with practical problems. To the industrial partner, the partnership may offer best-in-class expertise, relatively short lead times, relatively low costs, and/or simplification (no need to recruit talent, etc.) One potential barriers to HEI-industry partnership is appropriate handling of intellectual property rights (industry's concern) and publications (HEI's concern). A common solution is to delay publication until a patent disclosure has been submitted. An-other barrier to partnership is awareness: There is no practical clearing house where potential partners can meet.
115. HEI's facilitate knowledge exchange between researchers and industry through their technology transfer organizations. These have become increasingly active and visible in re-cent years. For example, TTO's now lease booths at industry trade shows. They also sponsor open houses and other outreach activities intended to promote connections with industry. However, HEI's and their TTO's do not facilitate connections between local companies and international partners as such is neither perceived to be their role nor incentivized at any level.
116. The State of Israel has chartered a number of technology incubators under a public-private partnership arrangement that works as follows. Like an ordinary venture (risk) investment firm, the incubator raises private capital, solicits proposals for new business ventures, vets them, and makes

investment decisions. The twist is, the government provides matching investment capital to further the incubator investment. In exchange, the incubators must operate in areas intended for economic development.

3.1.7 Law for the Encouragement of Investment (1959)

117. An important tool for economic stimulus at the national level is the Law for the Encouragement of Investment (1959) (the “Law”). The Law establishes two means to encourage economic growth: matching funds for capital investment and tax incentives. Under the matching program, administered by the Ministry for Industry, Trade and Labor qualified capital spending by private companies can receive up to 50% matching funds at favorable terms. Under the tax incentive program, administered by the Israel Tax Authority, new businesses in qualified development zones pay no corporate tax for up to 10 years. The Northern District is a qualified development zone. Although popular with industry, the matching program is under funded by 95%. That is, each year qualified business plans are submitted in an amount equal to 20 times the program’s budget. Also, a recent study by the Knesset Research and Information Center indicates that initiatives funded by subsidized capital are less likely to survive than those financed on market terms. The study concludes that investment in human capital may be more effective over the long term.

3.2 Responding to regional needs and demands

118. Research universities in the Project Region, as elsewhere in Israel, emphasize excellence and global impact over regional considerations. Incentives for advancement are based primarily on publications and participation in the international professional community. That said, many research projects explore regional issues as research topics. This is true both in the social sciences where the Galilee’s diverse demographic landscape makes it a unique social laboratory and in urban planning, water management, transportation and other engineering disciplines. However, these activities are not so much the result of HEI policy as *ad-hoc* initiatives by individual researchers.
119. Migal–Galilee Research Center, a privately owned research and development center located in a modern building in an industrial park in Kiryat Shmoneh, is an important center of regional innovation. Migal has 130 affiliated scientists who work on issues of biotechnology, environmental sciences, and agriculture and offer support services relevant to the region’s agricultural base. Because most of Migal’s scientists also work or study at Tel Hai College, the Center is able to compete for academic grant and

project funding. Activities at Migal have led to the establishment of five start-up companies in Kiryat Shmoneh.

3.3 Technology transfer

120. Each university (and some colleges) has a technology transfer office. The largest such offices are aggregated under a single portal called the Israel Technology Transfer Organization with website at <http://www.ittn.org.il/>. However, this is no more than a collection of links to the university TTO's.
121. University TTO's have been very active and pro-active. At the Technion, the TTO employs a team of MBA-trained commercialization officers who comb research results and often attend research seminars in order to identify commercialization opportunities. Through their websites, TTO's invite industry to inquire about consulting.
122. Neither the universities nor their TTO's have a regional mission. If anything, there is an incentive to locate new companies in the center of the country due to the positive perception factor. Colleges usually see themselves as agents for regional change especially regarding social involvement. However, very little new company creation has resulted from the colleges, even those with an engineering orientation.
123. An important channel of knowledge exchange is the internship system employed by some HEI's. For example, at ORT-Braude College, all third-year engineering students participate in some form of internship in industry. Many students continue working for the industry partner after the internship is completed so that internship becomes the entry point into the workforce. HEI faculty keep apprised of industry developments and requirements through direct contact or student feedback.

3.4 Conclusions

124. Strong and diverse framework conditions exist to commercialize innovation at the national level. However, few policies exist to channel knowledge creation into regionally relevant commercial activities. The two large research universities within the Project Region are focused on international excellence. However, the college system, especially in the interior of the region, could work to have greater regional impact. Although colleges perceive themselves to have a regional mission, regional impact is not factored in to the incentive system and there are *de facto* disincentives to regional activity. An interesting exception is the Migal research center. Through Migal's leadership, Tel Hai faculty work on biotech issues of relevance to the local agriculture economy.

125. There are hundreds of highly qualified academic researchers in the Region. Substantial infrastructure and familiarity with regional issues are further strengths. However, the lack of a recognized regional mission with clear goals and a significant role for academic researchers is a weakness in the present system. The lack of policies and incentives that could drive strong regional engagement by academic researchers is an additional dimension. The latent capabilities of the region's many college researchers create the greatest implicit opportunity.

Chapter 4

Contribution of Teaching/Learning to Labor Market and Skills

4.1 Localizing the learning process

126. Many of the colleges draw heavily on regional characteristics to aid or focus learning and teaching. This is done through two mechanisms: localized curriculum and internship. Several examples (of many):

Gordon College for Education grounds its studies in a basic understanding of the region through field work covering local ecology, water sources and management, and more. Gordon students deepen their regional understanding through a variety of courses on earth sciences, geography, geology, plant physiology, *etc.*, all of which are taught with a regional emphasis. Moreover, Gordon, with its diverse student population of Jewish, Arab, and Druze students, provides a practical introduction into the ethnic landscape of the region.

ORT-Braude College, with its engineering orientation, uses an internship program to localize the learning process. Beginning after the 6th semester of study, students work as interns in industry under the supervision of experienced engineers. The program enforces an on-going dialog between the College and industry through which the ORT-Braude gains an up-to-date picture of industry requirements and directions.

Emek Yezreel College uses in-community and regionally-driven learning heavily. Its Sociology Department offers a course on cross-cultural negotiation and conflict resolution that includes a practical workshop on Arab-Jewish issues.

Emek Yezreel College also makes a student-run radio station a platform for localized learning by offering academic credit for students who prepare and broadcast a weekly show on local social issues.

Emek Yezreel College 's Visual Arts Department regularly uses local events and issues as its learning platform. In one recent project, students designed posters and visuals to help mark the 30th anniversary of a local rape counseling center. In another project, students designed visuals for a national campaign on feral (street) cats.

[Emek Yezreel College]'s Management Department has created an innovative course in collaboration with a local technology incubator. Each year, students form consulting groups and work in year-long collaboration with companies from the incubator under the supervision of Emek Yezreel staff.

127. ORT-Braude in Carmiel, with its engineering orientation, uses an internship program to localize the learning process. Beginning after the 6th semester of study, students work as interns in industry under the supervision of experienced engineers. The program enforces an on-going dialog between ORT-Braude and industry through which the college gains an up-to-date picture of industry requirements and directions.

Best practice...

- Management students at Yezreel Valley College earn course credit by acting as consultants to companies from a local technology incubator.
- ORT-Braude College uses internship programs to help transition students to the workforce while keeping abreast of industry trends.
- Gordon College employs extensive fieldwork to ground future teachers strongly in the physical and human geography of the region.

4.2 Student recruitment and regional employment

128. HEI's operate independently on a competitive basis. The CHE allocates student seats at each HEI. HEI's are funded by the PBC according to the number of actual students enrolled up to the allocated limit. Aside from this central planning and budgeting, there are no policies to encourage regional recruitment nor arrangements among the HEI regarding quotas.

129. With the exception of the Technion and Tel Hai College, Project Region HEI's draw students heavily from the Galilee region. Technion recruits nationally due to its position as the premier technical university in Israel. Tel Hai, alone among the colleges, has reached a scale and level of prestige that permits it to recruit substantially from the center of the country. Its methods are sometimes unorthodox: It advertises, *inter alia*, in India where many Israelis travel after their army service and before college. Tel Hai also believes that its support center for students with learning disabilities is a unique offering that contributes to its ability to recruit nationally. ORT-Braude College sees recruitment from the center of the country as a core part of its mission to develop the Galilee region. However, in the last ten years, it has not been able to recruit meaningfully from the center where there are ample opportunities for engineering training close to key engineering employment centers.

Best practice...

- Tel Hai College advertises in India where many Israelis travel after their army service and before college.

130. Recognizing the need to increase access and enrollment, the Council worked over the last decade to increase the number of colleges throughout the region including those in which Arabic-language or bilingual teaching is carried out. It is currently believed that an adequate response has been made as far as geographical footprint is concerned.

4.3 Access

4.3.1 Pre-academic preparatory institutes

131. Pre-academic preparatory institutes are used throughout the higher education system to increase access. Commonly, each HEI will run one or much such institutes with the mission of closing the gap between student test scores and the HEI's admissions requirements.

Best practice...

- The Technion has opened a pre-academic program for the ultra-orthodox population.
- The 18-month program provides accelerated study of mathematics, physics, english, and scientific writing.
- In 2008, 11 participants were admitted for mainstream study at the Technion.

132. A highly innovative pre-academic program recently opened at the Technion targets the ultra-orthodox population. Ultra-orthodox Jews grow up in an educational system that emphasizes religious studies and includes almost no math, English, or science. The purpose of the Technion program is to prepare students from the ultra-orthodox Jewish sector of the population for study at the Technion and other HEI's in Israel. The program includes a 5 months pre-entry program and an additional 12 months as a preparatory program that teaches mathematics, physics, english and scientific writing. In 2007 and 2008 this program trained 60 students. In 2008, 11 program participants were admitted to various Technion departments.
133. A number of programs also address completion rates. Both Western Galilee and Tel Hai Colleges have programs to identify and support students with learning disabilities during their studies. Western Galilee further plans to open program for Arab students, 33% of their student body.
134. A number of stakeholders interviewed report the need for more preparatory institutes directed at the Arabic-speaking population. For many Arab and Druze students, higher education is the first experience in a fully Hebrew-speaking environment. Their ability to adapt is a key predictor for completion and success according to these stakeholders. Pre-academic preparatory training targeted at the needs of this demographic could form a helpful transition layer.

Best practice...

- Gordon College pioneered a culturally appropriate campus that enabled Druze women to attend.
- Oranim College runs a program to recruit and train Ethiopian immigrant students as teachers.
- Tel Hai and Western Galilee Colleges have centers for the support of students with learning disabilities.

4.4 The regional supply chain

4.4.1 Academic Training

135. Project HEI's recognize themselves as part of the regional education supply chain. This is perhaps most strongly felt at the academic teaching colleges (Oranim, Gordon, Arabic, WIZO, Sakhnin) where there are regionally oriented programs both for the intake of new students and the placement of graduates. Because graduates of these colleges go on to work within the region, and because of the cultural diversity of the region, these colleges recognize the importance of specialized, regionally-oriented training for their students. Oranim College, for example, ran a program to recruit and train Ethiopian students as teachers following a wave of immigration by that group in the 1990's. Gordon College similarly pioneered a culturally appropriate program to enable young Druze women to attend and receive teacher training.
136. The academic colleges similarly view themselves as key parts of the regional educational supply chain. ORT-Braude views the development of the Galilee as a key part of its mission. The translation of that mission into action lies in its position as a near-unique provider of engineers and technicians in the interior of the region. ORT's internship program is an effective tool in exposing students to local employers where many of them find their first jobs in their fields. Tel Hai is an important trainer of workers in the social sciences (as well as computer and natural sciences). Those students are similarly exposed to the workforce through internship programs and field work.
137. While the Universities do not have a regional mission *per se*, they nevertheless strongly participate in the regional education supply chain. Many corporate and political leaders are graduates of the University of Haifa or the Technion.

138. The primary pathway between HEI's and regional firms is the internship. For example, at ORT-Braude, students work as interns in industry under the supervision of experienced engineers beginning after the 6th semester of study. The program enforces an on-going dialog between ORT-Braude and industry through which the college gains an up-to-date picture of industry requirements and directions.
139. A secondary pathway between HEI's and regional firms is open houses, conferences, and seminars held from time to time on topics of professional interest. None of the HEI's have mechanisms in place to track career paths of graduates.

Did you know...

- Mr. Stef Wertheimer, industrialist, founder of Iscar, Ltd., former member of Knesset^a, and Israel Prize winner has funded a new vocational training center in the Galilee called *The Galilee Center for Industrial Training*.
- The Center will offer a one-year training program culminating in a certificate from the Landesakademie für Fortbildung und Personalentwicklung an Schulen of the state of Baden-Württemberg of the Federal Republic of Germany.
- The Center seeks to reverse a trend away from vocational training and support the manufacturing economy.

^aIsrael's Parliament

4.4.2 Vocational Training

Mr. Stef Wertheimer, industrialist, founder of Iscar, Ltd., former member of Knesset¹, and Israel Prize winner, has, for many years, advanced a critical view of the country's higher education system. According to this view, HEI's overemphasize the preparation of students to work in research and development while underemphasizing vocational training in support of a manufacturing economy. According to this view, the education system has abandoned vocational training as the country has shifted toward R&D and away from manufacturing.

¹Israel's Parliament

In an effort to fill the gap, Mr. Wertheimer has funded a new vocational training center in the Galilee called *The Galilee Center for Industrial Training*. In cooperation with the state of Baden-Württemberg of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Center will offer a one-year training program culminating in a certificate from the Landesakademie für Fortbildung und Personalentwicklung an Schulen. The study program will include six months at the Galilee Center followed by six months at the Landesakademie. Initially, 20 students per year will participate in the program.

4.5 Lifelong Learning

140. Most regional HEI's offer programs in continuing professional development and training. The Technion program is naturally largest with 2,800 students enrolled at three centers around the country. (One may estimate 1,000 students in the Project Region.) Technion programs leading to academic degrees include:

- MBA with emphasis on high technology;
- M.E. in systems engineering, biomedical engineering, environmental engineering, civil engineering with emphasis on development and business management in construction, civil engineering with emphasis on managing construction projects, biotechnology and food engineering;
- M.Sc. in architecture with emphasis on conservation;
- M.E.E. in electrical engineering — program offered through Intel;
- M.R.E. - Masters of Real Estate;
- B.A. in Geo-information.

Certificate programs include:

- Management Studies in human resources, project management, quality assurance engineering, logistical systems management, and coaching;
- Real Estate Studies in land assessing and property management, planning and construction law, construction project management;
- Interior Design Studies in landscape design and curation of art exhibits;
- Computer Studies in software development, software testing, network administration and management, and data security;
- Continuing education in family medicine;
- Continuing education in dentistry.

The Technion has a history of working with regional partners to tailor programs to regional needs. Tailor made programs for various companies such as the Israel Electric Corporation, Intel, RAFAEL, Elbit, Cellcom, Bezeq, IDF, Iscar, Ministry of Defense, and more.

4.6 Changing forms of educational provision

141. The primary provider of online higher education in Israel is the Open University where entire degree programs can be taken through distance, online learning. In the 2006/7 academic year, 40,006 students were enrolled at the Open University. Of these, 7.9% (3,161 students) reside in the Northern District and another 9.8% (3,921) in the Haifa District. We may estimate 5,120 students from the Project Region representing 12.8% of the Open University enrollment.

By comparison, the Project Region comprises approximately 24% of Israel's population. 60.4% of the Open University's student population reside in the Central Region (compare 40% of the general population). Thus, the Galilee residents are under-represented at the Open University. Moreover, data on enrollment by ethnic group shows that Arabs are especially heavily under-represented. 20% of the general population, Arab students comprised only 5.5% of the Open University's student body in 2006/7.

In summary, 1 out of every 120 residents of the Central Region studies online at the Open University but only 1 out of every 340 students of the Project Region does so. (CHE-01)

Chapter 5

Contribution To Social, Cultural And Environmental Development

5.1 Social development

5.1.1 *Perach* mentorship program

142. The largest single program for social development is the *Perach*¹ program. *Perach* pairs needy children with university students who act as tutors, mentors and role models in a one-on-one relationship. Participating HEI students earn a credit toward tuition fees. The *Perach* project was established in 1974 by students from the Weizmann Institute of Science, who tutored children in need. Today, approximately 15% of students in Israel's HEI's participate in the project. A significant percentage of *Perach* mentors and mentees come from minority groups. Program goals are:

- To enrich and improve the lives of children from underprivileged backgrounds from all sectors of society—Jewish, Arab and Druze—through a warm and caring relationship with a personal mentor.
- To help university students meet the cost of higher education, by providing partial scholarships and/or academic credits in return for their work with needy children.

¹Hebrew acronym for “Mentorship Program” and homonymous with the Hebrew word for flower.

- To create awareness and prepare HEI students for future leadership positions by exposing them to the country’s most pressing social problems.
 - To promote tolerance and understanding among different sectors of society through joint activities.
143. *Perach* targets children from disadvantaged socio-economic background, often suffering from educational, emotional and behavioral difficulties. Approximately 20% of *Perach* children are new immigrants. Another 20% come from the Arab sector. *Perach* also provides mentors to children with disabilities, children of parents in prison, disadvantaged high school students who need help to prepare for their matriculation exams, dyslexic or blind university students.
144. Mentors meet mentees twice per week for two hours each time. Encounters take place at the pupil’s home, at the university campus, at playgrounds, libraries, museums or at *Perach* enrichment centers and typically focus on homework, computer games, sports, movies, hikes, *etc.* Approximately 75% of student-mentors meet their mentees on an one-on-one basis. The others serve as tutors in various programs throughout the country. The syllabuses of these programs are prepared by professionals who provide the tutors with written materials and guidance. These programs are offered in a variety of areas such as health and dental care, science education, nature and environment, law and order, music, *et alia.*

Best practice...

- 15% of HEI students nationwide participate in the *Perach* mentorship program.
- Students earn tuition credits by working in one-on-one relationships with disadvantaged children.
- *Perach* provides support and role modeling to needy children while fostering social awareness among HEI students.

5.1.2 Other community service programs

145. HEI’s offer numerous programs for social involvement. Three examples (of many):

Oranim College offers a program called *Melach Haaretz*² in which students maintain a half-time job in community social/educational work

²Acronym for “Educator Leadership” and Hebrew for “salt of the earth”.

while studying on campus only two days per week. The community work is supported by expert external lecturers and recognized for credit by the College.

Tel Hai College students created an innovative program called *Ayalim*³, based on students living directly within the most troubled neighborhoods.

Oranim College pairs students with high-risk children to develop work habits and skills as well as communications skills.

146. Sometimes HEI's support the community by making college programs available to the public. Western Galilee College created a program to identify and support students with learning disabilities and then made the diagnostic team available to local school to increase awareness in the community. Similarly, the Technion encourages science education among middle- and high-school students through its Harry and Lou Stern Youth Activities Unit. The purpose of this unit is to encourage the study of science and technology by children. Activities are held in the morning during science and technology days and in the afternoons as part of after-school programs. In the 2008/9 academic year, 9,300 children participated in 140 days of activities.

Best practice...

- Western Galilee College created a program to identify and support students with learning disabilities and then made the diagnostic team available to local schools to increase awareness in the community.

147. Other community programs are directed at encouraging academic excellence. The Technion's Archimedes Project lets exceptional regional students combine high school studies with academic studies at the Technion, especially in the field of chemistry. In the first year students attend three theoretical courses and one lab course in basic chemistry for a total of 12 academic credits. Students who finish the first year with an average above 80 receive a 100 on their high school matriculation exam in chemistry (5 units) per a policy set by the Ministry of Education. Following the first year, students may study for an additional two years. The curriculum includes math and computer science as well as chemistry. During these two years, participants accumulate 30–35 academic credits. Each year the project admits 70–75 students. The total number of participants at any given time is about 110. Lectures are usually held on Fridays.

³Hebrew for "Antelope"

The program is sponsored through the tuition paid by the students and through donations. It includes transportation from distant locations and need-based scholarships. A significant number of the program's graduates attend the Technion today.

148. In some cases, the community benefits from serving as HEI's living laboratory. The Technion's course "Planning with Community" paired Masters students in planning and advanced B. A. students in Architecture with community-based organizations in the Project Region to offer fresh visions for social change. In Haifa, one group of students found that a much-disliked new road cutting through a very poor neighborhood actually opened opportunities for new public spaces. As a result, the city is now developing plans in accordance with the students' ideas. A second group of students worked with a local feminist center to map spaces of physical safety and fear in the mixed Jewish and Arab Hadar area of Haifa. The work has spawned a new coalition to renew the Hadar area, and their first joint product was a bilingual (Hebrew and Arabic) position paper based on the students' work. A third group of students analyzed the ongoing World Heritage preservation in Old Acre from the residents' point of view. Subsequently, the Acre Development Corporation adopted several of the student recommendations including the need for policies to mitigate against gentrification and displacement of the very low-income Arab residents.

5.2 Medical Care

149. The main HEI contributor to medical care in the Galilee is the Technion Faculty of Medicine and the main mechanism for impacting regional health care is through the ap-pointments of leading hospital departments as teaching clinical departments in which the clinical studies of the M. D. program are conducted. 12 different hospitals participate in teaching medical students; 8 general hospitals: Hillel Yaffe Hospital in Hadera, Lady Davis (Carmel) Hospital, Bnai-Zion Medical Center and Rambam Medical Center in Haifa, Haemek Medical Center in Afulah, Poriya Hospital in Tiberias, Rivka Sief Hospital in Safed and Western Galilee Medical Center in Nahariya; 3 psychiatric hospitals: Mizra, Tirah and Shaar Menashe; and one geriatric hospital: Fleeman Hospital.

Studies of family medicine are carried out in clinics throughout the Galilee. The hospitals are non-academic bodies, but individual departments are accredited as academic teaching departments. Clinicians who work in these hospitals and have academic appointments at the Technion are an integral part of the Faculty of Medicine.

In January 2005, the Dean of Medicine decided to allocate an annual budget to upgrade teaching equipment in the teaching clinical departments

on a matching basis for the benefits of the medical students and of the daily activities of the clinical departments. Additionally, the faculty, through its research committee, provides several grants-in-aid to foster research cooperation between clinical and pre-clinical faculty members in order to advance clinical research in the hospitals with special emphasis on those more peripheral to Haifa. This is also done on a matching basis between the faculty and the hospitals.

The Technion has adopted a rule that clinical faculty cannot receive tenure at academic ranks lower than full professor. This rule ensures motivation by clinical faculty to continue in their clinical and basic research despite the heavy burden of clinical practice.

150. There has been a government decision to create a new, fifth medical school in Israel. It has further been decided that this school will be located in the Galilee. The goals of this new medical school are:

- Increase in supply of doctors to match population trends in Israel;
- Improvement of medical services in the Galilee;
- Overall development of the Galilee.

In July, 2009, the Israel National Institute for Health Policy and Health Service Research held a two-day workshop entitled, Medical Education in the 21st Century. The workshop included presentations by top health planners in the country as well as presentations by the President of the State of Israel, the Deputy Minister of Health, and the head of the opposition party. Among the important points made repeatedly at this workshop:

- The purpose of the new medical school is not only (or even primarily) to provide additional training capacity; this could be done within the existing 4 medical schools.
- A purpose of the new school is to change radically the way medical education occurs in Israel.
- A second purpose of the new school is to revolutionize health care in the Galilee. More specifically, planners intend that the new medical school will reflect a new, community-based approach to medicine and medical education. Medical students will spend far less time in hospitals and far more time in communities. Students will further learn from an early stage to work in multi-disciplinary teams alongside nurses, social workers, psychologists, and others. The medical school selection process will be changed to favor students who excel at teamwork and interpersonal communications.

Did you know...

- The government of Israel has decided to create a medical school in the Galilee.
- The medical school is intended to have broad-reaching impact on the Galilee.
- Leading healthcare planners intend to utilize the Galilee's unique geographic and demographic character to make the new school a pioneer in community-based medicine and medical education.

5.3 Conclusions

151. Regional HEI's are strongly involved in the social and cultural development of the region. Programs too many to list provide interfaces between students and local residents through which the social and cultural life of the community are enriched, the experience and commitment of the students are enhanced, and quality of life improved. HEI's act independently in this regard except that the largest community involvement program, *Perach*, is nationally organized and managed.

Chapter 6

Capacity Building For Regional Co-Operation

6.1 Mechanisms to promote regional engagement of HEIs

152. Despite a lack of formal mechanisms to promote regional engagement, two factors drive HEI's to be regionally engaged: (1) A sense of the strategic importance of Galilee development to the State of Israel; and (2) Relevance of regional activities to the learning process of their students. Thus, ORT-Braude College defines its mission (in part) as attracting educated young people from the center of the country to the Galilee (even as it reports failure in this endeavor over the last 10 years). Similarly, Tel Hai College feels it is in the vanguard of regional development because of its relative success in recruiting student from the country's center. Moreover, since most college students in the region train in the social sciences or for careers as teachers, a high degree of community involvement is natural. In that sense, the HEI's and the region's requirements are well aligned. Heavy community involvement by HEI students is a positive and ubiquitous element of the Galilee region.
153. The mechanisms through which HEI's identify regional needs are all informal. The primary channels of engagement-internships, community involvement programs, mentorship programs, sponsored research-are all driven by personal relationships between the parties. Thus, engineering faculty at ORT-Braude keep in contact with local industry in order to learn about evolving projects where students might find positions as interns; teaching faculty at Gordon are in touch with area principals to learn of trends and placement opportunities for their students; and community involvement programs are in touch with local government to identify nascent opportunities for social field work.

154. In regional engagement as in other areas of activities, HEI's compete for students and resources. The government neither organizes nor supports a pan-institutional approach to regional development. The CHE does monitor regional engagement of HEI's through annual self-evaluation reports however said engagement is not quantified or factored into an incentive system such as the funding system. In the spirit of this competitive approach, the CHE's main role is to oversee and rationalize the opening of new degree programs to as to align educational capacity and supply with demand. Demand is mainly gauged by student trends and the assumption is that students are responsive to trends in the labor marketplace.
155. The most strategic plan currently in place for the Galilee revolves around the proposed 5th medical school. Modeled on the perceived success of Ben Gurion University of the Negev in the southern city of Be'er Sheva, the new medical school would be a major employer in the region and would revolutionize health care in the region. Moreover, the medical school would create demand for trained workers in a series of paramedical fields. The training of this workforce creates opportunities for area colleges. Finally, the medical school is seen as a first step toward a large, research university in the interior of the Galilee.

6.2 Evaluating and mapping the impact of the regional HE system

156. HEI's submit annual self-evaluation reports to the CHE. Consequently, they keep careful track of community involvement programs and coursework. However, there is less data available to quantify the direct and indirect economic impact of HEI's on the region. Nevertheless, HEI's are believed by all to have important direct and indirect economic impact. For example, Tel Hai College is now the largest employer in the Galilee panhandle. ORT-Braude, Emek Yezreel College, Sakhnin College, as well as the two universities, are similarly important employers in their communities. Although there is no data on student employment and internal migration following graduation, it is believed that most graduates of regional HEI's continue to live and work in the area. Therefore, the indirect economic impact of these institutions is also great.

Did you know...

- Tel Hai College is the largest employer in the Galilee panhandle.

6.3 Institutional capacity building for regional involvement

157. Some HEI's have administrative offices that facilitate community involvement. Such is the case, for example, at Emek Yezreel College where the Unit for Social Involvement is organized as a department of the Dean's office. Through the Unit, 140 students found opportunities for volunteer work in 21 community programs and institutions throughout the Galilee in 2008. Participants receive a scholarship credit toward their tuition expenses.
158. HEI's make substantial use of adjunct appointments. In some cases, these appointments add expertise and important relationships to the capacity mix. Increasingly, adjuncts are also used as a low-cost solution to teaching core courses. As budgets are cut and tenure stream appointments become tight, adjunct staff have become an increasingly common solution for the teaching of core courses. Recognizing this trend, the CHE intends to modify the HEI funding formula to reduce somewhat the incentive for using adjunct teaching staff.

6.4 Creating a new organization culture

159. All HEI's in the Project Region view regional development as an essential part of their mission. However, HEI's fall into two groups regarding the culture of regional engagement:
 - To the academic and teaching colleges engaged primarily in the social sciences and teacher training, regional engagement is a natural and organic part of the life of the institution. These HEI's have no cultural conflict between their educational and regional missions. They impact the region directly through a web of engagement whose strands include community-based activities both inside and outside the classroom.
 - Institutions whose mission is global excellence also participate in the life of their communities. However, since their main mission is academic excellence, the primary mode of engagement may be indirect, *i.e.*, through the drip-down effect that comes from creating a supply of highly trained academics for the region. For these institutions, academic excellence is regional development.
160. There is a trend among the region's colleges to strive for world-class research excellence. World-class research is a part of the faculty incentive process, *i.e.*, it is a critical element for advancement in academic rank and tenure. By way of illustration, ORT-Braude College recently held "The Fifth ORT-Braude College Interdisciplinary Research Conference"

featuring speakers from around the country and papers on such topics as “Derivation of the Langevin Function from the Principle of Detailed Balance” and “Double Well Bose-Hubbard Model: A Playground for Quantum Control.” By contrast, Tel Hai College will sponsor in November a conference on regional entrepreneurship as part of their participation in Global Entrepreneurship Week.

161. Despite the above, the primary system of incentive for HEI staff is promotion in academic rank and tenure. For promotion to professor at all HEI's, a standard review is carried out at the national level by the CHE and is based on traditional performance metrics: quantity and quality of publications, participation in international conferences, teaching ranking. Thus, a staff member who wishes to work on regional issues should combine his work with traditional publications.

Chapter 7

Conclusions: Moving Beyond The Self-Evaluation

7.1 SWOT Analysis

7.1.1 Strengths

162. The region has a great many strengths. First and foremost is a consensus among stakeholders that Galilee development is a national priority.

The region further enjoys a robust higher education system with a broad geographical footprint and dedicated and caring staff members. Faculty and students alike have a culture of social action and community involvement.

The region is located near key markets, potential markets and business centers including Tel Aviv, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. There are successful industries in the area and experienced business-people who could serve as mentors or advisors in new ventures. Framework conditions are strong and include subsidized capital, tax incentives, partnership programs, and an entrepreneurial culture.

7.1.2 Weaknesses

163. One important way in which HEI's can drive regional development is by stimulating new business creation. Despite the strengths described above, there is generally a low level of new business creation from Galilee HEI's. None of the academic colleges seem to embrace this metric as part of their mission in more than a theoretical way.

Projects, policies, and systematic changes that could enhance regional engagement must come from above. Because of the multi-focal nature of

decision making, such changes may require collaboration across organizational lines at the national level.

As far as HEI staff are concerned, the present system of incentives (advancement, tenure) emphasize traditional academic publications. In most cases, these publications must come at the expense of regional engagement. There is no umbrella policy in place that encourages HEI staff to be locally engaged and impactful.

7.1.3 Opportunities

164. The rich cultural diversity of the area combined with the educational infrastructure create opportunities.

The region already has successful businesses in manufacturing, biotech, and clean-tech. A focus on new business creation in these areas could stimulate further growth and drive a transition from public services to knowledge-based manufactures.

Moreover, according to Dr. Raed Muallem, Vice President of Mar Elias College, the Galilee, with its population of native Arabic speakers, could become a leader in higher education in the Middle East and North Africa upon resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. It could similarly become a leader in international trade in the region.

The 5th medical school project, if realized, could provide game-changing health care.

Already a tourist destination, the Galilee could develop into cultural tourism and eco-tourism.

Finally, the region can be a laboratory and a showcase for Jewish-Arab coexistence.

7.1.4 Threats

165. The first threat to any development plan is the macroeconomic background which, as of this writing, is still characterized by poor credit, conservative markets, and high unemployment.

Another threat to the region’s development, as to any region that engages in manufacturing, is off-shoring to low-cost emerging economies such as China.

Another threat is the business impact of the real/perceived degree of geopolitical stability. Instability impacts tourism by staunching the flow of tourists to the Region; manufacturing by creating concern among foreign customers for security of supply.

Another threat is the danger of focusing exclusively on tactical issues due to the multi-focal nature of government. For example, a focus on

infrastructures to the exclusion of human capital may yield disappointing returns.

7.2 Conclusions

166. The reader of Section 7.1 is struck by the many strengths and opportunities. A region of physical beauty and cultural diversity, the Galilee possesses substantial tertiary educational capacity including world-class research universities, academic colleges, and academic teacher-training colleges; manufacturing infrastructure and expertise; and supportive national framework conditions. It is therefore surprising that there is relatively little new enterprise creation associated with HEI's.

Among the most important resources are the hundreds of academic staff at the 8 academic colleges in the region. Not funded to perform research, they are nevertheless evaluated based in large part on their research records during regular reviews for academic advancement or tenure. Thus, the colleges pursue a *de facto* policy of world-class excellence.

The primary tool that the CHE and PBC use in this respect is budgetary: By not funding research infrastructure at the academic colleges, and by requiring staff at the colleges to carry a greater teaching load than staff at the research universities, the CHE and PBC bias the college system away from research and, presumably, toward regional engagement. However, the CHE advancement and tenure system negate this effect and enforce a focus on academic publications. The effect drips down to the colleges so that in-house evaluation also relies heavily on academic publications.

The situation is a result of two factors. On the one hand, the free-market planning policy pursued by the Council allows each college leave to chart its own course within certain parameters. On the other hand, the leadership of most colleges, as well as the promotion/tenure committee members at the national level, are products of the research university system. Their notion of excellence is *academic* excellence and global impact as measured by traditional metrics.

Other elements of the research university are also replicated in the academic colleges. As in the university system, college teachers accrue sabbatical leave. In an effort to increase the exposure of Israeli staff to world-class research, national policy holds that sabbatical must be taken abroad. This policy is easily understood in the context of a global excellence strategy. By contrast, in Spain, researchers can use their sabbatical leave to work on local start-up companies and new ventures.

The question arises, Does the *de facto* policy of world-class excellence pursued by the academic colleges best serve the region?

167. Another important reality in the Galilee is the lack of a regional government and the multi-focal nature of centers of decision-making. Aside

from the CHE and PBC, the most important player is the Galilee Development Authority. Of the various stakeholders, the Authority is the only one whose stated mission is regional in nature. Moreover, the Authority operates a forum of local governments which provides the only practical means of interfacing with the multiplicity of local leaders.

168. In light of the above, it seems desirable that the Council for Higher Education and the Galilee Development Authority create a forum for exploring means and policies through which the academic colleges could increase their regional engagement. Other important participants are the Ministry for Minority Affairs and the Arab Affairs Desk within the Prime Minister's office. While it is the Council's sole responsibility to set policy for the HEI's, such a forum might offer a venue for exploring ways to increase regional engagement and, ultimately, economic impact.

Appendix A

References

- Smith, 2007** A. B. Smith, "Report on Education System in Israel," Publisher (City) 2007.
- CBS-01** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, "Population by Population Group," http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/yarhon/b1_h.xls (Hebrew).
- CBS-02** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, "Population by District, Sub-District, and Religion," http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton59/download/st02_06x.xls.
- CBS-03** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, "Population by Population Group, Religion, Age and Sex, District and Sub-District," http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton59/download/st02_10x.xls.
- CBS-04** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, "Population by Population Group, Religion, Age, Sex and Number of Males per 1,000 Females," http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton59/download/st02_21x.xls.
- CIA-01** CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html>.
- CBS-05** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, "Demographic Situation in Israel-2007," http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200801252 (Hebrew).
- CBS-06** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, "Sources of Population Growth, by District, Population Group, and Religion," http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton59/download/st02_04.xls.
- PMO-01** State of Israel-Prime Minister's Office, "Decision to Locate Israel's Fifth Medical School in Safed," <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Secretarial/Decisions/2009/03/des4541.htm>.

- CBS-07** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, “Selected Data for International Child Day,” http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/hodaot2008n/11_08_235b.doc.
- BTL-01** State of Israel-National Insurance Institute, “Dimensions of Poverty-Annual Report 2008“ (in Hebrew).
- BOI-01** Bank of Israel, “Income maintenance allowances in Israel-ideal versus actual,” Israel Economic Review vol. 2, no. 1 (2004), 69-90 http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mehkar/iser/03/iser_4.pdf.
- CBS-08** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, “Internet usage among Israelis.“ (in Hebrew), http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200519176.
- CHE-01** State of Israel-Council for Higher Education, “Students at Institutions of Higher Education 2006/2007.“
- BIS-01** Dr. Bishara Bisharat, Midical Education in the 21st Century, July 6-7, 2009, Safed, Israel.
- CBS-02** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, “Local Authorities in Israel-2007“, www.cbs.gov.il/www/hodaot2009n/24_09_088b.doc.
- S&P-01** Standard and Poors, <http://globes-online.com/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=850874&fid=1049>.
- NAS-01** NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2006/ne_section06_134.stm.
- CBS-10** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/mop05/pdf/h_intro_mavo2.pdf.
- CBS-11** State of Israel-Central Bureau of Statistics, “National expenditure on civil-ian R&D by operating sector and financing sector,” http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton59/download/st26_01.xls.
- OECD-01** Gross Domestic Product, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/534570242112>.
- OCS-01** “The intellectual capital of the State of Israel,” Office of the Chief Scientist, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, <http://www.israeltrade.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C973239E-F6C2-453A-A4D9-5A30F59258E3/0/intellectualcapital.pdf>.
- IVA-01** Israel Venture Association, “2008 Summary of Israel High-Tech Company Capital Raising,” http://www.iva.co.il/data/uploads_EN/pdfs/IVC_Q4_08_Survey_En.pdf.
- PBC-01** State of Israel, Planning and Budget Committee annual report, 2006, <http://www.che.org.il/articles/article.aspx?ArticleId=2>.

Appendix B

Tables

City	Pop. (1,000's)
Haifa	264.9
Nazareth	65.5
Nahariya	51.0
Acre	46.0
Upper Nazareth	43.1
Tiberias	39.7
Safed	28.5
Sakhnin	25.1
Carmel	24.9
Kiryat Shmona	22.1

Table B.1: Populations of cities and towns in the Project Region. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*

City	Tel Aviv	Jerusalem
Haifa	95	157
Nazareth	107	147
Tiberias	137	176
Safed	166	205
Kiryat Shmone	187	226

Table B.2: Driving distances from the Project Region to the Central Region. *Source: Google Maps*

City	Tel Aviv	Jerusalem
Haifa	1:32	2:38
Nazareth	3:23	2:15
Tiberias	3:12	2:50
Safed	3:23	3:28
Kiryat Shmone	3:55	3:55

Table B.3: Bus travel times (hour:min) from cities in the Project Region to main cities in the center. *Source: Egged Bus Cooperative*

	Central Region		Haifa Subdistrict		Northern District		Project Region	
	Pop.	%	Pop.	%	Pop.	%	Pop.	%
Jews	2,660.0	90.3%	431.5	81.7%	532.1	43.6%	963.6	55.1%
Moslems	150.8	5.1%	17.5	3.3%	464.1	38.1%	481.6	27.6%
Christians	17.3	0.6%	22.1	4.2%	89.9	7.4%	112.0	6.4%
Druze	0.0	0.0%	22.3	4.2%	96.6	7.9%	118.9	6.8%
Unclassified	118.4	4.0%	35.0	6.6%	36.9	3.0%	71.9	4.1%
TOTAL	2,946.5	100.0%	528.4	100.0%	1,219.6	100.0%	1,748.0	100.0%

Table B.4: Population by religion in Tel Aviv and Central Districts, Haifa Subdistrict, Northern District, and Project Region. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*

	1995	2007	% Change
Israel	5,612.3	7,243.6	29.1%
Northern District	946.9	1,221.9	29.0%
Haifa Sub-district	495.0	527.5	6.6%
Total Project Region	1,441.9	1,749.4	21.3%

Table B.5: Population growth in Israel and the Project Region between 1995 and 2007. *Source: CBS-06*

	Jerusalem	Tel Aviv	Haifa	Northern District
Beds per 1,000 population	2.50	2.66	2.70	1.58

Table B.6: Hospital beds per thousand population by location. *Source: Dr. Bishara Bisharat*

Universities (8)	
Bachelors	76,155
Masters	33,817
Doctorate	9,972
Academic Colleges (27)	
Bachelors	65,926
Masters	4,120
Doctorate	
Academic Teachers Colleges (27)	
Bachelors	26,883
Masters	994
Doctorate	
Total (62)	
Bachelors	168,964
Masters	38,931
Doctorate	9,972

Table B.7: Students in the higher education system, by HEI type and degree. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*

Universities (2)
Technion–Israel Institute of Technology
University of Haifa
Academic Colleges (8)
Emek Yezreel
Kinneret
Mar Elias
ORT-Braude
Safed
Tel Hai
Western Galilee
WIZO Academy Haifa
Academic Teachers Colleges (5)
Arab College of Haifa
Gordon College
Ohalo College
Oranim College
Sakhnin College
Research Center (1)
Migal–Galilee Technology Center

Table B.8: HEI's in the Galilee by type. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*

APPENDIX B. TABLES

HEI	Founded	Independent	1st	2nd	3rd	Total
Universities (2)						
Technion	1925		8,693	2,812	925	12,430
University of Haifa	1963		10,658	4,964	898	16,520
Academic Colleges (8)						
Emek Yezreel	1965	1994	3,420			3,420
Kinneret			169			169
Mar Elias						
ORT-Braude			2,118			2,118
Safed			1,900			1,900
Tel Hai			2,297			2,297
Western Galilee			1,100			1,100
Academic Teachers Colleges (5)						
Arab College of Haifa						
Gordon College						
Ohalo College						
Oranim College						
Sakhnin College						
WIZO Academy Haifa	1971					

Table B.9: . Source: Council for Higher Education

	Private Non-profit	Higher Education	Government	Business	Total
Total (Million NIS)	1,003	3,792	1,460	20,384	26,639
	3.8	14.2	5.5	76.5	100.0
Financing Sector					
Business	14.7	7.6	15.7	95.4	75.5
Government	51.4	57.0	76.0	4.6	17.7
Higher education	1.0	14.7	0.2	–	2.1
Private non-profit	7.8	6.5	2.7	–	1.4
Rest-of-world	25.1	14.2	5.4	–	3.3

Table B.10: National expenditure on civilian research and development by operating sector and financing sector (2005). Percentages except first line is millions of NIS. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics

Appendix C

Figures




Figure C.1: State of Israel: division into districts. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.2: The Project Region, its districts and main cities and towns. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.3: Rural vs. urban settlements in the Project Region. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.4: Rural settlements in the Project Region by type. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.5: Urban settlements in the Project Region by size. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.6: Types of municipalities in the Project Region. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.7: Types of municipalities in the Project Region. *Source: Central Bureau of Statistics*




Figure C.8: Business innovation programs of the Office of the Chief Scientist, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor. *Source: Office of the Chief Scientist*




Figure C.9: Investment model of the BIRD Foundation. *Source: MATIMOP*

Development of the Negev and Galilee For Jews only?

A proposal for equal development for Jews and Arabs in the Negev and Galilee

متابعة اور
مناظرات اور
Or Watch
سیکڑی سیکڑی



Policy Paper

Jerusalem, July 2005





A proposal for equal development for Jews and Arabs In the Negev and Galilee

Policy Paper

Submitted to the government of Israel

Jerusalem, July 2005

Development of the Negev and Galilee - For Jews Only?

A proposal for equal development for Jews and Arabs in the Negev and Galilee

Policy paper, Jerusalem, July 2005

Authors: Nissim Shlam Salman and Roy Folkman (Or Watch Project, Sikkuy Association)

Editor: Shuli Dichter

Advisors: Dr. Rassem Khamaisi, Michal Belikoff, Nada Matta

Linguistic editor: Ayelet Bartal

Graphic editor: Liat Simani

Translation to Arabic: Jalal Hassan

Translation to English: Ira Moskowitz

English language editing: Jessica Bonn, Batya Kallus, Carl Perkal

Or Watch Staff:

Roy Folkman - co-director

Ayman Odeh - co-director

Michal Belikoff - researcher

Nada Matta - researcher

Alexandra Klein-Franke - administrator

The Or Watch is funded by the European Commission and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Printing: Yuval Press, Jerusalem

Sikkuy

העמותה לקידום שוויון אזרחי סיקווי الجمعية لدعم المساواة المدنية
The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality


רחוב המשוררת רחל 17, בית הכרם, ירושלים 96348, טל. 02-6541225, פקס. 02-6541108, 17 Hameshoreret Rachel St., Beit Hakerem, Jerusalem 96348, Fax. 02-6541108, Tel. 02-6541225
ת.ד. 99650, חיפה 31996, טל: 04-8523188, פקס: 04-8523065, P.O.B 99650, Haifa 31996, Fax. 04-8523065, Tel. 04-8523188
E-mail: jerusalem@sikkuy.org.il

شارع همشوررت راحيل 17, بيت هكريم, القدس 96348, تل: 02-6541225, ف: 02-6541108
حيفا 31996, ص.ب 99650, تل: 04-8523188, ف: 04-8523065


www.sikkuy.org.il

www.orwatch.org

Table of Contents



Introduction	1
Government policy for developing the Negev and Galilee	3
Structural barriers and remedies for their removal	7
Planning	10
National priority zones	14
Encouraging entrepreneurship	16
Housing and mortgage criteria	18
Employment and Arab industrial zones	21
Education	23
Summary	24
Sources	25
Map of ISRAEL	27





INTRODUCTION

The Objective: Equality between Jews and Arabs

The Galilee Conference 2005, held in Karmiel on June 16, aroused profound concern among those committed to equality for Jews and Arabs in the Galilee. In the conference, the second in an annual event initiated by local government but significantly attended by top national officials, the development of the Galilee was declared as a national goal and as the focus of a concerted effort by the state. State officials also promised at the conference to raise funds for this mission from many sources. Vice Premier Shimon Peres reportedly decided not to attend the conference in protest over the fact that no Arab speaker was scheduled to appear. Indeed, it was most unfitting that not a single Arab speaker attended the conference; yet it appears that an invitation to a lone Arab speaker would only have served as an empty gesture. Today, in 2005, the problem is not the exclusion of Arab speakers at a conference, but rather the exclusion of Arab citizens in the actual development of the Galilee.

The declared goal of the plan to develop the Negev and Galilee is to increase the number of residents in Israel's outlying areas, as (also known as the "periphery") and it is clear to everyone that the plan is intended for Jewish residents.

According to reports published in recent months and preliminary government action, it seems that a drive to develop Jewish communities in the Galilee and Negev can be expected in the coming years. During July, a delegation representing the prime minister is meeting in Washington to discuss financing for the disengagement, of which the development of the Negev and Galilee is considered a part. It must be emphasized to all of the participants in these discussions that this development should be intended for all residents of the Negev and Galilee, Arabs as well as Jews, in an equal manner.

The Or Commission, which was appointed to investigate the events of October 2000 in which thirteen Arab demonstrators were shot to death by police, noted in its conclusions that the discrimination of Arab citizens relative to Jewish citizens was one of the root causes for the stormy demonstrations. The commission's resounding conclusion was that it is essential to "remove the blight of discrimination" from the State of Israel. The Sikkuy non-profit organization took upon itself the task of actively monitoring the implementation of the system-wide conclusions of the Or Commission. As part of this monitoring effort, we have proposed and are promoting a number of practical and egalitarian alternatives to the discriminatory development policy.

Since its establishment, the state has focused on developing Jewish communities and has neglected the Arab communities. Thus, for six decades, an intolerable gap has grown between Jewish and Arab towns in the Negev and Galilee. The new development drive, whose signs are already apparent, will further widen this gap, which constitutes a continual source of conflict between the two communities. This policy is unjust and unworthy of a democracy. It also poses a danger to all of the residents of the Galilee and Negev, Jews and Arabs alike.

The State of Israel is known for its ability to mobilize sources of financing, personnel and organizational resources to drive historic measures. Thus, for example, about one million new citizens were integrated in all of the state's systems during the 1990s. This same kind of high-level and exceptional capability, which mobilizes numerous and varied resources, should be exercised in light of the critical need to achieve equality between Jews and Arabs in Israel.

Today, the central significance of developing the Negev and Galilee is to define the Arab communities in these areas as direct targets for special development in an effort to achieve parity between their infrastructure and that of neighboring Jewish communities. The historic move to develop the Negev and Galilee is an opportunity (perhaps the last one) to attain this goal, and it must not be missed.

This policy paper suggests general directions for a policy of equitable development for Jews and Arabs in the Negev and Galilee, as well as some detailed proposals. It is our hope that it will encourage the authorities to act logically and justly in developing the Negev and Galilee during the coming decade.

Shalom (Shuli) Dichter
Co-Executive Director
Sikkuy

Government policy for developing the Negev and Galilee for Jews only? ¹

“The main goal of the plan is to increase the number of residents in the Negev to 1.5 million, and in the Galilee to 1.1 million, by 2010. The plan’s cost is estimated at NIS 16.8 billion, with most of the budget to come directly from government ministries, a small part from the Finance Ministry (about NIS 2 billion), some from American aid following the disengagement plan, and the rest from the Jewish Agency and donors...

The plan describes 18 projects slated to begin during the coming years in periphery in the areas of education, housing, infrastructure, employment and more...”

Nir Hasson, Haaretz, November 17, 2004

Government policy and declarations by members of the government in recent months indicate that the disengagement plan is expected to provide impetus for development in the Negev and Galilee. Signs of this intention were evident in January 2005 when a ministerial committee² for the development of the Negev and Galilee was established, which assigned a steering committee the task of presenting the outline of a national plan for development by May 2005. (Submission of this plan was later postponed until August.) In addition, the Evacuation-Compensation Law for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip offers a financial incentive of 90,000 NIS⁴ for evacuated families that choose to move to either of these regions. A government decision from June 19, 2005 promises to provide a discount of up to 40% for the purchase of land rights in the Galilee.³ And complementing these policies, the government’s decisions to build rail links to these areas, to establish a university in Karmiel and to transfer IDF bases to the Negev reflect the prevailing mood in the government vis-à-vis the development of the Negev and Galilee, and provide some indication about the anticipated scope of investment.

¹ Special thanks are extended to Dr. Rassem Khamaisi, a planner and geographer from Haifa University and the Floersheimer Institute, for the abundance of information, comments, corrections and practical proposals for development. We are grateful to Michal Belikoff for the data and comments.

² The chairman of the committee is MK Shimon Peres.


³ Haaretz, June 20, 2005, By Moti Bassok

⁴ \$1=4.5NIS (07/05)

The link between disengagement and development of the Negev and Galilee was most clearly expressed by Vice Premier Shimon Peres during a visit to the United States in April 2005. He spoke in favor of using part of the disengagement funding provided by the U.S. to promote development goals in these areas. Peres' words received an official stamp of approval during the same visit, when President Bush said he recognizes the importance of the need to create new opportunities in the Negev and Galilee. This statement constitutes a very significant endorsement of the plan's validity. As of now, it seems that some \$250 million will be allocated for the plan to develop the Negev and Galilee, with about a third of this money to come from the American grant for the disengagement. This sum will be supplemented by international financing that Minister Peres has mobilized.

All of the above indicates that during the coming months the steering committee for the development of the Negev and Galilee will accelerate its pace of operation. However, every indication is that the plans for developing the Negev and Galilee only include new Jewish residents and existing Jewish communities, and do not include the Arab communities.

Diagram 1: Percentage of population distribution (%) by region and group 2003



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2004

The Negev and Galilee comprise about 66% of Israel's territory (see map at the end of the paper). As of 2003, there were 2.05 million people living in the Galilee and Negev, including 701,000 Arab residents, who accounted for about 34% of the population in these regions (52% of the population in the Galilee, including the Safed, Kinneret, Acre and Jezreel districts, and 14% of the Negev population). Diagram 1 (P.4) shows that about 62% of the Arab population lives in the Negev and Galilee regions. Therefore, the government's policy regarding these regions has a direct impact on most of the Arab population in Israel.

The Or Commission report emphasizes the fact that Arabs in Israel are discriminated against in many ways, both institutionally and otherwise. If the historic pattern of providing massive development resources for Jews and mere leftovers for Arab citizens is continued, this inequality will only grow worse, generating great frustration and creating additional tension between Jews and Arabs. Similarly, the failure to exploit the human potential of an entire sector of the population, through official and informal discrimination, seriously damages the potential for economic growth in Israel.

The narrowing of gaps between Arabs and Jews should be a central component of every general trend and specific plan for developing these regions, thus serving as a catalyst for the development of the overall population in the periphery. A development plan that only assists Jewish communities and bypasses Arab communities would only widen the gaps and increase tensions between these two groups of citizens.

Therefore, it is of utmost importance to bring before the ministerial committee for the development of the Negev and Galilee, and before the entire government, the full range of variables and considerations necessary for the actualization of real development for all of the residents of the Israeli periphery, both Jews and Arabs.



Development Plans and Arab Citizens

The large gaps between the infrastructure in Jewish communities and in Arab communities in the Negev and Galilee are the direct result of massive investment in the development of the Jewish communities including the construction of regional infrastructure, while neglecting neighboring Arab communities. Since the establishment of the state, plans for developing the Negev and Galilee have bypassed the Arab communities, which have remained as isolated islands with weak connections to the developed national infrastructures.

An examination of the development and assistance plans for the Negev and Galilee in the past decades reveals that all of these plans use the same tools: **expansion of infrastructure, construction of residential units, subsidies for new residents, subsidies for industrial plants and, ultimately, establishment of new communities.** The establishment of new communities is a development tool of the highest order due to its substantial cost. According to an assessment prepared by the Open Landscape Institute of the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, the state invests some \$250,000 per resident in infrastructure when building a new community, in addition to an annual maintenance cost of NIS 6,300 per resident.⁵

Since the founding of the State of Israel, not a single new Arab community has been established in the Galilee. Moreover, the Arab public has almost no chance of making use of other development tools. Master plans for development constitute a bottleneck that is difficult to pass through. And because there are no master plans for most Arab communities, it is impossible to submit a request for mortgage assistance, initiate public housing projects or build industrial zones and public infrastructure. The Arab population is, for the most part, only able to enjoy the fruits of development indirectly, if at all- through increased employment opportunities or an improvement of central traffic arteries as the new Jewish residents move into the area. Therefore, in order to ensure that the new development plans now being formulated will lead to a real narrowing of gaps (and not only equality of opportunity), **a policy should be initiated that aims to remove procedural barriers and position the Arab communities in the Negev and Galilee as direct targets for development, on equal terms with the Jewish communities.**

⁵ In a study conducted by the National Council for Planning and Construction, the cost estimates are even higher: about \$480,000 per residential unit at 2005 prices, including the cost of providing temporary housing, such as mobile homes. Naomi Carmon, Hubert Law-Yon, Gavriel Lifshitz, Shaul Amir, Daniel Czamanski and Baruch Kipnis, *The New Jewish Settlements in the Galilee - an Evaluation Study*. The Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Technion, Haifa, 1990.


Structural barriers and remedies for their removal

There are many obstacles that prevent the Arab population from participating in existing development trends. These include institutional barriers (the Jewish identity of the state, majority-minority relations, center-periphery relations, etc.), as well as barriers that derive from within the Arab population itself. However, this document does not seek to deal with these barriers, as important as they are. Rather, it attempts to describe the structural and technical barriers found among the thousands of paragraphs of the state budget and the regulations issued by various government ministries. These barriers constitute real discrimination against Arabs and limit any development initiative by Arabs or Arab communities.

In general, there is no discrimination explicitly stipulated in legislation. However, various criteria for extending assistance contain built-in barriers that cannot be traversed by most of the Arab public. For example, the Law to Encourage Capital Investment, which is intended to encourage the establishment of factories in the periphery, mainly helps export industries, while most of the industry in the Arab sector targets the local market. Therefore, it is clear that these resources will only be allocated to Jews. The assistance the Housing Ministry extends to homebuyers is directed toward Jews from the outset, because Arabs are not accepted in the member-based communities qualifying for mortgage assistance and do not live in qualifying towns where there is massive construction.

Diagram 2: Unequal allocation by the Trade Ministry's Investment Center

In 2003, the Investment Center approved plans for establishing new plants and expanding existing factories at a total cost of NIS 3,328,796,000. Of this sum, NIS 45,374,000 - or 1.4% of the total - was invested in Arab communities.



Source: Ministry of Industry, Trade & Labor - analyzed by Sikkuy

The Problem - Access. The Solution - Improving Accessibility

Each government assistance program should be examined to clarify why the proportion of Arabs enjoying its benefits is so small. Criteria should be stipulated that are consistent with the existing reality and that ensure that Arab citizens are able to benefit from the special funds allocated for the development of the Negev and Galilee.

In this context, it is worth noting that even egalitarian legislation would not be sufficient and that it is not enough to make state resources available to the Arab public ⁶. What is needed is a pro-active approach. Instead of the present, passive policy, in which citizens ostensibly enjoy statutory equality - the state must adopt a pro-active policy that creates opportunities in an operative way. What is needed is not only equality of opportunity but also equality of results.

This approach should apply to all aspects of resource allocation, including civil service jobs, public appointments, mortgages and the directing of investors toward selected industrial zones.

On each count, government officials should ask why the number of Arab beneficiaries does not correspond to their proportion in the population. These officials should adopt an active policy of aspiring toward equality in every field and in all budgetary categories in the plan to develop the Negev and Galilee.

In addition to our recommendations, several guidelines for an overall policy are described below. The basis for these guidelines already appears in National Master Plan No. 35 (page 187):

⁶ A significant gap in the equality of capability - whether this derives from discriminatory laws that were in effect in the past and no longer exist, or faulty conceptions that have taken root in society - increases the chances of the strong groups and reduces the chances of the weak groups. Affirmative action is designed to balance this gap... the granting of equal opportunity in such circumstances will only maintain a formula of formal equality but will not provide members of the deprived group a real chance to receive their share of the resources of society. The existence of merely formal equality over time raises the concern that due to the ways of the world and the habits of mankind, the results of discrimination will be perpetuated. Correcting the injustices of the past and attaining real equality, therefore, can only be achieved by granting preferential treatment to members of the weak group." (Justice Eliyahu Mazza, High Court of Justice 453/94, Women's Lobby in Israel v. State of Israel, 529[5])



- 1. Establishing a pattern of confidence-building dialogue with the Arab population** - Due to social and cultural barriers, and because of a lack of trust in the establishment in particular, the Arab population does not fully exploit the opportunities and programs that could help narrow gaps dividing the Arab populace from its Jewish neighbors. This is true in regard to investments and entrepreneurship, housing assistance, construction, etc.
- 2. Adopting a policy that enables expansion of the range of opportunities and choices for Arab citizens in housing and employment in order to facilitate development within their communities** - mainly by creating housing and employment alternatives and raising citizens' awareness of the possibilities available to them. This also entails creating housing and employment opportunities within the main cities (for example, developing neighborhoods with services for the Arab community in Haifa).
- 3. Adoption of a new tactic: to create models of success and to develop growth centers** - No Arab urban centers have yet emerged that offer a real alternative for social development outside of the framework of village living, which offers very little chance of employment and advancement. Concentrated development of several urban centers would provide much greater chances of success and of generating tangible change than limited and pinpoint intervention within the broad expanse of village communities. (Possible centers include Nazareth, Tamra, Um al-Fahm in the Galilee, and Rahat in the Negev.)
- 4. Preparation and updating of development plans in accordance with Master Plan No. 35** - The master plans and blueprints drafted for these centers, with government assistance, can serve as the basis for investing public resources in their development. The master plan is perceived as a tool that limits the development of communities due to a lack of sufficient dialogue with residents and, especially, because these plans are not appropriate for future development needs. Defining the goals of future development and ensuring resources, as is customary for Jewish communities and development towns, would encourage a more positive attitude on the part of both the residents and the establishment.
- 5. Establishment and development of centers for administrative services and employment in Arab communities** - These would also serve Jewish communities in the area; the development of the centers would be based on a wide target population and would correspond to positive migration to the area and natural growth. (For example, in Rahat - establishing a complex of government offices, a branch of the Islamic court, birthing center.)
- 6. Providing government encouragement and support: loans, granting national priority (A) zoning status** - for development in the fields of housing, employment, education and business initiatives, as well as services and infrastructure at urban standards.

Listed below are the structural barriers preventing the immediate development of Arab communities, as well as steps that can be taken to remove these barriers and facilitate rapid development. In some cases, specific recommendations are proposed for infrastructure and development projects that should be implemented as part of an overall program for developing the Negev and Galilee.

It is important to emphasize that these barriers are interconnected. At the top of the list is the issue of allocating land and approving development plans, as well as the mechanisms and tools for carrying out these plans. Without a supply of land, it will be impossible to develop industry, roads and public buildings; planning restrictions account for the bottleneck in every development effort. Several practical proposals for investment and development will also be formulated for each topic.



A. Planning

Recommendations for development:

Nazareth and Rahat - Master plan No. 35 designates Nazareth and Rahat as the main centers for urban development. This development should have a regional metropolitan vision.

1. Master plan for the Nazareth area, including new residential neighborhoods (potential growth to about 400,000 residents)
2. Linking Route 6 (Trans-Israel Highway) with Route 77 (between the Golani and Yokne'am junctions)
3. Promoting initiatives for fair land arrangements in the Negev, expediting master plans (positive examples are Darjat and Hawashla)
4. Connecting Route 31 from the Lehavim Junction to the Mishmar Hanegev Junction south of Rahat, which also serves Tarabin a-Sana.
5. An initial investment of about NIS 100 million in developing infrastructure - electricity, water, sewage and roads - in the Bedouin communities in the Negev.

Providing resources, mechanisms and practical tools for executing master plans, such as detailed planning of sites and implementing a mechanism

Special planning boards, in parallel to the regional planning boards

Of about 120 Arab communities, 88 are included in project planning through the end of 2005. For 12 of these 88 communities, the planning process has been completed, and their development plans have been granted statutory status. Another 34 communities are in the process of preparing a master plan and of them, 24 are expected to complete this planning by the end of the year. However, this does not mean they will receive statutory status: It appears that three of the 24 will receive statutory status this year, while the rest will attain this status in 2006.⁷

Despite the good will demonstrated by the institutions for higher planning at the Interior Ministry, and despite the visible efforts, the current progress in planning is not a sufficient condition for changing the situation. Even after the planning process advances, it must be confirmed that the master plans indeed facilitate and support growth rather than delaying and limiting it. The planning barrier is characterized by a decentralization of authorities between the various planning commissions and by timetables that lack a strict framework. This state of affairs involves multiple players and numerous procedures that delay the process of planning and obtaining approvals. It is a cumbersome situation that is very familiar in the administrative and public system in Israel.

The central planning institutions must be equipped with more efficient tools for expediting procedures and preparing master plans that could provide a framework enabling development momentum.

Example: During the large-scale immigration from the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, it was clear to the executive branch that due to the limitations of the planning bureaucracy it would be very difficult to meet the urgent demand for construction. Therefore, the government, with the Knesset's approval, ordered the establishment of **special committees**, parallel to the regional planning boards, to enable an expedited process that would circumvent decision-making barriers and meet the goal of rapid and extensive construction for housing and industry.

About six such committees were formed, on a regional basis. They were authorized to overstep the planning hierarchy, with the exception of directives from the national master plan. The operational capability of the committees derived from the tight timetable and from the fact that three of the nine representatives on each committee were from the Housing Ministry.

⁷ According to a report by architect Shamaï Asif, the head of the Planning Administration, presented to the Knesset Interior and Environment Committee on March 2, 2005.

During the peak activity of these committees (1993-94), they approved the zoning and planning of 96,000 dunams⁸, or about 43% of the total land that received zoning approval during this period. The rapid execution by these committees was partly attributed to a reform at the Israel Lands Administration. This reform introduced a preliminary arrangement providing a share of future profits as compensation to landowners, thus turning landowners into business entrepreneurs.

This same compensation structure could also serve as a model for the Arab public: A substantial part of the planning problems in the Arab community derives from the private ownership of land and the tradition of refraining from selling land. Establishment of an entity to facilitate compromise and mediation in land transactions among the Arab village population, and to provide economic incentives for compromise would be of tremendous help in overcoming this planning obstacle.

The government could initiate this type of national project through *ad hoc* legislation and mobilization of maximal resources. This should be declared as a national goal, along with the establishment of an authority or directorate to expedite planning in Arab communities. The project should be implemented as part of a coordinated program for Arab development plans and be presented to the various planning boards and government ministries as a comprehensive package⁹. In addition to the formation of committees for approving development plans, committees for approving plans for unifying or dividing up plots should be established. This would help inspire faith in the planning system.

Expanding areas of municipal jurisdiction and the range of housing options

During the past decades, the boundaries of jurisdiction of Arab communities have not been significantly enlarged, with the exception of specific instances that followed the approval of the master plan¹⁰. Recently, some 11,500 dunams have been added to the jurisdictional area of Arab authorities in Wadi Ara as part of the A-Ruha agreement (IDF firing zone 107). Often, the regional planning board approves a municipal master plan, but the development of the plan entails encroaching into the jurisdiction of another local authority, usually a Jewish one. Thus, almost every expansion of an Arab community requires the approval of a neighboring local authority, which in most cases stalls the request or rejects it outright. The situation results in long delays.

⁸ 1 Dunam= 1/4 Acre = 1000 sqm²

⁹ See the proposal for establishing an Equality Authority, Sikkuy Report 2004, as well as Senate report 248: "Adopting the Recommendations of the Or Commission and Appointment of the Lapid Committee."

¹⁰ Recently, some 11,500 dunams have been added to jurisdiction of Arab localities in Wadi Ara as part of the A-Ruha agreement (IDF firing zone 107).

The problems are ultimately resolved by an investigative committee for determining municipal boundaries, but only after the loss of much precious time, sometimes as much as 10-15 years.

All of the measures proposed below should be implemented by professional teams that include Arab citizens who are top experts in their fields; they should be appointed in consultation with the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee and enjoy public trust as well as full government backing. This type of practical cooperation offers a chance to successfully traverse the required development processes. In the field of planning, there are many experts and civil society institutions that can help leverage the development effort. Cooperation with them can serve as an initial confidence-building stage for implementing this public process.

Recommendation: Immediate removal of planning barriers, expansion of housing options

1. Formation of a special committee for approving master plans in the Arab sector. The committee would coordinate all of the master plans vis-à-vis the Planning Administration, Housing Ministry, Israel Lands Administration and regional boards. It would receive top priority for hearings in the various committees and define a rigid and narrow timetable for approving plans. The committee would include several representatives of the Arab public.
2. Opening up a range of possibilities for Arab residence outside of Arab communities (Haifa, Ramla, Lod, Nazareth Illit, Tel Aviv, Modi'in, Rishon Letzion, Holon, Ramat Gan and more). This would be accomplished by developing residential neighborhoods especially for an Arab population, with dedicated services including schools and community centers. These residents should be allowed to take full advantage of their rights as citizens.
3. Funding extensive professional assistance in the areas of planning and development for local authorities that require this. The assistance would be offered as part of an approach seeking to build trust in the establishment.
4. Expanding the supply of land in Arab communities, especially by allocated state lands within and adjacent to them.

National priority zone “A” vs. national priority zone “B”

The State of Israel offers subsidies for construction and industry according to various criteria, such as geographic location, rate of unemployment and socio-economic standing. For example, the Housing Ministry offers subsidies for private construction according to classification as priority zone “A” (and “special A”) or priority zone “B,” and the differential in subsidies between these categories is very large.

An examination of the eligibility table according to community indicates that 54 Arab communities are included. But most are classified as priority zone “B” and receive the lower subsidy. In addition, eligibility for these grants is offered to real estate developers who build at least 25 housing units at a given construction site. Since this type of construction is not characteristic of most Arab communities, they are effectively denied eligibility for this grant from the outset. Moreover, while the Housing Ministry considers basic criteria such as minimum number of residential units and location in the priority areas, there is another criterion - the community’s socio-economic ranking - which is not taken into consideration.

Table 1 (p.15) demonstrates the absurdity in ignoring socio-economic standing when allocating grants for private construction initiatives. The figure shows that relatively well-established Jewish communities receive subsidy grants according to the national priority “A” classification, while neighboring Arab communities, whose socio-economic situation is weaker, receive a lower subsidy, generally according to the priority “B” category.

The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor also awards aid on the basis of national priority classification, according to criteria such as rate of unemployment and socio-economic ranking: Communities ranked in clusters 1-4 are assigned priority zone “A” or “B” status. Since these important criteria are taken into consideration, most of the Arab communities are indeed placed in the priority zone “A” category.

Nonetheless, the channels of subsidization by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor actually prevent Arab communities from taking advantage of the benefits at their disposal. This is due to the communities’ economic structure, which evolved over the years without state assistance. Thus, for example, the ministry grants assistance to factories for expanding their operations or transferring them to a priority area, but with the caveat that the new or expanded factory hires at least 25 new workers. Since the factories in Arab communities do not receive government assistance in the first place and are small in scope, the number of Arab industries receiving this subsidy is negligible.

Recommendations:

During the next five years, the definition of national priority A zones for industry and housing should focus on development efforts in urban centers such as Nazareth, Rahat, Umm al-Fahm and Tamra, Jedida-Makar and Sakhnin.

1. Practical steps should be taken to train local Arab authorities and the Arab community about the rights and benefits that come with national priority zone A status. Information centers should be established to help local authorities take full advantage of these rights and benefits.
2. Appropriate criteria should be defined to enable factories in Arab communities to take advantage of the benefits available to industries in national priority A zones. (For example, various eligibility

Table 1: Socio-economic cluster and the Housing Ministry's definition of national priority zone eligibility for private construction, the Negev and Galilee 2004 ¹¹

The Negev region

LIGHT - Jewish community; **DARK** - Arab community

Community	Economic cluster	Area
Khoura	1	B
Kesaifa	1	B
Arara	1	B
Rahat	1	B
Segev Shalom	1	B
Tel Sheva	1	B
Laqiya	1	B

Community	Economic cluster	Area
Ofakim	3	A
Be'er Sheva	5	B
Dimona	4	A
Yeruham	4	A
Mitzpe Ramon	4	SPECIAL A
Netivot	3	A
Arad	5	A
Sderot	4	A

¹¹ The economic cluster Index was devised by the CBS (Central Bureau for Statistics). 1 is the lowest socio-economic condition and 10 is the highest.

Table 1 (cont.)

Galilee region: Partial list by pairs of neighboring communities in the same area

LIGHT - Jewish community; **DARK** - Arab community

Community	economic cluster	Area
Hatzor Haglilit	4	SPECIAL A
Rosh Pina	7	A
Tuba Zangriya	2	A
Yavniel	5	B
‘Ein Mahel	2	B
Kfar Vradim	9	A
Yanuh Jatt	4	B
Migdal	5	B
Dir Hana	2	B

Community	economic cluster	Area
Nahariya	6	A
Mizra’a	2	A
Safed	4	A
Arabeh	2	B
Karmiel	6	A
Nahf	2	B

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001.
Priority areas: Housing Ministry, 2004



B. Encouraging entrepreneurship

The Arab minority in Israel is characterized by a small independent business sector, even though it has a larger scope of financial and human resources at its disposal¹². It is well known that a developed business capability contributes to the improvement of infrastructure, the rate of employment and the development of local economic institutions without which the utilization of the Arab minority’s resources will remain limited and inefficient. In addition, the global economy offers an abundance of opportunities, but does not reward limited capability and low productivity. This also serves to underline the great need of the Arab economy - which possesses good financial and human resources, but lacks infrastructure and business awareness - to rise to a higher level.

Centers for encouraging business entrepreneurship should be established to promote the Arab business sector. These centers would identify and lend assistance to individuals well suited for business leadership.

¹² Dan Czamanski and Rassem Khamaisi, “Encouraging entrepreneurship in Arab communities in Israel”, Floersheimer Institute, Jerusalem, December 1993

The curriculum would include basic studies of business administration, cost-benefit analysis, an introduction to the financial system, and mentored training. A training center and information center would support all of these activities. Civil society organizations active in this field would serve only as a catalyst, and should not be relied upon to implement the entire program.

The success of the program is dependent on developing infrastructure and on subsidies for investing capital in Arab communities in the Negev and the Galilee. As mentioned above, there is an urgent need for creating industrial areas in Arab communities and including them in the state's priority zones so that they will be able to enjoy financial support. A team should also be formed at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor to encourage Arab entrepreneurs to meet the criteria to receive ministry assistance. This ministry team should be totally dedicated to raising awareness about rights and facilitating access to procedures - for example, help with the required paperwork.

While there is a need to create a setting and infrastructure, the human players must also be urged to take advantage of the possibilities.

Accordingly, we recommend removing barriers:


1. Encouraging entrepreneurship: Support for small and medium-sized businesses located in Arab communities.
2. Increasing budgetary allocations for developing infrastructure for employment zones in Arab communities that have completed the planning process for employment sites.
3. Expediting the land arrangements for plots earmarked for employment in cases where these plots are subject to dispute. Special committees for expediting processes should be convened for this purpose.
4. Marketing land planned for employment at low prices that are attractive for entrepreneurs - linking the prices to priority zone A.
5. Completing development of access roads to Arab communities and employment zones located within them - recommending certain places/areas in the region of development concentration.
6. Establishing centers for promoting Arab business entrepreneurship in parallel to the dedicated development team at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor. These efforts should be aimed at assisting Arab businessmen in becoming familiar with their rights and opportunities.



C. Housing and mortgage criteria

In practice, there is discrimination against Arabs relative to Jews due to the structure of criteria for mortgage eligibility. Thus, a Jewish citizen receives a bigger loan for purchasing a home than an Arab citizen.

Diagram 4: Rate of government mortgage use in the West Bank, Gaza and Golan, development towns, general population, and Arab communities, 2000-2002
(in % of veteran Israel households that do not already own a home)



Source: Adva Center, based on data from the Housing Ministry's Population Division, memos from June 2001, September 2003; Central Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing 1995 series, "Demographic Characteristics of the Population in Localities and Statistical Areas," Vol. A, Jerusalem; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years

These gaps stem from the criteria for receiving grants, such as the type of construction, geographic location by priority zone, and military service, which are designed for the lifestyle and lives of the Jewish population. Most of the Jewish population is urban, living in apartment buildings in areas defined as saturated construction. This definition gives Jewish homebuyers an additional grant. On the other hand, most of the Arab population regards apartment living as contrary to the tradition and culture of the village, despite the fact that there are actually many shared residential buildings in the Arab communities. However, these buildings are located on private property, with each serving one extended family.

Moreover, due to the lack of master plans and available land, apartment buildings cannot be built for young Arab couples. Thus, again, the grants for purchasing an apartment become a channel of assistance for Jews only. Finally, the definition of national priority zones also works to the advantage of the Jewish population. These zones are located in most of the Jewish periphery and in confrontation line areas. Arab communities have also been assigned development zone A status in this framework, but end up not taking advantage of housing rights due to the filter of criteria and lifestyle.

Table 2: Criteria and eligibility sums for mortgages, selected data 2005

LIGHT - Jewish community; **DARK** - Arab community

Settlement name (National Priority Zone)	Basic entitlement according to the family characteristics	Military service increment	Preference area A B and confrontation line increment	NEGEV increment to a 100 m ² apartment	Total
Dimona (A)	85,250	51,120	97,200	72,000	305,570
Arad (A)	85,250	51,120	97,200	54,000	287,570
Rahat (B) high density construction	85,250	30,672	67,672	66,000	249,122
Rahat low density construction	85,250	30,672		66,000	181,922
Nazareth Ilit (A)	85,250	51,120	97,200		233,570
Nazareth (A)	85,250		97,200		182,450
Carmiel (A)	85,250	51,120	97,200		233,570
Sakhnin (B) high density construction	85,250		67,200		152,450
Sakhnin low density construction	85,250				85,250
Eiron	85,250	51,120			136,370
Um al-Fahm	85,250				85,250
Givat Olga high density construction	85,250	51,120			165,170
Givat Olga low density construction	85,250	51,120	28,800		136,370
Taibe high density construction	85,250				114,050
Taibe low density construction	85,250		28,800		85,250

Source: Housing assistance wizard on the Housing Ministry's Internet site. The data only constitutes general information. The regulations and exact figures are available at mortgage banks.

We recommend the implementation of these steps in the field of housing and mortgages:

1. Expanding the diversity of residential construction projects, establishing residential neighborhoods at the initiative of the Housing Ministry, encouraging establishment of residential neighborhoods by private contractors.
2. Encouraging construction projects in Arab communities by providing economic incentives for building neighborhoods with a variety of apartment types for sale: neighborhoods for those with low income, “build your own,” two-story, and more. At least NIS 40 million should be allocated for this in the 2006 state budget, in addition to budgets for special projects “for development of the minority sectors.”¹³
3. Physical and social renewal of neighborhoods, finishing uncompleted development in neighborhoods in Arab communities; Arab and Jewish communities should receive this assistance on a 50-50 basis, as a policy of affirmative action.
4. Intervention in the housing market by building on state lands through Housing Ministry initiatives and private construction by contractors.
5. Providing a supplement to mortgage assistance for building additional floors onto an existing building that meets the criteria of saturated construction (number of units per dunam).
6. Offering eligibility points to Arab citizens who purchase an apartment in development zone A as compensation for the lack of points for military service. Or, alternatively, making eligibility equal by creating an eligibility criterion parallel to that of the military one - for example, socio-economic status.
7. Initiating the construction of rental apartments in several Arab communities for those with low or irregular income who cannot meet any mortgage terms.

¹³ According to government decision No. 2469 of August 15, 2004, the scope of subsidies for urban construction, including private land, will be about NIS 100 million, a sum earmarked to finance the subsidy for the cost of infrastructure in national priority zones A and B.



D. Employment and industrial zones in Arab communities

The allocation of industrial areas in 2003 by the Ministry of Industry and Trade reflects the inequities in the field of development. The data indicate that 6,016 dunams of industrial area were allocated to Jewish local authorities in the Galilee versus only 921 dunams, or 13%, allotted to Arab local authorities in the Galilee, though Arabs comprise over 50% of the population in this region.

In the Negev, the situation is even worse: Only 506 dunams were allocated to Arab local authorities, while 29,165 dunams were allotted to Jewish localities. That is, the Arab population received 1.7% of the allocations while their proportion in the population of this region is 14%, not including the unrecognized villages - about half of the Arab citizens in the Negev live in communities that are not recognized by the state¹⁴.

An industrial zone works to strengthen business ties by creating demand and through an advantage of scale. Thus, this type of project creates employment opportunities and expands the population's consumption options. Moreover, an industrial zone creates a source of tax income for the local authority in which it is located. Therefore, to develop the Arab community in the Negev and Galilee, intensive construction of industrial zones must be undertaken.

In addition, the establishment of industrial zones in Arab communities would move industry away from the residential centers, thus reducing the environmental damage caused by the small factories located within the community¹⁵.

The government decision (August 19, 2003) to include Arab local authorities in the directorates of regional industrial zones is a step in the right direction, but has yet to be implemented. The implementation of this decision demands the investment of considerable human and financial resources, and the development of the Negev and Galilee presents an opportunity where such an investment will be necessary.

¹⁴ The data is based on a 2003 Sikkuy report: "Areas marketed in the industrial zones handled by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2003."

¹⁵ Many businesses are located underneath existing residential buildings.



We recommend:

- A. Defining a mandatory timetable for completing the integration of Arab local authorities in the directorates of regional industrial zones by mid-2006 and creating incentives for establishing a joint directorate for industrial zones.
Galilee - Terdiyon Bar-Lev, Kidmat Hagalil, Zipporit, Jezreel Valley, Alon Hatavor.
Wadi Ara - Joint industrial zone for Um al-Fahm, Menashe regional council, Katzir-Harish, Arara, Kafr Kara; a joint industrial zone for Megiddo, Um al-Fahm and Ma'alei Iron.
- B. Expediting planning and development procedures in these industrial zones:
Galilee: Jedida-Makar, Yarka, Julis, Kafr Yasif complementary industrial zone to the Bar-Lev zone in cooperation with Acre, Sakhnin East
Negev - Rahat, Bnei Shimon, Lahavim

Many of the factories located in various industrial zones in the north enjoy grants under the Law for Encouraging Capital Investment. This law provides grants to businesses whose products are intended for overseas markets and the tourism industry. As mentioned above, industries in Arab communities do not take advantage of this law because most of their products are intended for the local market.

Accordingly, we recommend the following steps:

1. Expansion of the scope of the Law for Encouraging Capital Investments to also include factories that produce for the local market, while improving the accessibility of these grants to the Arab sector via business development centers and proactive selection of clients. At least 20% of the budget for the Law for Encouraging Capital Investments should be earmarked for the Arab public in 2006, and officials in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor should actively work to see that these funds are utilized.
2. Allocation of land and an enlarged budget for establishing small industrial zones in Arab communities.
3. Development of incentives for employers to hire Arab workers in factories, similar to the model adopted for absorbing new immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

Therefore, the criteria for receiving a grant under this law should be diversified and expanded to include factories that manufacture for the local market and do not share this advantage. Foreign investors should be recruited and selected businesses in the Arab community should be upgraded in order to receive this “foreign passport privilege.”



E. Education

Another aspect of the gaps between Arabs and Jews is reflected in the school system. According to Ministry of Education data, about 92% of Jews (not include the ultra-Orthodox population) reach 12th grade, while the rate of Arabs still in school in 12th grade is 75%, and among Bedouins just 64%. Moreover, about 57% of Jews (excluding the ultra-Orthodox) qualify for a matriculation diploma, while the proportion of Arab students with matriculation diplomas is only 36%, and only 26% among the Bedouins. These are very large gaps and their impact on the future employment and income of the next generation is decisive.

Sample recommendations for development:

1. Address the classroom shortages. (In Sakhnin, for example, the 56 kindergartens operating in the city are located in rented apartments.)
2. Build a regional school (academic and vocational) in the Shoqet Junction area for the communities of Hura, Um Batn, Tel Sheva and Lakiya.
3. Build a school of technology in Segev Shalom
4. Build a new school in the town of Darjat.
5. Encourage Ben-Gurion University to enter into joint ventures with Arab schools in the region.
6. Build a technological college in the Nazareth area (Kafr Kana).





Summary

The Or Commission determined that the State of Israel was remiss in ensuring equality for its Arab minority. Institutional discrimination against Arabs in Israel is intolerable from a moral perspective and untenable in a democratic regime. This failure has many implications in various spheres, including economics and the social fabric. Denying social mobility to part of the state's population engenders economic inefficiency and political and social instability. In the Israeli periphery, the gap of inequality between Jews and Arabs is widening, and is threatening to bring the two sides to deterioration and collapse.

Thus, there is an acute need to narrow the gap through a decisive change in the policy of government resource allocation as part of the prospective development of the Negev and Galilee. The anticipated momentum for development in the Negev and Galilee offers an historic opportunity for such a change. If this opportunity is missed, it will undermine the foundations of the state's economy and society. All citizens, Jews and Arabs, need suitable infrastructure that meets their needs, but equality between citizens is an urgent need that should not be compromised.

In the history of struggles for justice and equality, on whose pages the Jewish is accorded a place of honor, a familiar motif repeats itself: Blocking the path of an ethnic minority's civil advancement ultimately has a negative impact on social stability. Thus, it is clear that maintaining the historic policy of discrimination is completely opposed to the State of Israel's interests, economic development and moral strength.

The physical planning of Arab communities is the bottleneck that hinders development, but it is not the barrier. The principal barrier to development is the state's attitude that development in Israel is for Jews, while Arab citizens must be content with the leftovers. The practical steps presented in this paper can help promote equality in the Negev and Galilee, but what is necessary, first and foremost, is a change of attitude on the part of those responsible for making and executing policy.

These very days, Israeli representatives in Washington are meeting with their American colleagues to discuss the details of the aid for the disengagement plan and development of the Negev and Galilee. This is the time to unify the separate development tracks for Jews and Arabs into a uniform civic track, without partiality, and to create a setting where social and economic equality can thrive.



Sources

- Aviv Business Consulting, Ltd. (www.aviv-ebc.co.il)
- Ahmadi, Saad, "Allocation of resources in Israel", Draft for discussion, Israel Democracy Institute, 1999.
- Benn, Aluf, "Israel and the U.S. to begin talks next week on disengagement aid", Ha'aretz, May 18, 2005.
- Bassok, Moti, "Peres: \$1 billion from guarantees for the Negev and Galilee", Ha'aretz March 14, 2002
- Dichter, Shuli, "Disengage from discrimination, too", Ha'aretz, May 2, 2005.
- Dichter, Shuli (ed.) Sikkuy, Annual Report, 2002/3.
- Dichter, Shuli (ed.) Sikkuy, Annual Report, 2003/4.
- Georgi, Anat, "Homebuyers to receive state grant of NIS 20-25,000", Ha'aretz, May 24, 2005.
- Evacuation-Compensation Law, Disengagement Plan Implementation Law, Knesset Web site, February 18, 2005.
- Greenbaum, Lior, "How do you say 'Wisconsin' in Arabic?" Globes, July 22, 2004.
- Haifa: The Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Technion, 1990.
- Interview with Aziz Khaider, researcher at the Truman Institute, May 24, 2005.
- Kedar, Sandy, "Power and land: Dividing space between Jews and Arabs in Israel", Sikkuy, Tzohar lecture series.
- Khamaisi, Rassem, "Land and the allocation of resources", Israel Democracy Institute, 1999.
- Khamaisi, Rassem and Czamanski, Dan, "Encouraging entrepreneurship in Arab communities in Israel", Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Jerusalem, December 1993
- Khamaisi, Rassem, "Barriers in planning Arab communities in Israel", Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, 2004.
- Khamaisi, Rassem, "Toward of an expansion of the jurisdiction areas of Arab communities in Israel", Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, 2002.
- Konor-Attias, Ety and Pishav, Fanny, "Government mortgage use by region, community and selected groups 2000-2002", Adva Center, May 2004.
- Koret Fund for Assisting Small and Medium-sized Businesses
- Law for Encouraging Capital Investments, Web site of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor.
- Meir, Avinoam, "Tension between Negev Bedouins and the State", Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, 1999.
- Naomi Carmon, Hubert Law-Yon, Gavriel Lifshitz, Shaul Amir, Daniel Czamanski and Baruch Kipnis, "The New Jewish Settlements in the Galilee - an Evaluation Study",



Sources

Reiter, Yitzhak, Rassem Khamaisi, and Elkarnoy, Talal, “Land and resource allocation”, Israel Democracy Institute, 2002.

“State commission of inquiry on clashes between security forces and Israeli citizens in October 2000”, Report and conclusions, August 2003.

Sehayak, Dafna, “Unemployment in the Arab sector”, Knesset Research and Information Department, 2004.

Sfadia, Erez, “Judaizing the Negev”, Maariv, September 18, 2003.


Sikkuy, “Toward an equal development policy for Jews and Arabs in Israel in the housing field”, draft position paper, 2005.

Smooha, Sammy, “Representation and involvement”, Israel Democracy Institute, 1999. Telephone interview with Rassem Khamaisi, May 17, 2005.

Tabibian-Mizrahi, Michal, “The situation of Arab children in Israel”, Knesset Research and Information Department, 2004.

Tavor Economic Consultants, Ltd., www.tavor.biz

The Fund for Assisting Small Businesses



Staff

Shalom (Shuli) Dichter	Co-Executive Director
Ali Haider, Adv.	Co-Executive Director
Naief Abu Sharkeia	Director, Jewish-Arab Mayors Forum
Michal Belikoff	Research Coordinator
Chassia Chomsky-Porat	Civic Action Group Coordinator, Misgav
Roy Folkman	Co-Director, Or Watch
Sigalit Givon	Civic Action Group Coordinator, Modi'in
Alouph Hareven	Head of the Human Dignity Initiative
Batya Kallus	Information Coordinator, Interagency Task
Force on	Civic Equality
Amira Karakra	Haifa office administrator
Ilan Katz	Civic Action Group Coordinator, Hof Carmel
Alexandra Klein-Franke	Jerusalem office administrator and bookkeeper
Nira Krasne	Internet Coordinator
Nada Matta	Research Coordinator
Ayman Odeh, Adv.	Co-Director, Or Watch
Carl Perkal	Director of Resource Development
Youval Tamari	Coordinator, Jewish-Arab Mayors Forum
Lyth-Nachshon Ltd.	Public Relations Consultant (pro bono)
Unik unexpected advertising	media & PR

Board of Directors

Co-Chairmen

Dr. Khaled Abu-Asbah
Professor Itzhak Galnoor

Board members

Nasreen Alemy-Kabha, Adv.
Dr. Muhamad Amara
Professor Miriam Ben-Peretz
Professor Abed Gera
Shlomo Gur, Adv.
Dr. Ramzi Halabi
Patsy Landa
Ambassador (ret.) Benjamin Navon
Dr. Elie Rekhess
Professor Jonah Rosenfeld
Aida Touma-Sliman
Professor Gavriel Salomon

Funding Sources Abroad

The Abraham Fund Initiatives, New York
American Friends of Sikkuy
Robert Arnow, New York
Jacob and Hilda Blaustein Foundation, Baltimore
The Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies
European Commission
Fohs Foundation, Roseburg, Oregon
Ford Foundation - New Israel Fund, New York
Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington D.C.
Seth Glickenhau Foundation, New York
Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund, San Francisco
Paul Guilden, New York
Robert and Ardis James Foundation, New York
Zanvyl and Isabelle Krieger Fund, Baltimore
Harvey Krueger, New York
Kuriansky Foundation, Stamford
Albert E. Marks Charitable Trust, Boston
Joseph and Harvey Meyerhoff Family Charitable
Funds, Baltimore
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
New Israel Fund, Washington D.C.
P.E.F. Israel Endowment Funds, Inc., New York
Irvin Stern Foundation
UJA Federation of New York

Funding Sources in Israel

Friends of Sikkuy in Israel
Keren Beracha
Landa Family Foundation
Hachsharat HaYishuv

SIKKUY: THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CIVIC EQUALITY IN ISRAEL

Sikkuy (a "chance" or "opportunity" in Hebrew) is a non-partisan, non-profit, NGO in Israel that develops and implements projects to advance civic equality between Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel in government budgets, resource allocation, hiring policy, land usage etc.

Founded in 1991 as a Jewish-Arab advocacy organization, Sikkuy's actions are motivated by the right of every citizen to influence government decisions and policies. Sikkuy is an active member of the international civil society community and is dedicated to advancing civil society in Israel through the values of: **EQUALITY** - Advancing complete equality between Arab and Jewish citizens.

SHARED CITIZENSHIP - Promoting the core value of citizenship as the basis for equality.

HUMAN DIGNITY - Mainstreaming human dignity as the supreme value in relations between the citizen and the state and the state and its citizens.

Sikkuy is jointly governed by Arab and Jewish co-chairs, managed by two Arab and Jewish co-directors and staffed by Arabs and Jews. Sikkuy's programs are aimed at mobilizing a transformation of the relations between the state and the Arab minority in Israel. They include:

OR COMMISSION WATCH - To monitor and advance the Or Commission's institutional recommendations for implementing civic equality between Arab and Jewish citizens.

This project includes *THE SIKKUY REPORT*, an annual report monitoring government budgets and resource allocations for Arab and Jewish citizens (www.orwatch.org).

JAMFI - A Jewish-Arab Mayors Forum building sustainable frameworks for municipal cooperation between Jewish and Arab communities. The first forum is active in the Wadi Ara region and is advancing cooperation for the establishment of a shared industrial zone, cooperation in tourism and in environmental issues.

CIVIC ACTION GROUPS (CAGS) - Facilitates local groups of Jewish citizens that advocate for equality between their communities and their neighboring Arab communities and fight against discrimination.

The three active groups are in the Galilee, Hof Carmel and the city of Modi'in.

Sikkuy will facilitate the formation of Civic Action Groups by Arab citizens in the coming year.

FAIR REPRESENTATION & EMPLOYMENT EQUITY — Advocates for equal hiring policies and practices in the public and private sectors.

HUMAN DIGNITY INITIATIVE - Works to implement the core value of human dignity in Israeli public institutions.

A wide range of foundations and individuals in Israel and abroad supports Sikkuy.

Contact: jerusalem@sikkuy.org.il Tel: 972-2 654-1225

Visit our websites:

www.sikkuy.org.il

www.orwatch.org

Sikkuy

העמותה לקידום שוויון אזרחי סיקוי הסיקוי לסיקוי
The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality

רחוב המשוררת רחל 17, בית הכרם, ירושלים 96348, טל. 02-6541225, פקס. 02-6541108, 17 Hameshoreret Rachel St., Beit Hakerem, Jerusalem 96348, Fax. 02-6541108, Tel. 02-6541225

ת.ד. 99650, חיפה 31996, טל. 04-8523188, פקס 04-8523065, Haifa 31996, P.O.B 99650, Fax. 04-8523065, Tel. 04-8523188

E-mail: jerusalem@sikkuy.org.il

شارع همشوررت راحيل 17, بيت هكريم, القدس 96348, تل: 02-6541225, ف: 02-6541108

حيفا 31996, ص.ب 99650, تل: 04-8523188, ف: 04-8523065



**National
Foreign
Assessment
Center**

Secret

25X1

Syria-Israel: The Golan Heights in Perspective

25X1

A Research Paper

DIA review
completed.

State Dept. review
completed

Secret

*GI 82-10299
January 1982*

Copy **559**

Page Denied



**National
Foreign
Assessment
Center**

Secret

Syria-Israel: The Golan Heights in Perspective

25X1

A Research Paper

*Information available as of 31 December 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This paper was prepared by analysts in the Near East-South Asia Branch, Geography Division, Office of Global Issues, with contributions from the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Near East-South Asia Branch, OGI [redacted]

25X1

This paper was coordinated with the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis and with the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. [redacted]

25X1


Secret

*G182-10299
January 1982*

Secret

25X1

Figure 1
Golan Heights



505058 (542748) 12-81

Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1


**Syria-Israel:
The Golan Heights in Perspective**

25X1

25X1

Overview

Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights on 14 December 1981 culminated a steady tightening of control over the region it had captured from Syria in 1967 (figure 1). Well before the annexation, most of the Syrians who had not fled during the fighting had been expelled, many Syrian villages had been razed, the Israeli curriculum was being taught even in the few remaining Arab schools, and 31 Jewish settlements had been established and transferred from military to civilian control. 25X6



Historically, the Golan Heights had never been a part of a unified Jewish state, and the region had not contained a significant Jewish population for 3,000 years. The Ottoman Empire, the last of a millenium-long succession of Muslim rulers, governed the area until the end of World War I. Then France assumed control of it as part of the League of Nations Mandate for Syria, while Britain assumed control of the neighboring Mandate for Palestine. In 1922 the two countries established an international boundary between their Mandates. 25X1

In 1946, the French Mandate was divided and Syria gained its independence. In 1948, when Britain withdrew from Palestine, Syria and four other Arab states attacked the new state of Israel as it fought to establish its borders within Palestine. The Armistice Agreement signed in 1949 left Syria in control of three small regions in northern Israel. Although they were

Secret

GI 82-10299
January 1982

Secret

25X1

demilitarized, competition and conflict over the three regions gradually escalated and in 1967 provided Israel with its primary justification for invading Syria following its successful attacks on Egypt and Jordan. By the time a cease-fire was arranged, Israel was in control of two-thirds of Syria's agriculturally prosperous westernmost Province of Al Qunaytirah; it subsequently renamed the region the Golan Heights. [redacted]

25X1

In 1973 Syrian forces attacked Israel and temporarily reoccupied about half of the Golan Heights before they were repulsed, and agreed to a new cease-fire line and buffer zone. The 1973 Middle East war proved to be only a temporary interruption in the gradual "Israelization" of the Golan Heights. [redacted]

25X1

More than 100,000 Syrian Arabs fled or were expelled from the area during and after the 1967 fighting. An Israeli census taken soon after the war counted only 6,400 Syrian nationals on the Golan, most of them Druze farmers living in a few villages in the north. Since then the Arab population of these villages has grown to about 14,000. Meanwhile, the Syrian imprint on the remainder of the Golan has been all but destroyed. [redacted]

25X1

Since 1967 some 6,000 Israelis have settled 31 new Golan communities, including Katzrin, the administrative and commercial center where the Israelis plan to house 20,000 citizens. Agriculture—grain, vegetables, fruit, and livestock—is the predominant activity. Although the Israeli settlements on the Golan have increased steadily in size and number, progress has been slower than planned, owing to a shortage of funds and a dearth of willing settlers. They nonetheless exist as "facts" created by Israel to strengthen its hold on the occupied Golan. [redacted]

25X1

According to the terms of the disengagement agreement signed in 1974, Israeli and Syrian military forces are separated by a buffer zone at the eastern margin of the Golan Heights, which is manned by the UN Disengagement Observer Force. Each country may maintain only limited forces and weaponry within specified distances of the buffer zone. Although force and weapon levels have varied considerably, both sides have generally adhered to the terms of the agreement with neither side normally maintaining as large a military presence as the agreement permits. Even during the Israeli military buildup on the Golan beginning in December, the Israelis apparently did not exceed the authorized levels. Syria limited its reaction to diplomatic efforts. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Overview	iii
Evolution of Control Over the Golan	1
The 1922 International Boundary	1
The 1948 War and 1949 Armistice Lines	2
The 1967 War and Cease-Fire Lines	4
The 1973 War	4
The 1974 Disengagement Agreement	6
The Golan Heights as Part of Syria	6
The Golan Heights Under Israel	9
The Golan Druze	9
Israeli Settlements	11
[Redacted]	[Redacted]
Water Resources	13
Transportation System	16
[Redacted]	[Redacted]

25X6

25X1

Figures

1.	Golan Heights	ii
2-A.	Palestine Partition Plan	3
2-B.	Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922	3
2-C.	Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949	3
3.	Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma	4
4.	Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley	5
5.	Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights	6
6.	Golan Heights Viewed From Israel	6
7.	1967 Cease-Fire Lines	7
8.	Current Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines	8
9.	Al Qunaytirah	9
10.	Tall al Aram and Razed Village	9
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
12.	Druze Village of Ayn Qunyah	11
13.	Water Development Schemes on the Jordan River	14
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

25X6

25X6

Secret

25X1

Tables

1.	Non-Jewish Population of the Golan Heights After the 1967 War	11

25X6
25X1

Appendixes

A.	Chronology of Events Affecting the Golan's Inhabitants	19
B.	Convention between Great Britain and France for the settlement of certain points connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia—Paris, December 23, 1920	21
C.	Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, 20 July 1949	27
D.	United Nations. Security Council Resolutions No. 234 of 7 June 1967 and No. 235 of 9 June 1967 (Demarcation of cease-fire lines reported separately in Document 5/7930/add.18-41)	35
E.	United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967	37
F.	United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 338 of 22 October 1973	39
G.	Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement, Israel and Syria, 31 May 1974	41
H.	Camp David Frameworks for Peace, September 17, 1978	43

Secret

Secret

**Syria-Israel:
The Golan Heights in Perspective**

25X1

25X1

The Golan Heights has long held a special security significance in Israel's view. Israeli political leaders and the general public remember well the period before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when Syrian artillery on the Golan sporadically shelled Israeli farms and civilian communities in the disputed demilitarized zones in the Hula Valley. The scheduled final withdrawal from the Sinai next April, moreover, has generated new anxiety about increased vulnerability to the perceived Arab threat. This concern—plus longstanding suspicions of Syrian intentions—has further reinforced the Israelis' attachment to the Golan.

Indeed, Knesset passage on 14 December of Prime Minister Begin's bill effectively annexing the Golan Heights culminates a steady tightening of Israeli control over the territory. In 1979 the Israelis established a Golan regional council controlled by the Interior Ministry. A year later, the Knesset authorized the Interior Ministry to confer Israeli citizenship on amenable Golan Druze. Most major Israeli parties, moreover, have long sponsored settlements in the territory—a connection that has assured the settlers a formidable lobby within the government and Knesset. Public opinion polls in recent years showed consistently that an overwhelming majority favored eventual annexation. The timing and tactics used in passing the recent bill have sparked ineffective criticism by the opposition, which staged an unsuccessful no-confidence vote shortly after the 14 December annexation move.

Control of the Golan Heights gives the Israelis a buffer zone beyond its borders within which to contain a possible Syrian invasion. From their positions on the lower slopes of Mount Hermon, which dominates the local landscape, the Israelis can monitor not only the movements of Syrian units near the Golan but those of Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon as well. Control of the northern Golan, moreover, ensures Israeli control over the headwaters of the Baniyas River, a tributary of the upper Jordan River.

Evolution of Control Over the Golan

The territory now known as the Golan Heights is a tiny part of the "fertile crescent," the ancient pathway around the deserts of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq that has been a route of trade, migration, invasion, and shifting political control throughout recorded time. Although this particular area was never a part of a centralized Jewish state in the modern sense, ruins of Jewish synagogues on the Heights are continuing evidence of Jewish settlement there during the Second and Third Centuries A.D. Following the fall of Jerusalem to the Romans in 70 A.D. and the subsequent Jewish dispersion, the entire region eventually came under the control of the Byzantines and later of a series of Muslim powers—periodically interrupted by Crusaders, the ruins of whose castles still dot the area. The Ottoman Empire (1517-1917), the last of the Muslim sovereigns over the area, ended with World War I. Near the end of Ottoman rule, several Jewish philanthropists bought land in various areas of the Middle East for the resettlement of Jews from Europe and Russia. Although most of these purchases were in Palestine, two such resettlement communities were attempted on the Golan Heights.

25X1

The 1922 International Boundary. During World War I, the British, French, and Italians encouraged the Arabs to revolt against Turkish rule by promising them independence. After the war, however, the Allies reneged on their promise and divided up the territory into Mandates under the League of Nations.

25X1

The boundary between the British Mandate for Palestine (out of which Israel was carved) and the French Mandate for Syria (which included the Golan Heights and present-day Lebanon) was demarcated by an Anglo-French boundary commission in 1922 and formally accepted by those governments in March 1923 (appendix B and figure 2-B). The boundary is about 65 kilometers long and extends from the current Lebanon-Syria-Israel tripoint to the present Jordan border (then British Transjordan).

25X1


25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Secret

Figure 2



505052 (547810) 1-82

Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1




Figure 3. Former Arab resort town of Al Hamma on Nahr al Yarmuk River, 1979. [redacted]

one and that only the United Nations had the authority to settle disputes arising in and over the zones. The Syrians reasoned that since they had controlled the zones at the time the armistice was signed they had an obligation to protect the rights of Palestinian Arabs living there. The Israelis contended the zones were part of their territory based on the UN Partition Plan. The Israelis claimed that the only limit on their authority in the demilitarized zones was the prohibition on troops and military activity and that the chairman of a Mixed Armistice Committee appointed by the United Nations had authority only over the return of civilians to the zones and the hiring of local residents as police. [redacted]

The Armistice Agreement directed that farming in the demilitarized zones be quickly restored to prehostility levels but gave no guidance on how the land was to be returned to its owners. The problem was complex because the fields of Arab and Jewish farmers often abutted and in some places were intermingled. Both Syria and Israel used the expansion of agricultural holdings as a means to establish control. As farmers returned to the war-ravaged zones, numerous disputes over land ownership occurred. The Syrians and Israelis had established defensive positions on the Golan Heights and in the Galilee Hills from which flat trajectory fire could be delivered to the zones on the valley floor (figures 4, 5, and 6). Despite UN willingness to arbitrate, the governments tended to

back their own participants in local disputes, and disagreements quickly escalated to shootings—and on occasion to more serious military actions involving armored vehicles and artillery. [redacted]

The 1967 War and Cease-Fire Lines. By early 1967 artillery exchanges and even airstrikes were occurring fairly regularly. The climax came on 9 June 1967 when Israel invaded Syria following its earlier attacks on Egypt and Jordan. Israeli forces captured the demilitarized zones and penetrated about 25 kilometers into Syria, occupying about two-thirds of the Syrian Province of Al Qunaytirah. In response to a UN Security Council demand, a cease-fire was implemented on 10 June. During the next several days the line that marked the limit of advance of the Israeli forces was demarcated by UN observers. A buffer zone ranging in width from a few hundred meters to 2.5 kilometers was established east of this line (appendixes D and E, figure 7). [redacted]

Israel officially named the region it occupied the Golan Heights. The name Golan is derived from the name of a city of refugees in Bashan, as the region was known in Biblical times. Sometimes, the Israelis still refer to the region as Bashan. [redacted]


The Golan Heights remained relatively quiet between 1967 and October 1973. In part this was due to the Israeli policy of not allowing the return of the approximately 100,000 refugees who had fled or were expelled during and after the 1967 fighting. Beginning in 1968, the Israelis began establishing farm communities on the Golan; this violation of international law drew widespread international criticism and enraged the Syrians. Some of the new settlements were within 3 kilometers of the 1967 cease-fire line and in sight of Syrian Army positions. In effect, the Israelis had merely moved many contentious aspects of the Demilitarized Zone situation about 25 kilometers to the east. [redacted]

The 1973 War. On 6 October 1973, in coordination with Egyptian attacks on the Sinai, Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israeli positions in the Golan Heights and penetrated the center of the Israeli

Secret

Secret

Figure 4
Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley



Note: See Figure 2C.

Vertical exaggeration=3X

585957 1-82

25X1

line, passing to the south of Al Qunaytirah and isolating several pockets of Israeli troops. By the morning of 7 October the southernmost Syrian elements had almost reached Al Al, about 10 kilometers east of Lake Tiberias, while in the north the penetration was shallower. The Israelis counterattacked on 7 October, and by 10 October the Syrian forces had retreated east of the 1967 cease-fire line except for units still holding a portion of Mount Hermon. By 14 October the Israeli forces had carved out a roughly semicircular area that stretched from the lower slopes

of Mount Hermon almost to Sasa, about midway between Al Qunaytirah and Damascus, and rejoined the cease-fire line southeast of Al Qunaytirah. For the next 10 days the Israelis directed most of their efforts toward holding the 600-square-kilometer semicircle, although they also recaptured their positions on Mount Hermon. Large-scale hostilities ended on 24 October, but hostile incidents, snipings, and occasional artillery exchanges continued during the winter and spring while US Secretary of State Kissinger practiced shuttle diplomacy.

Secret



Figure 5. The Hula Valley and Galilee Hills viewed in 1975 from a pre-1967 Syrian gun emplacement on the Golan Heights. Gadot, an Israeli kibbutz in the center of the photograph, is located in a demilitarized zone created by the 1949 armistice. [redacted]



Figure 6. Southern Golan Heights viewed from Galilee Hills west of Lake Tiberias, 1975. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The 1974 Disengagement Agreement. A disengagement agreement was signed by Israel and Syria on 31 May 1974 (appendixes F and G). On 6 June Israeli and Arab forces began a staged withdrawal. Under the agreement, Israeli military forces pulled back to positions west of "Line A," which coincided with the 1967 cease-fire line except near Ar Rafid and Al Qunaytirah (figure 8). From just north of Al Qunaytirah Line A swings westward and then south-eastward to rejoin the 1967 cease-fire line. An additional line termed "A-1" forms a bulge on Line A around Al Qunaytirah, in which Israeli civilians, but not military forces, are permitted. [redacted]

agreement. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] The arrangement went into effect on 26 June 1974 and remains current, subject to renewal every six months (in May and November). [redacted]

25X1

25X1

In addition, the need for Syria and Israel to negotiate the future of the Golan Heights and to conclude a peace treaty is specifically mentioned in the Camp David Accords (appendix H). [redacted]

25X1

All territory east of Line A is under Syrian administration and with the exception of Al Qunaytirah—which was largely destroyed after the cease-fire by withdrawing Israeli units (figures 9 and 10)—was gradually repopulated by Syrian civilians. Syrian forces are required to remain east of "Line B"; the area between Lines A and B is the zone of separation where the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF—strength about 1,250) is stationed to maintain the cease-fire. UNDOF also monitors the bulge between Lines A and A-1. East and west of Lines A and B are areas in which forces and armaments are limited as specified in the disengagement

The Golan Heights as Part of Syria

25X1


Until 1967 the region now known as the Golan Heights formed about two-thirds of Al Qunaytirah Muhafazat, Syria's 13th province (figure 11). In 1965 Al Qunaytirah Province had an estimated population of 142,600 people, most living in small farming communities but about 30,000 living in Al Qunaytirah, a town in the center of the province. Most of the province residents were Muslim Arabs, predominantly Sunnites; minority groups included Druze, Alawites, Christian Arabs, and Sunni Muslim Circassians. In addition to the Syrian population, some 13,000 Palestinian refugees were housed in the town of Al Qunaytirah. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

Figure 7
1967 Cease-fire Lines




505050 (544087) 1-82

Secret

25X1

Secret

Figure 8
Current Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines



505054 1-82

Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1

25X1



Figure 9. Downtown Al Qunaytirah, 1975. White markings on buildings indicated structures not to be destroyed by withdrawing Israeli units. [redacted]



Figure 10. Tall al Aram and razed Syrian housing viewed from Al Qunaytirah, 1975. [redacted]

25X1

Although its 1,770 square kilometers accounted for only about 1 percent of the country's total land area, Al Qunaytirah was nevertheless one of Syria's most productive agricultural regions. According to 1965 land use statistics, 58 percent of the land was suitable for cultivation (some was actually in natural pasture), 16 percent consisted of scrub woodlands and orchards, 11 percent was in improved pasture, and the remainder was unsuited for any agricultural use. Most of the farmland lay between the towns of Fiq and Al Qunaytirah; the orchards were located mainly in the north, although some tropical fruit trees were grown near Lake Tiberias. Although much of the pasture land was on the poorer, rocky slopes in the west, it still had the highest stock-carrying capacity in the country, about four times the national average. In 1965 Al Qunaytirah accounted for about 16 percent of Syria's corn production, 17 percent of its millet, and 7 percent of its fodder crops. Winter vegetables, especially tomatoes, were an important specialty crop. Fruit yields in the province were the highest in Syria; its output of apples, for example, accounted for a fourth of the country's total crop. [redacted]

The Golan Heights Under Israel

During and after the 1967 fighting in the Golan Heights, much of the population—an estimated 100,000 Syrians and some 13,000 Palestinian refugees—fled or were expelled farther into Syria. An Israeli census conducted in September 1967 enumerated only 6,400 Syrian nationals—most of them Druze living in a few villages northeast of Al

Qunaytirah. Since then, the population of these villages has more than doubled, but the Syrian population of the Golan Heights is still only a small fraction of its pre-1967 population (table 1 and figure 11). [redacted]

Except for the aforementioned villages, the original Syrian settlement pattern on the Golan Heights has been largely obliterated. Since 1967 the Israelis have razed at least 80 of the 190 former villages and have destroyed other Syrian private property to make way for Israeli settlements, farms, fortifications, and military training areas. In many areas the Israelis have removed the stone fences and markers that outlined Syrian fields, making any future individual Syrian land ownership claims nearly impossible. [redacted]

The Golan Druze. Why the Israelis allowed these few thousand Druze (and Alawites) to remain on the Golan Heights is not known, but it is probably the result of a combination of circumstances. The Druze villages in the northern hills were outside the main battle areas; the communities were close knit, and determined not to abandon their rich farmlands; and the Israelis regard the Druze living in Israel as complaisant citizens who support the state—for example, by serving in the military.¹ [redacted] 25X1

¹ The Alawite village of Al Ghajar also survived because it was taken late in the war; Israel initially believed the village was part of Lebanon. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Secret

25X1

25X1

Table 1

**Non-Jewish Population of the Golan Heights
After the 1967 War**

Syrian Settlements	Census 1967	Estimate 1981
Druze		
Majdal Shams	2,918	7,280
Buqata	1,425	3,080
Masadah	705	1,540
Ayn Qunyah	578	1,260
Shayta	173	(Destroyed in 1973 war)
Mansurah	6	(Razed by Israelis)
Alawite		
Al Ghajar	385	950
Mixed		
Al Qunaytirah	206	(In UNDOF zone after 1973)
Total	6,396	14,110




Figure 12. Druze village of Ayn Qunyah with Mount Hermon in background, 1973.

In any event, the residents of the five surviving villages still farm the lands they farmed before 1967. The 10,500 hectares under cultivation consist of extensive fruit orchards, vegetable gardens, grain fields, olive groves, and vineyards (figure 12). Additional land in pasture supports herds of sheep, goats, and cattle.

The Druze are neither united nor consistent in their political loyalties. Some express a desire to belong to an independent Druze state by flying the Druze flag. Others favor Israeli annexation, and still others want the return of Syrian sovereignty. Even family members disagree. Shaykh Sulayman Kanj Abu Salih, the current leader of the Golan Druze, has provided inconsistent guidance. In 1974 he formally requested Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. Later, he evidently changed his mind, for he was among the hundreds of Golan Druze who petitioned Prime Minister Begin *not* to be incorporated into the State of Israel. In 1980 some Golan Druze accepted Israeli identity cards (conferring upon the holders some of the privileges of citizenship) only to turn them in a few months later under pressure from their religious

authorities. Some of these Druze have apparently welcomed the new Israeli law, for it requires them to have Israeli identity cards. Others still claim, however, "I am a Druze by religion, an Arab by nationality, Syria is my homeland, and I prefer to remain Syrian."

25X1



25X6

25X1

Page Denied

A number of organizations are cooperating in the development of the Golan Heights. The Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) is the primary planner but coordinates closely with the Israeli Government and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an international fundraising group. The JNF is responsible for preparing land for Israeli farming; various other ministries and agencies in the Israeli Government provide support. All major political parties sponsor settlements on the Golan Heights. [redacted]

The WZO establishes settlement goals and sets up general budget requirements based on four-year cycles. More definitive plans are made yearly through the budgets of individual Israeli Government ministries. The budget of the WZO is implemented through the Ministry of Agriculture, while the government's own plans are funded mainly through the ministries concerned with housing, commerce, communications, and defense. Additional funds come from other ministries that handle education, health, religion, and immigrant absorptions. According to one WZO official, settlement activities for all the occupied territories generally amount to about 3 percent of the national budget. (This percentage is likely to rise appreciably to cover the special compensation due to the settlers who are required to evacuate the Sinai by April 1982.) [redacted]

Since Prime Minister Begin's election in 1977, Golan Heights settlement activities have slowed because funds initially earmarked for this area have been diverted to the accelerated West Bank settlement program. As the 1978-81 WZO planning cycle ends, five of the eight planned new settlements have been established, and the settler population has grown to an estimated 6,500 (vice the 10,500 planned). Many of the new Golan communities contain vacant housing units, but there is no current evidence that large numbers of Israelis are likely soon to move to the area. Nevertheless, the 14 December annexation might eventually spur some increased settlement, especially after Israel's final withdrawal from the Sinai next April. [redacted]

Israeli Agriculture. All but a few of the 31 Israeli settlements are at least partly engaged in farming. In 1975 some 5,600 hectares (including field crops, orchards, and vineyards) were being cultivated by the

Israelis; in addition, about 4,000 hectares (mainly along the rocky, western slopes) were being used for grazing. In 1977 the WZO claimed that almost 6,800 hectares were being farmed and that the total would reach nearly 12,000 hectares by 1981. According to 1981 data, however, this goal—like earlier ones—was not met; a reported 6,000 to 7,000 hectares are under cultivation in field crops and orchards. If pasture lands are added, the total area being used by the Israelis for farming amounts to more than 10,000 hectares. [redacted]

25X1

El Rom and Ramat Magshimim are typical of the older Israeli agricultural settlements. El Rom, in the northern Golan, uses 290 hectares to grow wheat, apples, and avocados and to raise fish; in addition, it uses more than 1,700 hectares of land in the southern Golan for pasturage. Ramat Magshimim has some 450 hectares in wheat, 45 hectares in apple orchards, and 2,500 hectares in grazing land for 1,000 head of cattle. [redacted]

25X1

Israeli agriculture is more intensive than that practiced earlier by the Syrians. Irrigation is widespread, even on some of the large wheat fields, and is expected to expand as new land is brought under cultivation. Data on total agricultural production from the Golan is not available to allow comparisons with former Syrian output or to determine the area's contribution to Israel's total crop and livestock production. In any event, the production is of little consequence to the national economy. [redacted]


25X1

Water Resources. Although water resources on the Golan Heights were generally adequate for the area's Syrian population before June 1967, the Israelis are developing an expanded water distribution system designed to support irrigated agriculture (figure 11). When completed, the new system will supply a total of 28 million cubic meters of water annually. Because this amount is not available on the Golan Heights, water is drawn from two taps in Lake Tiberias and pumped up some 600 meters through three 16-inch pipes to a system of water towers and tanks located at settlements and military facilities in the southern Golan. Birkat Ram, a natural lake in the northern Golan, has also been tapped to supply water to the settlement blocs west and north of Al Qunaytirah and to some of the Druze villages. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Figure 13
Water Development Schemes on the Jordan River



505051 1-82

Secret

25X1

Importance of the Golan to Israel's Water Supply. Israeli governments have repeatedly claimed that control of the Golan is critical to ensuring adequate supplies of water to their water-short country. To guarantee control over the upper Jordan River, however, the Israelis would have to occupy the river's entire watershed, including the part in southern Lebanon. Specifically, the Israelis want full access to two Jordan River tributaries, the Hasbani and the Baniyas, which together provide about half the river's flow.¹ (Jordan River water stored in Lake Tiberias provides about one-third—500 million cubic meters per year—of Israel's total water supply.) [redacted]

The sources of the Hasbani River lie entirely within Lebanon (figure 13). From the village of Al Ghajar the Hasbani forms the former Syrian-Lebanon boundary for about 3 kilometers before entering Israel's Hula Valley, where it joins the Jordan River. The Baniyas River rises in the Golan on the western flank of Mount Hermon and flows for about 16 kilometers across the Golan Heights before entering Israel, where it also joins the Jordan in the Hula Valley. [redacted]

International disputes over control of the Jordan's headwaters preceded the formation of the Jewish state. Early Zionist planners tried unsuccessfully to get the British to demarcate Lebanon's southern frontier so as to place the Litani River within Palestine. Since then, proposals to divert the Litani southward to double the Jordan's flow have been a recurrent theme within Israel and a source of apprehension to Lebanon. [redacted]

In the 1950s Israel and its northern neighbors failed to negotiate a treaty to establish water rights in the Jordan watershed. In the absence of any agreement or international legal restraint, Israel and the Arab states forged ahead with their separate plans. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Israel began plans to

¹ The Dan River contributes most of the rest. Although much of its water is ultimately derived from the snow and rain of Syria and Lebanon, the Dan originates in Israel from a spring near the Israeli town of Dan in the Hula Valley. [redacted]

divert water from the upper Jordan River, the Arab states threatened to divert major Jordan River tributaries. Lebanon proposed to divert the Hasbani into the Litani via a tunnel and canal; Syria proposed another conduit from the Hasbani, tapping its flow either at Al Mari or Al Ghajar. The Syrian canal would have intercepted the Baniyas River en route, to divert water southward across the Golan Heights to the Nahr al Yarmuk where it would tie in with the Jordanian irrigation systems. When the Lebanese and Syrians began actual work on these plans in 1964, Israel attacked the sites with artillery and aircraft, preventing further work. [redacted]

Along the southern boundary of the Golan, Jordan developed a number of plans to divert waters from the Yarmuk. The East Ghor Canal, an underground diversion of the Yarmuk largely financed with US aid, was completed in 1966. Jordan also planned to build two water storage dams farther upstream, including the Al Mukhaybah dam on which excavation work was halted when the Israelis occupied the Syrian side of the river during the 1967 war. [redacted]

Initial Israeli planning for diversion of water from the upper Jordan to the south called for a canal beginning in the demilitarized zone along the Syrian border, but Syrian artillery fire prevented work in the area. As an alternative, the Israelis resorted to drawing water from Lake Tiberias. The National Water Carrier, as the system is known, was completed in 1964. [redacted]

The Israelis do not need to occupy the entire Golan Heights to physically control all significant Golan tributaries to the Jordan's waters; they could accomplish this by occupying only a small portion of the northwestern Golan that includes the area from Baniyas to Al Ghajar. Lake Tiberias, Israel's primary water reservoir, would remain completely under Israeli control even with a withdrawal to the 1949 Armistice Line or to the original boundary of the Palestine Mandate. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The Israelis are also constructing small reservoirs for supplemental irrigation and for possible industrial use. Existing catchments store at least 7 million cubic meters of water; more are planned. The Baniyas River (annual flow 100 million cubic meters) is not a direct source of water for the Golan settlements. No dams have been built, and the entire flow goes into the Jordan, which feeds Lake Tiberias. [redacted]

25X1


Transportation System. Before June 1967 the Golan Heights was mainly a farming region with one relatively large market center, Al Qunaytirah, which was also the provincial capital. Consequently, most of the roads in the region led directly or indirectly to Al Qunaytirah, and the only major road led from there to Damascus, some 65 kilometers to the northeast. [redacted]

The Israelis have significantly improved this Syrian road network. They have opened five paved, two-lane access routes to the Heights, using parts of the earlier system (figure 11). They have built a number of other new roads, including the tortuous, loose-surface security road along the Lebanese border and have upgraded some existing roads such as the single-lane paved road along the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPline). [redacted]

25X1

The TAPline carries crude oil from Saudi Arabia's oilfields across the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon to the Lebanese oil port and refinery town of Az Zahrani. It crosses the Golan Heights diagonally from a point just south of Ar Rafid to a point just south of Al Ghajar. Despite the two wars fought on the Golan Heights, the Israelis have never stopped the flow of oil through the pipeline—although on a couple of occasions the Saudis have, for reasons not related to the Arab-Israeli wars or to Israeli occupation of the Golan. [redacted]

25X1



25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

Appendix A

A Chronology of Events Affecting Golan Residents

1967	Israel occupies Golan Heights; many residents flee; most of rest expelled.
1967	Israeli census enumerates 6,400 Syrian nationals on Golan, mostly Druze.
1968	Israeli school curriculum imposed on Syrian Golan villagers, a violation of international law governing occupied territories.
1972	Shaykh Kamal Kanj, leader of the Golan Druze, sentenced to 23 years in Israeli prison for espionage.
1974	Some 90 percent of the Golan Druze reported to be members of Histadrut (Israel's labor federation).
May 1974	Shaykh Sulayman Kanj Abu Salih, leader of the Golan Druze, asks for Israeli annexation of the area to end confusion.
September 1974	Israeli security forces arrest a number of Golan Druze, mostly from Majdal Shams, on suspicion of offenses against state security.
February 1976	Majdal Shams and Buqata, the two largest Syrian Golan villages, linked to Israeli national power grid.
March 1976	An Israeli Druze is appointed officer in charge of religious affairs in the Military Government on the Golan, succeeding an Israeli Jew.
January 1977	A number of Druze are arrested by Israeli security forces on suspicion of hostile activity on behalf of Syria against Israel.
March 1979	Israeli Rabbinical courts with full authority established on the Golan Heights.
June 1979	Regional councils for Israeli settlements on the Golan established, transferring control of settlements from the Israeli military government for the occupied territory to Israeli civilian administration.
January 1979	Shaykh Sulayman Kanj Abu Salih and hundreds of others petition Prime Minister Menachem Begin, asking <i>not</i> to be incorporated into the State of Israel.
July 1980	Israeli Knesset passes a law authorizing Minister of the Interior to issue Israeli identity cards to residents of any territory under Israeli control who apply for them. The law is directed toward the predominately Druze population of the Golan. About 500 Druze reportedly receive identity cards.
October 1981	Only 28 Syrian Golan villagers continue to hold Israeli identity cards, because Druze religious leadership opposed to Israeli citizenship for Golan Druze.
December 1981	Israeli Knesset passes a bill extending Israeli law, legislation, and administration to the Golan, in effect annexing Syrian territory.
December 1981	Israeli Interior Ministry incorporates Golan Heights into its northern district for administration of taxes and services. Justice Minister establishes magistrate courts in Druze village of Masadah and in Jewish town of Katzrin.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix B

Convention between Great Britain and France for the settlement of certain points connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia—Paris, 23 December 1920.

THE British and French Governments, respectively represented by the Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, wishing to settle completely the problems raised by the attribution to Great Britain of the Mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia and by the attribution to France of the Mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, all three conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, have agreed on the following provisions:—

ART. I. The boundaries between the territories under the French Mandate of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British Mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on the other, are determined as follows:—

On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French Mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse, then a line to the south of Nasib on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of

Secret

Secret

356

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French Mandate; the frontier will in principle leave the valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French Mandate, but will be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British Mandate. At Semakh the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadyie. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El Kuneitra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestinian territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French Mandate easy communication entirely within such territory with the regions of Tyre and Sidon, as well as continuity of road communicating to the west and to the east of Banias.

From Metullah the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah-Houroun and Kerkerah, which will remain in the territory under the British Mandate, and the Wadis El Doubleh, El Aioun and Es Zerka, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el-Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate.

II. A Commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present Convention to trace on the spot the boundary line laid down in Article I between the French and British Mandatory territories. This Commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the Mandatory Power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British Mandatory territories respectively.

In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the Commission, the question shall be referred to

Secret

Secret

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

357

the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

The final reports by the Commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground; the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the Commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate; one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the Mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned.

III. The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a Commission, whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French Mandatory territory, the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable degree the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British Mandate in Mesopotamia.

IV. In virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government.

V.—1. The French Government agrees to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the joint use of the section of the existing railway between the Lake of Tiberias and Nasib. This arrangement shall be concluded between the railway Administrations of the areas under the French and British Mandates respectively as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Mandates for Palestine and Syria. In particular, the Agreement shall allow the Administration in the British zone to run their own trains with their own traction and train crews over the above section of the railway in both directions for all purposes other than the local traffic of the territory under the French Mandate. The agreement shall determine at the same time the financial, administrative and technical conditions governing the running of the British trains. In the event of the two Administrations being unable to reach an agreement within three months from the coming into force of the two above-mentioned Mandates, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to settle the points as to which a difference of opinion exists and immediate effect shall be given as far as possible to those parts of the Agreement on which an understanding has already been reached.

The said Agreement shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall be subject to periodical revision as need arises.

Secret

Secret

358

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

2. The British Government may carry a pipe-line along the existing railway track and shall have in perpetuity and at any moment the right to transport troops by the railway.

3. The French Government consents to the nomination of a Special Commission, which, after having examined the ground, may re-adjust the above-mentioned frontier line in the valley of the Yarmuk as far as Nasib in such a manner as to render possible the construction of the British railway and pipe-line connecting Palestine with the Hedjaz Railway and the valley of the Euphrates, and running entirely within the limits of the areas under the British Mandate. It is agreed, however, that the existing railway in the Yarmuk Valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French Mandate. The right provided by the present paragraph for the benefit of the British Government must be utilised within a maximum period of ten years.

The above-mentioned Commission shall be composed of a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the British and French Governments.

4. In the event of the track of the British railway being compelled for technical reasons to enter in certain places the territory under French Mandate, the French Government will recognise the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French Mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.

5. In the event of the British Government making use of the right mentioned in paragraph 3 to construct a railway in the valley of the Yarmuk, the obligations assumed by the French Government in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article will determine three months after the completion of the construction of the said railway.

6. The French Government agrees to arrange that the rights provided for above for the benefit of the British Government shall be recognised by the local Governments in the territory under the French Mandate.

VI. It is expressly stipulated that the facilities accorded to the British Government by the preceding articles imply the maintenance for the benefit of France of the provisions of the Franco-British Agreement* of San Remo regarding oil.

VII. The French and British Governments will put no obstacle in their respective Mandatory areas in the way of the recruitment of railway staff for any section of the Hedjaz Railway.

• Page 350.

Secret

24

Secret

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

359

Every facility will be given for the passage of employees of the Hedjaz Railway over the British and French Mandatory areas in order that the working of the said railway may be in no way prejudiced.

The French and British Governments agree, where necessary, and in eventual agreement with the local Governments, to conclude an arrangement whereby the stores and railway material passing from one Mandatory area to another and intended for the use of the Hedjaz Railway will not for this reason be submitted to any additional Customs dues and will be exempted so far as possible from Customs formalities.

VIII. Experts nominated respectively by the Administrations of Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six months after the signature of the present Convention the employment, for the purposes of irrigation and the production of hydro-electric power, of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and of their tributaries, after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under the French Mandate.

In connection with this examination, the French Government will give its representatives the most liberal instructions for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the benefit of Palestine.

In the event of no agreement being reached as a result of this examination, these questions shall be referred to the French and British Governments for decision.

To the extent to which the contemplated works are to benefit Palestine, the Administration of Palestine shall defray the expenses of the construction of all canals, weirs, dams, tunnels, pipe-lines and reservoirs or other works of a similar nature; or measures taken with the object of re-afforestation and the management of forests.

IX. Subject to the provisions of Articles XV and XVI of the Mandate for Palestine, of Articles VIII and X of the Mandate for Mesopotamia, and of Article VIII of the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and subject also to the general right of control in relation to education and public instruction, of the local Administrations concerned, the British and French Governments agree to allow the schools which French and British nationals possess and direct at the present moment in their respective Mandatory areas to continue their work freely; the teaching of French and English will be freely permitted in these schools.

The present article does not in any way imply the right of nationals of either of the two parties to open new schools in the Mandatory area of the other.

The present Convention has been drawn up in English and French, each of the two texts having equal force.

Secret

Secret

Done at Paris, the 23rd December, 1920, in a double copy,
one of which will remain deposited in the archives of the
Government of the French Republic, and the other in those
of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

(L.S.) HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.
(L.S.) G. LEYGUES.

Secret

Secret

Appendix C

*Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement,
20 July 1949.*

328

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

No. 657. ISRAELI-SYRIAN GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.¹ SIGNED AT HILL 232, NEAR MAHANAYIM, ON 20 JULY 1949

Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948,² calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;

Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties. The establishment of an armistice between their armed forces is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces—land, sea or air—of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term *planned*

¹ Came into force on 20 July 1949, as from the date of signature, in accordance with article VIII (1).

² United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council*, Third Year, No. 126 (381st meeting), page 53.

Secret

Secret

330

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, considerations.

Article III

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties—land, sea and air—is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military, forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in article V of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party.

3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party or against civilians in territory under control of that Party.

Article IV

1. The line described in article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.

No. 657

Secret

Secret

332

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.

3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement, with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of that article.

Article V

1. It is emphasized that the following arrangements for the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Israeli and Syrian armed forces and for the Demilitarized Zone are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two Parties to this Agreement.

2. In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the Demilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

3. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on the map attached to this Agreement as annex I. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow a line midway between the existing truce lines, as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for the Israeli and Syrian forces. Where the existing truce lines run along the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the boundary line.

4. The armed forces of the two Parties shall nowhere advance beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line.

5. (a) Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the Parties, shall be established as a Demilitarized Zone from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or para-military forces shall be permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the Demilitarized Zone.

No. 657

Secret

Secret

334

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

(b) Any advance by the armed forces, military or para-military, of either Party into any part of the Demilitarized Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives referred to in the following sub-paragraph, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

(c) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article VII of this Agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

(d) The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the Demilitarized Zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this Agreement (annex II).

(e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the Demilitarized Zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of this article.

6. On each side of the Demilitarized Zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex III to this Agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex IV to this Agreement.

Article VI

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows:

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall take place at the site of the Armistice Conference within twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

No. 657

Secret

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.¹

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in article VII of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

Article VII

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission, shall maintain its headquarters at the Customs House near Jisr Banat Ya'qub and at Mahanayim, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Volume CXVIII, page 303; Volume CXXII, page 367; Volume CXXVI, page 460; Volume CXXX, page 468; Volume CXXXIV, page 431; Volume CXXXVIII, page 452; Volume CXLII, page 376; Volume CXLVII, page 351; Volume CLVI, page 229; Volume CLX, page 383; Volume CLXIV, page 388; Volume CLXXII, page 413; Volume CLXXVII, page 407; Volume CLXXXI, page 393; Volume CXCIII, page 270; Volume CXCVI, page 417; Volume CXCVII, page 316; Volume CC, page 511; Volume CCIV, page 448; and United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Volume 31, page 497.

Secret

338

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and article I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Article VIII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

No. 657

Secret

32

Secret

340

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and III. Participation in such conferences shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought, on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, is signed in quintuplicate. One copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Hill 232 near Mahanayim on the twentieth of July nineteen forty-nine, in the presence of the personal deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

For and on behalf of the Israeli
Government:

(Signed)

Lieutenant-Colonel Mordechai
MAKLEFF
Yehoshua PELMAN
Shabtai ROSENNE

For and on behalf of the Syrian
Government:

(Signed)

Colonel Fozi SELO
Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed NASSER
Captain Afif SIZRI

No. 657

Secret

Secret

Appendix D

United Nations. Security Council Resolutions No. 234 of 7 June 1967 and No. 235 of 9 June 1967 (Demarcation of cease-fire lines reported separately in Document 5/7930/add.18-41).

Resolution No. 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967

DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE

The Security Council,

Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East [resolution 233 (1967)], military activities in the area are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

1. *Demands* that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

Adopted unanimously at the 1350th meeting.

Resolution No. 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967

NOTING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA AND DEMANDING THAT HOSTILITIES SHOULD CEASE FORTHWITH

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),

Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

2. *Demands* that hostilities should cease forthwith;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now.

Adopted unanimously at the 1352nd meeting.

Secret

Secret

Secret

Secret

Appendix E

United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967.

Resolution No. 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967

STATING THE PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied* in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

Secret

Secret

Appendix F

*United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 338 of
22 October 1973.*

Resolution No. 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973

CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL OF ITS PARTS

The Security Council,

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

*Adopted at the 1747th meeting.**

In favour: 14

Against: —

Secret

Secret

Appendix G

Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement, Israel and Syria, 31 May 1974.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES SIGNED 31 MAY, 1974

A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of this document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 dated 22 October, 1973.

B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-1. [Editorial note: See fig. 14, ch. 5.]
2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.
3. The area between Line A and the Line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.
4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.
6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached map there shall be no military forces.

D. This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than 31 May, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group who will agree on the stages of this process. The military working group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the military working group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than twenty days after it begins.

E. Provisions of paragraphs A, B, and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.

F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the military working group, all remaining prisoners will be repatriated.

G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within 10 days after the signing of this agreement.

H. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 dated 22 October, 1973.

Secret

Secret

**PROTOCOL TO AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN
ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES CONCERNING
THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE**

Israel and Syria agree that:

The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) under the agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, it will comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission. It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defense. The number of the UNDOF shall be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.

The UNDOF will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary General, under the authority of the Security Council.

The UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the agreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a regular basis, not less often than once every fifteen days, and, in addition, when requested by either party. It shall mark on the site the respective lines shown on the map attached to the agreement.

Israel and Syria will support a resolution of the United Nations Security Council which will provide for the UNDOF contemplated by the agreement. The initial authorization will be for six months subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council.

Secret

Secret

Appendix H

*Camp David Frameworks for Peace,
September 17, 1978.*

Camp David Frameworks for Peace, September 17, 1978

A. Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Text of Agreements Signed September 17, 1978

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its

neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government

Secret

Secret

and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

—Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neigh-

borly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority

Secret

Secret

to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the

inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. *Egypt-Israel*

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three

Secret

Secret

months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

(a) full recognition;
 (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
 (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure re-

spect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government
of the Arab
Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

For the Government
of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

Secret

Secret

Secret

Page Denied

April 3, 2015

Arabs in Wadi Ara warn: “If it won’t be good for us, it won’t be good for you, and that’s not a threat”

The residents of Umm al-Fahm get stuck in a traffic jam every morning when they leave the city - In nearby Ara-Arara there are no buses - Both towns suffer from a shortage of daycare centers, and hope that someday industrial zones will be built there - Meanwhile they can only envy the investment in Jewish communities

Tali Heruti-Sover

From one spot in Umm al-Fahm it's easy to understand the whole story. On one side a two-lane highway that ends suddenly ("The money ran out") and on the other the exit from the city, a bottleneck that becomes increasingly narrow as it approaches Wadi Ara, Highway 65.

In the afternoon hours when we visited the second-largest Arab city in Israel – with a population of 53,000 – traffic flowed easily. But that's not the situation seven days a week at 5:30 A.M., when 20,000 cars are trying to leave the city.

"It takes 25-40 minutes," says Saliman Mahamid, the veteran city engineer. "Every resident knows that in order to get to work he has to get through the traffic jam, and 12 hours later he'll get stuck in it on the way back. There's no city in Israel, certainly not one of this size, where the exit and entry rely on one small traffic light. That's how it is here. Because 52 percent of the residents are commuters, and people work all over the country and therefore leave early, everyone is stuck in the same intolerable traffic jam. I assume that in a Jewish city of the same size they would have taken care of it already."

Mahamid is probably right: Over 10 million shekels were recently invested in an additional interchange for the second largest neighborhood in Hadera, Givat Olga, whose 12,000 residents suffered from an infuriating, but much smaller traffic jam. Now they have a new and impressive connection to the Coastal Road. In Umm al-Fahm, on the other hand, they'll wait, and not for lack of plans. This traffic congestion is the perfect illustration of the discrimination and absurdity that typify the conduct of generations of Israeli governments.



Umm al-Fahm

Already in the 1990s a comprehensive statutory plan was adopted that included a logical connection to Highway 65, and Maatz, the Israel National Roads Company, even had operative plans. "Then came [Likud Minister of Transport] Israel Katz and said – I'm not signing," says Mahamid. Katz announced the transfer of 150 million shekels to the Netavei Israel transportation infrastructure company in order to solve the problem, but if "afterwards the plan has no statutory validity, what good will the money do now? We told the Transport Ministry: 'If it's impossible to upgrade the main entrance, let's work on an entrance from another direction.' But endless planning problems are plaguing the new plan. Now the money is being transferred to the nearby Gan Shmuel-Granot interchange. There probably won't be any problem there."

So the Transport Ministry is the problem?

"It's possible that we're also to blame. Maybe we didn't demand enough, maybe we should have gone to the High Court of Justice, maybe we don't know how to ask."

In Umm al-Fahm they feel that the city suffers from discrimination, one reason being its problematic image as a dangerous place for Jews. Attorney Wissam Qawash, the deputy mayor and chairman of the engineering department, is angry about that: "No Jew has ever been harmed here," he says. "Jews walk around freely here, except for those who are convinced, thanks to [Foreign Minister] Avigdor Lieberman, that Umm al-Fahm is on the West Bank. So it's true that the northern branch of the Islamic Movement is located here, and that this place is alive and kicking and has multiple opinions, and that's as it should be, because this is a democracy, isn't it? You see us

via the plate of hummous, but we aren't hummous, and not every resident of Umm al-Fahm is [Islamic Movement leader] Raed Salah. We're Israeli citizens."

And still you don't want to integrate. You wouldn't send your son to work in the police force, for example

There's a misunderstanding in the Jewish sector: We don't want to enlist in the security forces because in their view it's always a question of the safety of Jews vis a vis Arabs. The police don't come to collect illegal weapons or to solve murder cases in the Arab communities. We meet them only when they harm us. But Arabs work at the Magen David Adom emergency medical services in Umm al-Fahm, and the firefighters are also Arabs. We want to integrate into civic organizations and government jobs, just like in other places of work. To say that we have a problem cooperating with government institutions – is not true, and even infuriating.

So where does that view come from?

"The government wants people to think that Umm al-Fahm is a dangerous place, because the government doesn't know what to do with us. One time they wanted integration, another time they wanted to marginalize us, now there are some who don't even want to see us, that's how we wound up where we are today.

"But you don't understand: If we're not happy, you won't be happy either – and that's not a threat. The economic interest of the government is to narrow gaps. When you come to Umm al-Fahm you have to think how to eliminate the traffic congestion in the morning instead of thinking in terms of 'security.' Planning in the Arab sector is not done for the purpose of development and prosperity but for security reasons. When you come to plan the interchange in Umm al-Fahm you don't relate to it like the Kfar Shmaryahu interchange, because here there were demonstrations, so you have to rethink the situation, maybe not do anything, maybe give money for plans that can't be implemented, and once again we're left behind."

The first bus line – two years ago

The visit to Umm al-Fahm raises quite a number of questions that haven't come up for a long time in the Jewish sector. For example, very few people know that the first public bus line began to run there only two years ago. "In other cities they're talking about bicycle paths, I'm asking for local buses," says Qawash. "Who's thinking about anything more advanced? If I want to increase the number of bus lines I need infrastructure. What seems trivial in Jewish communities becomes a barrier here."

The reason for the absence of public transportation in the Arab sector sounds absurd, but it's absolutely true: Many of the urban bus lines travel only from one point to another, where they turn around and return to the first point. In order to create the traffic circle in older neighborhoods you have to widen alleyways or move houses. In Umm al-Fahm they know how to do that, according to the local council engineer, but for that you need money. Here's the good news in the new plan announced by the

Finance Ministry at the end of 2014: This year 660 million shekels will be allocated to deal with the barriers that harm the Arab sector, including public transportation.



Umm al-Fahm

But there's a catch: "They give 20 million shekels for a transportation infrastructure to all the communities combined, and we'll get 4 million of that when after years of neglect we need 70-80 million shekels," says Mahamid. "Communities of our size receive 40-50 million shekels for that, so it's nice that the treasury is promoting a new plan, but we need a realistic budget. The problem is that whoever shouts the loudest – gets. Whoever has sources of power in the government ministries gets budgets, mayors whose party members are decision makers – get more, and we're not in the game.

"I don't want affirmative action, I really don't. I want criteria. We need parameters for the distribution of budgets. The problem is that since the establishment of the state there has been mainly one parameter for budgets: the policy of the minister and his government. Today only one organization has clear and transparent parameters for distributing money – the Mifal Hapayis National Lottery. The Transport Ministry announced that they have criteria - so they announced it. As long as there aren't any clear and transparent parameters we'll be stuck in the same vicious cycle. Those with power will get money, the weak will be left behind."

And here's another structural problem that few people are aware of: When government ministries issue a tender for a certain project, the construction of daycare centers for example, the wealthy municipalities pull out contingency plans and are able to pay external planning companies to write budget requests. The engineering departments in the Arab sector are very small and don't have the money to involve an external organization. While the government considers the tender egalitarian, the practical result is discrimination. "They submit the plans far faster than we do, and their plans are better," says Mahamid. "It's a fact that 32 Arab local councils submitted plans for a project to construct daycare centers, and 31 didn't meet the criteria."

The Economy Ministry is aware of this barrier and is working to eliminate it. "Despite the preference shown in the regulations for the Arab local councils, no councils were found whose requests could be approved, mainly for lack of the required permits," they say. "However, in the planning procedure 30 requests by local councils in the Arab sector were approved, for a total of about 10 million shekels, and in the transition procedure 18 (of 38) requests by local councils in the sector were approved, for a total sum of about 10 million shekels. Before we conclude the allocation of the entire earmarked budget, we expect two additional allocations, which will be distributed to all the local councils and local authorities that meet the criteria, including priority for the weaker sectors."

Preschools and daycare centers really are a painful issue that prevents women from entering the job market. Today Umm al-Fahm lacks preschools for about 500 children, to join the 110 active preschools. The construction problem is a chicken-and-egg situation. "In order to allocate land for public needs, which will be available and registered in the name of the local authority, the municipality must initiate and submit a plan," says Mahamid. "Often the municipality has no money to pay for the plan, and even after a plan has been submitted we encounter problems in getting a permit.

"Sometimes everything is in order, but there's no approval from an architect from the Economy Ministry, because there is no such thing. While the Education Ministry has a system for dealing with planning, the Economy Ministry doesn't. The government wants to allocate money, but they don't establish a bureaucratic system that will handle the matter easily. And without the system – it simply won't succeed."

So what should be done?

Saliman Mahamid: "In the late 1980s, when I came to government ministries they would ask me: 'Are you a Druze?' When I said that I wasn't, they would say that there's no budget. Today the situation is somewhat better, but the lack of trust exists. Once they didn't give at all, today they do, but the distribution is incorrect. Good will is important, but it's not enough."

Qahwash: "We managed to rent buildings, but the physical conditions aren't always good and we have to pay the rent. We of all people, the weak Arab local authorities, have to pay rent for preschool and school buildings, while the Jewish authorities don't. Local non-profit organizations operate five preschools subsidized by the Economy Ministry, but that's not enough. Registration begins in February and ends within two days, and the situation is good relative to other communities.

"In the past the government didn't think that the Arab sector needs daycare centers. In 2010 the situation was catastrophic and there was nobody to talk to, today things look somewhat different because the government gives budgets, but the shortage is still great, mainly because of planning problems. Here they have to help us. The

problem is that the planning is done from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and they exclude us from dealing with problems that we know more about than anyone else.

"Why don't they ask us? Why don't they include us? Why don't they sit with the city engineer and ask: 'Where is it most important to invest?' Of course the information about budgets that can't be utilized doesn't help either, nor does the fact that there is no transparency in the planning parameters. If there aren't any – how will I know how to plan when the money arrives?"

You're painting a harsh portrait. Do you feel that the attitude has been changing recently, or is it the same old story?

Qahwash: "After so many years there is great distrust, but now we have more power in the Knesset, and that could be a turning point. We'll begin to believe that something is changing when there's an objective policy based on criteria. On the other hand, the Arab population also has to undergo a conceptual change - we have to start thinking about high-density construction and begin an urbanization process. When the government sees that we, as a society, are contributing our part to the change that will lead to more budgets and approval of plans."

Half the houses are connected to pirated electricity

The real estate market in the Arab sector is also a significant barrier: Today the city lacks about 2,000 residential units, but the municipality itself is already planning a new neighborhood that includes affordable housing. It's more difficult to handle local employment. Unemployment in Umm al-Fahm in particular and in Wadi Ara in general is 12 percent-13 percent, and the area residents travel to work in Tel Aviv as well as in the north and the south of the county. In the early 1990s we started planning a small industrial zone, which will begin to be marketed only this year, and the construction of two additional industrial zones, which are supposed to be built in cooperation with the neighboring Megiddo and Menashe regional councils, are still stuck.

"In such a situation it's impossible to attract factories to provide local employment, or to clear away nuisances such as garages or workshops. The city coffers also suffer. Umm al-Fahm is in socioeconomic cluster 2 [the clusters range from 1-10, in ascending order], 81 percent of the arnona property tax comes from households (which legally receive a large number of exemptions), while revenues from commercial property tax are very limited. The situation is reversed in Jewish communities, where according to a study by Sikkuy, 50 percent to 60 percent of property taxes come from businesses, industry, infrastructure facilities, public buildings and more."

Even when the new industrial zone is built - after 25 years in the planning - it won't help 28-year-old Athar Masarwa, a teacher from the neighboring community of Ara-Arara. Like dozens of her colleagues, she leaves the house every day for a long trip

south. Masarwa teaches Arabic in the Bedouin diaspora near Dimona. The trip, for which she pays 80 shekels a day, takes about two and a half hours in each direction. In order to get to the school in time she leaves at 5:30 A.M. and returns home in the evening. Mudar Younis, the head of the local council, as well as the director general of the municipality (the only woman in the position in the Arab sector) Ruida Younis, are very familiar with the procession of cars that leave the village every morning, and at the moment there is no solution."

"There's no work for teachers in our area," says Younis. "And unfortunately they are rarely hired to work in the many Jewish schools in the area, and have to travel far in order to make a living. They start out there and after several years they request a transfer to the north. Meanwhile they travel."

The merged village in the heart of Wadi Ara turns out to be a lovely place: The atmosphere is quiet, the place is clean, and only the potholes in the roads indicate that there's a problem there. The homes in Arara's new neighborhood could compete with nearby [upscale] Caesarea, but the roadways are nonexistent. The scouts have a beautiful community center built by the Mifal Hapayis national lottery, but the road that leads to it is unpaved and the children have to fight the mud in order to get there on rainy days. There is no public transportation at all.

"I live in Baka al-Garbiyeh, 15 kilometers from here," says Younis. "If I don't have a car I travel for two hours via Hadera. The community has never had public transportation. We pay to transport the children to school, but the government is unwilling to subsidize public transportation. Why? Because the bus doesn't have a terminal. A truck and a cement mixer can enter the center of the community, but not a public minibus. The Transport Ministry says - we'll discuss one bus line, maybe in early 2016, first we have to do infrastructure work, squares, traffic circles, for that we need money. We're in 2015, in the middle of the State of Israel, and public transportation is just a dream. That doesn't happen in any Jewish community."

Not only public transportation and work in the area are a distant dream, so is a standard thing like being connected to electricity. "Until the two villages merged in 1993, each village owned 6,000 dunams," says Younis. "When they merged the government decided to take over 4,000 dunams, with which nothing was done. It turns out that to the east we're restricted by nature reserves, and to the west there was a firing zone, and you try to plan inside the can of sardines that the government left to you. Due to serious planning problems there is no master plan. The residents built large houses for the extended family, but there are no roads between them. Since there's no Form 4 (a permit for receiving services) there's no link-up to the Israel Electric Corporation. Of 4,770 households, 2,000 lack a permit, and the electrical connection is pirated. Homeowners pay electricity contractors who arrange an electrical link-up for them and pay the IEC, and of course they make a profit. It turns out that the weaker elements pay more for a basic item like electricity."

But it's illegal construction, how can the government give them a Form 4?

"It's a chicken and egg situation: People build because you have to live somewhere, pay large fines here, and deal with demolition orders by going to prison, among other things, and many homes are demolished. That happens for a simple reason: We're 30-40 years behind in planning. I want to build upward, three stories, six stories, but that requires planning and budgets.

"The problem is that there are no criteria for distributing money. If the head of the local council bangs on the table - there's money. Anyone who doesn't - is forgotten. If the government returns the area that it nationalized quite a few problems will be solved. It would be possible to build an industrial zone and a college that would attract students, but the government is in no rush to expand the borders of our jurisdiction. It took [land] and it says - you'll manage.

"There are good intentions, there's a realization that the situation cannot be left as is, but the problem is that the council heads didn't participate in the planning discussions, and with all due respect – one Interior Ministry conference that is attended by members of the local councils does not constitute public involvement. They have to relate to Arab society as different. I'm not competing with Tel Aviv: There they have contingency plans, industrial zones, and preschools. They have lots of money and manpower. We have a shortage of professionals. They tell me - bring project heads from outside. I need an expert on energy efficiency; he'll cost me 10,000 shekels - who will pay?

"It's convenient for the government to ignore us because we aren't nudniks, we don't have the Israeli mentality. Someone told me: You want an interchange? Sit in the Transport Ministry and don't budge. You have to be a favorite of the government in order to get anything. When there are friends in the Likud, there are more opportunities. I say - don't do it for me, do it for yourselves. If things aren't good for us here, they won't be good for the Jewish sector either. Let us dream too."

660 million shekels? It's not certain that 6 billion would suffice

Sikkuy – The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality, a joint Jewish-Arab organization, was established in 1991. Since then it has been working with government ministries to advance equality between Jewish and Arab citizens. Sikkuy is very familiar with the frustration in Arab society and is a partner to the harsh criticism, but also identifies a positive change.

"If 10 years ago they didn't talk about discrimination at all, today the era of denial is over," says Ron Gerlitz, the co-executive director. "A significant percentage of Jewish officialdom wants to promote equality for economic-pragmatic reasons, and for some it's a matter of values. There's a consensus today that it's impossible to improve an economy when 20 percent of the citizens are thrown outside the job

market. This realization was helped by Israel's entry into the OECD and by pressure from civic society organizations.

"Happily, today we are hearing some different music in the government ministries, in the treasury and the Budget Department in particular. At the same time, the government traditionally prefers to operate by means of special programs instead of fighting for a change in the allocation mechanisms of the various ministries. The activity of the Authority for the Economic Development of the Minorities Sector in the Prime Minister's Office, headed by Aiman Saif, is important and is bringing about change, and the Budget Department is also working in that direction, but change is coming too slowly.

"It's nice that they're giving 660 million shekels in the context of the program to develop the economy and reduce the gaps in Arab society, but it's not at all certain that even 6 billion would suffice. The solution has to be far more radical: standardization of the allocation mechanisms of all the ministries, along with the special programs. In addition, the budget of the Arab local councils has to be increased by expanding the equalizing grants [grants to reduce budget deficits created when the expenditure of municipalities and local councils for essential services exceeds their income].

"The treasury maintains that not all the resources will be properly exploited. That's true. But without more resources they are completely suffocated. On this issue the Budget Department still doesn't get it. They don't understand that many positive processes that they are promoting will fail as long as there is no minimal budget for professional work in the Arab councils."



Sikkuy staff (l-r): Moran Aviv, Ron Gerlitz, Shirley Racah, Abed Kanaanah

Shirley Racah, a co-director of the Equality Policy Department in Sikkuy, once again mentions the main solution: "Budgets are distributed without clear and uniform criteria," she says. "Those who ask in a more professional manner and a loud voice get more, but that's not how to make up for 67 years of discrimination. The Budget Department has to lead a process of uniform and equal criteria according to which government ministries will allocate the money. That's an essential step for repairing the discrimination."

Abed Kanaaneh, co-director of the Equality Policy Department, mentions the biggest problem. "The Arab sector has suffered years of disappointments from the government," he says. "They are mired in crowded conditions and sewage, and see nearby communities developing. In Sakhnin there's no room to build, but the new neighborhoods of [Jewish] Galilee communities keep growing, and the property tax of the Teradion industrial zone goes to the communities of the [Jewish] Misgav region, not to Arabeh. So now the officials and the government are beginning to understand, but when for almost 70 years they slapped us down, and in the 70th year there is genuine sincerity – I say just a moment, is this really happening?"

"The government has launched a process, but Arab society doesn't believe it. That's why the government representatives have to understand – talk won't be convincing, only action will help. When there are buses in Kafr Qasem and transportation is cheap and subsidized, as opposed to the years when they spent twice as much for pirate transportation, people say to themselves – the government is taking an interest in me."

"You can't take something that's suitable for Jewish society, copy-paste it to Arab society and then say 'We've done it,'" says Gerlitz. "Narrowing the gaps requires complex work that includes an understanding of the barriers and how to dismantle them. Fortunately, everything is possible. With a joint effort even the Umm al-Fahm traffic congestion can be eased soon."

Budget Director Amir Levi agrees. "We're coming with genuine good will to integrate the Arab population into the economy, in order to achieve improved growth and to narrow gaps. This is an important strategic socioeconomic target," he says. "We consider the present situation an opportunity rather than a threat."

Levi, one of those behind the promotion of the program for economic development and narrowing gaps in Arab society, knows that there is need for a change in the traditional methods. "It's clear that budget allocation is insufficient, and that we have to change the allocation mechanisms. We're also working in that direction. In the past year we made sure that at least 20 percent of the budget for daycare centers would be earmarked for the Arab local councils so that they won't have to battle within the general budgetary reserves as has been the case until now.

"At the same time, we supported the Education Ministry in promoting differential budgeting, which will also benefit the Arab local councils. In addition, 40 percent of

the increase in the public transportation budgets, an important tool for integration into the job market, will be channeled to Arab communities. These are all important changes in the budgetary mechanisms that will yield significant results and were promoted with full cooperation and team work with the Prime Minister's Office, and the economy, education and transportation ministries."



Umm al-Fahm

The claim is that this process is too limited and too slow

Amir Levi: "Significant changes naturally take time. It's important to remember that in order to achieve the implementation of this mutual interest, both sides have to work. Our job is to present this issue as an important economic issue, and the local authorities are responsible for taking the existing budgets and knowing how to get things done. Today there is complete understanding of the importance of prioritizing the issue in terms of budgets, and there is a clear strategy that recognizes its importance.

"Success depends on the work of the government ministries and the local authorities. If everyone does his job there's no reason why we shouldn't succeed by means of joint efforts. In effect we are seeing positive trends: an increase in employment rates, in the percentage of people with academic degrees, in the percentage of those gaining a matriculation certificate, as well as a decline in poverty in the past year."

You plan from Jerusalem and don't allow residents of the communities to participate

In the context of the new program a 120-day team was formed, composed of members of the third sector, Jews and Arabs, which is formulating recommendations on housing, another major issue for Arab society. It's important to us to include all those with an interest in the matter and we maintain almost daily contact with the heads of Arab local councils and various civic organizations. It's a joint effort, at which we can succeed only if we work together."



Part C

CVs:

MK Aryeh Deri

Ehud Olmert

Uri Ilan

MG (INP) Shimon Lavi

Prof. Rassem Khamaisi

Adv. Moder Younes

MK Osama Saadi

Ron Cohen

Dr. Erez On

Mr. Eliyahu Meiri

MG Amir Baram

BG Amal Asad



MK Aryeh Deri

MK Aryeh Deri, is one of the founders and representatives of the SHAS party, Minister of Interior, Minister for the Development of the Periphery the Negev and the Galilee, and is member of the Security Cabinet. He is the former Minister of Economy.

Deri serves as chairman to the SHAS party – a party the represents Haredi Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews. Formerly in the Knesset, Deri was on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Joint Committee for Defense Budget, and the Lobby for Strengthening and Promoting the Arab Economy.

MK Deri held many portfolios as a minister, including: Religious Services, Interior, Industry and Economics. He is the only minister to have returned to the government after sitting in jail.

The Ministry for the Development of the Periphery, Negev and Galil, was formed in January 2005 with Deri its main promoter. The Government decided to open this ministry in order to develop the northern and southern areas of Israel and to give them top priority. The ministry's objectives are assisting and strengthening towns under the definition of a social periphery in order to improve the social resilience in these areas, improving growth rates and extending live expectancy.



Ehud Olmert

The 12th Prime Minister of Israel, between 2006-2009

Olmert was elected Likud member in 1973, when he was 28. He served as a minister in the Israeli government, representing Kadima and Likud, and as the Mayor of Jerusalem (1993-2003).

As mayor, Olmert worked to increase Israeli control over Eastern Jerusalem, to build the Har Khoma neighborhood and to open the *Kotel Tunnels* (a system of underground tunnels underneath the Western Wall in Jerusalem). He also granted permission to build the Holyland building complex, with which he was later indicted.

The main event that took place during his time as PM was the Second Lebanon War.

On June 25th, 2006, an Israeli soldier – Gilad Shalit – was kidnapped by Hamas. As a result, Israel opened Operation Summer Rains in Gaza which lasted until November 28. On July 12th, 2006, two soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah, which caused Israel to go into the Second Lebanon War.

Olmert has a BA in psychology, philosophy and law from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.



Uri Ilan

Chairman of the District Committee, Northern District, National Housing Office, Ministry of Finance.

Ilan heads the District Committee for Planning and Construction in the Northern District, which discusses in its plenary and subcommittees some 850 programs a year.

Partner in formulating and implementing government policies and decisions relating to the Northern District. Previously, he served as CEO of Safed Municipality, in various real estate roles and also served as head of education and society administration in Netanya Municipality.

He graduated the Senior Program of the Civil Service Commission and the Wexner Foundation, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA. He holds an MA in Public Administration and Policy, from Haifa University, and a Bachelor of Business Administration from the School of Business in New York College. He also holds a BA in Geography and International Relations.

A cooking and sailing enthusiast who holds a yacht sailing certificate.



Major General Shimon Lavi

Northern District Commander, Israel Police

He served as a fighter in the Givaty Brigade's "Shaked" battalion and in 1990 received a certificate of excellence from Southern Command General Matan Vilnai for neutralizing a strike in the Beit Ilma refugee camp near Nablus. On Israel's 42nd Independence Day, he received The President's Excellency Award by President Haim Herzog.

When his military service ended in 1991, he joined the Israeli police as a detective in the Dan area of Tel Aviv.

In 1998, on Israel's 51st Independence, he received the The President's Excellency Award, by Ezer Weizman, this time as a police officer.

Lavi has held a number of senior positions in Tel Aviv. These include: Commander of the Neighborhood ('Shchunot') Station (2007), Commander of the Galilee Station (March 2008-2010), Officer of the Yarkon Area Operations Division (2010-2011), Tel Aviv District Operations Officer (2011-2013), Dan Area Commander (2013-2016).

In 2016, he was appointed commander of the Sharon district at the Central District under the rank of Brigadier General. In January 2018, he was appointed deputy chief of the Central District. In June 2019, Lavi was appointed to the rank of Major General as Northern District Police Chief.



Prof. Rassem Khamaisi

Urban planner and geographer, lecturer in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department in the University of Haifa.

Prof. Khamaisi got his PhD in the Hebrew University and did his Post-Doc in the London School of Economics and Political Science, and then in the Queen Mary and Westfield College in London.

Prof. Khamaisi has taught in the Geography Department of the Haifa University since 1994, and in the Western Galilee College since 2011.

From 1998 he serves as head of the Planning Committee and the Academic Committee in the International Peace and Cooperation Center in Jerusalem. Since 2013, he serves as head of the Jewish-Arab Center in Haifa University.

Prof. Khamaisi has participated in various national planning committees. He consults to municipalities and various public and private bodies on strategic urban planning and administration.



Adv. Moder Younes

Moder Younes, Head of the Ar'ara Local Council and Chairman of the Committee of Arab Authorities.

Graduated from "Hanna Mawis" High School in Kfar Rama in the Galilee
He holds a law degree from the Hebrew University of Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem.

He worked in various law offices in Jerusalem and Haifa.

From 1991-2013, he worked as an independent lawyer and established a law firm in Ar'ara, where he focused on matters of municipality, planning and construction, real estate, labor law and damages.

From 2013, he served as the head of the Ar'ara Local Council.

He was a member of the Urban Planning and Construction Committee. He was also a member of the secretariat of the monitoring committee in the Arab Authorities.

Starting in 2018, Younes serves as the head of national affairs for the heads of the Arab Authorities. In addition, he is a member of the "Mifal Hapayis" board of directors and a board member of the 'Local Government Center'.

Moder Younes is fluent in three languages. Arabic- native language, Hebrew- reading and writing (very good) and English- understanding (very good), writing and speaking (reasonable level).



MK Osama Saadi

Osama Saadi, Arab-Israeli politician, Member of Knesset on behalf of the Ta'al ('Arab Movement Party for Renewal') Party in the Joint List faction.

Osama Saadi graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University and a lawyer by profession. During his studies at the university, he was chairman of the Arab Student Union in Israel, and since 1996 he is the Secretary General of the Ta'al Party.

For the first time, Saadi was elected to the Twenty-first Knesset on behalf of the Joint List, and is a member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, the State Audit Committee, the Special Committee on Public Inquiries, and the Special Committee for Discussion of the Government Basic Law Bill.



Ron Kobi

Mayor of Tiberias

In 2011, Kobi set up the "Lifting Tiberias off the boards" (basically meaning: "Making Tiberias Great Again") forum. As part of his activities on the forum, Kobi broadcasted live streaming to the social network Facebook, where he shared his vision for the city of Tiberias.

In 2018, he ran for mayor again, winning local elections, winning 45.3% of the electorate. However, he found it difficult forming a coalition at the city council plenum and passing the municipal budget to the plenum.

In February 2019, Kobi promoted a Saturday bus ride on behalf of the "Noa Tanua" association, in conjunction with the municipality, from the city's neighborhoods to the center. He also works to allow businesses to open at entertainment venues on Saturday, especially on the city's promenade.

Kobi's attempts to approve the municipal budget failed, and the Ministry of the interior warned that unless the budget was approved by June 30, 2019, by law, his term could end. The city council did not approve the budget in a timely manner, even after an extension. Kobi was summoned to a hearing, which ultimately decided whether to dismiss him. He appealed to the High Court, and Minister Deri accepted the justices' recommendation to hold the hearing after the election. At the same time, Deri overturned a previous decision to dissolve the City Council. Kobi again petitioned the High Court against this move, and withdrew the petition following the judge's recommendation.



Dr. Erez On

Director of the Baruch Peda Medical Center,
Poria.

Dr. Erez On, Director of the Baruch Peda Medical Center since October 2013.

In his previous positions, he was Deputy Director of Rabin \ Beilinson Medical Center, Deputy Chief Medical Officer at the rank of Colonel, Medical Commander of the Central Command at the rank of Colonel.

He is a graduate of the Technion School of Medicine, Haifa, a specialist in orthopedic surgery.

Erez On is a Member of the Medical Association of Israel, Member of the Israeli Orthopedic Association and Member of the Hospital Directors Association.



Mr. Eliyahu Meiri

CEO of the Tiberias & Valleys Local Authorities

Serves as CEO of the Tiberias & Valleys Local Authorities since early 2019, and in fact is busy establishing it. In his role, he is responsible for connecting 15 cluster authorities, developing regional services and economic and social growth engines.

Previously, he served as strategic advisor to cities in the field of education and before that, he ran high schools - Ort's experimental school "Ma'aleh" in Tiberias, where he developed his career education concept. Earlier, he founded the Branco Weiss Golan Youth School.

Eli serves as a commander of a reserve armored battalion.

Graduated with a Master of Public Administration and Policy from Tel Aviv University.

Has a BA in History from the Hebrew University. Also holds a teaching certificate.

He lives in Moshav Arbel in the Lower Galilee, married to Michal and father of Shira, Nitzan, Ron and Yaela.

Sports enthusiast (mainly running) and field trips.



Major General Amir Baram

Commander of the Northern Command


An outstanding graduate of the Real School in Haifa. Joined the paratroopers and held several positions. After completing his position as Company Commander in BAHAD 1, he went to study at the IDC Herzliya. In 2002, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed commander of the 890th Battalion. During his post, he led the battalion in fighting against the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Bethlehem before "Homat Magen" operation, and in Nablus during the operation.

On August 17, 2006, he was promoted to Colonel and appointed commander of the Samaria Brigade. During his command, he led operational activities to eliminate Palestinian terrorism and thwart terrorist attacks, while facilitating the civilian population. He then went on to study at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London (RCDS- Royal College of Defence Studies) and concurrently graduated with honors in International Relations at the University of London (King's College London University). After his return in January 2010, he was appointed commander of the 'fire support formation'. Subsequently, he was appointed commander of the Paratroop Brigade. During his tenure, he insisted that the regiment return to parachute training, and in January 2012 commanded it in the first parachute regiment exercise in fifteen years. In 2013, he was promoted to Brigadier General and appointed commander of the 'fire formation' and then appointed commander of the Galilee Formation.

On December 7, 2017, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed commander of the Northern Corps and on January 3, 2018, he was appointed commander of the Military Colleges. In April 2019, he was appointed Chief of the Northern Command.

Baram lives in Even Yehuda, married and father of three children.

He holds a B.A. in Law from the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, and an M.A. in International Relations from King's College, London.



Brigadier General Amal Assad

Assad is among the first Druze to enlist in the Paratroopers Brigade.

Assad participated in the Yom Kippur War, fought in the Chinese farm, and was wounded from a shrapnel close to his eye.

From 1978-1980, he served as commander of a sabotage and engineering company in the Paratroopers Unit, among others in the Sigal Operation. Assad fought in the First Lebanon War, in the battles waged by the brigade under the command of Yoram Yair, from the sea landing at the Awali Estuary to the foothills of Beirut.

In 1983, he was appointed commander of the 932th Battalion, serving in that position until 1984. In 1991, he was appointed commander of the Menashe Brigade in charge of the Jenin Area. During his command in Jenin, the "Black Panther" squad received a severe blow when most of its members were arrested or eliminated.

He later served as Brigade 5 Commander, after which he was appointed deputy commander of the Lebanon Liaison Unit. In 1998 he was promoted to brigadier general and became the third Druze to reach that rank. His last role was Commander of the Liaison Office. A year later he retired from the IDF, after 26 years of service.

After Assad's political experience, he began working in the private business sector and began advising companies (including "Bezeq", "Klil", and "Dor Film"), on options for approaching the Arab sector in Israel and in Arab countries.

Joined the Military Industry Board of Israel, where he was the first Druze to be member of the board. He also served on the Directorate of the Airports Authority. Today, he is also the CEO of the "Tirek" Company for tire recycling. In May 2012, he was appointed a member of the Israel Aerospace Industries Board of Directors.

In 2012, he initiated the "For the Druze Boys" project to commemorate the Druze soldiers. The project includes the creation of a hiking route that will pass through all Druze villages, from the Carmel, the Upper Galilee and the Lower Galilee.