**DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR FINAL PAPER**

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**Subject of the paper: India’s Counter Proxy War against Pakistan: Relevance of Israeli Experience in the Emerging Security Paradigm**

**Background:**

**India’s Counter Proxy war in Kashmir**

India has faced numerous insurgencies since independence in North East India, Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab due to various political, social and economic reasons. While the insurgencies in most of the North Eastern states and Punjab have been managed and controlled***, terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)***, abetted by Pakistan***,*** remains one of the **major security challenges of India**. Pakistan has been waging a relentless and an intense proxy war against India since 1989 in the form of sponsoring cross border terrorism, infiltrating terrorists across the Line of Control **(LoC)** and providing **active, unstinting and open support to militancy in J&K**.

The hard reality in Pakistan is that Pakistan Army is the undisputed and the main power center having a decisive and a dominant say in the country’s policies concerning national security and India (including Kashmir). Pakistan’s much dreaded and feared **intelligence agency the ISI** is under the virtual control of the Army. **The Pakistan Army and the ISI known as the deep state** – have been waging a proxy war against India as part of their strategy of **‘bleeding India through a thousand cuts’ (Operation Topac, 1987)**. Besides, the recent terrorist attack of **18 September 2016** on the **Army Base in Uri (J&K),** in which 18 soldiers were killed and 30 injured, the major terrorist attacks in the past have been on the Indian Parliament (December 2001, Mumbai (November 2008) and Pathankot Air Base (Jan 2016).

During the last 26 years –neither after the attack on Parliament nor after the multiple terrorist strikes at Mumbai, did India choose to address the perpetrators of terrorism in Pakistan and Pak occupied Kashmir (PoK) and conducted its counter-proxy war campaign on its own side of LoC. However, the recent terrorist attack on the army

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base at Uri could be deemed to have crossed India’s **‘red lines’** and India responded by launching **‘Trans LoC Surgical strikes’** on terrorist training camps with its Special Forces sending a strong message to Pakistan, that the Indian establishment will not tolerate the wanton killing of innocent Indian civilians or soldiers by state-sponsored terrorists from Pakistan. ‘**Surgical strikes’** notwithstanding, the **spurt in terrorist incidents** during the period following it establishes that the genesis of the problem lies in the insatiable ulterior machinations of Pakistan’s deep state committed to provide the ideological, material and financial support for the proxy war in J&K. This belief is strengthened by and the **empirical analysis** of **similar inflection points** in the Indo-Pak security conundrum, be it, the incursions in Kargil, the attack on Indian Parliament or the notorious events of November 2008 at Mumbai. It is therefore important that this new feature of ‘**unpredictable Indian response’** afforded by the **paradigm shift** in the decades old policy of self-imposed, ‘**Strategic restraint’** must be taken as a **tipping point** for devising a more efficient counter proxy war strategy**.**

Therefore, the need for formulating and implementing a clear and focused policy to put a stop to Pakistan’s terror policy once and for all. Any vacillation in Indian resolve on this account would condemn the country to repeated assaults and resultant causalities in future too. At the same time efforts must also be made to stop J &K from being used as a pivot for harbouring, planning and launching terror attacks at target within and outside the state and politically resolve the latest unrest in Kashmir and put this episode behind before it gets further complicated any further.

**Israel’s Counter Proxy War along Northern Borders**

The state of Israel since its formation, too, has faced terrorism from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, the proxy terror groups **harboured and encouraged by its neighbouring inimical states**, who have failed to defeat the Israel Defence Forces on the battlefield. The most potent amongst these, Hezbollah was founded in the

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early 1980s as part of an Iranian effort to aggregate a variety of militant Lebanese Shi’a groups under one roof.  Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as a byproduct of Israel’s effort to dismantle the Palestine Liberation Organization approximately 1,500 IRGC advisers established a base in the Bekaa Valley as part of its goal to train Hezbollah members, to make the Israeli occupation costly and prevent the emergence of a Lebanese government willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Over the past three decades, Hezbollah has become a powerful guerrilla and terrorist group, Iran and Syria’s help. As per estimates Iran provides Hezbollah with weapons and spends up to $200 million a year funding the group’s activities, over time, these efforts, have made Hezbollah into its current mix of military organization, terrorist group, social welfare agency, and political party.

During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the group used elaborate bunker systems, rockets, anti-tank weapons, and well-designed explosive mines capable of crippling Israeli tanks to stymie Israeli ground forces and frustrate Israeli air attacks while maintaining heavy rocket barrages of northern Israel for the course of the month-long conflict. Post the conflict Hezbollah’s claimed victory, temporarily increased its and Iran’s standing in the Arab world, while increasing Iran’s deterrence against threatened Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Not well matched to confronting Israeli conventional forces head on, Hezbollah’s focus has been on counterinsurgency warfare against Israel. After the turmoil of the Arab Spring in 2011, as the Syrian regime appeared vulnerable, Hezbollah has become involved to deal with the effects of the Syrian civil war and the larger Saudi-Iranian proxy war of which it has become a part. At the same time, Iran still looks to Hezbollah to maintain the capabilities to threaten and deter Israel.

Israel believes that the negative fallout of the recent Iran nuclear deal resulting in increased financial support to Hezbollah from Iran and gains in the civil war in due to the ceasefire in Syria, affording alliance with the recently established pro-government paramilitary forces in Syria and access to weapon systems, such as surface-to-air missiles, from Syrian military inventories may present this ‘Radical, Hezbollah- Iran-Syria Axis’, with more opportunities to create problems in the

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event of a conflict with Israel. The challenge for the US policymakers then is to help bring about a peace in Syria that maintains Hezbollah’s current reluctance to spark yet another war with Israel.

As part of this arena, at the other end of spectrum are the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihadi groups in the southern (Gaza and Sinai Peninsula) areas and to a relatively lesser degree from Palestinian territories comprising the West Bank, who indulge in various forms of terrorist violence against Israel ***to undermine physical security and generate fear in the local population***. In the decade since the end of the second Intifada, there has been a relative lull in the number of terrorist incidents on Israeli soil, despite the periodic increase in the nature and scope of this threat in the form of **high *trajectory fire***, which has resulted in series of operations, the most recent being ‘**Operation Protective Edge’ in 2014**.

**India and Israel’s Proxy Wars : Is there a Common Ground?**

**What is Different?**

In their fight against terrorism, India and Israel face distinct security challenges, the primary element that is at a variance with the Israeli model is the approach to insurgencies within the country in India. While India as a victim of proxy war from Pakistan -a nuclear state, there is a direct link between the nuclear weapons and the rogue terror policy of Pakistan, because the former provides cover for the latter, in as much as nuclear weapons are meant to neutralise the threat posed by a possible response based on India’s proactive conventional military strategy, therefore, till the recent trans LoC response to the Uri incident India conducted its counter terrorism campaign within its borders. On the other hand, Israel declared policy of deterrence has always afforded Israel the leeway to s launch ***pre-emptive offensive actions across its borders,*** aimed at mitigating both existing and potential future terror threatsand develop some of the most advanced strategies to better cope with constant and evolving threat of terrorism. Second, the Indian approach is aimed at political accommodation and reconciliation as the primary element of countering insurgency with the military acting as a support element to maintain a degree of

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stability, the Israeli approach seems to be focused towards breaking the military capability of a group through targeted killings. It is my (the researchers’) considered opinion that military means have their limitations and will rarely be enough to defeat an insurgency without the final political resolution of the problem. And, third, the Israeli model relies on intelligence to undertake clinical standoff strikes against targets. India has instead witnessed a grid form of deployment which is more manpower intensive but is able to physically control an area. Conversely, the vulnerability of security forces increases. There are both pro and cons of these methods.

**Issues of Convergence**

 Both countries have learned over the years that terrorism is a stubborn phenomenon and that, in contrast to conventional warfare, **decisive victory over terrorism is rare**. When countermeasures **block one avenue** of attack, terror organisations adopt more flexible methods in changing circumstances to ***improvise*** some new means of inflicting damage. The Indians much like the Israelis have attempted to create physical boundaries to stop the movement of terrorists. Both of us have realised that it has its advantages, however, it will always be impossible to ensure zero infiltration. And therefore, additional measures have to be in place to fight the challenge. The use of technology is yet another force multiplier which is increasingly being seen as a critical element of counterinsurgency. While the Israelis have been pioneers in this field, the recent cross-border strike by India reinforces the importance of this trend, the Indians have much to gain from the Israeli experience in this regard. ***Thus, despite the divergent nature and approaches,*** many of the ***lessons learned by Indian and Israeli counterterrorism experts*** are ***relevant*** to the each other country’s fight against terrorism.

Goal of the Paper: *To analyse the India’s Current Proxy war strategy against Pakistan, and establish the relevance of Israeli experience for an effective counter terrorist operations strategy for India, in the present and foreseeable future.*

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**Research Questions:**

Relevant to Indian Context from Israeli Experience

1. Lessons from Israeli Operational Strategies.
2. Intelligence operations and Multi-dimensional cooperation between

intelligence and operations.

1. Co-option of modern technology to strengthen physical security infrastructure at border areas (territories) and hinterland bases.

**Relevant to Israeli Context from Indian Experience**

1. Design, nature and scope of counter terrorist operations waged against a

 Nuclear armed neighbour.

1. Counter terrorist operations in increasingly radicalized society.

Research Claims: As terrorism increasingly becomes a global phenomenon, insights and lessons of counterterrorism strategies of each country *have significant relevance to both in the present and foreseeable future.*

Method of presenting the Idea of the Research: Chapterisation

1. Chapter 1. Historical background - Pak sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir

2. Chapter 2. India’s Counter terrorism Strategy in Kashmir and its shortcomings:-

1. Political (Governmental) level.
2. Inability to hold Pakistan accountable for immoral and unjust war at diplomatic and economic level.
3. Persecution or Alienation of Kashmiri Awam.

 (b) Military Level.

(i) Border Security- ability of terrorist to infiltrate despite LoC

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 fence and Counter Infiltration Grid.

1. Ability of terrorist to strike at security forces bases as well as

 civilian targets and inflict high causalities.

1. Fighting terrorism in own territory: Predictability of response.
2. Inadequacy of intelligence, equipment and technology.

3. Chapter 3. Israeli Experience – Historical background, lessons and conditions for waging a successful war against terrorism.

4. Chapter 4. Proposed Strategy:

1. Politico – Economic and Social Level (External & Internal).
2. Synergised integrated approach
3. Redraw area of influence – control the surroundings.
4. Use diplomatic and economic leverages against Pakistan.
5. Political solution to address alienation within Kashmir.
6. Military Level.
7. Strengthening of Internal security mechanisms including optimal exploitation of technology for security along borders and in hinterland.
8. Potency and unpredictability (timing) of response.
9. Capability building for covert operations against Pakistan.

5. Chapter 5. Way Forward and Summary of recommended changes in Indian Strategic and operational methodologies for a credible Indian response to proxy war.

The Importance/novelty of the Paper:

The paper will draw out lessons relevant to India for conduct of counter terrorism

operations and set out areas of mutual interest in specific fields between India and

Israel.

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Connection of the paper to National Security:

The topic is fundamental subset of national security, is topical and in line with

the current and the evolving nature of future wars/conflicts.

Author’s link to the work:

The paper is based on the professional experience and the anticipated employment

requirements of the author in the Indian Army.