
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| **Flipping the DIME:** |
| **The role of American society in the pursuit of national interests when there are ‘no-boots-on-the-ground’** |

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| Vincent J. Ciuccoli  26 April 2016 |



**Table of Contents**

[Chapter 1 – Introduction 1](#_Toc449449692)

[The Research Aim 4](#_Toc449449693)

[Chapter Layout: 5](#_Toc449449694)

[Limitations: 9](#_Toc449449695)

[Chapter 2 – The US Strategy of Operations Other than War 11](#_Toc449449696)

[In Pursuit of the US National Interest: 12](#_Toc449449697)

[War? 17](#_Toc449449698)

[Operations Other than War: 20](#_Toc449449699)

[Conclusions 23](#_Toc449449700)

[Chapter 3 – The Significance of Society in National Security Affairs 27](#_Toc449449701)

[The Societal Sphere 27](#_Toc449449702)

[Social Resilience: 30](#_Toc449449703)

[The Resilience Process: 34](#_Toc449449704)

[The American Experiment 37](#_Toc449449705)

[Conclusions 43](#_Toc449449706)

[Chapter 4 – The US Society Sphere in Super Power OOTW 47](#_Toc449449707)

[US Social Contract Artifacts 47](#_Toc449449708)

[The Cost of National Interests 51](#_Toc449449709)

[Peace and Crisis Response Operations 55](#_Toc449449710)

[OOTW Vignettes 57](#_Toc449449711)

[Fukushima 58](#_Toc449449712)

[Libya 61](#_Toc449449713)

[Today’s ‘No-Boots-on-the-Ground’ Operations 63](#_Toc449449714)

[Conclusions 65](#_Toc449449715)

[Chapter 5 – Final Reflections and Speculations 68](#_Toc449449716)

[Future US National Security Implications 69](#_Toc449449717)

[The Prospective Relationship of National Social Resilience to the DMP: 70](#_Toc449449718)

[Addressing the Flipside 73](#_Toc449449719)

[Application in the Israeli experience 77](#_Toc449449720)

[Final Conclusions: 81](#_Toc449449721)

**Table of Figures**

[Figure 1- The Elements of US National Power 2](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449185)

[Figure 2 - CoG Systems Analysis 3](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449186)

[Figure 3 - The Range of Military Operations 6](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449187)

[Figure 4 - US spending on SC from 1991-2008 15](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449188)

[Figure 5- Security Cooperation Activities 21](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449189)

[Figure 6 - Holling's Adaptive Cycle 34](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449190)

[Figure 7- Author’s rendition of the National Social Resilience Process 35](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449191)

[Figure 8 - Participation of US society in the military 44](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449192)

[Figure 9 - US population makeup vs. US military makeup 44](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449193)

[Figure 10 - Military Deaths by Cause (1980-2010) 52](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449194)

[Figure 11 - Estimated War and OOTW Funding by Operation and Agency, FY01-15 (in Billions) 53](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449195)

[Figure 12 - US global military presence (2014) 54](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449196)

[Figure 13 - UN Peace Operations 55](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449197)

[Figure 14 - Potential effects of Operation Tomodachi 60](file:///C:\Users\vinny_000\Desktop\Flipping%20the%20DIME%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20American%20Society%20in%20Securing%20National%20Interests_26%20Apr.docx#_Toc449449198)

**Chapter 1 – Introduction**

It is instinctive for a United States (US) Marine Corps officer to critically examine the country he would protect to the death, but it is nearly impossible to remain objective when harboring service-oriented pride and an extreme sense of patriotism in all that is American. Notwithstanding this brand of exceptionalism, future dilemmas posed by the ever changing domestic landscape and the dynamic role of US foreign policy in global affairs warrant a learned approach to national security – the most relevant system of systems[[1]](#footnote-1). Within that purposeful system, the strategic military echelon is subservient to elected politicians, appointed civilians and engaged citizens while a series of interwoven processes influence the when, where, why and how the US pursues its national interests. Against this geostrategic background, **tensions are created through the dynamic interaction of** **social resilience and grand strategic level decision-making processes in the pursuit of enduring and emerging national interests during the periods between wars.** And it is the complicated relationship of a ‘melting pot’[[2]](#footnote-2) society to the other sources and elements of national power in the broader context of the US national security system, that is most intriguing for a practitioner of strategy. This paper will present a super power's approach to non-existential threats and its exhaustive use of ‘soft power’[[3]](#footnote-3) interventions during these periods of relative peace. The final analysis will either corroborate or contradict the relevance of American society and the national social resilience process in the study and practice of US national security strategy.

So why is the paper titled "Flipping the DIME"? On one hand, the traditional elements of national power as described in *Figure 1* – diplomatic, informational, military and economic – as well as the more recently articulated sources of power – finance, intelligence and law enforcement – are universally recognized across US national security architecture. On the other hand, the factors most commonly assessed by strategists in their analysis of a particular operational/strategic environment or center of gravity (CoG)[[4]](#footnote-4) of an opposing actor is – political, military, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time. The DIME-FIL and PMESII-PT memory aids seem to complement each from opposite sides of the ends-ways-means methodology as one model considers the friendly strategy and the other seeks to target the adversary’s sources of power. But however revered in today’s strategic thinking, social processes are rarely internalized in terms of friendly considerations in the decision-making process (DMP). As a matter of fact, the same holistic approach used by technocrats and military strategists alike to better understand external variables that comprise the opposing system, rarely calculates domestic factors, including US society – a pivotal sphere in the American security system.




Figure 1- The Elements of US National Power

This most relevant axis, along with its associative nodes, symbolizes the widespread critical requirements and processes of the collective population. Sometimes these nodes materialize as critical vulnerabilities in the media, the voting booth or the halls of Congress. However, the societal sphere’s most fundamental requirement – social resilience – is a defining phenomenon that organizes a pivotal set of capabilities across the entire system. And when the population, as the friendly CoG, is targeted by foreign state or non-state actors, social resilience can become the touchstone for the advancement of national interests. As such, from here forward this interdisciplinary social process will be referred to as national social resilience. Moreover, since it is a national level process, one with a parochial yet responsive rhythm, its possibilities are endless during times of war and peace. In that regard, the power of the societal sphere, detectable through the will of the American people, can be the hidden strength in US national security strategy – a relative advantage that can only be found on the flipside of the ‘dime’.

As an extension of the people’s will, strategic military leaders along with the custodians of the other elements of national power are expected to protect society, especially when it is considered the country’s primary point of balance – the strategic CoG. In a systems analysis, the CoG can be a collection of decisive points that cross boundaries. As depicted in *Figure 2*, a series of nodes and links portray a close relationship between the military, political and social spheres. In the US these three axes should never act in isolation, particularly in the strategic DMP. Instead, the relationship is best characterized as a ‘social contract’[[5]](#footnote-5), an agreement forever enshrined by the founding fathers of the American nation. While perhaps risking over simplification, for the purposes of this paper, the most renowned theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau will be held in abeyance to make way for the author’s interpretation. The social pact described in this paper is simply the dynamic system that represents the critical and convertible relationship between three overlapping spheres - the people, the government (state) and the military.




Figure 2 - CoG Systems Analysis

**The Research Aim**

In terms of national social resilience, each purposeful sphere within the broader system must be emboldened while maintaining a connection to, and striking a balance of trust with, the other signatories to the social contract. And for a ‘Republic’[[6]](#footnote-6) that pursues its national interests through a wide range of ways and means, the will of the people is the most important variable in the system. Consequently, the tensions created within the societal sphere that manifest themselves in the social resilience process can and should be factored into the strategic calculus. Yet, in the American national security system of systems, an ecosystem in and of itself, the role of US society is at times underplayed by today's grand strategic level decision-makers, particularly when not prosecuting a traditional war. Furthermore, the societal sphere is not a main focus of national security studies at today's top level US professional military education (PME) institutions. This path is inconsistent with the importance normally placed on public opinion, as an expression of the predominant narrative, in shaping national interests during war; and more aptly, when strategic level leaders formulate grand strategies that are highly leveraged by operations other than war (OOTW)[[7]](#footnote-7). Therefore, the seamlines that may already exist and the national level tensions that could be created by the potential divergence of US society and existing civil-military strategic DMP mechanisms are worthy of analysis. It is the opinion of the author that ignoring the possibility of such phenomena creates an unacceptable level of risk for beltway[[8]](#footnote-8) decision-makers – a cognitive dissonance that will be resolved in this monograph. The analytical approach will require the un-packaging of select aspects of the US national security system to best understand its key components before assembling a theory on the issue at hand.

**Chapter Layout:**

In simple terms the paper is organized into five chapters, the first of which is this introduction that provides the basis and framework for the research as well as a glimpse into the conclusions found in the last chapter. It contained a short explanation of the social contract – the military-society-government relationship inherent to a western style democracy – and also included a short explanation of other foundational concepts that are essential to the central premise. The main purpose of the introduction was to create a conceptual springboard that frames the strategic environment in which a super power's security apparatus must decide and act in the 21st century

Chapter 2 will continue laying the foundation by breaking down US national security as it is conceptualized at the grand strategic level, while also framing the global situation as seen through the lens of a super power. To that end, key excerpts have been selected from US government (USG) policy level documents that makeup up the national strategy hierarchy. Other joint doctrinal references will be used to highlight national security priorities, vis-à-vis the pursuit of national interests over the last few decades of US hegemony. The chapter will build on the notion of national interests before going into great detail on what constitutes OOTW. And to set the stage for the practical application models in Chapter 4, the military contribution to crisis response and contingency operations as well as Security Cooperation (SC) efforts will also be outlined in this chapter. Most importantly, however, is the OOTW blueprint that dominates US national security strategy during periods of relative peace. The significance of this menu of activities is best illustrated along the range of military operations (ROMO) as seen in *Figure 3* above. This is no small effort as the majority of US undertakings in the contemporary security environment do not involve, or require, major combat operations as employed in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. The greater Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as well the joint and interagency activities that makeup the majority of the continuum are all in fact included in the greater scope of OOTW. In that regard and to reduce the natural tendency to overly emphasize the military aspect of national security, campaigns that exercised the use of ‘smart power’[[9]](#footnote-9) through a blended DIME approach will be explored. The purpose will be to summarize the breadth and depth of OOTW in the pursuit of US national interests across the globe.




Figure 3 - The Range of Military Operations

Chapter 3 will attempt to summarize the main features of the American societal sphere, including its critical capabilities and vulnerabilities as well as the opportunities and challenges presented in light of the national social resilience process. An upfront confession - this could not be done without previous exposure to the tensions created in the social pillar as conceived in the national resilience of the State of Israel. Although it won't be a side-by-side comparison, accommodations will be made for each country's distinctive qualities throughout the paper. For example, the differences in population attributes and the uniqueness of the US federal government DMP won't detract from the societal similarities in the two democracies, i.e. immigrant nations with common sets of values. In the end, the juxtaposition of the two models will provide a solid basis for a shared methodology on the study and practice of national security.

The entire work is designed to reveal whether there could be untapped potential in US strategy; principally, in terms of a restrained societal dimension and an indiscernible approach to the national social resilience process. An amplification of these considerations, including the dilemmas caused by the potentially toxic combination of existing political gaps and impending societal changes will be essential ingredients to future national security calculus. As a counter to these debilitating effects, Chapter 3 will lay the groundwork for a tailored approach to social resilience in the context of the US national security system. Although the term ‘resilience’ is perhaps overused in contemporary discourse, this hybrid interpretation of a very versatile process will be effectively leveraged in the final chapter to examine the US and Israeli models during periods of relative calm.

Chapter 4 will offer a snapshot of current OOTW undertakings as well as a brief selection of historical vignettes from recent US experiences abroad. Each account will indicate the potential impacts of national social resilience on the security system. Any indications of prior collisions with the strategic DMP in the long-term expenditure of finite resources and potential opportunities for metering the pursuit of national interests will be pointed out. In particular, cases where national social resilience enabled freedom of action will be evaluated against those campaigns where the strategy exhausted the will of the people. An effort will also be made to portray those episodic US interventions where a decision to pre-emptively act may have preserved long term balance in the international system. And it is in this section that the unique geopolitical position of the US and its resulting global strategy as well as the changing face of US society and the volunteer nature of the military will be taken into account. Since this chapter includes the closest thing to empirical data in the research paper, it’s purpose is to identify artifacts[[10]](#footnote-10) that signify any involvement of the societal sphere in the making, or carrying out, of US national security policy. These vestiges will mark the path to conclusions and recommendations in the final chapter.

Chapter 5 will need to accomplish a few objectives in order to galvanize the results of the study. The first goal will be to capture key takeaways from an analysis of US global security endeavors, vis-à-vis the role of the social contract system as a multi-dimensional axis in the broader national security ecosystem. The secondary purpose is to address the main thesis which argues that national social resilience is an interactive process that must be synthesized with the strategic DMP when conducting OOTW, just as in war. If the premise holds up, the study of society and the primacy of society in the prosecution of US national interests is just as fundamental to the overall scheme of national security as are the classical elements of national power. The third and final purpose of Chapter 5 will provide a wrap-up of the conclusions made in the preceding chapters while presenting some final reflections on where US strategy is headed, as it pertains to pursuing national security interests in OOTW.

The final chapter will also reapply the unpackaged version of the system of systems analysis back into Israeli national security affairs. Lessons learned from the American societal sphere examination may be relevant to the social pillar that currently underpins the State of Israel’s national security concept. And, if that is indeed so, it will be important to evaluate emerging opportunities and challenges in Israel’s very unique national social resilience process. Such an appraisal could inform the Israeli strategic-level purveyors of the elements of national power on the most appropriate application of smart power in the pursuit of their national interests. To that end, an examination of the significance of the occupation and the ongoing military campaign in Judea and Samaria will set the conditions for a useful articulation of Israeli national social resilience. Finally, and no less important to the body of work, recommendations will be made to inform future MABAL classes on the utility of their considerably extensive studies on the social pillar in its national security curriculum.

**Limitations:**

As mentioned in the chapter layout section, self-imposed limitations are prevalent throughout this study, some of which cannot be characterized as trivial. Academia does in fact thoroughly address the civil-military relationship in western-style democracies, and so to avoid confusion this paper will center on the significance of this system with regard to the national social resilience process. Also to limit the analysis in time and space, the paper will only focus on the multi-directional interaction of government, society and the military, particularly the formulation of US strategic priorities in the pursuit of national security interests following the end of the Cold War. Moreover, as a basis for the analysis and as a vehicle through which to reapply lessons learned, the fundamental application of the Israeli social pillar in national security will act as the sole point of reference for the US model.

To help visualize the US model and to create a stepping off point for the discourse on the societal sphere in OOTW presented in Chapter 4, the divide between the narratives of the Left and the Right will be presented in short. In that regard every nuanced detail of the political, military and social axes as conceptualized in the Israeli National Defense College plenum will not be presented. Specific micro-level examinations of the effects of religion, race, age, gender, etc. are examples of this omission. Similarly, and although important when characterizing public opinion, state and local level trends will only be selectively considered. Instead a broader overview of the US federal system as it relates to national level social resilience macro-processes will act as the basis for the study. In defining and describing what constitutes OOTW, the author will broaden the analytical scope by highlighting the inter-agency contributions of the US Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) policies to accentuate the comprehensive approach to particular national interests. Finally, the overall methodology will impose quantitative and qualitative limitations throughout, not to set conceptual limits on future US or Israeli national security repertoires, but mainly to leave a theoretical path open to further refining or expanding this paper’s findings.

**Chapter 2 – The US Strategy of Operations Other than War**

The national interest straddles the social contract axes and security strategy systems. It occupies the zenith of grand strategy in the policymaker’s DMP and shapes the strategic military level's thinking about the current and future security environment. Hence, elected government officials, appointed civilians and statutory military leaders that makeup the national command authorities (NCA) and the National Security Council (NSC)[[11]](#footnote-11) have a responsibility to protect the American idea. How well the people fulfill their end of the social bargain is another matter, for to close the loop in the national resilience process a responsible citizen must be socially aware and politically informed. Yet even amongst like-minded, advanced, western-style democracies, the people's level of concern varies from society to society and rises and falls with the passage of time according to the particular geostrategic situation. In a healthy security system, the particular ends-ways-means methodology in which strategic decision-makes choose to pursue the national interest resonates across society in concert with, or against, the people's will.

In the US, there is still a place for the reciprocation of the society's influence on strategy and the ongoing DMP by way of popular movements, voting trends, or a particular cohesive sentiment that cross constituencies. The two relational forces – the nationwide feeling and campaign strategy, as well as the process that ties them together – national social resilience, are constantly interacting in a fluid national security system of systems. This chapter lays the foundation for that system by illustrating the current US strategic approach and the manner in which a super power addresses its challenges and opportunities in the steady state security environment.

**In Pursuit of the US National Interest:**

For the purposes of this examination, the national interest is the vital basis on which the people of any sovereign state are willing to expend blood and treasure in defense of their way of life. In a democratic society, the national interest usually incorporates security and resource concerns along with value-driven obligations to create a balance in the use of force against perceived threats. (Huntington, 1997, p. 35) In the post-Cold War era, national security and American values have found a way to coexist, even when there was little agreement between the demands of super power foreign policy and moral demands. In such a relationship broad public support does not naturally conform to government efforts, creating tension in the national social resilience process. As described by Walter Lippmann[[12]](#footnote-12), what remains is either a gap or a surplus in the strategic decision-maker’s options and overall capacity to lead.

In the contemporary security environment, the US exists in a surplus situation where there is a need to find purposes in which to use the elements of US national power because of the absence of a peer competitor or any existential threat. (Huntington, 1997, p. 36) In such a strategic situation, support for major foreign policy initiatives can quickly dwindle, especially amongst those who choose to assume global disorder is not an American problem. Large segments of society do not see any benefit to dedicating resources via an unplanned military strategy or hidden foreign aid budget that permits an unrestrained expansion of democracy initiatives and other unilateral interventions. However, this trend toward an expansion of US global influence has uncontrollably grown since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

As such, the US Congress began authorizing the DoD to provide direct assistance to foreign militaries in the 1990s when it began asking the Pentagon to train and equip western hemisphere militaries, an authority traditionally oversaw by the DoS. This authority has now metastasized into a broader and less visible mission set – building partner capacity (BPC) – making it difficult to calculate the cost and effectiveness of each country program. According to a recent Research and Development (RAND) Corporation study, “since 9/11, these programs have surged in both size and number and the Pentagon now has at least 70 different authorities under which it provides BPC to confront myriad challenges around the world. In total, the DoD has spent at least $122 billion arming and training foreign partners in the past 15 years”. (Ravinsky & Lumpe, 2016) In clear opposition to this trend, a clear and transparent articulation of the ways and means in which national security policies will be pursued is a necessary aspect of strategic leadership in creating consensus on the national interest.

Accordingly, the February 2015 edition of the National Security Strategy, which is the highest level US policy-shaping document, provides a vision for government leadership; clarifying the purpose of American power in advancing national interests and values.

Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth—America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead. The United States will always defend our interests and uphold our commitments to allies and partners. But, we have to make hard choices among many competing priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we make decisions based upon fear. (Obama, 2015, p. 1)

The enduring US national interests that President Obama refers to are: (1) The security of the US, its citizens, allies and partners; (2) a strong, innovative, and growing economy in an open international economic system; (3) respect for universal values at home and around the world; and (4) a rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. (Obama, 2015, p. 2) These interests are the bedrock of a comprehensive foreign and domestic policy agenda that guides security system processes and manages finite national resources. And since they are constantly subjected to political wrangling, long term strategic priorities usually fall subordinate to more obvious national security risks, the least of which are not threats against the homeland originating from ungoverned spaces and weak or failed states.

While not setting aside the notion of existential threats, a broad outlook on US leadership on the international stage is not possible without an understanding of the grand strategic endstate in the steady state security situation, in which a whole-of-government approach must be employed. The policy discourse is also compounded by a contemporary and future security environment that is characterized by increasing unpredictability, fluidity and interconnectedness. Consequently, the operational environment (OE) constantly presents an array of new challenges which demand a comprehensive effort by joint and interagency forces. Recent security environment forecast published by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Combat Development and Integration Futures Directorate presented the following:

“The challenges to global stability, prosperity, and peace in the 21st century are vastly more complex and uncertain than those of the last century. Globalization is contributing to increased political, military, and economic competition and increased velocity of change in a more connected, interactive, information-driven international environment. Effective planning in this situation calls for enhanced foresight and revitalized efforts to study the future.” (Killea, 2015)

With increasing implications to the US homeland this sort of strategic thinking relies on a strong military that is constantly and globally engaged to shape the OE and to preserve a network of alliances. In such a context, a global posture to control escalation is of the utmost importance as a hedge against unpredictability. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015) Additionally, this kind of future requires designated strategic approaches, normally categorized into ends, ways and means[[13]](#footnote-13). One such methodical grouping that relies on foreign assistance efforts can be captured under the moniker Security Cooperation (SC). Perhaps not on in theory, but certainly in practice, SC activities are considerably broad, consuming a great deal of the defense budget – see *Figure 4*[[14]](#footnote-14) below.




Figure 4 - US spending on SC from 1991-2008

So what does all of this mean? Future priorities for the US military’s joint force fortified with interagency enablers will be focused on maintaining a global forward-deployed presence and conducting SC activities that increase capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression or defeat transnational threats.

Security cooperation activities are at the heart of our efforts to provide a stabilizing presence in forward theaters. These build relationships that serve mutual security interests. They also develop partner military capabilities for self-defense and support to multinational operations. Through such activities, we coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners to build cultural awareness and affirm relationships that increase regional stability. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015, p. 10)

SC activities are conducted in several ways across the ROMO, from humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations to crises response and the conduct of limited contingency operations. Some of these ways would tend to employ a heavier does of kinetic means such as combating terrorism and defeating adversaries. However, all of these military-centric missions support the use of ‘smart power’ – a balance of diplomatic, informational, and economic activities that promote US enduring national interests.

In specifying the DoD’s role in security policy, the US Secretary of Defense has interpreted those national interests found in the National Security Strategy into national security interests (NSIs), or military-related ends that the joint force must contend with. These nested priorities guide military leaders in providing recommendations on when and where the US should use military force, the type and degree of force to employ, and at what cost. And so from the enduring national interests, the US military has derived six NSIs: the survival of the Nation; the prevention of catastrophic attack against US territory; the security of the global economic system; the security, confidence, and reliability of allies; the protection of American citizens abroad; and the preservation and extension of universal values. (Department of Defense, 2014)

All NSIs are important, but not equally so, and consequently they inform the strategic DMP in the formulation of strategy and in the application of critical resources. The DoD must prioritize its missions – ways – to advise the Secretary of Defense and the President on how to distribute the force among the Combatant Commanders – the strategic military leaders of US warfighting commands. In a fiscally constrained environment this is a very politicized process, one which can succumb to popular opinion, particularly during election years. Nonetheless, the military must always be capable of conducting prompt and sustained land combat as part of large-scale operations, including post-conflict stability operations that transform battlefield victories into enduring security and prosperity. (Hagel, 2014, p. 29)

One last key policy level document that reiterates some of the same national security themes is the DoS and USAID Strategic Plan. The Secretary of State's plan lays out five strategic goals: (1) strengthen America’s economic reach; (2) strengthen America’s foreign policy impact; (3) promote the transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient world; (4) protect core U.S. interests by advancing democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society; and (5) modernize the way we do diplomacy and development. (Kerry, 2014, p. 2) At least four of these goals require soft power tools, creating a competition for resources that emerges in the national discourse on liberal or conservative approaches to domestic and international security. In that sense, it is important to recognize that not all strategies can be neatly organized under one government agency or packaged into one phase or type of campaign, unless perhaps the “dogs of war” [[15]](#footnote-15) are completely unleashed.

**War?**

Notwithstanding the introduction to the notion of operations other than war (OOTW) in Chapter 1, perhaps the most relevant conceptualization of this abandoned strategic toolbox is the public's perception of such operations as a factor of war and peace. The role of society is especially critical in the lead up to, or conduct of, any campaign that involves the re-appropriation of the elements of national power. This practical arrangement of limited resources, both money and manpower, can and should always be traced back to national interests. With respect to national social resilience as the equalizer in the national security system of systems, the policies or strategies that are the manifestation of national interests should be reflected in US public opinion. And in a situation where the subject action requires an element of legitimacy, a forgone conclusion in most of today's US interventions, the views of the international community (IC), are just as important. (Lee, 2010)

In the complex international arena, the idea of going to war is routinely reserved for major state on state conventional operations and enduring low intensity conflicts involving non-state actors. Complicating this paradigm are the high visibility counter-terrorism efforts that occur outside the boundaries of a traditional war, but still labeled as essential to the GWOT. That said, it is extremely rare for the old-fashioned concept of a presidential request that leads to a formal declaration of war[[16]](#footnote-16) to hold any sort of meaning in today's society. Moreover, other military engagements that have been authorized by Congress either unilaterally or following the passing of a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)[[17]](#footnote-17), also confuse the notion of war in a post-modern society. Although the US experience in Vietnam[[18]](#footnote-18) is invariably labeled as such for practical reasons that war suspiciously falls outside of this more formalized category.

Also belonging to this much maligned category – Acts of Congress that lead to extended military engagements involving combat operations – is the more recent US intercessions in Libya. Overall, the impact of such a campaign on the American psyche is not always driven by the effectiveness of the strategy but more likely by the time or severity of the actions taken. Therefore, the placement and timing of each and every 'use of armed force', 'major combat action', 'kinetic military operation' or any other hybrid campaign that requires a concerted use of hard power, is only as impactful, in terms of the societal sphere, as the news headlines that accompany it. This means a citizen does not conceptualize foreign policy as written by the USG or as categorized in the campaign plan. Instead they base their perceptions on a variety of assumptions drawn from main stream and social media optics on the operationalization of national interests. Resulting effects on their will to pursue a particular foreign policy or campaign strategy is a function of the national social resilience process. The American people may choose to portray a US leadership image to the IC or they may rely on a cost benefit analysis of the strategy in light of domestic issues, i.e. socio-economic situation, to guide their narrative. Whatever transpires, the impending strategic DMP is best synchronized to the ebb and flow of the resilience process, particularly when the population’s collective awareness is triggered by some form of disruption.

Therefore, a brief exploration of US legislation as it relates to war and peace is informative but not as instructive as the contemporary language used to describe the American military's actions abroad. It's fair to say that in popular terms, 'boots-on-the-ground'[[19]](#footnote-19) is how US policy makers actually express themselves today. And it's also clear the media and consequently the typical American, identifies with this language. The presence or absence of 'boots-on-the-ground' is the main determining factor in the people's collective belief the country has or has not put its sons and daughters in harm's way. Unfortunately, it is an undefined concept, one that can be easily framed to serve different political agendas or fulfill ideological strategic aspirations. But, it also serves as the penultimate form of OOTW, a form that is just as instrumental to the US foreign policy and defense strategy DMPs, as it is susceptible to the forces of national social resilience.

**Operations Other than War:**

OOTW is the self-defined niche and philosophical sweet spot this paper targets because in the eyes of US society war declarations or UN mandates are not the only source of legitimacy in a military campaign. Moreover, the entire ROMO must be considered when examining the resilience process in the pursuit of national interests. There is however, a lack of transparency throughout the OOTW menu of activities, and BPC is no exception. Today, the Pentagon is not required to provide an annual, detailed, country-by-country budget of all its BPC efforts and US taxpayers are in the dark with regards to the overall impact on US national security or that of our global partners. (Ravinsky & Lumpe, 2016) Yet, it is common practice for US policy makers to make unpopular and unilateral decisions to advance common security by encouraging a counter-culture to the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability. Moreover, US efforts to promote democracy and human rights protect core national interests by combating causes of instability and increasing inclusiveness in the political process while strengthening diplomatic and economic partnerships. In its July 2010 Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, the Pentagon is very specific in the ways it will implement strategy to promote US interests – security force assistance to train host nation forces and develop the capacity of their supporting institutions. (JCS, 2010, pp. I-16). However, the domestic impact, operational reach and strategic significance of those and other USG-led missions that fall into the category of OOTW, as well as the American society’s general trust in their merit, is not for certain.

In its broadest sense, OOTW encompasses the many related but non-hierarchal programs, operations, and activities that rely on particular *ways and means* designed to advance a common global security by assisting developing nations. Where the ways are a sequence of capacity-building actions, methods, tactics, and procedures most likely to achieve the endstate, the means are the resources required, such as forces, weapons systems, funds, will, and time to accomplish the sequence of actions. These actions are organized to set the conditions for like-minded states to be partners in addressing common security challenges. To this end the less politically charged designation of foreign assistance has taken the place of the overused notion of nation assistance to describe the USG's comprehensive approach. Foreign assistance takes on three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and security assistance (SA). (Chairman of the JCS, 2009)

The employment of the joint force in SC efforts is the DoD’s doctrinal contribution to the USG’s foreign assistance model, which constitutes the wider list of OOTW. Even though SC spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from USG agencies. (White, 2014) However, to reduced ambiguity in this OOTW analysis, the broader field of foreign assistance can be understood as interchangeable with SC because this category conjures up the widest, and still manageable, menu of activities. *Figure 5* depicts those activities designed to achieve national security interests outside major combat operations. It encompasses most of the non-kinetic efforts undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the US to achieve strategic objectives. While SC can also incorporate the other two forms of foreign assistance – HA/DR and development assistance, the DoDs main focus is on its interactions with foreign defense and security establishments. Included in its SA programs are efforts to: 1) build defense and security relationships which promote specific national security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; 2) develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and 3) provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (Department of Defense, 2008)



Figure 5- Security Cooperation Activities

Although it’s now outdated in the US national security lexicon, OOTW, which includes the conduct of military operations outside the traditional framework of warfare, is a useful theme in the grand scheme of super power strategy. In its most expansive form military OOTW once included: conflict prevention (non-combatant evacuation operations, surveillance and early warning, preventive deployment); peace keeping (observation force, transition assistance); peace enforcement (enforcing embargoes, enforcement of no-fly zones, establishing exclusion zones; peace building (military aid to civil authorities, assistance to refugees and displaced persons); and HA/DR. (Caforio, 2007, p. 174) The inclusion of all of these ways and means lend credence to the complexity of operations that don’t fall neatly into the war category but still create a massive effect over time.

Building on that idea, DoD doctrine now asserts that SC can be used to help prevent instability and reduce fragility in partner states, particularly to help prevent the development of terrorist sanctuaries or other adverse conditions in partner states. This premise— the preventive hypothesis—has become an important aspect of U.S. global strategy and an operational pillar for US armed forces. (RAND, 2004, p. 91) Following this logic, a modified definition of SC emerges – “the activities undertaken by the US government to encourage and enable international partners to work with the US to achieve security sector objectives.” (RAND, 2004, p. xiii) While most SC is based on multiple US interests, such as improved access and influence, SC does not produce instant results. Perhaps because such missions can be conducted for a small fraction of the cost of direct unilateral involvement, the preventive hypothesis is now a key part of US national security policy, codified in numerous strategic level documents. (RAND, 2004, p. 2).

Generally, SA, the largest component of SC in terms of dollars spent, is a group of programs through which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in support of US national interests. (DoS and DoD, 2012) Amongst others, SA programs include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The DoS has overall responsibility for many of these programs, but they are primarily implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at DoD (Rand & Tankel, 2015). Just to give an idea of the scope and size of the foreign assistance field, the Obama administration included over $2.1 billion in its Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget request for just two of the main programs. (Rand & Tankel, 2015, p. 6) And, Presidential Policy Directive 23 outlined the need for a coordinated effort synchronizing such programs such as these across USG agencies – including DoS, DoD and USAID. (White House, 2013)

**Conclusions**

It remains to be seen whether the military can sustain the long-term support of the American people given the ambitious mission sets of full spectrum OOTW that strain the services to their breaking point. A 2003 statement made by US Marine General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni reinforces this hypothesis and is now reflected in most recent strategy documents.

"There's a difference between winning battles, or defeating the enemy in battle, and winning the war….What strikes me is that we are constantly redesigning the military to do something it already does pretty well…..If we're talking about the future, we need to talk about how you win the peace as a separate part of war, but you've got to look at this thing from start to finish….The military does a damn good job of killing people and breaking things…But that is not the problem." (Zinni, 2003)

The greatest challenge for grand strategic level decision-makers will be to reconcile this expansive conception of the imperatives on American strategy with the constraints deriving from the nature of US society itself. (Weigley, 1977, p. 148).

Essentially, super powers are expected to contribute to world order and in that regard the US shapes the global community using smart power tools, such as those found in SC activities. But, this and other forms of OOTW can only achieve political objectives through the maintenance of public support on the home front and the legitimacy acquired through favorable judgments in the international arena. For that reason, strategic leaders must constantly temper their advice to elected and appointed USG decision makers according to changing security needs and public perceptions of the US role in world affairs. As does the strategic level military commanders, state institutions and the citizen have a role to play in the preventative strategies derived from the agreed upon national interest. In that regard, as leaders seek to mobilize support, the response signal in the form of domestic support and international legitimacy should act as a rheostat for the strategy in question. Because interventions can be lengthy and costly, it is often easier for a super power to support a structural approach to conflict prevention rather than organize reactive military engagements to every crisis. Conversely, the same global security strategy is difficult to consistently apply due to domestic tensions created by political indecision and social exhaustion. The media also plays a pivotal role in the cycle as they influence how the public responds but, unlike in armed conflicts that are highly publicized, those actions that prevent war may not be so apparent. (David Last, 2002, p. 19) This, however, doesn’t negate the need for a certain constabulary rationale in the pursuit of national interests and in that regard OOTW, just like major combat operations, are subject to IC legitimacy standards. Moreover, the national social resilience process is more vulnerable to the complexities of OOTW and is therefore subject to a great deal of uncertainty. This complexity is characterized by the following: a high demand for frequent military deployments; the blurring of boundaries between war and peace; an increased prospect of open ended commitments with unclear objectives; a lack of clarity in combat and civilian oriented efforts; and lastly, but most importantly, a steady trickle of human losses and resource expenditures. (Caforio, 2007, pp. 4-8)

The prevalence of OOTW, and its post-heroic manifestation of ‘no-boots-on-the-ground’ operations correspond to a decline in the number of declared wars between states. In this paradigm, ‘small wars’[[20]](#footnote-20) rage on and coexist alongside a robust SC strategy, significantly impacting the open economy, international politics and world opinion. As the lone superpower, the US proves to benefit from its interventions, but decisions to pursue self-serving interests through the application of costly ‘smart power’ can overexert the will of the people. Moreover, peacetime strategies hinge on the principle of legitimacy and are not measured by the use of force but instead by the requirement for public support. In this situation a super power’s OOTW acts rely on moral authority as much as they do on the Clausewitzian principle that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means”[[21]](#footnote-21). And the values that are woven into the US national fabric suddenly take the place of US military dominance, making the difference between the success and failure of a campaign. (Barnes, 1996, p. 23) In this quest for a central purpose in the expenditure of American blood and treasure the continuity of the national social resilience process is integral because "when threats are ambiguous the promotion of national values can be a litmus test for the legitimacy of US military might" (Barnes, 1996, pp. 53-4) Consequently, when vital national interests are threatened and major combat operations are needed to resolve a conflict, the maintenance of national values can over take the need for legitimacy.

In this sense, the discourse on US national interests, in the absence of a clear set of unifying objectives, can be debilitating. But, strategic options do exist nonetheless and isolationism can be avoided by remaining globally involved through the promotion of ethnic or commercial interests. However, societal tensions are exacerbated when the chosen blend of national power elements, normally organized to serve a grand national purpose, are redirected to serve more narrow transnational purposes. This is the case today as special interest groups are having a greater influence on American foreign policy today. This unsettling vector in US society can be very unsettling for strategic political and military leaders charged with translating the national ethos into foreign and defense policies. Yet it is a seemingly unescapable trend, one that must be contended with, since the lone super power is also the premier immigrant country in the world and can therefore be most affected by the shifts from assimilation to diversity. (Huntington, 1997) These tendencies and a host of other current and changing US societal sphere factors will be covered in the next chapter.

**Chapter 3 – The Significance of Society in National Security Affairs**

National security studies in Israel would not be complete without considering the dilemmas posed by the four areas that constitute its base, commonly referred to as pillars or spheres. The economic, political and military spheres are envisaged as inter-related systems in the Israeli national security concept and are most appropriately configured alongside an equally important social sphere. This sort of approach conceptualizes the critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of each sphere while always paying a requisite amount of attention to the more traditional challenges outside of the routine security situation. As evidence of this balanced approach, the Israeli National Defense College today emphasizes the criticality of their pluralist society in what seems to be a more comprehensive system of systems approach to strategic thinking. The juxtaposition of the US model and the Israeli model create a suitable framework for this analysis of a western democracies societal sphere. Moreover, and as mentioned in Chapter 1, it is Israel’s affinity for societal processes, and in particular its provincial fascination with national resilience, that provided a catalyst for this research of parallel US specific dilemmas. With this in mind, Chapter 3 seeks to create a rubric to decipher the tensions created by the changing nature of a ‘melting pot’ society in a western democracy’s pursuit of national interests.

**The Societal Sphere**

Like its adjacent axes – political, military, economic, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time – the societal sphere is a way of conceptualizing potential power of a given political player. The collective attributes and processes of that nation-state’s population is synonymous with the societal sphere that operates according to the corresponding ‘social contract’ and national security system of systems. In a democracy, these systems yield foreign policies and defense strategies through the political-military DMP and the national resilience process – the glue that holds the eight spheres together. In large and diverse or fragmented countries, smaller social sub-systems that are regionally or socio-economically constructed can confuse the model. However, those same groupings are nested in a collective population that organizes itself in response to existential disruptions. In the context of national security, the nationwide alignment of resilience factors is most relevant because its activation brings with it a source of collective purpose. For this reason, the societal sphere holds a prominent position as a source of power in a nation-state’s security concept. It’s critical capabilities, which are generated by the people’s values as well as the tangible expressions of their historical experiences can be used to prepare for crises as much as bounce back from national tragedies. (Kirschenbaum, 2004) Particularly in a situation where the coping aspect is more important than avoidance measures, the potential adaptive behaviors within a social network is where recovery opportunities in the context of national security can be found during uncertain times. These critical nodes and linkages that allow the societal sphere to pre-emptively adapt as a matter of survival, can act as a hedge against future disruptions behaviors. (Kirschenbaum A. , 2005, p. 64)

Still, the societal axis creates the most nebulous set of variables in the system, so to illuminate its capabilities in a highly individualistic post-modern society, the idea of "social capital"[[22]](#footnote-22) is important to comprehend. Social capital brings together the entirety of decisive characteristics pertaining to social relations, social trust, solidarity, or moral norms which facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit. (Putnam, 1995) Where there are common values that contribute to social cohesion and a delicate balance between individual and public interests, there are tensions. To balance these tensions, trust, which generates the most credible social capital, can be built through civic associations and when people play an active social role, they learn the importance of the cooperative network that can be built outside their more tribal unions. (David Last, 2002, pp. 74-5) In terms of the social contract, civil-military relations create a situation where the capacity of the military to reorganize itself is consistent with the will of the people. However, in the US model where a free society operates alongside a professional military the social capital created by the more dominant system – the American people – can overtake the strategic decision-makers, destabilizing the system over time. (David Last, 2002, p. 78)

With regard to the national security apparatus, social capital is a resource associated with frequent social interactions and based on mutual commitment to a common goal. (Amit & Fleischer, 2005, p. 94) There are two versions – *bonding*, i.e. military; and *bridging*, i.e. political movements, which tend to strengthen heterogeneous societies. (Putnam, 2000) The more inward looking version of social capital – bonding – can only link similar people together, creating an unwanted byproduct of segregation. Therefore, in forging common bonds across a pluralist society, bridging capital is the ultimate goal. And because it is the toughest version to acquire, resilience capabilities must be appreciated in the context of a total population. With the proper understanding, social resilience can be leveraged to draw strength from the collective population even when there are select deficiencies in social capital.

**Social Resilience:**

Any primitive thought of "resilience"[[23]](#footnote-23) conjures up many different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In that regard when classified by type, e.g. economic or ecological, the ambiguous set of attributes becomes more manageable. Social resilience is no exception and when put into the context of national security, one envisions an even more clearly defined concept. Therefore, carrying over pre-packaged definitions such as, "the commitment of various segments of society to join forces for the achievement of common goals, in their ability to cope with threats over extended periods of time, and in their ability to adapt to changes" (Friedland, 2005, p. 8), will not suffice. The intent here is to remove the mystery behind the concept of national social resilience, creating a simple, but not oversimplified, model for application in matters of grand strategy. In this case the specificity comes with the concepts delineation as a process – a dynamic and iterative process that interacts with the national security system of systems in which it operates.

To bring the concept to life it is important to understand a particular society’s view of history, as well as the people’s perspective of present conditions. Also essential is their view of the future where the individual psyche competes against an overall national sense of pessimism in the face of uncertainty. (Arian, 2005) In situations such as these where real-time traumas dominate the society's outlook on the future, the regeneration aspect of the process can be just as important as the readiness phase leading up to the disruption. In that regard, the societal element in the four-axis construct of Israeli national security[[24]](#footnote-24) provides a platform for operationalizing the concept of social resilience. However, this model of society creates a situation where resilience would only be conceived as a single feature or basic goal in a constant state of national preparedness. Instead, society and its defining process of social resilience are more universally applicable to national security if understood in terms of their effect on the pursuit of national interests, vis-à-vis the elements of national power. This sort of systems approach provides the framework for a precise portrayal of the super power brand of social resilience.

Assuming this is true and given the cyclical nature of human psychology and intertwined aspects political and military processes, if resiliency is what gets a nation through periods of war, there needs to be a complementary dose of down time - periods of peace - for social capital to be built back up. To create time and space for this regeneration of capabilities, the state can pre-emptively invest resources to delay potential security risks or it can advocate for resistance at home. Both strategies rely heavily on the full extent of the resilience process, and are equally reliant on society to absorb stress and recover rapidly from the threat. Put into the context of the tremendous changes taking place in the world, governments today need to consider resilience as an ongoing interdisciplinary process, an outlook that can harness opportunities in the formulation of national security strategy. In order to accomplish that goal, the societal system and its key processes must receive the same level of attention as that paid to the processes inherent to the military and government spheres, mainly the strategic DMP. Only then will the entire state’s system have knowledge of the right capabilities and appropriate levers to build national resilience. (Ng, 2015)

With a view to meet this need, that is the need to build a ‘bounce back’ capability into its policies, the USG first formerly recognized resilience in its official national doctrine in the 2010 National Security Strategy, which proclaims America must “enhance its resilience—the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption.” (Obama, 2016). The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also recognized resilience in its 2014 Quadrennial Review, devoting one of its five DHS missions to resilience - Mission 5: Strengthening National Preparedness and Resilience. (Johnson, 2016) But unfortunately it’s not that simple even for a western democracy, particularly given the various national security challenges presented to a super power. The interface of pursuing national interests and building resilience is controlled by individual perceptions and society’s collective attitudes toward the strategic leadership. Within the terms of their social contract, political and military leaders are expected to constantly interact with the people to communicate a vision for national security that remains consistent with the values of the society at large. (Hogan, 2007) It is through this individual level of synergy that a security system thrives.

In his graphic representation of national resilience during war – Dr. Lewin analyzed the factors of national resilience that act within various fields of life and discovered that strategic level leaders play a pivotal role, including setting the vision for society. Lewin's model shows the government's control over social resilience to be most influenced by their ability to project a national ethos, harness collective fear, create war enthusiasm and inspire collective optimism. This capacity is translated into an action plan that exploits strengths, protect weaknesses, counter threats and creates success from opportunities. (Lewin, 2012, pp. 272-3) As an articulation of that model, in 2013 the School of Political Sciences at Haifa University studied two democratic countries facing national threats of war and terrorism – the US and Israel. They found that perceived threats, optimism, and public attitudes such as patriotism and trust in governmental institutions, are the most critical components of national resilience. (Canetti, Waismael-Manor, Cohen, & Rapaport, 2016) These components fluctuate within the system and must be properly nurtured to maintain the integrity of the social contract in the pursuit of national interests.

As experienced throughout history, the integrity of the American social contract is heavily strained in election years. To consolidate the gains made during their political campaign, elected leaders implement grand strategies that either gain or lose the trust of the people. When these strategies are properly aligned to the external and internal security environment, the national social resilience process can energize the strategic level DMP, creating a reciprocal source of power. And the best way for leaders to invoke that power is through a national ethos. The societal factor most capable of harnessing this power is ‘social cohesion’, where the national ethos, which is represented in the eagerness of the people to share values derived from past traditions and future vision, is essential to the health of a society. (Lewin, 2012, pp. 35-9) Although less important than the emotions stirred by an inspirational and common identity, a well-known and common enemy also acts to motivate social, military and political systems. In other situations, where the security environment is impacted by a ‘new normal’[[25]](#footnote-25) of civil unrest or external conflict, political mobilization is an effective tool to ensure the coherence of the state.

Accordingly, a national ethos fortifies the State’s image by defining what is meant by ‘the people’s will’. (Migdal, 2001, pp. 33-93) It is this factor that normally dominates the DMP because of its ability to create resolve in a society and collectively inspire all components of the social contract in the pursuit of national interests. Consistent with the Machiavellian view of the outsider group acting as the necessary motivator for social order, internal divides such as those found between political ideologies facilitate the worst kinds of social barriers. (Lewin, 2012, pp. 40-2) Notwithstanding these factors that assist leaders in their choices on how to employ the elements of national power, it is clear the societal sphere, although its capabilities are less tangible, is relevant in the context of security. Its interaction within the strategic DMP is realized through the resilience process which can transform the entire system. It is as much a national process as it is a dynamic social process, a process that will be described in the next section.

**The Resilience Process:**

For the purposes of this analysis, the national social resilience process is envisaged as a recurring cycle with the capacity to regenerate itself over time – during short and long term periods of conflict and peace, as well as space – through constant interaction with the national security system of systems. The model best suited to illustrate this renewable circuit is derived from a tool for thought in the study of dynamic ecosystems. (Resilience Alliance, 2016) The “adaptive cycle”[[26]](#footnote-26) as depicted in *Figure 6*[[27]](#footnote-27) below is a methodical way to conceive the capacity of a system to prepare for disruptions, recover from its impacts, then adapt and grow from the experience. According to the model’s architect, the ecologist C.S. Holling, systems are either stable or resilient, where "resilience…is a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables": (Holling, 1973) The adaptive cycle is essentially a process by which a system absorbs and adapts to change, consisting of four (4) distinct stages that repeat and overlap across two major transitional phases. The first two stages, exploitation and conservation, makeup the incremental and cumulative foreloop while the backloop, consisting of the release and reorganization stages, is a more rapid phase leading to renewal. The two phases are separated by a disruptive event – a disturbance that is either self-generated or outside the confines of the system. The author’s rendition of the cycle as it applies to national social resilience in the security system is at *Figure 7*.





Figure 6 - Holling's Adaptive Cycle

Using this simplified version and turning again to the subject of national security, developed systems have a tendency to seek stability even after a disturbance has been introduced. But it's not always beneficial to resist change, especially in a dynamic global environment. In many cases adaptation rather than absorption may be the goal. For that reason, all three components of the social contract that fuel the national security strategy must be able to transform even when the system is absent of disturbances. And when considering a country’s level of readiness, political and military strategic decision-makers have an interdisciplinary coordination role. (Rodin, 2015, p. 136) Therefore, within the confines of the system, foreign and defense policies created at the grand strategic level should be consistent with the will of the people. Moreover, a strategic leader’s awareness of the different forces operating in one’s society, particularly those that affect the common national identity as well as the national sense of purpose, are of the utmost importance. (Rodin, 2015, pp. 183-203) Ultimately, the strategic leadership must predetermine strategies or responses that are commensurate to the synergy created across the system while always striving to close the cycle’s backloop by leveraging the system’s capacity to adapt. (Rodin, 2015, pp. 3-13)

Figure 7- Author’s rendition of the National Social Resilience Process



As in a typical DMP, the tendency is to focus on the response signal, but the real potential is found in the readiness or revitalization phases of the process. Attention to those areas of the national social resilience process is least likely because that is also where the most stability is experienced, usually equating to a propensity for resource preservation. As discussed throughout this paper, these are the key shaping periods before or after wars and it is during these periods of relative calm that key trade-off decisions need to be made about potential solutions to alternative futures. Coupled with an analysis of global patterns and insight on the character of future conflict as well as variations in the future security environment, plausible alternatives can be created that match the trajectory of political and social momentum. (Killea, 2015) In America this momentum is built out of a forward looking narrative and relies on an inclusive DMP that involves a wide range of stakeholders who understand system-wide tensions that transcend the forces at work in Washington. This comprehensive view of the political, military and social tensions in the context of the national social resilience process, especially those that create critical vulnerabilities in the system, is absolutely essential in developing security strategies.

When translating foreign policy into a strategy, military leaders first frame the problem – a step that requires a speculative approach to the future security environment. In most cases, predictions will be based on the frequency of previous events and the resulting DMP will turn out suitable courses of action to counter the most dangerous as well as most likely scenarios. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) Similarly, the foreloop of the national social resilience process should be conducted with an intent to cause a preemptive disruption that could lead to some degree of control in the outcome. In this approach, the growth and conservation stages attract the most attention because the frequency, variability and severity of each disruption in today’s complex geopolitical environment is too great to operate from crisis to crisis by making small incremental changes. It is more important to have some control over the when and how a super power’s system will react to the next global crisis, so the nation-state can balance an isolationist approach designed to only address vital national interests with policies that promote preemptive action.

In the pursuit of its interests, nation-states can take well calculated strategic risks rather than always concentrating on the changing threat paradigm. To consider the national social resilience process is to place one’s own requirements over that of emerging threats so as to protect critical vulnerabilities. In this regard, the strategic leader is the one who needs to set the conditions for the entire system to prevail. (Rodin, 2015, pp. 305-19) It takes time to self-examine and understand one’s system, but it is clear that strategizing with an intent to simply and immediately ‘bounce back’ is not always the best option for the long term viability of the system. For instance, it is perhaps more appropriate to balance the growth and conservation stages of the process against the post-crisis actions to set the conditions for a sort of ‘bounce forward’[[28]](#footnote-28) result. As such, the question remains whether the options available to US strategic leadership in their pursuit of national interests are being justly considered in the context of the changing face of American society.

**The American Experiment**

Where cultural pluralism[[29]](#footnote-29) can sometimes generate conflicting value systems or even competing national identities, in the American context it is associated with a tolerant assimilation process that preserves ethnic, racial and cultural connections. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, large populations of immigrants from all over the world flocked to America creating a society built on shared experiences and a common set of values. This uniquely multi-ethnic society continued to grow alongside a particular form of government – that of a Republic – which honors a mutual agreement between the people and the government. In its central ideas of a representative democracy, America's promise of liberty consistently resonated in the passages of the Mayflower Compact of 1620 and the Declaration of Independence in 1776. And before being enshrined in the US Constitution, the idealistic nature of the social contract was also presented in Federalist Paper no. 10 where James Madison argued for a constitutional framework that accommodates pluralism, mainly as a political basis for balancing internal conflict between competing groups. (Madison, 1787, pg. 71-78) The tensions between the original conceptualization of the American experiment and the potential shift to a more multi-cultural society is just one of the root phenomena experienced in today’s national social resilience process.

Sometimes these roots branch out to create more obvious divides, but in America it’s never as simple as classifying gaps in terms of rich and poor, black and white or any other overt groupings. This paper seeks to avoid such a myopic view and instead turns to the broader clash of the Left vs. the Right in exemplifying today’s rifts in US society pursuant to national security. While liberals and conservatives do share the same overall vision, their preferred methods to achieve those ends causes a significant split that affects the national interest. (Prager, 2012) The Left prefers a culture where quasi-pacifism, egalitarianism and secularism dominate society as much as the government, while the Right shares none of these goals. The Left sees Americans as citizens of the world, regarding ‘exceptional’[[30]](#footnote-30) displays of patriotism as conceited, while the Right expects the US to confront all evils in the world. Conservatives are in principle looking to improve on the American experiment while liberals want to fundamentally transform the country. (Prager, 2012, pp. 25-7) And when asked what it means to be American, most citizens wouldn’t find it to be an odd question, a peculiarity that can be attributed to the distinct American state-of-mind. Underpinning this state of mind is Dennis Prager’s ‘trinity’, which is really just a clever way of describing the American system of core values that was devised by the Founding Fathers, as inscribed on all US coins – “Liberty”, “In God We Trust” and “E Pluribus Unum”.

“The United States of America is not merely a geographical location. And unlike most of the worlds’ nations, Americans are not, and never have been, a race or an ethnicity. America is and has always regarded itself as an idea. That idea is a value system. And that value system – unique to America – can be called the American trinity.” (Prager, 2012, p. 311)

The central idea of Liberty, characterized by political, economic and religious freedom, is further expressed in the US Constitution’s Bill of Rights. In practical terms it equates to a small government with responsible citizens. In this type of social contract, the people must be held accountable outside of the state format, and therefore their free society trusts in God through some form of religion built on Judeo-Christian values[[31]](#footnote-31). To increase its applicability throughout society, this theology can also be pronounced in ethical monotheist terms, as done by Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin perhaps because their core beliefs naturally lined up with Judeo-Christian values. (Kidd, 2010, p. 169) Where the Right believes God to be the source of liberty, the Left argues that people can be good without God, particularly if the state is strong. Of note, the US remains one of the most religious of advanced western democracies today, despite its reliance on the separation of church and state. (Boisi Center, 2016) The last unique component of the American trinity is the governing principle of “From Many One” where the Latin motto captures the national identity outside of any single ethnicity or race. This belief that a nation of immigrants was built to assimilate people from every background transcends the white anglo-saxon protestant (WASP) look of the majority and rejects racial, tribal, familial and ethnic components. (Prager, 2012)

And so it is not the coexistence of different groups that makes America strong, it is really the ability to unify that diversity. There is, however, a tendency for the Right to magnify the trinity with a belief in the military as a force for good, using the motto to create moral confidence in US superpower values. This belief that no country or international institution can replace American leadership is contrary to a more leftist multicultural identity. (Prager, 2012, pp. 312-83) No matter the political basis, the values and self-images widely shared by Americans stand out as a primary societal source of power in American foreign policy. US policymakers seek to export its core beliefs in democracy and capitalism as well as the values of limited government, individual liberty, the rule and due-process of law, self-determination, free enterprise, natural human rights, majority rule with minority rights and federalism with the separation of powers. (McCormick, 2012, p. 11) Although US strategic level leadership had traditionally been able to define the parameters of America’s role in global security while counting on public support, since the end of the Vietnam War public opinion toward foreign policy has more commonly revealed domestic divisions on the appropriate role for the US in international affairs. (McCormick, 2012, p. 12) Additionally, it is now very common for the media to play a major role in shaping American political views and the resulting foreign policy appeal of the masses can therefore explain how the US conducts itself in the world.

Always working in opposition to the leaders of the super power system is the global security environment, and the troubling scenarios it presents; but, external threats are only one half of the equation. There are changing domestic trends that could grow to threaten democracy as it is currently practiced in the American model. (Barnes, 1996, pp. 29-35) In addition to the controversial strategies that fill the vacuum created by the absence of an existential threat, there are a host of nation-wide trends that will continue to influence US foreign and defense policy. Along with those factors that breed intolerance, such as perspectives on illegal immigration, some of the key societal sphere vectors listed by Rudolph Barnes in his book on US legitimacy and the use of force in the new millennium are listed here (Barnes, 1996):

* Disappearing middle class – economic system supports the wealthy
* Changing role of government – providing more entitlements, i.e. health care
* Racial and ethnic polarization – ‘hyphenated’ Americans creating a spill over violence in major cities
* Increasing intolerance in the name of political correctness
* Loss of separation when considering religion or race in politics
* Decline of the family – competing political rallying cries
* Focus on group rights that undermine the concept of equal justice

When looking ahead to the future of US society, multi-ethnic diversity will continue on the rise unlike in the beginning of the 20th century when Americans were becoming more connected through a sense of community. As social ties erode and political participation levels decline, hidden cases of increasing social connectedness may still occur in certain regions of the country. (Putnam, Frederick, & Snellman, 2012) However, if it is to translate to meaningful strategic impacts, the national social resilience process cannot be relegated to a regional phenomenon. When associations create opportunities for new forms of bridging ‘social capital’, those social changes should be force multiplied by technological and economic changes. Moreover, just because US social resilience is typically developed in a geographic area doesn't mean local anomalies can’t be translated into strategic gains due to the effects of social media and the world wide web. The dilemma facing decision makers is how to extend the power and reach of these gains through the system of systems in the pursuit of national interests. (Putnam & Feldstein, 2003, pp. 2-10)

So what does all this mean in terms of the US social contract? The growing divide between the Left and the Right, and sometimes the elites and the periphery, weakens the ability of the national social resilience process to support effective policies that promote solidarity in society. In an operable model, the national social resilience process creates an outcome where disparate groups unite and a situation where the state sustains their well-being in the face of adversity. (Hall & Lamont, 2013, pp. 8-13) As a result of active processes, state institutions create educational, health and financial opportunities but only as a force multiplier for cohesive social networks that promote civic engagement. (Hall & Lamont, 2013, pp. 14-19) In such a system, state institutions, all segments of a society and in some cases the military, are bound together by a series of values where the core “is the patterned normative order through which the life of a population is collectively organized." (Parsons, 1966, p. 10) This has traditionally been the case in the US system where its ‘melting pot’ society embraces an overarching set of values that tie the political, military and social institutions together. However, today the American national social resilience process is ever more subjected to the domestic jockeying between ideological groups over their conceptions of the ideal set of values that will dominate day-to-day behaviors. Against this social backdrop, US executive and legislative leaders are still expected to harness a shared sense of purpose while writing the foreign policy nested in its overall national security strategy; a strategy normally designed to portray the country’s super power status in the world. (Migdal, 2001, p. 11)

**Conclusions**

In a speech at Yale University in 1997, the US Secretary of Defense stated that a chasm is developing "where the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy-makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and so unrelenting" (Cohen, 1997) This statement was made during a relative period of peace when the US military presence across the globe supported an expanded security context. In his book "National Resilience During War", Dr. Lewin used a more scientific interdisciplinary approach to explore the formulas for success in terms of the tools, including civil-military cooperation, that allow a nation to outlast existential threats during war. He used the concept of national resilience to point out how a state responds and repairs itself following systematic disruptions with a special emphasis on the adaptation of its social order at the national level. (Lewin, 2012, p. 8) While also taking national security into consideration, social resilience is expressed in the willingness of individuals and disparate sectors of a given society to unify in order to pursue mutual interests as well as their collective ability to confront risks and adjust to changing situations. (Friedland, 2005, p. 8) With a good objective understanding of these more subjective perspectives, it isn’t hard to find the logic behind the study of the American social sphere as a key factor in the prosecution of war. There does however seem to be some doubt whether the same can be said of US society’s influence during the periods of relative calm that characterize the steady-state security environment.

In returning to the former US Secretary of Defense’s comments, the growing tendency to frequently expend finite resources in the pursuit of non-vital national interests outside the lines of a formal declaration of war, or even a UN mandate, puts a premium on political and societal awareness. Close to 10% of the current US population are veterans of the US armed forces; however only about 1% is currently serving as shown in *Figure 8*. More importantly, *Figure 9* (National Public Radio, 2016) depicts a cross-section of the military almost mirrors the population in terms of race. Consequently, it is particularly incumbent upon strategic leaders to be aware of the social forces and dominant ideologies at work in the society it protects, particularly when a voluntary military system underpins the social contract. A heightened awareness of the will of the people should inform foreign and domestic policy just as world opinion empowers international coalition efforts. And just as a national security strategy protects against existential threats, strategic imperatives for OOTW should be balanced against the internal perils of a fragmented society. Armed with its new found social consciousness, decision-makers within the social contract can orient their strategic thinking on concepts such as the resilience process. They may discover that just as in building social capital, the trust component is critical to building the national resilience needed to sustain long term campaigns where there are no ‘boots-on-the-ground’. This approach should be natural for the US military because more than any other institution in the national security apparatus, its leaders understand that mutual experiences, irrespective of a group's affiliation, contributes to an interest in preserving the rights of all within the society. (Amit & Fleischer, 2005, p. 98)




Figure 8 - Participation of US society in the military




Figure 9 - US population makeup vs. US military makeup

With respect to the enduring nature of the globalized SC campaigns of today, the societal sphere can play an even greater role in long-term, low-intensity conflicts. As discovered during the recent campaigns in the GWOT, support for American ‘boots-on-the-ground’ during the periods between wars can’t be solved with a simple social resiliency formula based on resource allocations or casualty counts. For example, in Vietnam it took three years and over thirty thousand dead US service members to reduce popular support to levels comparable to those experienced in the first years of OIF. (Weigley, 1977, p. 145) In such a case, and especially when a hegemonic super power’s existence is not directly threatened, a disconnected civilian society can naturally distance itself from the professional military culture, a separation that can also lead to a military that neglects its contractual obligations to society.

In 1997 Thomas Ricks[[32]](#footnote-32) wrote of these broader culture wars in America alongside extraordinary changes in US foreign and defense policy in the mid-90s. He wrote of the military’s strong sense of alienation from civilian society and the overreaching influence of the US military’s strategic level decision-makers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the policy-making crises. (Peter D. Feaver, 2001, pp. 3-8) The civil-military gap that presents itself at the intersection of those US specific systems is an ideological divide between the generally conservative military leadership and the more liberal civilian society. The size of the gap can change in response to fluctuations in the level of the external threat to the nation and therefore the gap must be managed before it becomes prime breeding grounds for disenfranchisement. (Huntington, 1957) The civilian leadership is best suited to regulate the gap and the US Constitution protects that principle, particularly in guarding against the dangers of a large professional army isolated from civilian society. It is important for strategic leaders to recognize that the same tensions and conflicting values that may have little effect during wartime, can completely undermine the social contract during OOTW. (Barnes, 1996, pp. 54-5)

This is a good lead into the practical application portion of this paper and in that regard, the next chapter is designed to put the relevance of national social resilience in actual OOTW experiences to the test using the following line of questioning:

1. Assuming it is a relevant axis in the national security system, does the societal sphere play a significant role in the prosecution of OOTW?
2. Is there evidence of tension between the national social resilience process and the foreign policy or defense strategy DMP?
3. Does the exhaustion of a great deal of finite resources in OOTW campaigns create the conditions for a new norm of social contract related dilemmas in a super power’s full spectrum approach to the steady-state global security environment?
4. In the US national security system, has society and the national social resilience process affected how strategic decision-makers choose to pursue national security interests?
5. Do today’s “no-boots-on-the-ground” strategies put unknown strain on US society?

If my thesis holds true and the synthesis of the grand strategic decision-making and national social resilience processes is in fact crucial to the pursuit of US national interests, my answers to all the above queries will be an emphatic ‘yes’.

**Chapter 4 – The US Society Sphere in Super Power OOTW**

Conventional wisdom suggests that a free society directly impacts a western democracy’s strategic level DMP in a way that affects the leadership’s planning and conduct of war. But, as outlined in Chapter 2, unilateral declarations of war and even coalition efforts in armed conflicts based on a UN mandate are more and more rare in the contemporary security environment. Moreover, the power of US foreign policy to secure favorable outcomes through the efficient allocation of resources, a principle normally used to justify interventions abroad, is routinely challenged in the long wars of today. Therefore, it is becoming less likely that the central reasons – national interests - for putting American sons and daughters in harm’s way will always coincide with a single and common narrative in US society. This is particularly risky since it is these themes that tell a society what they are all about, what its past embodies and its future portends, who belongs to it, and what kind of behavior will demand respect. (Hall & Lamont, 2013, p. 4) And so where it is an established fact the US has spent a great deal of blood and treasure in its post-Cold War ‘wartime experiences’, society’s reaction to the casualty counts and resource expenditures associated with the pursuit of national interests during OOTW has fluctuated in most recent decades. The significance of this dynamic in the context of national social resilience will be addressed throughout this chapter using a cross-section of US interventions overseas.

**US Social Contract Artifacts**

Today’s military operations abroad, particularly when there are no proclaimed ‘boots-on-the-ground’ pose challenges to the DMP in tandem with the national social resilience process. In contrast to Israel which principally employs a conscript force against threats to the homeland, an all-volunteer US force is routinely asked to expand their mission sets to fulfill the role of a super power in the pursuit of global security. (Caforio, 2007, p. 11) By performing well in that role, the American military has evolved from a small institution to a major presence in society, and even with the end of military conscription in 1973, US armed forces still reflect America’s racial, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic diversity. (Segal & Segal, 2004) Taking all this into consideration the military continues to reflect the demographic trends that are altering the entire American population.

With those adaptations in mind, the US military’s organization and role in national security affairs underwent a transformation in the 1980s. Defense budgets declined and force structures were reduced as the mission focus moved away from large-scale force-on-force conflicts to smaller scale contingency operations. (Raney, 2003) The overall downsizing process was accompanied by the nation’s call to partake in more operations and execute more deployments with less resources. And because in theory the US military belongs to the people rather than the executive or legislative branches, the metamorphosis bound the nation's military to only pursue war when it enjoyed broad public support. (Cimbala, 2005, pp. 32-33) That pattern delivered a total force concept that called for an increase in reserve forces to make up for the reductions in the active duty force that defined the periods between wars.

The use of the total force is just one example of the changes in US military operations of the 21st century. Also important is the overall historical context in which those changes have taken place. In particular, changes in communication technology have altered the relationship between the US military and the society it defends back home. (Caforio, 2007, p. 59) It is no longer standard practice for public officials to signal the start or end of a conflict, instead the media can serve that purpose. In some cases, social media can even be the trigger that starts or ends the process, most of the time irrespective of the sanctity of the civil-military relationship. But, under ideal circumstances the US President, through proclamation, or Congress, through legislation, has been responsible for designating the war’s start and termination dates. (Elsea & Weed, 2014)

Since the official end of the war in Vietnam in May of 1975, there have been few instances of the use of US armed forces abroad in the traditional sense of war, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 being one of those rare cases. There is then a large gap in major US military combat deployments that was interrupted by the events of 9/11 – triggering the start of OEF. At the end of December 2014, after 13 years in Afghansitan, President Obama announced the end of major combat operations in a conflict that claimed the lives of more than 2,200 American troops. The follow-on mission, Operation Freedom’s Sentinal, which most Americans perceive to be a continuation of the same ‘war’ began in January 2015; however, US conventional and special forces now focus on training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces alongside small formations from NATO allies. Turning back the clock to the Iraqi theatre, after less than two months of military operations President Bush declared that “major military combat actions”[[33]](#footnote-33) were over, yet U.S. troops remained in Iraq for almost seven more years. (Torreon, 2015).

These highly charged political-military manifestations of beltway rhetoric are also a testament to the predominant social processes that influence the grand strategic level’s DMP. Accordingly, the rationales used by administrations to justify their policies "differ depending upon the social constructions of target populations". (Ingram, 1993, p. 339) US foreign policy-making machinery depends directly upon these pre-defined agreements, meaning this is how the government, military and people define themselves in the national social resilience process. (Campbell, 1992) As such, the state’s collective leadership who make their living in the business of national security have a tendency to shape the threat to their liking despite the potential adverse effects. US strategic leaders, with a direct influence over the DMP, have a propensity toward creating opportunities for interventions in domestic and foreign policy when it is most advantageous for them, particularly. (Fordham, 1998) There are also cases where connections between identity and the national interests are less apparent, leading to increased friction in the DMP due to differences between foundational belief systems. This difference can be characterized as the State protecting the majority's right to physical security vs. the State defending basic rights and universal values through equal distribution. (Yoav Peled, 2011, pp. 67-8)

In the overall scheme of full spectrum military operations, combat capability must remain the mainstay of a strong defense including a quick response force for emerging crises. Although this principle does not necessarily apply to the employment of US super power armed forces, it does seem logical that the active duty component’s level of activity can be reduced during periods of peace. During such times, standing combat forces, not ideally suited for the conduct of specialized OOTW, must be complemented with forces that are integrated with the diplomatic and economic elements of national power. (JCS, 2014) Such a thought process assumes there is a balance in the use of force that must be maintained by military leaders out of respect for societal processes, even in the employment of an all-volunteer force. Within this temporal space that represents the American peoples’ expression of enthusiasm or exhaustion lies the majority of US historical experiences in war and peace. In such an experience driven paradox the longer and tougher conflicts increase the chances for the DMP to result in the pursuit of national goals through OOTW. This result can be further exacerbated by the effects of the mass media on public opinion, even in a Republic where the patriotic citizen's way of life naturally creates a civic appreciation for the use of force in preserving the collective. (Lewin, 2012, pp. 43-7) In all respects, the social contract although constantly subjected to geostrategic and political pressures, is alive and well in America.

**The Cost of National Interests**

Nowhere is the resolve of a western democratic society tested more than in the land, sea and air domains of a distant land – unforgiving domains that don’t always include a traditional battlefield. Since the over 58,000 service members who gave their lives in Vietnam, out of an estimated 8.75M who served, US casualty counts have not been near as high. Still, a snapshot of the relative period of peace between 1980 and 1996 indicates US military members continued to give their lives in service to their nation at an alarmingly high rate. And in the years following the mission to rescue the US hostages from Iran where eight American service members died in Operation Eagle Claw, casualty counts are as follows: (Congressional Research Service, 2016)

* Peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (Aug 82 – Feb 84) – 265
* Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983) – 19
* Operations Just Cause (1989) in Panama – 23
* Operations Desert Shield and Storm in the Persian Gulf (90-91) – 383
* Operation Restore Hope and UNSOM in Somalia (92-94) – 43
* Uphold Democracy in Haiti (94-96) – 4.

The death toll continued to climb over the next fifteen years, with a total of close to 20,000 – an average of over 1300 service member deaths per year. The numbers of wounded are almost triple that tally, but it’s also important to note that less than five thousand of the total deaths were due to hostile action, the bulk of which came between 2003-2010 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Incidentally, the causes of death aren’t exactly what the American people may guess. *Figure 10* uncovers this important backstory, illustrating that other than the spikes from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, overall death rates remained consistent through the non-conflict periods. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015)




Figure 10 - Military Deaths by Cause (1980-2010)

Where the loss of American lives isn’t the main deteriorating factor in US public opinion the monetary cost of US global strategy can have a debilitating effect. The cost of GWOT operations including both Afghanistan and Iraq reached $1.7 trillion in 2014, according to data compiled by the Mercatus Center citing the Congressional Research Service. (Rugy, 2015) Of that, the vast majority has been allocated to the DoD and so compared to past wars, US military interventions since 9/11 have proven extremely expensive. Moreover, as a percentage of gross domestic product, the defense budget, independent of the earmarked overseas contingency operations monies, hasn’t really fluctuated significantly since the mid-90s, despite the previous surges and most recent drawdowns following OEF. In contrast to a post-WWII high of almost 10% at the peak of Vietnam in 1968, defense spending as a percentage of GDP is on the decline. Today it’s stable around 4-5% but, the low was 3.7% in the lull preceding 9/11 and there is currently a plan to go down to 2.4% in 2023. (Walker, 2013) This trend does not, however, account for the over 8,300 deceased American service men and women as well as the billions of dollars spent on OOTW, which is not always politically transparent nor communicated to the public in terms of media headlines.

*Figure 11*[[34]](#footnote-34), although complex, is the best way to illustrate the budget allocations for OOTW, as defined in this paper, from 2001-2015. By percentage points the ‘War-designated Funding Not War Related’ category is not very significant but the take-away is the mere existence of such a category in the planning and execution of DoD, DoS and USAID budgets. (Belasco, 2014) Of the total budget, about 92% is for DoD led missions while only 6% is for DoS and USAID programs. Of the DoD’s cut, around 10% (close to $100B) was used outside the framework of higher profile Afghanistan and Iraq operations, some of which was to provide enhanced security at military bases.


As for the geographic scope of the US global military presence, whether forward deployed as part of a broader SC campaign, permanently stationed abroad or involved in worldwide expeditionary operations the US has a foothold on every continent as seen in the 700 military positions in more than 120 foreign countries depicted in *Figure 12.* (Washington Blog, 2014) As an example of this super power ominpresence, in March 2014 there were still close to 35,000 military personnel stationed across the Arabian Peninsula and north Africa as well as in Turkey in support of operations in Iraq. (Heritage Foundation, 2015) And for the continuation of counter terrorism operations post-Afghanistan, there were just under 80,000 military personnel stationed in southwest Asia and the Gulf States as well as the Horn of Africa and Philippines in support of OEF. There were an additional 30,000 deployed aboard US naval shipping.

Figure 11 - Estimated War and OOTW Funding by Operation and Agency, FY01-15 (in Billions)




Figure 12 - US global military presence (2014)

Although the US may be decidedly forward deployed, most operations are conducted on the lower end of the spectrum. However, the US service member doesn’t actually find him or herself in any less dangerous of a situation. Actually, today’s OOTW can be more dangerous and uniquely complex because they are subjected to a lot of changes or ‘mission creep’[[35]](#footnote-35). They often include multi-purpose objectives including combat and support to civil authorities and the local population, i.e restoration of public services, organizing national elections, establishing security forces and other SC-related efforts. The opponents in the OE are not formal armies or common soldiers and technology doesn't always prevail. Also complicating the SC arena is the factor of time – a major variable in a super power’s national security conception. Notwithstanding the goals and characteristics of OOTW, the question of when to intervene slowly became just as important as how to intervene. That is, there is still debate over the best use of the military in the conduct of foreign policy goals. In the 80s, the US saw value in stopping threat in its early stages but, from the 90s onwards, the idea has been to conduct anticipatory pre-action to avoid security risks and international crisis. (Daniel Maman, 2001, pp. 350-2) The next section characterizes and provides examples of some of the main types of OOTW from the 90s that were prosecuted for that very different purpose – to preempt future security risks.

**Peace and Crisis Response Operations**

The 90s are an ideal place to start the OOTW examination because this is a time where the steady-state security environment did not experience major disruptions. And there can't be a discussion on that period without reference to the UN Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain global peace and security, whereby members may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a peace operation[[36]](#footnote-36). Although the UN need not refer to a specific chapter in its charter when passing a resolution authorizing a peace operation, the legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII. The most commonly invoked chapter is VII which provides for actions with respect to breaches of peace or acts of aggression with a view to maintain international security. (United Nations, 2008, pp. 13-14) As illustrated in *Figure 12*, a large slice of peace operations actually require force, including ample doses of major combat or kinetic operations. However, just as linking UN peace operations with a particular chapter in its charter can be misleading, i.e. OEF was legitimized through Chapter VII, US public perception of UNSCRs that lead to the outright use of force, i.e. the 2011 military intervention in Libya, can be equally problematic. For that reason, this analysis considers UN initiated legitimate engagements that are designed to promote peace and security, but led by the one and only superpower, as prime breeding grounds for the national social resilience process to culminate. In this regard, the absence of a war declaration means most of these fringe campaigns cannot be neatly classified along the ROMO. As such, there are usually no clear indicators of the extent of US involvement nor the long term repercussions of what US leadership will entail in terms of troops, firepower and most of all money. Therefore, even with the necessary follow-on Congressional approval process for funding, the societal sphere may not have the opportunity to significantly interact within the national security system.




Figure 13 - UN Peace Operations

In summary, the US as the sole super power played a major role in the peace operations of the 1990s, even in those areas of little concern in terms of national security. However controversial, interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor were linked to the pursuit of the two main ends of US grand strategy during the Clinton administration – economic prosperity and the promotion of democracy abroad. (Coicaud, 2007, p. 135) The subsequent Bush Doctrine was a little more single-minded in that it centered more on absolute security through an offensive posture to preemptively neutralize threats that could potentially impact homeland security. This sort of American internationalism, a foreign policy that also came with negative consequences, involved the spread of American values as a means to enhance US national interests. (Coicaud, 2007, pp. 141-149)

Before taking a more in-depth look into specific OOTW it is important to highlight a watershed moment in the debate over the high-risk/low-reward criterion of peace operations abroad, more specifically the tenuous US military intervention in Somalia. The US-led force (UNITAF) in Operation Restore Hope and the follow-on US support to UNOSOM II, experienced several disagreements over the mandates and the level of security required to transition from a short-term oriented, unilateral intervention to a UN-led humanitarian relief operation. (Coicaud, 2007, pp. 39-52) Although not directly linked to this lack of coordination, the dramatic loss of US lives in Mogadishu on two fateful days in October 1993 were the most obvious negative consequences of a publicly disputed OOTW. This outcome and the impending withdrawal from Somalia reverberated throughout US society in a way that demonstrated a high sensitivity for casualties in campaigns not directly linked to national security. This in turn impacted US society, straining the national social resilience process in a way that dampened future requests from the IC and trimmed back on US interventions in similar zones of conflict. The next two sections will present further evidence of the impact two very different brands of OOTW have on the strategic DMP, the social resilience process and the overarching national security system of systems.

**OOTW Vignettes**

In the context of OOTW and as witnessed in the coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the desire to contain crises has led to the expansion of the continuum of military operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) term, crisis response operations (CRO) is used to cover the full range of UN peace operations that don’t require the invoking of Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty,[[37]](#footnote-37) These sorts of operations are a wider diplomatic approach to achieve long-term peace through a wider strategy in support of political goals. Such language opens the door for entrance into high-intensity conflicts, such as the one conducted by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. But these operations also include ‘Support to Civil Authorities’, of which humanitarian assistance is one subset in the far corners of the world. (NATO, 2010, pp. 47-9) The same principles, consistent with those needed to successfully execute CRO are used by the US in OOTW, namely SC, HA/DR and Non-combatant evacuation (NEO) missions as well as in the establishment of ‘no-fly-zones’ to name a few.

**Fukushima**

The 2011 earthquake in Japan that also damaged the Fukushima nuclear plant is selected as a vignette for exposing the significance of a US response to crises abroad in the context of the strategic DMP and the national social resilience process. This disaster response effort is especially appropriate because the event occurred in a friendly nation that permanently hosts US forces and benefits from a strong SC relationship. A wide sample of America’s HA/DR crisis response arsenal was heavily involved. From DoD, all four military services played a role, as did the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The DoS and the Department of Energy (DoE), also had significant roles in the response. Overall, the United States deployed— at the operation’s peak—close to 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 Navy vessels in support of the disaster response. (Feickert & Chanlett, 2011, p. 1) A request from the Government of Japan was received the day of the earthquake on 11 March 2011 and by 16 March “Operation Tomodachi” was fully underway with the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet operating 19 ships, 140 aircraft, and more than 18,000 personnel in support of the disaster response. By the start of April, the US Air Force had conducted 444 sorties, carrying close to 6 million pounds of cargo and the US Marine Corps, through the III Marine Expeditionary Force, was heavily involved in delivering supplies and clearing access to affected areas. (Moroney, Pezard, Miller, Engstrom, & Doll, 2013)

The Fukushima operation was chosen for two reasons. It depicts the very pure, humanitarian side of American foreign policy while also revealing the anonymous commitment of finite resources to the high risk business of OOTW. In this case, there were direct and indirect costs to pay, with the damage still being felt today. Although still being decided in the courts, a major lawsuit alleges a number of sailors and their children suffered thyroid and other cancers, leukemia, birth defects, and a variety of medical conditions including infertility after they were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. (Peeples, 2014) And because nearly 75,000 service members, families and other DoD personnel were on or near mainland Japan, the DoD is tracking potential effects on its personnel stemming from the release of radiation into the environment. The Operation Tomodachi Registry website identifies the extent of those who may have been exposed, along with their corresponding whole-body and thyroid radiation doses. A screenshot of the website at *Figure 13* depicts the shore-based locations where service members were stationed as well as the 17,000 individuals associated with U.S. Navy fleet-based locations, which included the 25 U.S. Navy ships and aircrew in the area during this period. (DoD, 2016) The USG’s post-crisis recognition of the dangerous effects of Operation Tomodachi illustrates the lack of cost-benefit analysis that may or may not have gone into this particular CRO. And though on the surface the operation may appear to have been conducted irrespective of US parochial interests, the mere presence of this great number of American men and women in and around Japan is a testament to the size and scope of the US ‘pivot to the Pacific’[[38]](#footnote-38) – a clear commitment to US national interests. In addition to setting the conditions for informational, economic and diplomatic initiatives to counter China’s influence on trade agreements, the rebalance emphasizes the strengthening of relations with existing allies in Asia and a move toward a more flexible and sustainable troop presence in the region. But, the most dramatic changes lie in the military sphere with new deployments or rotations of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore. (CRS, 2012) The operationalization of the increasing American presence and influence in the region was demonstrated in Operation Tomodachi. So where it may be expected that US service members will always run toward the danger according to orders from their civilian leadership, it’s not clear how much the American people knew or cared to know about this use of military power. This is therefore an accurate and very useful representation of the need to understand society’s preconditions for intervention as well as the possible post-crisis effects of casualties on their enduring will.




Figure 14 - Potential effects of Operation Tomodachi

**Libya**

Turning to a crisis response example from the other side of the OOTW spectrum, the importance of the US strategic leadership’s awareness of the finicky will of the American people is even more evident. Appropriately, the 2011 US-led operation in Libya, “Operation Odyssey Dawn” and the transfer of command to the NATO-led “Operation Unified Protector” in Libya has been the subject of heated debate over the purpose of international military intervention. Operating under the auspices of UNSCR 1973, which established a no-fly zone and UNSCR 1970 that first authorized robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo, member states were asked “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” (CRS, 2011, p. 1) Military operations under Odyssey Dawn commenced in March 2011 and before the transfer of command to NATO at the end of the month one US aircraft was lost due to mechanical malfunction, and a high-risk mission to rescue the crew had been executed. The estimated cost of the initial operation was close to $1 billion and therefore raised a number of questions in the media and American public eye, including the role of Congress in authorizing the use of force, the desired strategic end state and the role of US military forces in an operation under international command. (CRS, 2011, p. 23)

Like many other OOTW, this particular US intervention is an example of an operation that received support at the time of inception, due in no small part to the UN mandates. But, popular obsession by US citizens who recognized Qadhafi from his terrorist exploits in the 1980s-90s, quickly turned to contemporary political debates on the tribulations of foreign intervention. Today, the Libya affairs is remembered as a poor use of the US military in international affairs, especially since its associated with the events that eventually led to the 2012 terrorist attacks on the US Consulate and CIA annex in Benghazi. Moreover, Libya is now a case study for the manner in which supposed ‘limited interventions’ tend to mushroom into campaigns for regime change. (Zenko, 2016) It is also a representation of how OOTW can be deceivingly used to accomplish political objectives. In this instance, the American people would not have been aware of the great deal of strategic risk that was accepted in the form of coalition forces’ operational caveats and rules of engagement (ROE) constraints on air power and special forces. Conversely, strategic decision makers did not consider the amount of time and money it would take to achieve their goals, never mind the long term destabilizing and global effects of US intervention.

The question of what the military was authorized to do versus what the Administration set out to do versus what the American people expected to see as the long term outcome is the nexus of the debate. The threat posed by the Libya regime to civilian-populated areas was diminished by airstrikes within the first ten days and the coalition then shifted its efforts to close-air support for advance rebel forces. Such efforts were not transparent to the American people nor the IC and certainly didn’t trigger executive or legislative actions that could be considered publicly supported decisions. And it wasn’t until seven months after the first missions were flown over Libya, when a US Predator drone and French fighter aircraft attacked a convoy of regime loyalists, that Qadhafi was captured and then extra-judicially executed by rebel forces. (Zenko, 2016) In the eyes of the American public, as well as the IC, this marked the end of a successful NATO intervention; however, regime change was never the published end state. It would take some time to fully realize the extent of the damage but the end result, as well as the conditions that were set for future American sacrifices, did not justify such a large US investment.

**Today’s ‘No-Boots-on-the-Ground’ Operations**

Following the preceding selective OOTW review, there is no better way to examine the current US national security conception than to look at the 2016 Administration’s view of the world, specifically the Commander in Chief’sphilosophy toward foreign policy. It is still unclear whether current policies have a greater tendency to escalate threats or diffuse them but President Obama is definitely operating outside the traditional Washington playbook. At times there is a reluctance to commit US troops to open-ended wars and in other situations drone strikes are used to target terrorist suspects. (Shane, 2016) As such, security interests are always balanced against a basic humanitarian approach and kinetic force is only used when there is an immediate and substantial threat to the American homeland. This sort of ‘pick-and-choose’ intervention is unpredictable and fits very well into the discussion on why the national social resilience process must be synchronized with the strategic level DMP.

So what happens when the US doesn’t act and instead pushes regional powers to take on bigger military roles in their regional neighborhoods? Not unlike the initial stages of the Syrian conflict, a year after the civil war in Yemen started thousands of civilians have been killed and a humanitarian crisis is ongoing. Although the US has waged OOTW, providing the Saudi-led coalition with intelligence, airborne fuel tankers and thousands of advanced munitions, some critics say the Obama administration is not doing enough and other cannot figure out what the US national security interests are, an argument backed by a belief the US should not be giving any military assistance to incoherent wars. (Mazzetti & Shmitt, 2016) All along the American people are left in the dark while those prosecuting the ‘no-boots-on-the-ground’ missions continue to risk their lives unaware of the collective US population’s perspective. Unlike in a declared war or even a Congressionally approved combat operation, limited OOTW interventions clearly show the controversy over the significant gap between what policymakers tell the American people their objectives are and the orders issued to battlefield commanders. And the worst by-product of this slippery slope is the inability of strategic military leader to convey a trustworthy image to the people they defend. Unfortunately, this is common practice in the US – an inherent risk in the strategic DMP.

Turning to the most contemporary news-worthy example of not calling an operation what it really is – combat – the most recent US intervention in Iraq started with the use of military force in June 2014. In the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[[39]](#footnote-39),senior civilian and military officials often suggest the scope of particular operations is minimal relative to large-scale ground wars or worse yet, that there is no war going on at all. In this regard, it took fourteen months before the Pentagon admitted there were US ground troops involved in combat as part of the ongoing mission against ISIS. Meanwhile, because of two recent casualties on the ground the public just learned in March 2016 there is a previously unannounced detachment of Marines on the ground in northern Iraq protecting Iraqi military and US advisors. (Zenko, 2016) Yet, pleas for more action and the hangover effect of previous American sacrifices in Iraq make for a perfect storm of disturbances in the nexus of national social resilience and the DMP. This is not to say that absolute transparency over the anti-ISIL strategy to include force numbers and locations is the right policy. However, mistrust is growing based on the paradoxical position of the Administration on the 2008 withdrawal and the roughly 5,000 Americans now serving on the ground in hostile territory, a number exceeding the White House’s publicly announced cap. (Schmidt, 2016) This communication gap does seem to call for a greater degree of social contract awareness in the political and military decision-making arena as well as the public eye.

**Conclusions**

Together, the vignettes in this chapter only scratch the surface of modern day OOTW with the most common and non-descript manifestation of US foreign and defense policy being incursions that are classified as ‘no-boots-on-the ground’ operations. This sort of approach does not normally create conditions for the accomplishment of the strategic end-state through a clear set of ways and means but, instead leads to small wars, counter-terrorism and international peace keeping operations that can change the societies trying to respond to them. (David Last, 2002, p. 5) Moreover, a nation-state’s conception of war and peace emerges through their leadership’s attempt to reconcile the competing demands of security and societal imperatives. There is a tension between the perceived threats to the state's security and societal constraints on the use of force and this introduces significant conflict in the US model. Against this geopolitical backdrop, and by virtue of its super power status, the US fulfills continues to fulfill global security imperative to manage the international system through the threat or use of force. (Buley, 2008, p. 138)

There should be more occasions where military force is metered by societal constraints but, the American state-of-mind seems to protect against this tendency to some extent. As such, unique contradictions are built into the US strategic predicament – the tension between a republican ideal that war should not be an instrument of policy and the tendency to act as the global police. Also on the topic of the social contract, the military generally seeks to maintain its republican links with the American people and avoid unpopular limited wars for ambiguous political objectives. "The military's perception of the strategic imperatives on US strategy has always been conditioned by a deep sensitivity to social imperatives. The very essence of the civilian strategists' role, in contrast, is to calibrate the use of military force to the logic of national policy, a self-image less tempered by concern over the impact of this policy on the military's link with the wider society" (Weigley, 1977, p. 139) But, for a super power, decisions on when to pursue national interests abroad are not clearly defined.

Today’s OOTW are complex and time consuming but most of all they are primed for long term US involvement that equates to significant expenditures in manpower and money. When made aware of the objectives the American public, as well as prudent strategic leaders, typically demand minimum violence over maximum victory. But, even when *only* a few people give their lives or *only* a few billion dollars are spent, OOTW are much more difficult than war because of the wide spectrum of dangerous, high profile and time consuming tasks the military is expected to perform. These missions are conducted with limited public support from a US society that is normally exhausted from its previous war time experience. Compounding this complex set of circumstances, strategic military leaders are forced to leverage smart power as they manage several belligerents, reconstruct civil institutions, restore public services and train security forces all with the media embedded in their forces. (Daniel Maman, 2001, pp. 350-2)

To address political or social agendas, the media sometimes portrays select OOTW as major combat operations but it is usually unclear as to what the US is trying to accomplish and by what means. Accordingly, the nature of most military missions today is rarely consistent with what is told to the American people. In most cases of interventions in a steady-state security environment, the public is not informed of the scope of OOTW. Worse yet, they can be well informed but misled as to the role and purpose of US military forces. In an effort to maintain public support or sway it in a particular direction, today’s military objectives would be more appropriately described as a strategic risk or outside of US vital interests – a level of honesty that would bring more scrutiny and diminished public support. (Zenko, 2016) The future adverse effects of such a neglectful approach by US strategic leadership to the maintenance of the national social resilience process will be explored in the last chapter alongside the reapplication of a system of systems analysis (SOSA) on the Israeli model.

**Chapter 5 – Final Reflections and Speculations**

A western democracies’ national security system derives its power from society as much as it does from the diplomatic, military, informational and economic spheres. In the US, the severity of interrelated geostrategic issues and the expression of national interests considers first and foremost the promise of security for the American people. In that regard, national security cannot be separated from the social characteristics and ideologies of the collective population. Moreover, security is interwoven in the pursuit of national interests and the primary means of securing those goals – the military – is used in a wide variety of ways to make good on that promise. And so as to not implement a strategy that undermines the goals of national security in the traditional sense, interests should be directly tied to the society's belief system. The American state of mind, which encapsulates a set of core and multi-ethnic values is only vulnerable when the strategic decision-makers in the government use the military and the other elements of national power in clearly divisive ways. In such situations, the difficulty lies in the practices and doctrine that construct new realities.

In Israel, although associated with a different and unique set of civil-military issues, significant stress can be put on the system as a result of a people’s army carrying out politically charged and socially divisive duties in the occupied territories of the West Bank. Moreover, in Israel the military sphere intermingles to a great degree with the social sphere, creating a sometimes problematic relationship. (Cohen S. A., 2000, p. 243) Whereas in the US it tends to do just the opposite, creating a whole other set of challenges for strategic level leaders. But, one thing seems evident to both democratically led security systems – an imbalance of trust and lack of awareness between the three axes can lead to significant challenges when a state is engaged in OOTW, even more so than when at war. Building on the preceding relational analysis of the strategic level political-military DMP and the social resilience process in the context of national security interests, this last chapter will provide final conclusions and recommendations on both systems.

**Future US National Security Implications**

Historically in the US, the stability of aggregating institutions has been maintained at the high cost of the exclusion of over half of the voting population. Unfortunate as it may be, large numbers of voters consistently exclude themselves from the democratic process because they are either uninformed, indifferent or simply because they believe their participation is irrelevant to the outcome. (Aldrich, 1982) If such an undesirable trend continues, stability may continue to be achieved in the social contract because the underlying compatibility of views will eventually constitute the collective choice. Moreover, the balance between a representative legislature, supreme court and one party presidency will further induce stability in an overall smooth running society born out of solidarity in shared values. (Dowty, 2004) But, this paper does not advocate for stability over resilience. Nor does it value a national security system that is propped up by an unhealthy social contract between disconnected citizens, a coalition of apolitical policy-makers and socially unaware strategic military leaders. Instead, it foresees a perfect storm of foreign policy debates and strategic military deliberations associated with continued global instability and emerging challenges to US hegemony superimposed on the leading edge of a more socially and politically informed society. Standing in between these two future national security overlays are those entrusted with stewarding the strategic DMP in coordination with the national social resilience process

As a prelude to such a ‘new normal’ and as already realized during election years or during times of intense media reporting on key geopolitical issues, American society can be hyper-sensitive to, and a play a major role in, the controversy over the pursuit of national interests. While maintaining the trust of this more globally aware society, strategic military leaders of western armed forces are asked to train and equip their forces for a wide spectrum of missions – ranging from prevention, intervention and the restoration of order all the way to the conduct of full scale war. They are asked to think and act strategically, meaning increased awareness in the political, economic and informational dimensions, a particularly troublesome expectation when their mindset no longer entails decisive victory. (Caforio, 2007, pp. 175-6) It becomes even more complicated when imposing a more traditional political science view of this set of assumptions. Best captured by Niccolo Machiavelli, “the people tend to see the actions of the leader – the Prince[[40]](#footnote-40) - in moral terms and his actions must be guided by the amoral logic of political causation if he wants to secure the stability of the state”. (Ezrahi, 2004, p. 162) In this regard, public opinion, both international and domestic, can render even a super power and its elements of national power less effective.

**The Prospective Relationship of National Social Resilience to the DMP:**

Nationalism determines who is included and excluded from the political community and galvanizes those who adhere to its ideals into service of a greater goal. Though a post-heroic society may be trending, those who serve in western militaries continue to die for their nation-states because it defines the basic bounds of their political life. Accordingly, it is always more beneficial to the policy-makers and the strategic decision-makers when the identity is crystallized rather than malleable and fluid. (Shelef, 2010) Yet, there is no universal resilience formula designed to replace domestic vulnerabilities with learned behaviors following a disruption in the system. Challenges can be created by lack of trust as well as resistance to change and a state's political, economic or social inflexibility can result in overall decreased ability to act in times of crises. Therefore, the strategic leader's role in the DMP is of utmost importance. Those who have an ability to tie together distanced institutions and segments of the population by brokering relationships in a multi-level manner across political-military and socio-economic organizations are the kinds of leaders who can shape national resilience. (Zolli & Healy, 2012, p. 239)

As is the case with the national social resilience process, there is no one-solution-fits-all super power approach to foreign policy and defense strategy, certainly not one that is agreed upon between conservatives and progressives. The US needs inspirational strategic leaders who are in tune with society at the most personal of levels. Although individual citizens can be conflicted on the relevance of failing or failed states to US national security, most agree that in a unilateral world the IC at large looks to Washington to address the conflicts and crises stemming from those ungoverned spaces. The rest is of course unsettled for the American people, especially given the unpredictability of the current and future threat matrix. Therefore, in terms of the adaptive cycle in addressing security concerns, and in contrast to a traditional security strategy that advocate resistance and robustness, the doctrine of resilience accepts that some threats will eventually come to fruition. In such a case, society must absorb the stress and allocate resources for rapid recovery rather than exhausting them in prevention. (Ng, 2015)

Consequently, isolationism seems to run contrary to the American ethos even though the logic as to why the US should intervene, as well as the methodology of the strategy, is equally argued on the streets of small town America, in the halls of the Pentagon, the chambers of Congress and the situation room of the White House. In addition to the formal inputs from the policy makers and strategic leaders that interact through the NCA or the NSC, the ubiquitous main stream and social media arenas invite and practically empower American citizens to take part in the national security system. And in response to existential threats or life-changing events that could unilaterally destabilize domestic processes, the main players in the system are more likely to agree on the need to go to war in the pursuit of national security.

The same can’t be said of the contemporary exchange of views on the need to conduct OOTW, where the perception of ‘no-boots-on-the-ground’ changes the game significantly. As such, future strategic leaders may never have the opportunity to return to the exact modalities of the 1990s, in which a UN mandate led to the prosecution of peacekeeping operations – a modus operando that did not always resonate across the US foreign policymaking establishment. (Coicaud, 2007, p. 4) This is not to say that peace operations and coalition building CROs can and should be avoided. Rather, the new norm in a steady-state global security environment sees OOTW as a necessity because costly as they are, they are not nearly as expensive in terms of blood and treasure as a reactive posture that translates into pre- and post-conflict unilateral interventions. To that end, the latest US National Security Strategy as well as DoD, DoS and USAID budget allocations confirm the use of OOTW in the form of SC, BPC and other varieties of foreign assistance to be the ways in which foreign policy will be conducted. When executed properly, this grand strategy employs ‘hard power’ interventionism in parity with ‘soft power’ internationalism. However, this blended approach is vulnerable to politics and today’s global and domestic phenomena quite fittingly suggest an isolationist trend is on the horizon. If additionally linked to an exhaustion signal emanating from the social resilience process, strategic decisions that substitute smart power OOTW with a more kinetic-style reactionary approach to US foreign policy could be erroneously triggered.

Unfortunately, and as discovered in the Chapter 4 vignettes, the extent of the linkages between the strategic DMP and the national social resilience process are hard to diagnose. There are a great deal of professional publications evaluating the value of SC efforts and other OOTW activities but not in terms of the relationship with the societal sphere. Moreover, there is an inordinate amount of literature addressing the predominant role of civil-military relations during the conduct of war. Clearly, when put into the context of historical global realities, US strategic level leadership, as well as the public, favor intervention rather than isolation. But, the resulting global security cooperation strategy, just as can be observed in war planning, can fall victim to faulty assumptions, such as high expectations for enduring public support – a tendency that can unintentionally subvert US national security interests. Therefore, if future administrations continue with their love affair with OOTW approaches to conflict prevention, military and political strategic level decision-makers must act now. They must act to engage society to increase mutual awareness and develop a shared understanding of strategic priorities in order to improve the efficacy of this very useful instrument of the national security system. (Rand & Tankel, 2015, p. 28) Only then can policy makers ensure a return on the investment that advances American interests.

**Addressing the Flipside**

Where grand national strategy is the process by which the elements of national power are arrayed and employed to accomplish the national interests, the building blocks are the sources of that power, including the institutions that form the social contract. At its very essence, a national interest is vital, meaning the state is willing to go to war over it. The strategy-making process may be inevitably political, particularly in the areas where national interests can be divided between those that are vital or simply ‘major’. In both situations, as argued in this paper, military leaders and other government policy-makers are asked to apply their trade. And where the US wields its diplomatic, military informational and economic super powers it can easily pursue a wide range of interests. In any case, matching the powers of the state to the interests while keeping them in line with the will of the people is the primary task for strategic level decision-makers. Determinations on which elements are available and the degree to which they should be applied are made in the political realm but they are really matters of the people. “In an open society, public opinion provides the final and ultimate restraint on governmental decision making. Principles of responsibility and accountability embedded in our constitutional system mean that decisions must be justified as being in the public interest, and the public must be willing to bear the burdens that policy decisions create.” (Drew & Snow, 2006, p. 94)

To simultaneously generate success from the national social resilience process and DMP is to synchronize the national security system and it can only be done by fine tuning the balance between national and international interests. Consequently, American foreign policy is more of a strategic art than science and it can be seen as weakness on the low end or illegitimate strength on the other. On one hand, today’s Administration is challenged to envision a grand strategy that accommodates emerging international complexities while fulfilling US society’s expectations.[[41]](#footnote-41) On the other hand, the Right’s national security strategy may be more consistent with the national social resilience process as its singleness of purpose stemming from vital US national interests can make their DMP effective. (Coicaud, 2007, pp. 199-202) The main issue with the conservative model is that a reactive approach to world order could be less effective in weakening dangerous challenges beyond America’s shores. This sort of policy which is untested in the post-Cold War era comes with a lot of risk given the unpredictability of the current threat matrix. And in the spirit of a multi-polar world that sees transnational terrorism taking hold in so many places, such a strategy could prove to be inconsistent with America’s leadership affluence and the growing tendency of US society to seek involvement before being formally mobilized. (Coicaud, 2007, p. 203)

Reinforcing this current trend, the notion of a mobilized society and total war are unfamiliar concepts to typical US citizens who don’t really have a mature or sustained interest in foreign policy issues. But that doesn’t mean their opinions don’t count. Just as there is no single voice of the American people the interplay of Left vs. Right requires some level of consensus in a democratic society and this ultimately requires all sides giving something to get something else. (Drew & Snow, 2006, p. 98) And when it comes to the profession of arms, the US military strategic leader’s interpretation of the civilian leadership’s policy compromises are integral in securing national interests. Amplifying that civil-military relationship is the military leader’s personal oath to the American people, a sacred bond they and civilian decision-makers must take into consideration when implementing national security policy. (Hertling, 2016)

As a reminder of the relevance of resilience in the context of national security, a resilient system has an innate ability to reorganize in the way it serves its interests to maintain continuity in purpose. (Zolli & Healy, 2012, pp. 10-12) If strategic decision-makers are to reduce the tensions in the national security system they must become intimately familiar with the iterative and cyclical nature of the national social resilience process. Because US society is seen as less homogenous then previously envisioned, the potential power resident in the foreloop of the process can be looked at in terms of the society’s willingness to waiver personal interests for the benefit of nation interests. (Amit & Fleischer, 2005, p. 87) In that regard, a high sense of common identity and belonging go hand in hand with a good resilience outcome in the backloop.

Historically, American identity derived from a set of universal ideas and principles articulated in the nation’s founding documents. Today’s social changes have brought into question the validity and relevance of these core values and Americans have resultantly become less able to define national interests, leaving room for commercial, transnational or non-national ethnic interests to dominate foreign policy. (Huntington, 1997) A cognitive shift away from a multiethnic society to multiculturalism is contrary to the creed – E Pluribus Unum. In such a case unity and the national social resilience process will depend on a continuing consensus on political ideology, a delicate balance that could put at risk America’s power to influence the global system. As such, super power ability to induce other countries to act in the way it thinks they should act is declining in part due to the gap between resources and resolve of the government. And the most substantial remaining power to attract is through concentrated BPC – a strategy that is not transparent to the American people. Worse yet, the elements of national power in the pursuit of national interests are becoming more and more devoted to the promotion abroad of particular commercial and ethnic interests. The roots for these developments lie in broader changes in the external and internal context of US society and changing conceptions of American national identity. (Huntington, 1997) As experienced in the early 90s, the 2016 presidential election campaign presents conservative sectors of the American public that are unwilling to support the commitment of significant resources to the defense of American allies, the protection of small nations against aggression, the promotion of human rights and democracy, or economic and social development in the Third World. (Reilly, 1995)

Comprehending the US foreign policy changes in a post 9/11 world where the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the economic recession, impacted the domestic political and social environments is to understand the social tensions in America’s pursuit of national interests abroad. This includes a renewed knowledge of which groups chart the direction of foreign policy and how to effectively mitigate those critical vulnerabilities. The alternative is an isolationist approach aimed at limiting the diversion of US resources in which the grand strategy is best characterized by restraint – a policy designed to safeguard vital national interests. "A more restrained role now could facilitate America’s assumption of a more positive role in the future when the time comes for it to renew its national identity and to pursue national purposes for which Americans are willing to pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their national honor" (Huntington, pg. 49) In terms of a super power’s national security system, such a strategy would presumably limit the risk to the social contract. The opposing strategy sees the potential for exhaustion in lengthy, pervasive and costly OOTW. And global overexposure to such operations leads to a propensity to take action while publicly reporting that there are no American ‘boots-on-the-ground’, a strategy that violates the integrity of the social contract. This strategic risk can also be experienced amongst the national security axes of a regional power faced with extended campaigns between wars.

**Application in the Israeli experience**

Since this work commenced with a model and process imported from the Israeli National Defense College, the local value of the research may be realized when reinserting lessons learned from the research back into the Israeli national security conception. Essential to this reflection and speculation is the application of the research with a tilt toward the future. This alternate future sees continued threats to civilian populations by non-state actors, against the strategic backdrop of a multi-polar world. In Israel repetitive disruptions and corresponding campaigns between wars define the national interests of their state institutions, security services and the population as much as their 20th century wars formed the foundation. One such disruption, the Second Intifada, lasted from 2000 to 2004 causing more than 1,000 fatalities, 80 percent of whom were civilians. (Israel MFA, 2016) These circumstances have led Israelis to look to resilience since it characterizes the flexible capacity of any system to respond, adapt and cope with the challenge it faces. The problem is that as often found in the US model, social resilience is not always an accepted national security phenomenon. Yet, because of the Israeli affinity for learning about and understanding their societal sphere, there is a greater awareness of social resilience and the role it plays in national security.

Despite this delta in the two models’ civil-military relationships, it is important to point out the US and Israel are nations that share common value systems – democracies built on the foundations of an immigrant society. More fundamental to the discussion is Israel’s ever changing society along with its conflicted ideologies, politics and culture that have routinely played a major role in national security issues. Less important are the differences in governmental and military systems, i.e. president vs. prime minister or professional vs. conscript. In Israel the sense of solidarity generated by Zionism and the formulation of a strong collective memory sustained a cohesive and stable society for four decades. This leads to a more direct connection of the societal sphere to the strategic DMP but, the absence of a social contract or constitution contributes to instability. (Dowty, 2004, pp. 27-8) And just as is becoming more and more apparent in the US, increased fragmentation from successive interruptions in a society's way of life can reduce the State’s ability to maintain a common sense of purpose.

Retired senior officers from the IDF have added their own views regarding the importance of regime, society and army subsystems in national security doctrine. (Ayalon, 1983). In 2013, a former Israeli Air Force Chief said Israel was fighting “a campaign between wars” and that it was doing its utmost “to keep [our] efforts beneath the level at which war breaks out. Israel is waging an offensive, defensive and intelligence campaign, a complex and potentially explosive war between wars”. (Ginsburg, 2013) In such situations, there are many examples of connections between critical vulnerabilities and the societal components of security strategy. The two key elements, military and society, aren't necessarily synchronized but they do experience trade-offs and coordination mechanisms are in place to stop the cracks in society, including a semi-permeable political-military complex in the DMP. (Lissak, 1993, pp. 72-3) Still, today’s IDF is considered the main vehicle of social integration where two-thirds of the total force is based on reserves as an integral part of the main force. (Yaniv, 1993)

Admittedly, there are other key differences between the super power and regional power models. The US deters aggression and projects its power through expeditionary military missions while Israel protects its homeland on sovereign territory. However, both approaches can have the same profound effects on the people they serve. The pervasive presence of US forces in what seems to be routine OOTW, does indeed alter the strategic environment in such a way that increases the security risk to the domestic population as well as expatriates. The same can be potentially said of the IDF’s role as an enduring military occupation force in Judea and Samaria. This destabilizing effect can be amplified when Israel conducts periodic engagements in between wars for the purpose of deterrence. The Israeli concept that encapsulates this strategy, referred to as MABAM, relies on the coexistence of denial and punishment in the limited application of force. For as long as the IDF performs the duties of an occupying force, MABAM will need to address internal security challenges. This translates into a vulnerability that must be protected. In that regard, strategic decision makers can dedicate more effort to soft or smart power strategies rather than hard military campaigns. Moreover, there needs to be a renewed focus of study on the societal sphere to analyze the connections between the national social resilience process and the quick return to normal functionality following a major disruption. (Elran, 2013)

So what constitutes national social resilience for a nation-state that already places some emphasis on that process? The following societal elements can be as critical to maintenance of the Israeli national security system as they are to any western style democracy:

* Empowered citizens taking part in open foreign policy discourse
* Inclusive relations between political leaders and constituency.
* A common sense of purpose shared across the population
* A community which feels secure in its relationship to the military

As repeatedly discovered in Haifa University’s “National Resilience Project” [[42]](#footnote-42), one of the central aspects which reflect the resilience of a society is the ability of its members and the sub-groups within it to cope with disruptions and sometimes recognize even a lack of success in addressing those security challenges. (Ben-Dor, Canetti, & Lewin, 2012) The national security system is further confused if the government curtails basic rights on behalf of security policies that don’t reflect the mobilized sentiments of the entire political spectrum. Within that system, the military sphere is tested by the ability of soldiers to imagine themselves as members of a wider society where operations rely on a restrained use of force. (Yoav Peled, 2011, p. 133) Today’s complex picture of the military’s relation to society seems to suggest the linkage has been weakened, placing possible constraints on the execution of divisive military operations.

In that regard, the same gaps that exist in Israeli society are not necessarily mitigated by an IDF that fails to motivate and integrate peripheral social groups. A recognizable change in the people’s attitude toward military service is an indicator of the change that’s taken place in the security ethos, a change mostly visible in the reserve forces. (Daniel Maman, 2001, pp. 125-6) For as long as political agendas are managed through military means, the DMP will likely be de-synched with the national social resilience process. And the fact that Israel is an ethnic democracy exacerbates the security threat posed by the Arab minority so as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains ongoing – a more prominent tension than any other civil-military issue. (Smooha, 1993)

To close out this speculative section of the paper, it is important to recognize that when any western democracy leverages its social contract, the government and its security institutions rely on the strength of its society as the CoG on which the state can pursue decisive victory. In this sense, a regional power, much like a super power, needs legitimacy to win as much as it needs its military for defense. Therefore, in Israel’s campaigns between wars, protecting the national social resilience process is just as important as safeguarding the other pillars of its national security strategy. Irrespective of political views, the professional challenges and stress of military duties that exceed the collective will of the people are most relevant to a people’s army. Currently, constabulary operations and governing duties associated with the military occupation of Judea and Samaria consume approximately 65% of the IDF’s active duty manpower. Such a strategy creates conditions that ultimately undermine resilience building measures because it is contrary to preserving the inner fabric of society.

**Final Conclusions:**

Before beginning this paper, the societal sphere appeared to lay somewhere outside, or perhaps on the fringe of, the US national security system. Now it is viewed as much a part of the system of systems as the government (a nation-state’s leadership and institutions) and the military. Strategic leadership must therefore remain oriented on the changing nature of society and its most critical requirement – national social resilience. The relationship of their own critical requirement – an effective DMP – with social processes can affect the timing and implementation of a particular defense strategy. Similarly, critical capabilities (manpower and equipment), programs and concepts are influenced by foreign policy. As mentioned in the introduction, military officials have become adept at utilizing political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables as an analytical start point to assess the enemy or the strategic environment in which it operates. However, just as a linear methodology only exposes the ‘what’ but not the ‘why’ of complex systems it also restricts a holistic understanding of the domestic environment from which power sources emanate. (Beckerman, 1999)

So, is it possible that today’s policy makers can find a way to sense an impending disturbance in the national social resilience process and create a strategy that self corrects for the perceived US societal shift toward isolationism? That is not likely, even in an election year where President Obama, unlike liberal interventionists, continues to avoid overextension in the Middle East. With this in mind, the US has intervened in the Syrian civil war in a limited way – to curb the tide of ISIL – demonstrating the Administration’s real willingness to balance national interests with super power responsibilities as well as temper the strategy with US and international opinion. Moreover, President Obama generally believes the Washington foreign-policy establishment is obsessed with the sort of credibility purchased with force and he has stated that “dropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason to use force.” (Goldberg, 2016)

Despite public opinion initiated fluctuations in the strategic DMP that dictate the output of the national security system of systems, the civil-military relationship and the personal trust it demands remains strained. As this paper is being written in April of 2016, a significant number of Marines are providing artillery support from their newly established firebase at Makhmour for both US and Iraqi forces while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes the mission in his own terms when addressing reporters. General Dunford does not refer to the mission as a ground combat role and as exemplified in his statement at the Pentagon, the current policy is to avoid using language that will undergo serious scrutiny from the US Congress and American people.

"From my perspective, this is no different than aviation fires we've been delivering…This happens to be surface fires, or artillery, but certainly no different conceptually from the fire support we've provided to the Iraqis all along…So this is not a fundamental shift in our approach to support the Iraqi forces. This happens to be what was the most appropriate tool that the commander assessed needed to be in that particular location…This position is behind what's known as the 'forward line of troops…So it's by no means out in front on its own." (Schogol, 2016)

A decision on what type of assistance the Iraqis may receive in the future has not been made, nor will it or should it include a vote from the American people. However, at least one red-blooded professional military man’s opinion is that strategic leaders should now, more than ever, consider the national resilience of the great citizens of the United States of America in the who, what, when, where, why and how a super power polices the world. Opening their strategic aperture will synthesize the people’s will with the national security apparatus’ strategic level DMP. Such a cognitive shift will embolden the country’s pursuit of national interests, while simultaneously assuring US civilian representatives retain the ultimate right of decision on matters of war and peace. (Yarmolinsky, 1971, p. 420)

The last order of business is a proposal for a new and improved US national security system of systems model that was disassembled and repackaged over the course of this paper. The cover page illustration – a virtual representation of that multi-dimensional model – superimposes the social contract over top of a PMESII-PT analysis of domestic strategic conditions in tandem with the sources of power that underpin the DIME elements of national power. The State axis, represented by the political variable, also covers the government, economic and infrastructure components as well as a slice of the time, informational and physical components. The Security axis includes the military, both its leaders and the resources of the total force as well as interagency capabilities of all relevant actors. Lastly, the Social axis describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment alongside the beliefs, values, and behaviors of society members. And because US society constitutes the CoG, its processes also rely on the informational, time and physical domains as well as some of the infrastructure and economic aspects. This model matches traditional assessments while accounting for the influence of national social resilience on the grand strategic level DMP.

In closing, a deep awareness of corresponding ‘friendly’ social data is absent in the US national security model and judging by the curriculum being taught at domestic-based professional military education institutions, the knowledge crisis remains in place. To the credit of the Pentagon, one hedge against a single-track mindset at the strategic military level is international fellowship programs, designed to expose future high level leaders to the learning process and critical thinking practices of like-minded partners across the globe. It is through this refreshed and diversified perspective on the civil-military framework that strategic leaders will develop a better sense for the capacity and willingness of Americans to sustain disruptions to their normal daily life. From this new found awareness, US decision-makers can create and implement strategies that really do serve the national interest, whether there are truly super power boots on the ground, or not.

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1. ‘System of Systems’ (SoS) is frequently used to describe systems in many domains. In the context of national security, SoS are sociotechnical and purposeful systems that possess an observable structure that must drive to a desired end state, where its elements are also purposeful systems. (Smith, Harikumar, & Ruth, 2011, p. 27) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The concept of a ‘melting pot’ was best described by a Jewish immigrant playwright, Israel Zangwill, in 1908 when he wrote that America is “God’s crucible, the great melting pot”. This metaphor was used to describe the assimilation of immigrants where customs and traditions of different nationalities, cultures and ethnicities would fuse together after close contact over time. (Fuchs, 1990) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The term ‘soft power’ was coined by Joseph Nye to describe the ability to attract rather than use force as mans of persuasion. (Nye C. , 1990) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Centers of Gravity (CoG) are physical or moral points of balance. They don’t just contribute to strength; they ARE the strength. At the strategic level, they are usually leaders and populations determined to prevail. Characteristics, capabilities and locations are critical requirements for a given center of gravity, and they should not be confused with actual centers of gravity. (Strange and Iron, Understanding centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, pg. 7, 22) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The social contract often covers two different kinds of pacts, the first of which generally involved some theory of the origin of the state. The second form presupposes a society already formed and defines the terms on which that society is to be governed. They promise him obedience, while he promises his protection and good government. The society must keep their end of the bargain but if he misgoverns the contract is broken and allegiance is at an end. (J.W. Gough, *The Social Contract*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, pp. 2–3) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The central pillar of a Republic is popular sovereignty. Although the people do not necessarily rule directly in a day-to-day sense, they do rule. The Republican form of government does not prohibit all forms of direct democracy but it does require a Constitution to be derived from the people. (Amar, 1994) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The nomenclature, “Operations Other Than War” (OOTW), is somewhat outdated in the US lexicon but it is quite useful in categorizing the US security apparatus’ repertoire in the pursuit of foreign and defense policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The “beltway” is a familiar term in the USG and it refers to the greater community created by the Interstate 495 loop encircling a great portion of the District of Columbia as well as parts of Maryland and northern Virginia. It includes just about every key governmental and national security related institution in the US. It is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘Washington’ to describe the District’s. decision-making apparatus. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The hybrid concept of ‘smart power’ was first developed by Joseph Nye in 2003 to counter the misperception that soft (attraction) or hard power (coercion) alone can produce effective foreign policy. With America’s image and influence always being challenged, he proposed the US can provide things that people and governments around the world want but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership. He further stated that by complementing its military and economic might with greater investments in soft power, America can build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges. (Nye & Armitage, 2007) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Artifacts are symbols of organizational life – logos and ethos, pathways of action; primary cultural phenomena (Gagliardi, 1990, pp. 3-38) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the US President but since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the President has used the National Security Council (NSC) in the consideration of national security issues that require executive level decision. As a subset of that entity, the National Command Authorities (NCA) which includes the President and Secretary of Defense signifies constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. (JCS, 2013) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Walter Lippmann is an American writer who was most famous for his introduction of the "Cold War" concept. During the Cold War communism was perceived as a threat to both American security and American values. Hence there was public support to any effort aimed at defeating communism and thus, in Walter Lippmann’s terms, a balance existed between capabilities and commitments. With the end of the Cold War, however, the danger of a “Lippmann gap” vanished, and instead the United States appears to have a Lippmann surplus. Now the need is not to find the power to serve American purposes but rather to find purposes for the use of American power. (Huntington, 1997, p. 35) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The ‘ends-ways-means’ methodology is commonly used in US doctrine. To inform the development of an ‘end’, end state conditions that constitute success for a particular campaign, the strategist must first understand the strategic environment including the national values, interests and policies. From there, the ‘ways’ or sequence of actions that is most likely to create those conditions and the resources or ‘means’ that will be applied can be identified. (JCS, 2001) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. RAND calculations based on data from USAID, 2012; DoD and Dos, various years; (Congressional Research Service, 2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. A phrase from William Shakespeare’s Julius Ceasar where "the dogs of war" refers figuratively to the wild pack of soldiers "let slip" by war's breakdown of civilized behavior and/or their commanders' orders to wreak "havoc", i.e., rape, pillage, and plunder. (Bate, 2016) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. In the United States, only the Congress can declare war. WWII was the last example of such formal action. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. More recent US engagements fall into the category of extended military combat campaigns that have been authorized by Congress. US funding for the 1991 War in Iraq was triggered by the passing of UNSCR 689; OIF was authorized in Sep 2002 by an Act of Congress; and the initiation of OEF in 2001 was written into US law via the 'Authorization of Military Force', which granted the US President the authority to use all “necessary and appropriate force” following the September 11th attacks. (US Congress, 2001) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Of note, the Vietnam War, unlike the Korean War or other high visibility campaigns in the 21st century, was not accompanied by a UNSCR. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Although loosely used during the Vietnam conflict, 'boots on the ground', is now a cliché that is commonly used today by politicians and the media to classify whether the US is really at war. The term was coined for use in counter-insurgency operations and is now more universally used to convey the belief that military success can only be achieved through the direct physical presence of troops in a conflict area. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. As coined in the 1940 USMC manual, ‘Small Wars’ are operations where military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by US foreign policy. (US Marine Corps, 1940) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. This is not a direct translation from the Prussian general’s original German but it is a widely accepted shorthand interpretation of one aspect of his dialectical language where Clausewitz argues that war can’t be categorized as solely an act of brute force or merely an act of policy. (Howard & Paret, 1989) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The term "social capital" was originally coined by Pierre Bordieu, a French sociologist, in 1986 and is defined as the total resources gained by virtue of a group or individual's social networks or reciprocal social interactions. American Political Scientist Robert D. Putnam’s notion of social capital contains three elements: 1) social trust, which facilitates the social coordination required for cooperation between individuals; 2) norm of generalized reciprocity which contributes to the solution of social dilemmas; and 3) networks of civil-societal engagements which develop social trust, i.e. political parties. (David Last, 2002) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The term "resilience" is often used in contradictory ways– resistance and flexibility. These oversimplified meanings are not the basis for this research. Social resilience in more traditional terms is a societal attribute related to a society's ability to withstand adversity and to cope effectively with change. (Friedland, 2005) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. As prescribed in Israel's National Defense College infrastructure season, the study of the State's four pillars of national security consists of: Security/Defense (aka military); Economic; Social; and Political. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The term ‘new normal’ is a ‘cliché’ implying that something which was previously abnormal has become commonplace. It was first used in the financial sector but it is now used quite commonly in the security sector. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Resilience thinking has undergone a number of iterations since its introduction by C.S. Holling in 1973. In 1986 Holling blended [systems theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_theory) and [ecology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecology) with simulation modeling and policy analysis to develop integrative theories of change that have practical utility. His ‘[adaptive cycle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptive_cycle)’ is a useful metaphor of system dynamics that includes 4 stages: growth, equilibrium, collapse, reorientation. (Fath, Dean, & Katzmair, 2015) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The Adaptive Cycle of Renewal taken from C.S. Holling and Lance Gunderson’s “Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems” (Holling & Gunderson, 2002) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. As opposed to the more common notion of a society that acts as a spring, ‘bouncing back’ following a disturbance, some social resilience experts support the idea of ‘bouncing forward’ where society tends to have a self-organizing tendency to find a new and improved equilibrium following a crisis. (Rodin, 2015) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Cultural pluralism is a term used when smaller groups within a larger society maintain their unique identities and their values are accepted by the wider culture provided they are consistent with that of the collective society. It is distinct from multiculturalism, which lacks the requirement of a dominant culture. A prominent example of pluralism is 20th century America in which a dominant culture with strong elements of nationalism contains smaller groups with their own ethnic, religious, and cultural norms. (Hazard & Stent, 1973) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. ‘Exceptionalism’ is a term used, often with negative connotations but sometimes with pride, to portray American greatness, presuming that America’s values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. The Right implies the US is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage while the Left believes that by focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways they are like everyone else. (Walt, 2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. It is important to note that Prager only spoke of Judeo-Christian values, not Judeo-Christian theology which isn’t the same thing. The focus is on the essential values of the Old Testament: People are not basically good and they are responsible for controlling their flawed nature; Good and evil only exist because there exists a moral God to whom they are accountable; There is no sense of ‘reason’ without God. (Prager, 2012, pp. 340-71) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Thomas Ricks wrote “The Widening Gap Between Military and Society” professing that the U.S. military was at the time best placed to decide how it should be used, either at home or abroad. He highlighted the sixteen month Bosnia experience, where the military warned of the impending complications, to suggest that future Pentagon estimates of the human costs of possible operations deserve to be viewed with great skepticism by the people. He further stated that mutual distrust between the nation's political elites and military leaders could ultimately undercut U.S. foreign policy, making it more difficult to use force effectively in instances where ‘mission creep’ may occur. (Ricks, 1997) [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. This is a direct quote from President Bush’s now famous ‘Mission Accomplished’ address to the nation from the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003. (Cline, 2013) [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. CRS calculations based on published “Greenbook” data. (http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/FY15\_Green\_Book.pdf) Table 2-1 in Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2015, April 2014. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Mission creep is the expansion of a military operation beyond its original goals, often after initial successes and its usually considered undesirable due to the dangerous path of each success only stopping when a final, often catastrophic, failure occurs. (Taw & Peters, 1995, p. 22) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The term ‘peace operations’ will be used throughout the paper as an umbrella category for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and other UN or international efforts not designed to wage war against an adversary. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. NATO member nations participate fully within the Alliance and are equally committed to the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5−namely to consider an armed attack from an enemy against one or more of them as an attack upon them all. This is known as “collective defense.” (NATO, 2010) [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. In the fall of 2011, the Obama Administration issued a series of announcements indicating the US would be expanding and intensifying its already significant role in the Asia-Pacific. The fundamental goal underpinning the shift is to devote more effort to influencing the development of the Asia-Pacific’s norms and rules. Given that one purpose of the “pivot” or “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific is to deepen U.S. credibility in the region at a time of fiscal constraint, it was expected Congress would help determine to what extent the Administration’s plans are implemented and how various trade-offs are managed. (CRS, 2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. This is a Salafi jihadist militant group that follows a Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. ISIL is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Daesh or its original Arabic name - ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah. (Tharoor, 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli, in his 1513 “The Prince”, conceived the aims of princes, such as glory and survival, can justify the use of immoral means to achieve those ends. (Strauss, 1987) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. This was also true of peace operations in the 90s where the strategic leadership wanted to satisfy the American people’s desire to end humanitarian crises but it was also unwilling to put their sons and daughter’s lives on the line in a decisive action. (Coicaud, 2007) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The National Security Studies Center in Haifa University has been leading a comprehensive semi-annual survey among a representative sample of the general population of Israel. This large poll has been taking place ever since October 2000 in order to examine the manner in which Israeli society handles its security problems. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)