**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**INDIA’s SUB CONVENTIONAL WAR IN KASHMIR:**

**LESSONS FROM ISRAELI EXPERIENCE**

**Background**

1. The Kashmir conflict which had its genesis in the birth of two nations India and Pakistan continues to be unresolved to this day, fuelling a bitter conflict lasting over six decades. This conflict spawned a conventional arms race between the two neighbours which resulted in three major wars with the possibility of many more. The antagonism between the two took on a nightmarish turn with the introduction of the nuclear dimension in 1998. Yet at the end of it all, both sides seem no closer to a resolution and Kashmir continues to be the bone of contention with the sunk costs especially in political terms being abhorrent to both sides. The rise of militancy in the late eighties with Pakistan’s support has further fortified India’s resolve to settle the matter as an internal issue with the Kashmiri people. India insists that the accession of Kashmir to India is final and complete and hence Kashmir is an integral part of India and that all would be well in Kashmir, but for Pakistan's cross-border terrorism. Pakistan on the other hand, insists that Kashmir is a disputed territory and that it is merely providing moral and diplomatic support for an indigenous freedom struggle in Kashmir.

2. While the issue of Kashmir appears to be rather simple on the face of it, the multidimensional nature of the problem and sheer number of actors, many of them hidden, with stakes of some form or the other have ensured that this problem takes on the character of the proverbial ‘Gordian knot’. In fact, so convoluted is the matter that identifying the problem has itself become a source of research to the strategic community as well the stake holders that makes up the kaleidoscope of Kashmir. All in all, Kashmir appears to a place condemned to have the past repeating itself, over and over again; inflicting untold misery on a people conditioned to suffering by the whimsical currents of history.

3. During the course of its chequered history, there have been many instances when the situation in the state has passed through the stages of disquiet, trouble and senseless acts of violence, followed by periods of relatively uneasy but well established calm that afforded viable opportunities forward to a sense of stability and progress. All chiefly with the help of the Armed Forces that have repeatedly helped to pull the sate back from near situations(s) of precipice. Unfortunately, following the ‘now on’ and ‘now off’ approach, not much has been achieved in concrete by both the Centre and the State, due to lack of political expediency and short-sighted view of interests. After the hectic events of the last year – triggered post killing of militant Burhan Wan, whether it is a potent for the future or making of the proverbial storm is difficult to foretell. But Kashmir today is on the cusp of its gravest crisis since 1989, which will have a direct bearing on its future.

4. Firstly, the population seems to be headed towards its worst levels of alienation. Secondly, the local militancy has started showing signs of revival attracting large number of young men towards this path. A fissure appears to be developing between the local population and the political establishment. Thirdly, the Hurriyat after furious activity over the last year and riding on the success of its shutdown calls seems to be again coming in forefront with its separatist agenda. The state government antipathy and inability to provide good governance is providing new impetus. Fourthly, on the external side, Pakistan unable to resolve its internal issues – related to economy, internal security and unity, fundamentalism and its relations with Afghanistan appears for better or worse up in the air for the moment desperate to muddying the waters for narrow political gains. There have been heightened tensions on the LC post, increased infiltration attempts, sharp increase in terror incidents, number of terrorists killed and fatal causalities to security forces (82 last year and 26 till date this year). The ceasefire fire violations have also recorded significant increase post the Indian Army’s surgical strikes in September 2016.

5. For Pakistan, whose sole claim to J & K is based on religious affinity, conquering Kashmir has been the prime obsession since its creation. It has fought three conventional wars, Kargil misadventure aside, towards its objective of annexation of Kashmir. Internally, the India’s central government and the local authorities have also contributed by misrule, manipulation, economic misdirection and a strange almost suicidal knack of converting promising periodic successes into a quagmire. Having suffered abject humiliation in 1971 and realizing its inequity as compared to the might of Indian armed forces, Pakistan opted for the low cost, low risk ‘proxy war’ which continues to seize the Nation since 1989. The Pakistan Army and their ISI’s (Inter-Services Intelligence) so called strategy of “bleeding India through a thousand cuts” has manifested itself in myriad ways to include infiltration of terrorist from Pak Occupied Kashmir (POK) across the line of control into India & maritime borders, provision of material, ideological and military support. The major terrorist attacks in the recent past have been on the Indian Parliament (December 2001), Mumbai (November 2008) and Pathankot Air Base (Jan 2016).

6. During the last 26 years, despite severe provocations, India has conducted its counter-proxy war campaign on own side of LoC. Pakistan has employed all major components of hybrid war- regulars, irregulars, criminals, economic, cyber war in the same battle space. Regulars are providing training, logistic support, intelligence support, facilitating infiltration, exfiltration, irregulars undertaking terror strikes, criminals undertaking drug trafficking, arms trafficking, Fake Indian Currency (FICN), cyber-attacks and radicalisation of population in Jammu and Kashmir and rest of the country. Pakistan is constantly changing its strategy in Kashmir, the unrest in Kashmir post the killing of young Militant Leader Burhan Wani in July 2016, which saw more a hundred days period of most challenging unrest, was a very carefully crafted operation controlled by Pakistan and by design leaderless. The unrest saw the rise of a new kind of unattached militancy and paralysed the valley. Pakistan created a haze and camouflaged the real intent of creating uncontrolled chaos to make it difficult for security forces to undertake counter terrorist operations, while it continued to conduct proxy terror operation in J & K.

7. On September 18, 2016, terrorists attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters in Uri, near the LoC in a predawn ambush. 18 army personnel were killed and many more were injured. The heavy casualties among the soldiers caught unawares, generated anger among the people compelling the government to take note of it. India retaliated on the night of 28/29 September by launching “Surgical Strikes” by the Special Forces (SF) and destroyed the terrorist camps where the terrorists were waiting to be launched into operations on India side of the LoC. It was restricted to disputed territory, allowing India to claim it remained within what it considers to be its own soil. A relatively modest operation, it deliberately focused on militants, rather than Pakistani troops, which would have been more provocative. However, despite achieving the much desired quotient of unpredictability in nature of response to such incidents, India’s political objectives of dissuading Pakistan from cross-border infiltration and terrorism are unlikely to be consummated. An aspect evidently displayed by a spurt in terror strikes and cross border violations post the incident.

8. Pakistan has employed a hybrid threat that is physical and conceptual in its control and support of indigenous population, the support of home front; and support of international community. India is fighting this proxy war in a conventional manner by employing regulars to deal with a hybrid threat. The current strategy seems to be wearing out and the strategy to deal with it is becoming ineffective. Acts of terrorism are on the rise, the population is disaffected and masses are resorting to Intifada. This perhaps is the most ineffective way to fight this war. To secure and stabilise the ground situation and defeat, India needs to break contact between the Pakistan’s based terror modules and Kashmiri youths. At the same time economy needs to be improved, law and order situation needs to be improved and costs imposed on Pakistan.

9. The problem of J & K looms large over the Indian sub-continent and affects not only India and Pakistan but also the region as a whole. This issue gains further importance in the back drop of Nuclear status by both the Nations in 1998. A frank and uninhibited review is thus called for to analyse and suggest a new approach required towards solving this problem for good.

**Israel’s Experience**

10. The state of Israel since its formation, has faced terrorism from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, the proxy terror groups **harboured and encouraged by its neighbouring inimical states**, who have failed to defeat the Israel Defence Forces on the battlefield. The most potent amongst these, Hezbollah was founded in the early 1980s as part of an Iranian effort to aggregate a variety of militant Lebanese Shi’a groups under one roof.  Over the past three decades, Hezbollah has become a powerful guerrilla and terrorist group with Iran and Syria’s help. As per estimates Iran provides Hezbollah with weapons and spends up to $200 million a year funding the group’s activities. Over time, these efforts, have made Hezbollah into its current avatar which is a mix of military organization, terrorist group, social welfare agency and political party. At the other end of spectrum are the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihadi groups in (Gaza and Sinai Peninsula) areas and to a relatively lesser degree from Palestinian territories comprising the West Bank, who indulge in various forms of terrorist violence against Israel ***to undermine physical security and generate fear in the local population***. In the decade since the end of the second Intifada, there has been a relative lull in the number of terrorist incidents on Israeli soil, despite the periodic increase in the nature and scope of this threat in the form of **high *trajectory fire***, which has resulted in series of operations, the most recent being ‘**Operation Protective Edge’ in 2014**.

**Linkages and Challenges: India and Israel**

11. In their fight against terrorism, India and Israel face distinct security challenges. The distinctive differences and linkages are highlighted as under:

(a) The primary element that is at a variance with the Israeli model is the approach to insurgencies with in the country in India. While the Indian approach is aimed at political accommodation and reconciliation as the primary element of countering insurgency with the military acting as a support element to maintain a degree of stability, the Israeli approach seems to be focussed towards breaking the military capability of the group through targeted killings.

(b) The Israeli model relies on Intelligence to undertake clinical standoff against the targets. India has instead witnessed grid form of deployment which is more manpower intensive that increases the vulnerability of forces.

(c) Significantly, India unlike Israel does not enjoy force asymmetry and conduct its counter proxy war under a nuclear overhang entailing a calibrated approach vs Israeli model of preemptive strikes aimed at existing & potential threats.

(d) India like the Israelis have attempted to create physical boundaries to stop the movement of terrorists. Both have realised that it has its advantages, however, it will always be impossible to ensure zero infiltration. Both countries have learned over the years that terrorism is a stubborn phenomenon and when countermeasures **block one avenue** of attack, terror organisations adopt more flexible methods in changing circumstances to ***improvise*** some new means of inflicting damage. Therefore, additional measures have to be in place to fight the challenge.

(e) The use of technology is yet another force multiplier which is increasingly being seen as a critical element of counter insurgency. While the Israelis have been pioneers in this field, the September 2016 cross-border strike by India across the LOC reinforces the importance of this trend. The Indians have much to gain from the Israeli experience in this regard.

12.Despite the divergence in approaches – vast potential exists for adoption of relevant lessons into India’s Counter proxy war military strategy from the Israeli experience in the following aspects:

(a) Conduct of **preemptive covert counter proxy war** into the enemy territory.

(b) **Intelligence and information operations** with particular regard to seamless intelligence cooperation/synergy, concept of providing depth to intelligence and use of cyber domain for information dominance.

(c) Israeli system of **intelligence and operation interface** and Intel driven operations.

(d) Use of t**echnology to supplement human effort in border and physical security**.

(e) System of cross pollination and capacity building of regular forces with special forces and intelligence units and for effective counterterrorist operations.

**METHODOLOGY**

13. Goal of the Paper: To study India’s sub conventional war in Kashmir and derive lessons from Israeli experience to propose future counter proxy war strategy in Kashmir.

14. Method of presenting the Idea of Research. The subject will be dealt with as follows:-

1. Chapter 1. Jammu & Kashmir Backgrounder.
2. Chapter 2. The Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir.
3. Chapter 3. Analysis of Key Factors and Actors.
4. **Chapter 4**. Drawbacks of India’s Current Strategy.
5. Chapter 5. Proposed Counter Proxy War Strategy for India.

15. **Sources of Info.** A large number of published materials have been referred to besides the coverage from Indian National Television Channels, CNN, BBC and the Internet. Information and views were also gleaned from prominent persons connected with management of the conflict in J & K. A detailed list of references is attached at Appendix A.

**SALIENT EXTRACTS OF THE RESEARCH**

## Challenges and Drawbacks: India’s Counter Proxy War Strategy

**16. Absence of a Broader Framework to Deal with Terrorism. Armies do not fight wars, nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, rather a social activity that involves the entire nations. Carl Von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy, each play their role in war. Any understanding that war ignores one of these elements is fundamentally flawed. The conflict in J & K is becoming more complex and strategy ineffective with signs of fatigue and fragmented approach distinctively visible.** The constraints current paradigms for India, are; lack of political consistency, lack of political consensus, lack of Military (operational capacity), and lack of operational coordination.

17. **Defensive Response to an Act of War**? Pakistan is fighting a low cost, low risk and high dividend war on Indian soil, without being penalised for war and terror crimes. The unchallenged aggression in the form of infiltrating irregulars assisted by the regulars on the Indian territory has led Pakistan to believe that it can do business as usual, in spite of open war with India within and on the borders. The restrain and patience exercised by the political leadership of India has emboldened the Pakistani establishment and its army. Being morally correct has not achieved any visible gains for India—rather, it has made our security apparatus more vulnerable and led to the persecution of own population. India’s current strategy is based on a defensive mind set where infiltrators are intercepted after they come into our territory and then are dealt with through force. The **implications for such a response for India are as under:**

(a)Instability in the strategically important state of J & K that shares common borders with China as well is a major security challenge and entails continued commitment of large number of forces.

(b) J&K is being used as the pivot for planning and launching terror attacks across India with a view of conducting Pan-India Jihad.

(c) The ISI and non-state actors have managed to create an environment of **insecurity in India**. Major festivals, and the republic Day and Independence Day all remain under the shadow of the terror threat each year, the government is adding an additional layer of security any additional security layer means an encroachment upon public liberty.

(d) The success in providing moral and material support is other anti-India elements and groups is helping in making the **Insurgency self-sustaining in Jammu and Kashmir and rest of India**.

(e) By extending support to the other anti-India elements and groups is looking at alternative Bases for Mounting Proxy War. This offers the ISI an opportunity to mount a proxy war from multiple locations as well as making India’s neighbourhood insecure to sabotage Indian interests in the region.

18. **Political and Diplomatic Fault lines.** The Kashmir issue is a political contestation operating at many levels, a saga of missed opportunities despite intervening periods of relative calm and peace. In the face of positive environment the political dispensations of both hues have faltered due to lack of substantive responses on contentious issues of autonomy, economic development and the special powers considered draconian by separatists and some political parties for the Armed forces deployed in the Kashmir valley. Notwithstanding India’s standing in the region vis a vis its neighbours India has not been able to gather the required international support to hold Pakistan responsible, isolate Pakistan diplomatically or adversely impact it economically, despite proclamations to the contrary.

19**. Socio Economic Fault lines.** By and large, the Kashmiri people live in perpetual fear of a gun battle between the security forces and the terrorists in their backyard, as a result, people do not like the idea of having gun-toting jihadis among the civil population.

(a) **Persecution or Alienation of Kashmiri Awam**: Pakistan has been able to create a perception among the people and the international community that there is indeed a freedom struggle going on in Kashmir, The unrest and revolt against the state especially in Kashmir valley is today at a critical stage and cannot be brushed aside in a hope that turmoil will settle down. To believe that India by employment of security forces will be able to handle the crises in Kashmir is being economic with the truth. Kashmir has reached a critical stage where only extraordinary steps can prevent its trajectory to a point of no return. The recent **ground swell and breakdown of communication** through a movement without leadership is a most dangerous situation. The rising socio-economic inequality, poor governance, exploitation, corruption and non-inclusive growth has contributed lead to mass movements, violence, organised crimes, subversion, economic sabotage activities and terrorism.

(b) **Human dimension** of Kashmir with a huge youth bulge and high unemployment due to lack of job related skills, if not properly channelized can become a political and social challenge. Younger population is susceptible to the extremist ideologies of the inimical forces towards achieving their political gains. To fight this type of enemy with a fragmented structure is a recipe for disaster. There are enough evidences that youths from poor, illiterate and disenfranchised societies fall prey to terrorist and separatist ideologies.

20. **Military Strategy Fault lines**. The pitfalls of fighting proxy war by direct means is that India is focused on elimination of terrorists but the source of energy to sustain the hybrid war and perpetrators go unpunished. On the other hand Pakistan has manages to increase the contact area by investing in human terrain to prepare future Jihadist from within India. We need to ask ourselves whether it is the right strategy to gain victory through tactical successes without addressing the source of war. The choice is either to fight within borders and suffer collateral damage or take the war to the source of energy and make the perpetrators of the war pay the price. Surgical strikes of September 2016 did prove that Indian army is capable of carrying out strikes across the LOC up to shallow/tactical depth successfully. Is it time we replicate it more often and get the much desired unpredictability in our military response to cross border terror attacks. Other major aspects include:

(a) **Non-Unified Institutional Structure.** The internal security system is fragmented and poorly coordinated. The central and state agencies coordinate through joint committees and task forces. But these are very slow and because of mistrust, competition over resources or simply incompetence, are unable to integrate efforts in any crunch situation.

**(b) Unintelligent Intelligence Infrastructure.** The 2016 militant attacks on Pathankot Air Base and the Uri Army Base, can be classified as one of India’s worst recent intelligence failures. Lack of quality strategic and operational intelligence, lack of cooperation between the intelligence agencies, its timely interface with operational requirements, lack of incorporation of modern technological means and deficiencies in information operations at tactical level are the major shortcoming of the current military strategy.

(c) **Counter Terror Capacities: Are there Chinks in the Armour?** The Army by itself is reasonably competent to handle the challenges of insurgency and terror, say security experts; the trouble is the systemic deficiencies in timely procurement of the correct equipment, ensuring its serviceability, follow up actions on the lessons from previous incidents.

(d) **Hollowness and Inadequacies at Operational and Tactical Level**. As a direct fallout of the systemic deficiencies at higher level, the operational and tactical commanders experience major deficiencies and inadequacies even with regard to quality individual protective gear and equipment to ensure zero causalities while executing tactical operations.

(e) **Technology enhancement & Cyber-terrorism**. These have given the terrorists and their sympathiser’s phenomenal powers. Besides, effectively contributing to increased frequency and potency of attacks, cyber domain is also being exploited for their propaganda missions. Not much inroads have been made by India agencies to harness cyber with regard to internet and monitoring of social media.

(f) **Lack of Legal Laws and Frameworks**. With every passing day conduct of CT operations is becoming increasingly difficult to execute due to public resistance and ground support to terrorists. India till date does not have a comprehensive law to fight terrorism. There is a cobweb of acts dealing with issues of internal security which include the National Security Act of 1980, the Code of Criminal Procedures of 1973, the Arms Act of 1959, the Explosive Substances Act and 1908, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 and the Religious Institution (Prevention of Misuse) Act of 1988 and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990.There have been attempts made to create an anti-terrorism law, but they have failed for various reasons.

**Recommendations: Proposed Counter Proxy War Strategy**

21. **Change in Strategic Perspective: Leveraging the Tools of Governance**. The military cannot achieve everything alone; all denominations of national power (political, diplomatic, economic, information and military) must be leveraged. The Challenges/drawbacks and contradictions analysed alongside establish that, the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan is not entirely a military problem. It is, indeed, a dogma which needs a comprehensive strategy and an integrated approach. A comprehensive strategy to impact Pakistan politically, economically, diplomatically and militarily is long overdue and is required to be employed in a synergised manner

22. **Political Strategy**. No reconciliation can take place in the absence of formal or informal dialogue. Today there are no stake holders coming forward to negotiate and discuss the confidence building measure to restore peace and stability. The overall political atmosphere in Kashmir need to be changed and political deadlock must be broken. Both, New Delhi and the State government need to discharge basic duties linked with governance by developing infrastructure, creation of employability/employment, provision of basic amenities through industrialisation, increase in accountability, check corruption, increase transparency and invigorate economic activity. It must define an integrated national strategic roadmap for J & K to create a secure environment so that social, economic and political aspirations including grant of autonomy can be addressed effectively and integrate local populace with national political, social, economic, security, technological and legal mainstream.

23. **Diplomatic Strategy and International Support**. India’s diplomatic strategy must aim at isolating Pakistan internationally. In addition, the countries which support terrorism or come in the way of sanctioning terrorist leaders must be named and shamed:

(a) The time has come to redraw the strategy and area of influence to build up diplomatic and economic leverages against Pakistan.

(b) China, Pakistan’s all weather friend has been at forefront to block India’s recent bid to blacklist Jaish - e- Mohammed Chief Masood Azhar in the UN despite the US support on two occasions. Indian needs to control the surroundings to curtail the diplomatic and economic reach of Pakistan and home on to China in this regard.

(c) Economically, leverages should be applied to convince Pakistan to see the Indian point of view.

(d) India must use the Indus water treaty and **water as leverage** in dealing with Pakistan.

24. **Socio-Psychological Strategy**. Internally, efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue politically by reaching out to people should be made. Initiatives to mainstream the Kashmiri Youth must be give fresh impetus. Efforts must be made to provide justice and restore harmony among all the communities in J & K. In long term efforts must be made to de-radicalise sections among Kashmiri people and restore traditional Kashmirayiat to the valley. Strategy must aim at social empowerment:

(a) Need to control mosque, madrassa, and media for Kashmir valley narrative. The maulvis at mosques should be engaged and that will go a long way in quelling the youth and the local away from insurgency.

(b) Meet aspirations of Awam by creating equal opportunities in governance, modern education, employment and development of rural areas through alternate arrangement such as Panchayati Raj. Financial schemes of the centre must be implemented to bring more people in their area of influence.

(c) Ensure assured infrastructure growth by adequate allocation of funds in communication, power, medical and health, public works and education so as to accelerate the achievement of national aim of integrating the Kashmiris with India politically, socially, economically and most importantly, psychologically.

(d) Ensuring all feasible avenues for meaningful education and **youth employment.**

(e) Implement special Schemes for Shia, Bakkarwal and Pahari Muslim Population before they get lured by separatists to the call of Wahhabism.

25. **Military Strategy**. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment for political flexibility, so that social, economic and political issues can be addressed. The Indian experience of restricting its military operations to own side of LOC has not proven to be effective and sufficiently detrimental. Militarily the cost of terror attacks for Pakistan should be raised to unacceptable levels by exploiting Indian military strengths to target Pakistan’s weak points. Concurrently, own vulnerabilities should be secured.

26. **Creation of Leverage and Options of Fighting Terror in Enemy Territory.** At the moment, Pakistan is not paying any price for the proxy war in Kashmir and the acts of terror in the hinterland. The proxy war in Kashmir can only be tamed when it starts pinching the Pakistan army. Pakistan is as vulnerable as any other state which has a fractured society and restive countryside. India has a lot to learn from the Israeli experience in this regard.

(a) **Trans LoC Operations**. An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan, by undertaking ‘Trans LC Strikes’ similar to September 2016 ‘Surgical Strikes’ executed last year in response to the Uri incident to across the LoC and into Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). The success of the strikes have shown that the Indian army is capable of executing these operations up to shallow /tactical depth. Foreign-based terrorists have to be hit at their bases, training camps and sanctuaries to end the surrogate terrorism or the proxy war by Pakistan.

(b) **Proxy Wars More Effective than Open War**. A serious threat to our security in the immediate future would emerge from proxy (secret) wars, whether state sponsored or initiated by non-state actors. The US, Russia, Israel and China have elaborate systems in place to either initiate or to unleash/ deal with such wars to support conventional forces engaged in conventional operations.

(c) **Capability Building and Methodology of Covert Operations**.India may not be able to develop such capability overnight, but it is high time that this capability is put in place. It is imperative that based on the Israeli experience a task force consisting of domain specialists of a very high order be part of this capability enhancement.

27. **Intelligence**. The evolution of a superior Intelligence System is imperative. This should encompass human, technical, electronic intelligence, as also modernisation of data processing and dissemination both external and internal. Israeli case highlights, **‘Relevant Intelligence and Multidimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations’ as two basic conditions specified to winning the counter insurgency wars**. The main lessons for the India from the Israeli experience are as under:

(a) Intelligence **cooperation between various Agencies**. Inter-organisational and intelligence cooperation between all Intelligence agencies. The Israeli model entails close cooperation between Shabak (ISA), Military intelligence, where required with Mossad as well as the border police, prison service and other state intelligence agencies.

(b) **Breaking the Walls.** There exists seamless synergy between the Israeli intelligence agencies and the operational branch**.** In the words of the Chief of ISA, their representatives at the level of Command sit, plan think and work together for the common goal. In a manner that the Intelligence operatives are able to comprehend significance of operational value of various kinds of available intelligence, the operational branch in turn is able to generate the precise intelligence for relevant operational concerns. There are instances in which they follow the“Intel-drives-operations” approach, conducting operations to obtain relevant and precise intelligence.

(c) **Relevant Intelligence**. Capability of Intelligence agencies to provide relevant intelligence, made up of three factors- precision, quality, timing along with proper intelligence collection and analysis provides the foundation for all counterterrorism efforts. The Israeli model entails optimised integration of human, signal, visual and field/terrain intelligence and close monitoring of communication networks for acquiring detailed knowledge of the following aspects of enemy (terror organisations) in this regard:

(i) Awareness of basic interests/ Why? Basis/likelihood of the infiltration to create the terror phenomenon.

(ii) Detailed knowledge of human terrain (Ideology and the local interests).

(iii) Pattern analysis of the entire geographical space (area of operations) including the likely method, the infiltration routes, staging areas, guides (sympathisers) and activity routine.

(iv) Monitoring of Internet and Social Media in ascertaining and zeroing on the friends and sympathisers espousing the common cause with the terrorists.

(v) Effective monitoring of internet and banking to control illicit fund transfer, restricting arms trafficking and transportation of chemical materials and electronic equipment to build IEDs and bombs.

(d) **Providing depth to Border Obstacles by Intelligence**. The border obstacle by itself can only succeed as an obstacle for enemy for control of own territory. A close relation exists between controlling the territory and intelligence. Along the J & K border area up to 10- 15 kms must be treated as a threatened region and the operational and tactical level commanders should have the precise intelligence of this area, where the terrorists have their final staging areas and the launch pads along the infiltration routes. Besides the resources mentioned above, aerial (UAVs, drones) and surveillance devices need to be optimised.

(e) **Freedom of Operation**. Freedom of action up to the level of unit commanders - In the Israeli case a great deal of authority is delegated to the lowest ranks, those in contact and in the field.

(f) **Adequacy of Resources**. Resources that make intelligence and operational missions effective – such as surveillance devices, long range surveillance vectors, camera’s , dug in sensors and other types of ground placing devices, , control of unmanned aircraft, drones interrogators, translators, etc. need to be decentralized to appropriate levels.

(g) **Use of Technology as Force Multiplier for Intelligence and Information Supremacy**. Development and refinement of the ability to fuse information from all sensors in all dimensions and from all disciplines, to create a situational awareness in extensive areas and with required flux. Use of powerful computers is the key to real time data processing of the vast amount of data available with the various agencies.

(h) **Force Buildup in Cyberspace**. The cyberspace has become an additional combat domain directly interfaced to intelligence. The domain shall feature intelligence gathering and offensive actions. It shall include establishment of a cyber-arm and be responsible for cyber domain campaign. It will also include development of technological capabilities for cyber defense for operational capabilities fighting the terror operations.

28. **Counter Terrorism Operations**.

(a) **Border Fencing and Physical Security**. The counter infiltration posture along the LoC and the counter insurgency grid in the hinterland must be continuously reviewed and perfected. Following best practices of Israeli physical security are recommended to be incorporated:

(i) **Technologies Employed in Israeli Border Fencing**: The technology used in the highly sophisticated border security system of Israel includes high quality long-range day cameras along with night observation systems employing third generation thermal imagers, long-range detection radars, electronic touch and motion sensors on the fence as well as underground sensors and signal intelligence tools to detect any infiltrating/ tunnelling attempts.

(ii) **Observer Companies** **Concept**. At the Observer company command post usually at the level of Brigade Headquarters and Battalion Headquarters, specially trained observers monitoring the surveillance inputs 24 X 7 and alert the commanders, designated reaction force and the security guards through a system of parallel reporting.

(iii) **Security of Cantonments and Bases**. Lately cantonments and the bases have become soft targets whereas they should be impregnable fortresses. Wire fencing is an illusion. It neither stops a determined terrorist nor provides protection against small arms and direct firing weapons. A cantonment should deny access, observation and freedom of manoeuvre to the terrorists. Terrorists are deterred if there is structural and electronic fence that restrict or detects their movement well before they enter the garrison. Human security is not a replacement for structural and electronic security rather they complement each other to provide fool proof security. As a follow up of Israeli example the garrisons must have blast proof gates layered structural security based on smart fences around the camps.

(b) **Reorganisation, Equipping and Training of Forces**. In the Israeli case, the integration among Special Forces, regular units, and intelligence officials is much tighter with fewer firewalls separating the exchange of information and plans than in other countries. **This cross-pollination between intelligence, special operations and regular units has led to a greater appreciation of each force's capabilities**. This blending has enhanced understanding and success in counter terror operations. This capability must extrapolate to following:

(i) **Special Forces/Infantry Air Raids**. Build up capability to parachute or fly Special Forces /Infantry to raid terrorist launch pads located closer to the border.

(ii) **Operation of Special Forces in Enemy’s Depth**. Ability to conduct deep extensive special operations to hit and destroy the identified terror camps.

(c) **Force Restructuring and Modernization**. India should emulate the Israeli approach of trying to prevent terrorist attacks by disrupting the broader infrastructure involved in the recruitment, indoctrination, training, and logistical support of terrorist operatives. Towards that, there is need to adopt some of the above best practices for force restructuring and modernization to enhance the operational efficiency of the special and the regular forces involved in fighting the proxy war in J & K to enhance their overall efficiency.

(i) **Capacity Building of RASHTRIYA RIFLES (RR)**. There is a need to have a hard look at the organisation structure of the RR battalions/formations tailored to fight insurgency can become an instrument with effective deterrence value if the Israeli example of cross pollination with intelligence and special forces units is implemented. This readily available battle hardened force comprising 60 odd Rashtriya Rifles Battalions, each with approximately 1200 combat soldiers, if suitably restructured, empowered is the best bet to achieve better results in the current counter proxy war campaign.

(ii) **Capacity Building of Police and other Forces**. There is also a need to increase the capabilities of Kashmir Police, CRPF and SOG by capability building measures and increased inter-operability to make it the principle instrument of Internal Security Management. The state of art riot control equipment and technology, and the non-lethal weapons used by the Israeli border police are worth consideration.

(d) **Systemic Deficiencies at Operational and Tactical Level**. It is incumbent that commanders and the troops involved in fighting terror at operational land tactical level must be provided the necessary wherewithal and equipment to fight this war efficiently, effectively with no or minimal loss of life. There is a definite need to provide better quality of protective individual gear to the troops, bullet proof vehicles and mine protected vehicles for small team operations for the urban terrain of counter insurgency environment of Kashmir.

(e) **Fine tuning of Drills and Procedures**. During the period between 1990- 2006, number of encounters and infiltration bids were far higher, but own causalities were far lesser. Now the rate of causalities has increased to near parity and in many case number of casualties of security forces much higher than the causalities to terrorists. The equipment profile is marginally better including the body armour than what it was. Besides other factors there is a need to carry out introspection, what is wrong with our tactics, drills, procedures or indecisive actions by soldiers and commanders. Are their clear directions when to open fire or the orders are ambiguous? A soldier cannot be expected to function effectively if he is not properly trained or functioning in in an ambiguous environment.

(f) **Training and Readiness**. Recent sharp increase in the causality figures, majority attributed to the first response highlights the fact that there is something **amiss in training of units**. If an untrained and ill equipped soldier, unit is allowed to operate in high intensity operational areas, the accountability rests with the commanders. **The best form of welfare of troops is first class training that saves unnecessary causalities**. A military unit should be trained hard and continuously.

(g) **Strengthening Procedural and Legal Security**.

(i) At the highest level, externally, there is a need to use the diplomatic and political channels for blacklisting and imposing international sanctions on the divestments of the terror organisation active and being used by Pakistan. There is a need to wage an economic warfare to uncover the manes to shame them globally and put in place legal/judicial mechanisms to stop the money laundering and illegal flow of funds.

(ii) Internally, in Kashmir, the **Armed forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) that** has been the biggest thorn in the centre-state relations in the recent past. It is in this context that the Honourable Supreme Court of India has upheld the constitutional validity of the AFSPA. The Court further observed that the instructions issued by military authorities in the form of “Do’s and Don’ts” while acting under the AFSPA are to be treated as binding and are required to be followed by the Armed Forces. There is a need to prevent opposition to AFSPA through credible perception management strategy and ensuring that the SF do not provide an opportunity to the people to project a case of gross violation of Human Rights.

(iii) Provisions of Public Safety Act (PSA), need to selectively applied against the over ground workers supporting the terror outfits and identified leaders inciting the mob to interfere with counter terror operations.

(h) **Psychological Operations, Propaganda and use of Media**. Pakistan has been able to create a perception among the people and the international community that there is a freedom struggle going on in Kashmir. The unrest and the revolt today is at a critical state and cannot be brushed aside in a hope that turmoil will settle down soon. It is clear that Pakistan has been able to take the Kashmir conflict to a stage where reversal will not be easy. To effectively counter the Pakistani attempts, coupled with an effective counter proxy war strategy entailing some of the steps enumerated above, India needs to build a counter narrative highlighting the grave loss of life, property and crimes against Pakistan state, the terror outfits and terrorists by effectively using the tools of psychological warfare i.e. All types of media including social media. Israeli model entails effective use of social media and Facebook for the purpose of deception, feint, and use of messages against the terrorists.