GEOPOLITICS AND THE REGIONAL SYSTEM

1. **Terms other than "the Arab world"**.

    (a) **Conservative Monarchies**. The dynastic rulers of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (with the exception of Bahrain) were relatively safe.

    (b) **Oil Money vs Linkage to Islam**.   It sustains autocracy, but this is not a factor in Morocco and Jordan. Probably, these monarchies **enjoy a form of traditional authority**. Being descendants of the Prophet, as in Morocco and Jordan, or having custodianship of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, as in Saudi Arabia, perhaps bestowed a kind of legitimacy on these countries' rulers that is directly linked to Islam.

    (c) **Monarchical Regime**.   Sunni ruling family in Shia-majority Bahrain, was seriously challenged during the Arab Spring. **Sectarian divide** seems to have been the crucial ingredient in the uprising, which was brutally suppressed with Saudi military help.

    (d) **Transition to a Functioning, Consolidated Democracy**.   A lengthy process is involved, and its success is dependent on certain preconditions.

    　　(i) A vibrant and autonomous civil society, and

    　　(ii) A strong pre-authoritarian tradition of pluralism, representation and tolerance.

    (e) **North Africa**.   A variety of countries make up the **Middle East and North Africa** (**MENA**), including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

2. **Is there a connection between the Middle East and the events that formed the basis of the "Arab Spring"?** { Arab Spring in individual countries - Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), Egypt Uprising of 2011, Yemen Uprising of 2011–12, Libya Revolt of 2011, and Syria Uprising of 2011–12.}

    Authoritarianism, Monarchy, Demographic Structural factors, 2000s Energy Crisis, Political corruption, Human Rights violations, Unemployment.

3. **Variables that explain the Existence or Absence of a Liberal Democracy**.

    (a) Egypt's silent majority also identifies with the **authenticity represented by various Islamic groups**, while **principles of democracy and civil rights** seem to them to be **imported Western abstractions**.

    (b) Most **international borders** in the Middle East and North Africa were **drawn by imperial powers** – Britain, France and Italy – either after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire (the Sykes-Picot agreements), or, as in Libya and Sudan, earlier. But in **no case** did these borders **correspond with local popular will, or with ethnic or historical boundaries**.

    (c) Syria has **ethnic and religious fissures** between **Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds**

4. **Research Paradigm used by Avineri**.

    (a) **Realism**. This theory explains these events **by view of power**, therefore we note that the change in Syria or other Arab spring countries are a struggle for power, moreover the **realists do not rely on the UN's role**, but they restrict it. Realism demands that the **international influence and power must remain unharmed**. To achieve these aims they

have to continue to **secretly sponsor the demonstrators in these Arab spring countries without armed intervention**.

(b)   **Constructivism**.   There are three assumptions that stand out in understanding this theory, **the cultural norms, ideas and values**. That is it **satisfied the needs of the demonstrators**. Moreover, it they consider the most important elements in decision-making for both domestic and international politics in the Arab world as well as worldwide. The **constructivist theory looks like a practical approach** to come close to clarifying current events, akin to these revolutions in Arab world.

(c)   **Liberalism**. This theory is concentrated on **cooperation and international sharing**, plus the **development of the interests** which explain this change in Arab spring countries. It focuses on their **change through the laws and international rules**. Many of the most serious human rights violations occurred during the Arab spring revolutions. The liberalism theory has had **a positive impact, on society** such as **providing** the **values - freedom, equality and justice**, which are still lacking for these countries. Noteworthy   in   this   context is to refer to the fact the **demonstrators needed improvement** in their **lifestyle, freedom, and democracy**.

5.   **Miscellaneous**.   It will be also be prudent to examine the analytic opportunities that emerge when the Arab uprisings are **conceptualized as moments of transformation** rather than as **incipient, flawed or failed transitions to democracy**. Critical issues that cut across and link the experiences of **Political Relevant Elites (PREs)** and **mobilized publics** in the cases of **Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen**, identifies **three sets of issues**: the **effects of stateness and patterns of state-society relations on the trajectory of Arab uprisings**; the **role of identity politics and non-state forms of solidarity as drivers of political mobilization and collective action**, and the **impact of these forms of collective action on possibilities for establishing stable, legitimate forms of governance**; and the **limits of civil societies and civic sectors in influencing transformational processes**[i].

(a)   **From Transitions to Transformations**. In all four countries, the removal of entrenched incumbents initiated transitions similar to those that occurred in other cases of authoritarian breakdown and democratization. Political parties that had previously been repressed, Islamist parties in particular, now entered the political arena, joined by dozens of other newly formed political groupings. Civil society organizations proliferated. Interim authorities organized competitive multi-party elections, oversaw processes of constitutional reform. **Democratic possibilities faded almost as rapidly as they had appeared**. Barring the Tunisian case, the Arab uprisings have **led in only two directions**: **state collapse in the midst of violent conflict**, as in Libya, Yemen and Syria, or **an 'Arab Thermidor' and the reassertion of authoritarianism**, as in Egypt, Bahrain and a majority of Arab cases in which protest movements initially arose

(b)   **Weak States and Strong Societies?**   It would be a **mistake to conclude that non-state actors have no use for the state**. Indeed, in both **Yemen and Libya**, control of the state remains a **focal point of social conflict**. In both cases, **conflicts among PREs and mobilized publics alike** are **driven** by **differences over whose interests will prevail** in shaping or reforming state institutions and defining new rules of the game. Egypt and Tunisia provide sharp contrasts to the Libyan and Yemeni cases and differ with each other in important ways. In both, **transformational outcomes** are **contingent on struggles** among **competing elements of the PRE for control of consolidated states**. In both, **non-state identities and solidarities are present** yet **play a subordinate role** in transformational processes.

(c)   **Identity Politics and the Challenge of Governance.** Egypt and Tunisia also stand apart from Yemen and Libya in the role that non-state identities and solidarities have played in transformational processes. In neither case have **non-state, non-citizenship-based political identities become a dominant axis** around which political conflicts among the PRE or mobilized publics organized. Such identities are certainly present in both, as are conflicts over **competing conceptions of citizenship, legitimacy and the sources of political authority**. Yet relative to Libya and Yemen, **identity-based conflicts have been secondary to struggles over control of the state**. In Libya and Yemen, **non-state identities and solidarities** - whether **sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional or combinations of these** - have **emerged as central fault lines**, as they have in Syria and Bahrain. For PREs and mobilized publics in Libya and Yemen, these identities and solidarities - consequential in shaping political dynamics: with the Arab uprisings they became **core 'pivots' anchoring and organizing transformational spaces**, largely **determining patterns of political mobilization and social conflict**. In some respects, such developments challenge the notion of transformations developed in this special issue as **moments of uncertainty and contingency**. To the extent that the Libyan and Yemeni uprisings have merely **amplified long-standing political divisions among established tribal PREs by weakening the capacity of** (already weak) **states to regulate conflict**, the scope for either agency or contingency would seem to be highly constrained.

(d)   **The Limits of Mobilized Publics.**   Among the most striking features of the Arab uprisings is the **failure of the mobilized publics** that played such an important role in launching protest movements **to sustain their influence once the focus of transformations shifted from streets and public squares into formal political arenas**.

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i https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081450