

**The College of International Security Affairs**

**National Defense University**

**CISA 6920**

**Geostrategy**

**Academic Year 2015–2016**

**Fall Semester**

Dr. Sean McFate COL Michael S. Bell, PhD

Associate Professor, ISS Dept. Chancellor, College of

Course Director International Security Affairs

**Geostrategy Course Schedule (fall 2015)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Part** | **Tue** | **Thu** | **Topic** |
| I. International Relations (IR) Theory | 9/22 |  | 1. What is International Security Studies? Why should I care? |
|  | 9/24 | 1. The Evolution of “International Society” |
| 9/29 |  | 1. Contending Intellectual Frameworks: Realism & Neo-Realism |
|  | 10/1 | 1. Contending Intellectual Frameworks: Liberalism & Neo-Liberalism   *Sign up for article presentation* |
| 10/6 |  | 1. Contending Intellectual Frameworks: Social Constructivism & Other Approaches |
|  | 10/8 | 1. What is Security? |
| II. Global Actors | 10/13 | 10/15 | 1. States and State Failure   *Submit your final paper topic to instructor for approval* |
| 10/20 | 10/22 | 1. International Organizations (IOs) and International Law |
| 10/27 | 10/29 | 1. The United Nations, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention |
| 11/3 |  | 1. Writing to Be Read   *Bring 1 page paper outline for in-class peer review (not graded)* |
|  | 11/5 | 1. Transnational Actors: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Humanitarian Space |
| 11/10 | 11/12 | 1. Transnational Actors: Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), Global Trade, and International Political Economy (IPE) |
| 11/17 | 11/19 | 1. Transnational Actors: Armed Non-State Actors |
| III. Global Security Challenges | 12/1 |  | 1. The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict |
|  | 12/3 | 1. The Role of Force |
| 12/8 |  | 1. Globalization |
|  | 12/10 | 1. “Human Security” and Development |
| 12/15 |  | 1. The Rise of Intrastate Warfare |
|  | 12/17 | 1. World Order in Transition?   *Final Paper Due* |

**Faculty**

**Professors**:

**Dr. Sean McFate (Section 2)**

**Course Director**

Associate Professor of International Security Studies

ALH 2117

(202) 685-7770

sean.mcfate@gc.ndu.edu

**Dr. Peter Thompson (Sections 5)**

Associate Professor of International Security Studies

ALH 2114

(202) 685-7781

peter.Thompson@gc.ndu.edu

**Dr. Michael Rupert (Section 1)**

Associate Professor of Regional and Analytical Studies

ALH 2332

(202) 685-8934

michael.rupert@gc.ndu.edu

**Dr. R.E. Burnett (Section 4)**

Professor of International Security Studies

ALH 2105

(202) 685-7771

robert.burnett.civ@gc.ndu.edu

**LTC John W. Francis (Section 3, 6)**

Visiting Faculty, International Security Studies

ALH 2118

(202) 685-3876

john.francis@gc.ndu.edu

**Dr. Kathryn Fischer (JSOMA)**

Assistant Professor of International Security Studies

Ft. Bragg

910-261-6866

kathryn.m.fisher.civ@ndu.edu

CISA main office phone number: (202) 685-3870

**Course Introduction**

Two major puzzles sit at the core of global politics: Why do actors fight, and why do they cooperate? One popular theory views conflict as ordinary in global affairs, presenting its supporters with the task of explaining why so much cooperation exists. Another popular perspective characterizes cooperation as the norm, posing a dilemma for its supporters to account for the violence in world affairs. Understanding cause and effect in a complex world is a difficult challenge.

This course provides an introduction to the systematic study of major issues in international security studies. Some themes recur throughout the course: power, motivation and choice, anarchy, sovereignty, interdependence, and political and economic market failure. We will systematically explore the actors, their goals, the constraints within which actors operate, the interactions between actors, and the strategies they pursue.

Students who complete this course should demonstrate the ability to:

* Evaluate national and international security at a theoretical and practical level
* Analyze the main concepts and terminology of international security
* Evaluate the dimensions of the contemporary security environment
* Create analytical skills to assess global security challenges
* Analyze the contemporary spectrum of conflict and the utility of force in countering threats and challenges across the spectrum

**Course Readings**

Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th* ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014).

Caldwell, Dan, and Robert E. Williams. *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

McFate, Sean. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Thompson, Peter G. *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

All other required readings will be accessible via the course Blackboard home page.

**Course Requirements**

The required readings listed for each topic should be read before the seminar meets. The faculty has selected the readings for their relevance, quality of ideas, readability, and timeliness. Generally, these readings are listed in an order reflecting the logical development of the topic and can be most profitably read in that order. Supplemental readings (when listed) are offered for background reference and for those who might wish to pursue a particular topic in greater depth, but are neither required nor reprinted.

The specific graded elements of the course are:

1. **Journal Article/Book Chapter Review and Oral Presentation**: Select and brief one academic journal article or book chapter from the “Optional Reading” list, and seek approval from your instructor in order to deconflict with other student sections. In other words, each student must choose a different article or chapter. You will then write a review dissecting the main arguments and why the arguments are compelling or not. You will also make an oral presentation on their article in front of the class. Further assignment details of the combined assignment will be distributed in class. Plan on giving your briefing the day the topic is assigned. The review and subsequent oral presentation will comprise **30 percent** of the course grade. The written review should be no more than ***700 to 900 words*** and the oral presentation should be **no more than 7 to 10 minutes.** You will select the date of your oral presentation/due date for your journal article/book chapter review at the start of the semester. *24-hours prior to your oral presentation, you must distribute your article and review to the instructor and class.*

2. **A Research Paper**: The paper will comprise **50 percent** of the course grade. Your instructor will distribute the paper assignment and detailed written instructions for the final paper during the second week of class. Choose and submit your final paper by Topic 7 “States and State Failure” for instructor approval. By Topic 10, “Writing to be Read,” students should have finalized their topics and come to class with a 1 page synopsis of their proposed argument and a brief preliminary bibliography. Students are encouraged to meet with their professor to discuss paper topics.

**Required format**: The body of the paper should be ***no more than 2,500 to 3,000 words (about 10-12 pages)***, double-spaced, 12-point font, with standard 1.25-inch margins. You will also be expected to submit an e-copy to your instructor at the end of the semester. It is expected that all papers will be properly referenced with footnotes, paginated, and have a bibliography. Please refer to the Chicago Manual for the correct format. Students can also access the CISA citation style guide on the College’s website.

3. **Seminar Contribution**: Students are expected to have read the assigned readings and to be prepared for class discussion and active participation in classroom debate. Students are also encouraged to use the “issues for consideration” as an additional guideline for the topics that will be discussed in class. Class participation during the semester constitutes **20 percent** of the final grade.

The final grade for the course will be computed with the following weights:

**Final Paper 50%**

**Journal Article/Book Chapter Review & Presentation 30%**

**Seminar Contribution 20%**

Grades are assessed using the following CISA grading scale:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Letter Grade | Grade Points | Numerical Scale | Criterion-referenced at grade level |
| A | 4.0 | 93-100 | Firm command of knowledge domain  High level of analytical development |
| A- | 3.67 | 90-92.99 |
| B+ | 3.33 | 87-89 | Command of knowledge beyond minimum  Advanced analytical development |
| B | 3.0 | 83-86 |
| B- | 2.67 | 80-82 |
| C | 2.0 | 70-79 | Command of only basic concepts of knowledge  Demonstrated basic analytical ability |
| F | 0 | 69 and below | No command of knowledge domain |
| I | 0 |  | Failure to complete course requirements |

The following serve as guidelines in the assessment of students in the course

**Papers**

There are six cornerstones of a superior paper:

1. It establishes the relevant question clearly;
2. It answers the question in a highly analytical manner;
3. It proposes a well-defined thesis, stated early on;
4. It presents evidence to support that thesis;
5. It addresses, explicitly or implicitly, opposing arguments or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence (this constitutes a counterargument); and,
6. It accomplishes the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

Standards for assessing student papers are as follows:

A (93-100): Work of superior quality; contains original thought.

A- (90-92): Work of high quality that demonstrates original thought.

B+ (87-89): A sound effort which meets all six cornerstones above.

B (83-86): A solid essay which is, on the whole, a successful consideration of the topic.

B- (80-82): An essay that addresses the question and has a clearly-stated thesis, but which fails to support the thesis fully and either does not address counterarguments thoroughly, has serious structural flaws, or does not develop conclusions fully.

C (70-79): Expresses a reasonable argument but makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand.

F (69 and below): The submission does not merit graduate credit. Students may be asked to resubmit the essay.

**Presentations:**

Briefings are to be provided to the instructor electronically prior to the presentation, although there is no obligation to use PowerPoint.

Assessment of student presentations will employ the following criteria:

* Content: Does the briefing inform on the topic in an appropriate manner? Does it have a proper balance of detail?
* Delivery: Is delivery of the presentation smooth with few pauses? Does the briefer express a sense of confidence in the subject matter?
* Presence: Does the briefer interact with the audience and make eye contact?
* Use of Notes: Does the briefer employ notes with subtlety? Is the briefer able to present with minimal or no use of notes?
* Slides or Other Presentation Materials: Does the briefer use slides or other materials to support the presentation? If the briefer employs slides, are they visually interesting, informative and readable? How well does the briefer transition between slides?
* Timing: Does the briefer stay within the state time parameters?
* Questions: How well is the briefer able to respond to questions on the material covered in the brief? Has the briefer anticipated likely questions and counterarguments?
* Adaptability: Does the briefer exhibit grace under pressure—the ability to respond and forge ahead in the face of technical problems or to summarize and skip slides when time constraints arrive?

Standards for assessing student presentations are as follows:

A (93-100): Work of superior quality that shows a high degree of original thought; presentation and supporting graphics set forth points in a well-organized, comprehensive yet sustainable manner.

A- (90-92): Above the average expected of graduate work; contains original thought. An insightful presentation but one that has gaps, leaving it short of an “A”.

B+ (87-89): A sound effort that meets all criteria above; a well-executed presentation that includes complete analysis of the question.

B (83-86): Average graduate performance. A solid presentation that is, on the whole, a successful consideration of the topic.

B- (80-82): A presentation that addresses the assigned topic and has a clearly-stated point or narrative but which fails fully to support these and either does not address counterarguments thoroughly, has serious structural flaws, or does not fully develop conclusions.

C (70-79): Expresses a responsible opinion but makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient adequately to explore the issue at hand.

F (69 and below): The presentation is unrepresentative of the qualities expected of graduate-level work or fails to address the assigned topic. Resubmission is at the instructor’s discretion.

**Seminar Contribution:**

The following standards are employed to assess student grades for seminar contribution:

A (93-100): Strikes a good balance between “listening” and “contributing.” Demonstrates superior preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to group discussion. Frequently demonstrates insightful and original thought. Respects the opinions of others but challenges when appropriate.

A- (90-92): Above the average expected of a graduate student. Well prepared for classroom discussion at each seminar session. Respects the views of colleagues and, by quality of contributions, commands their respect in return.

B+ (87-89): A solid contributor to seminar sessions. Joins in most discussions. Contributions to group understanding of the topic and discussions reflect understanding of the material. Respectful of the views of others.

B (83-86): Contributions to discussions reflect average preparation for class. Supports group efforts. Occasionally interrupts others.

B- (80-82): Contributes. Often speaks out without having thought the issue through. Sometimes fails to show regard for a colleague’s opinions or proper consideration or courtesy toward others in the seminar group.

C (70-79): Preparation is adequate, but frequently fails to respect the views of others, is sometimes belligerent in discourse with colleagues and/or instructor. Rarely steps forward to assume a fair share in group discussions. Usually content to let others form the class discussions and develop required seminar positions.

F (69 and below): Class preparation and contributions do not merit graduate credit. Student will be referred to the faculty, faculty advisor or Dean of Students for counseling.

**NDU Non-attribution Policy**

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by students of the College of International Security Affairs. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University or the Department of Defense.

The contents of this document are the property of the U.S. Government and are intended for the exclusive use of the faculty and students of the College of International Security Affairs or the National Defense University (NDU). No further dissemination is authorized without the express consent of the Chancellor, College of International Security Affairs, and the NDU President.

Presentations by guest speakers, seminar leaders, and panelists, including public officials and scholars, constitute an important part of University curricula. So that these guests, as well as faculty and other University officials, may speak candidly, the University offers its assurance that their presentations at the Colleges, or before other NDU-sponsored audiences, will be held in strict confidence. This assurance derives from a policy of non-attribution that is morally binding on all who attend: without the express permission of the speaker, nothing he or she says will be attributed to that speaker directly or indirectly in the presence of anyone who was not authorized to attend the lecture.

**Part I: International Relations (IR) Theory**

**Topic 1: What is International Security Studies? Why should I care?**

This is not a current events course. Rather, it will teach you how to better analyze current events, especially regarding armed conflict. International Security Studies (ISS) examines the fundaments of global security governance, why it succeeds or fails, and where the future of war is heading. One cannot formulate effective strategy without first understanding the dynamics of world order and how they might be shifting. A major theme throughout the course is globalization, and how it affects world politics.

**Required Readings**

Read this syllabus.

Alan Collins, “What is Security Studies?,” in Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2nd edition), 15-31.

Colin Gray, *War, Peace & International Relations*, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2012), 307-327.

**Optional Readings**

Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” *International Security* 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 129 – 153.

Jessica Mathews Tuchman, “Redefining Security,” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 162 – 177.

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *On Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 1-23.

Raju G. C. Thomas, “What is Third World Security?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (2003): 205-232.

Bryan Mabee, *The Globalization of Security: State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

**Issues for Consideration**

* What is “strategic studies”?
* What criticisms are made of strategic studies? Are they founded?

**Topic 2: The Evolution of “International Society”**

“International society” is a dominant concept in international relations theory and practice. It generally refers to a world order where states are the basic geopolitical unit of the planet. This state-centric notion of global security governance is built on “Westphalian” sovereignty, and provides the basis of international law (“International” literally means the rules between states). The best examples international society are Western European states, which is unsurprising since the modern state evolved from this part of the world. Proponents of international society believe states are natural and represent the apogee of human political organization. Others disagree, suggesting the modern state and the “international society” of states is not universal but an orientalizst, Euro-centric and ahistorical idea exported globally via colonization. Other challenges to its existence include failing states, regional hegemons, globalization, global poverty and increasing resistance to Western ideas pose a threat to international society. Despite these problems, the idea of an international society of states––whether it exists of not––undergirds much of international relations, and understanding how and why it evolved is essential for analyzing global politics.

**Required Readings**

David Armstrong: “The evolution of international society” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 35-50

Sean McFate. The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order. (Oxford University Press, 2015): 61-71.

**Optional Readings**

Len Scott, “International history, 1900-99” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 50-64.

Bull, Hedley. *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2006).

**Issues for Consideration**

* Does an “international society” exist? Or is the concept of “international society” inherently flawed?
* Why should states be privileged actors in global politics?
* Are states discovered or created?
* Is an international society actually capable of resolving problems like extreme poverty or climate change?

**Topic 3: Contending Intellectual Frameworks: Realism & Neo-realism**

At its core, Realism seeks to discredit the beliefs of Idealism. According to Realists, Idealists too often ignore the role of power in global politics, overestimate human rationality, and believed mistakenly that nation states shared common interests. As a result, Idealists were overly optimistic about the ability of mankind to overcome war and violence. Instead, Realism highlights the power struggle and competitive political nature between nations and has led world leaders to focus on states’ interests rather than ideology and to seek peace through strength. Of course, there are differing schools within Realism. Classical Realism dictates that international politics is driven by an endless power struggle rooted in human nature. Structural Realism attributes inter-state conflict to an anarchical system lacking an overarching global authority.

Neo-Realism simply refers to the contemporary school of realism. Centered on Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*, Neo-Realism posits that the structure of the international system is the primary determinant of state behavior. In security studies, there is another division between offensive Neo-realists and defensive Neo-realists. The former accept Waltz’s theories on world order, and the latter suggest that relations with other states depend on whether they are viewed as friends or foes.

**Required Readings**

Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt: “Realism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 99-113

Steven L. Lamy: “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: section on neorealism.

Charles L. Glaser, “Realism,” in Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2nd edition), 15-31.

**Optional Readings**

Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics” A Neorealist Synthesis,” *International Security* 35:4 (Spring 2011), 126-154.

Eric Hamilton and Brian Rathbun, “Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism,” *Security Studies* 22:3 (2013), 436-465.

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics* 51:1 (1998), 144-172.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 3-24.

Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2006).

Helga Haftendorn. “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security.” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no.1 (March 1991): 3-17.

John S. Duffield, “Alliances,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2013, 2nd edition), 339-353.

**Issues for Consideration**

* What is power?
* How would a realist explain the war on terrorism?
* Do realists confuse a description of war and conflict for an explanation of why it occurs?
* What are the similarities between traditional Realism and neo-realism?
* What role do relative and absolute gains play in neo-realist thinking?
* Can realism help us understand globalization?

**Topic 4: Contending Intellectual Frameworks: Liberalism & Neo-Liberalism**

Liberalism, though not as widely followed as Realism, is another ideological alternative to Idealism. According to Liberalism, states are sovereign actors on a global scale. The unique identity of each state determines its outward orientation, and each state holds certain ‘natural’ rights. Unlike Realists, liberals believe the causes of war lie in the collapse of the balance of power and undemocratic regimes. Their solution focuses on creating and coordinating roles of institutions, thereby projecting order liberty, and justice into international relations. This ideology also has an important cleavage between positive conception liberals who advocate interventionist foreign policies and negative conception liberals who emphasize non-interventionist policies.

Although Neo-liberalism also has several schisms in ideology, the most widely known is neo-liberal Institutionalism. Adherents of neo-liberal Institutionalism claim that neo-Realism focuses too heavily on competition and diminish the chances for cooperation via their anarchical international views. Neo-liberal institutionalists believe the way to achieve peace is to have independent states combine resources and surrender some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities which are able to promote economic growth and respond to regional conflict. Followers also believe that institutions are the means of achieving cooperation between states.

**Required Readings**

Tim Dunne: “Liberalism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 113-126

Steven L. Lamy: “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: section on neoliberalism.

Patrick Morgan, “Liberalism,” in Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2nd edition), 35-47.

**Optional Readings**

Woodrow Wilson, “14 Points Speech,” January 18, 1918.

Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1795), 107-116 and 117-142.

Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues* (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2009, 9th edition), 83-95.

Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Uncertainty,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2013, 2nd edition), 137-153.

Robert Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 39-51.

John Ruggie, “The False Premise of Realism,” *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 62-70.

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994-1995): 5-49.

Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485-507.

Louis P. Pojman, “Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Cosmopolitanism,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 36 (Spring 2005): 62-71.

John Mearsheimer, “E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On,” *International Relations* 19 (2005): 139-152.

G. John Ikenberry, “Rising Powers and Global Institutions,” in *International Politics*: *Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, Ninth Edition, eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009), 560-566.

John G. Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (Columbia University Press, 1993).

**Issues for Consideration**

* How does liberalism differ from realism in terms of security?
* Is force a legitimate instrument for liberal states promoting their values abroad?
* What liberal ideas have informed the Obama administration’s foreign policy?
* Will globalization have an impact on neo-liberal thinking?
* What role do relative and absolute gains play in neo-liberal thinking?

**Topic 5: Contending Intellectual Frameworks: Social Constructivism & Other Approaches**

Like so many other schools of thought, Constructivism has several internal divisions. There is however, an overarching feature that unites each faction; Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life. Some theorists draw from organizational theory, some from discourse analysis, and some prioritize the importance of agents over structures. No matter the focus, as social theorists adherents of Constructivism strive to conceptualize the relationship between agents and structures. One example is the relationship between states and the structure of international politics. Instead of offering predictions about tendencies in world politics, social Constructivism suggests how to investigate them. It questions what is accepted as fact and considers alternative methods and the alternative outcomes such methods could have.

**Required Readings**

Michael Barnett: “Social constructivism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 155-169

Walt, Stephen M. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” *Foreign policy* (1998): 29-46.

Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, Volume 145, (November-December 2004), pp. 52-62.

**Optional Readings**

Stephen Hobden, “Marxist theories of international relations” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. 6th ed: 141-155

Lene Hansen, “Poststructuralism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 169-183.

Christine Sylvester, “Post-colonialism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 184-196.

**Issues for consideration**

* What is the core of Constructivism?
* How are meanings fixed in world politics?
* How would a constructivist, realist and liberal explain 9/11? Conflict in the Middle East? Genocide?

**Topic 6: What is Security?**

What is security? And who is responsible for providing it? The concept of security has different meanings at different levels of analysis. At the international or system level, the focus is on the security of states—not the security of their system of government, their regime or their inhabitants—but their external security. Narrowly defined, it is about state survival. This is the most traditional concept of security. Another concept of security exists at the national level. National security is also state focused, but it is inward looking. Security is expressed in starkest terms as the survival of the state’s system of government or regime. Beyond survival, the concept of national security has included environmental, societal, and economic dimensions. Finally, at the individual level there is the concept of human security. This concept is broadly defined to include the protection of populations not only from violence, but also from economic, food, health, environmental, community, political, demographic and criminal threats.

**Required Readings**

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 1-21.

John Baylis, “International and Global Security” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th* ed. Pgs. 228-241.

Richard Shapcott: “International Ethics” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th* ed: 198-215.

**Optional Readings**

Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics* (Columbia University Press, 2012), 1-14.

Michael Cox, “From the end of the cold war to the new global era?” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th.

Andrew Hurrell, “Rising powers and the emerging global order” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th.

Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

Colin Gray, “How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War,” *Parameters* (Spring 2005): 14-26.

**Issues for Consideration**

* What is security?
* What are the different elements of national power and how are they incorporated into strategy?
* What is geostrategy?
* Has technology eliminated distance, climate and weather as important strategic factors?
* How strategically significant is the location of a state’s territory?
* How does the meaning of security change at the local, regional and international levels?
* Why is security a “gateway” political good?
* Who has primary responsibility for providing security at the international, national and local levels?

**Part II: Global actors**

**Topic 7: States and State Failure**

The contemporary security environment features dozens more state actors than it did a century ago. Not only are there more states, but also more types of states- mainly strong, weak, or failed. There are also more democracies than there were even fifty years ago. As more state actors and more types of states have emerged, the prevalent 20th century assumption that all states were like-actors is no longer valid. Strong, weak, or failed states can be differentiated by (1) the state’s ability to control its territory, (2) the state’s capacity to deliver core functions to its inhabitants, and (3) the legitimacy of the state and its regime. They can also be categorized by their system of government—electoral or liberal democracies or authoritarian regimes. The proliferation of state actors in the 20th century has significantly altered the contemporary security environment. There are more weak and failed states than there are strong states in the 21st century, and more weak democracies than there are strong democracies. In other words, there are more weak and failed states existing today than twice the total number of states a century ago.

**Required Readings**

Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, and Weak States: Causes and Indicators” in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Robert I. Rotberg, ed., (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1-25.

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 179-193, 213-224 (Chs. 10 & 12).

John Breuilly: “Nationalism” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 387-401.

**Optional Readings**

Peter G. Thompson, *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): 37-46.

Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’,” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 8 (2008): 1491-1507.

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014).

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

Prem Shankar Jha, The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalisation, Chaos and War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 1-20.

Robert H. Dorff, “Failed States after 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?” International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 20-34.

Angel Rabasa et al, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2007).

Stephen Krasner, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs 84 (Jul/Aug2005): 153-163.

The NPR interview with John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge on their book *The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014): <http://thedianerehmshow.org/audio-player?nid=19352>.

“Failed” States Indexes. There are over a dozen “failed” state indexes. The quality of their rigor remains questionable yet they influence foreign policy choices among donor states and institutions. A popular one in Washington DC is: “The Fragile State Index.” Foreign Policy. (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states).

**Issues for Consideration:**

* How has the proliferation of the number and of the types of states altered the role of the state as an actor in the international security system?
* What defines a strong or successful state? What defines a weak state? A failed state? How and why has legitimacy emerged as a measure of state strength or weakness?
* Why and how can state indices be important for policymakers?
* In what ways are orthodox approaches to security limited in their explanation of the weak-state insecurity dilemma?
* What makes the security dilemma in weak states unique?
* What domestic and international strategies do weak-state elites adopt to try to manage their security challenges?
* Is abandoning the state-building project in favor of alternative forms of political organization a realistic solution to the weak-state security dilemma?
* What role should the international community play in the state-consolidation process?
* Can you reverse state failure? If so, how? Also, how can we best counter the threat of failed states? What are the primary means by which we should approach the phenomenon?
* Why do democracies tend to fail in the first five years?

**Topic 8: International Organizations (IOs) and International Law**

Sometimes states form international organizations (IOs) to resolve international problems. The United Nations is the best example of an IO. A century ago there were about a dozen IOs and now there are over 355. Generally, they are comprised of states, maintain formal procedures, and focus on a region, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or a single policy issue, like the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). IOs both make international law and are governed by it. Yet, the decision-making process of international organizations is often less a question of law than one of political judgement. In theory, they allow states to pool their sovereignty and claim authority over individual member states for the greater good. In practice, some question their efficacy, while others worry that they are developing into supranational authorities that challenge state sovereignty. That is, the sum may prove greater than the parts.

**Required Readings**

Kelly-Kate S. Pease, *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century* (NJ: Prentice Hall, 2008), 20-42 and 103-111.

Edward Best and Thomas Christiansen, “Regionalism in international affairs,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 401-416.

Christian Reus-Smit: “International law” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 274-288.

Louise Fawcett, “Regional Institutions”; Thomas G. Weiss and Danielle Zach, “The United Nations”; and Michael Pugh, “Peace Operations,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2013, 2nd edition), 355-408.

**Optional Readings**

Richard Little, “International regimes” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 289-303.

Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security* 24, 1 (Summer 1999), 42-63.

Pitch, John O’Neal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” *World Politics*, 52, 1, 1-37.

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order: The Role of the United States in Reforming International Institutions,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 2 (March-April 2009).

Alexander Thomson, “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission” *International Organization* 60 (Winter 2006): 1-34.

Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 157-195.

Lloyd Gruber, *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15-32.

John G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998), 41-84.

Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 3 (May-June 2003).

**Issues for Consideration**

* What are the different types of International Organizations (IOs) and regional organizations?
* Do IOs enhance or threaten state sovereignty?
* Do these organizations act independently from the will and interests of the nation-state? How do these organizations reflect and shape the international and strategic environment?
* Some quip that international law is “60 percent international customs and 40 percent non-binding treaties” while others deride it as “soft law.” Is international public law really “law”? Is there an international judiciary? Law enforcement? Justice system? Does it matter if the answer is “no”?
* Is it accurate to argue that, in certain circumstances, international organizations may do more harm than good when it comes to conflict? And if so, can you name some of these circumstances?
* What is complex interdependence?

**Topic 9: The United Nations, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention**

The United Nations (UN) is the preeminent IO in world affairs. Established in 1946, it replaced the ineffective League of Nations following World War 2. It’s mission was initially to prevent future world wars however its role in international relations has broadened over time to include maintaining international peace and security, promoting good governance, defending human rights, fostering social and economic development, protecting the environment, and providing humanitarian aid in cases of famine, natural disaster, and armed conflict. This includes violating Westphalian sovereignty and intervening in state affairs on behalf of individuals. Human rights seeks to shift the loci of sovereignty from the state to the individual. Controversially, the UN claims to be the arbiter of this authority, reserving the right (even duty) to intervene in states that have “massively failed” in their obligations to uphold human rights. New doctrines of war, such as humanitarian intervention and Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have emerged to legitimize this. Additionally, supranational institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC) were created, and have even issued warrants for arrest of sitting heads of state. This emerging idea is a challenge to Westphalian sovereignty.

**Required Readings**

Paul Taylor and Devon Curtis. “The United Nations,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 304-319.

Jack Donnelly: “Human rights” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 463-479

Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 479-496.

**Optional Readings**

David Keen, *Complex Emergencies* (New York: Polity, 2011), 1-10, 100-115, 215-221

Theo Farrell, “Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations,” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 3rd Edition), 309-328.

Thomas Weiss, “Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges.” *Third world quarterly* 21.5 (2000): 795-814.

Thomas Weiss, *What’s Wrong with the UN and How to Fix it,* (New York: Polity Press, 2008).

Steven Holloway, “US Unilateralism at the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists*,” Global Governance* 6, 3 (July-Sept 2000), 361-381.

Theo Farrell, “Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations,” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*: *An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 3rd Edition), 309-328.

**Issues for Consideration**

* Is the UN Security Council a viable institution? If not, what are the alternatives to codify, promote, or organize collective efforts towards global security? What are the pros and cons of these alternatives?
* Are human rights universal?
* What exactly is “good governance”? Who decides? How do we achieve it? How would we know?
* Is it fair to describe Just War theory and R2P as “Western jihad? After all, they both justify military force.
* Are humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping effective in the long-term?
* What is the “consent divide” and when should it be crossed?
* Are low level, simmering conflicts war? Does strategic thought apply to such situations?
* Is the international community racist? To date, the ICC only issues arrest warrants for African leaders, and did little (if anything) to intervene to stop mass atrocities in Rwanda, Darfur and Eastern Congo yet intervened against the smaller “genocides” in the Balkans (1990s) and Iraq (2014).

**Topic 10: Writing to be Read**

Writing is an art. During this course session, we delve into the importance of researching and writing effectively for your final semester paper. This class is meant mainly as a peer review session with the goal of receiving valuable constructive criticism and essential critiques about the direction of your research from your colleagues. After a general group discussion about researching and writing, the remainder of the class will be spent in small groups of two to three to talk about the status and progress of your final paper. For this particular class, please bring in a 1-2 page summary and outline of your research question/topic and draft outline to share with your group.

**Reference Readings**

(The below readings are for reference. You are not expected to read these books from cover to cover for this topic. They are taken from your Policy Analysis & Critical Thinking course)

William Strunk and E.B. White, The Elements of Style: 50th Anniversary Edition (New York: Longman, 2008).

Booth, Wayne C, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams. 2008. The Craft of Research 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Paul, Richard, and Linda Elder. 2009. The Miniature Guide To Critical Thinking: Concepts And Tools. Dillon Beach, California: Foundation For Critical Thinking.

Roselle, Laura, and Sharon Spray. 2012. Research and Writing in International Relations 2nd ed. New York: Longman.

Strunk, William Jr., and White, E. B. 2014. The Elements of Style 4th ed. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” Horizon, April 1946.

The College of International Security Affairs Citation Style Guide

**Optional Readings**

Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams, The Craft of Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 88-106, 149-176.

William Zinsser, On Writing Well, 25th Anniversary Edition (New York: Quill, 2001), 6-16.

Gerald Graff and Cathy Birkenstein, They Say I Say: The Moves that Matter in Academic Writing, Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010).

Bruce Ross-Larson, Edit Yourself: A Manual for Everyone Who Works with Words (NewYork: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996.)

William C. Paxson, The New American Guide to Punctuation (New York: Penguin,1986).

John D. Ramage, John C. Bean and June Johnson, Writing Arguments: A Rhetoric withReadings, Sixth Edition (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004).

Fred D. White and Simone J. Billings, The Well Crafted Argument, Second Edition (NewYork: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005).

Colson Whitehead, “How to Write,” *New York Times*, July 26, 2012.

“Briefly,” *The Economist*, August 6, 2015.

**Topic 11: Transnational Actors: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Humanitarian Space**

NGOs are international nonprofit groups that operate independently of governments to provide humanitarian services directly to people, and they are on the rise. A hundred years ago there were 1,083 NGOs, and today there are more than 40,000. NGOs derive their legitimacy and power by doing “good works,” typically in the name of human rights but sometimes God. The universe of NGOs is diverse and defies a single description; NGOs are not a monolithic whole. There are humanitarian NGOs that operate like an ambulance, helping populations following a natural or manmade catastrophe. There are development NGOs that build infrastructure like hospitals and roads to assist poor peoples. There are also advocacy NGOs like Amnesty International that wage international “names and shame” campaigns against regimes, organizations and individuals they find offensive. There are NGO programs in almost every corner of the world, sometimes eclipsing the state in providing social services to populations, causing some to equip that such countries are actually a “Republic of NGOs.” Many NGOs worked relatively easily with governments and IOs. However, some are almost militant in their neutrality, such as Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF), who declare that they operate in “humanitarian space” and are therefore not subject to the authority of the state.

**Required Readings**

Peter Willetts, “Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 320-341.

Peter Willetts, “What Is a Non-Governmental Organization?” *UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems*, Section 1 Institutional and Infrastructure Resource Issues, Article 1.44.3.7, Non-Governmental Organizations (25 pages).

Slim, Hugo. “By what authority? The legitimacy and accountability of non-governmental organizations.” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (2002), (13 pages).

**Optional Readings**

Josselin, Daphne, and William Wallace, eds. *Non-state actors in world politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

Chiang Pei-heng (1981), Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations. Identity, Role and Function, (New York: Praeger).

Korey, William. *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

J. W. Foster with A. Anand (eds.) (1999), *Whose World is it Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations and the Multilateral Future*, (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada).

Weiss, Thomas George, and Leon Gordenker. *NGOs, the UN, and global governance*. Lynne Rienner, 1996.

Willetts, Peter. *The conscience of the world: The influence of non-governmental organisations in the UN system*. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1996.

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), xv-xvi, xix-xxiv, 1-17.

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*: *The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 3-15, 220-231.

Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973).

Dustin Ells Howes, “The Failure of Pacifism and the Success of Nonviolence,” *APSA* 11, No. 2 (June 2013): 427-446.

Richard Jackson. 2014. Bringing pacifism back into international relations. *Social Alternatives* 33, (4): 63

**Issues for Consideration**

* Can aid be political?
* What are the different types of NGOs and how might their agendas conflict?
* NGOs claim they speak for civil society and the voiceless. Do they? Who are they accountable to? Are they held accountable?
* Some say NGOs wield “legitimacy” and “soft power” to shape international relations? Do they? If they do, how so?
* Does humanitarian space exist?

**Topic 12: Transnational Actors: Multi-National Corporations (MNC’s), Global Trade, and International Political Economy**

Large corporations have also joined the ranks of international relations and even employ their own private security forces. More than $3 trillion flows across national borders each day in today’s globalized economy—nearly triple the world’s GDP a century ago. This incredible economic growth is propelled by multinational corporations (MNCs), which are private, for-profit organizations with commercial operations and subsidiaries in two or more countries. In 1960, they numbered 3,500, with an aggregate stock worth $68 billion. By 2000, there were more than 64,000 multinational corporations, worth $7.1 trillion. They account for between 25 and 33 percent of world output, 70 percent of world trade, and 80 percent of international investment. The fifty largest multinational corporations each have annual sales revenue greater than the gross national product of 142 countries, which is about 75 percent of the world’s nations. If revenue were counted as GDP, ExxonMobil would rank among the top 30 countries. The rise of multinational corporations has profoundly affected world politics. But they are not alone. They exist in a broader economic system states, international regimes and markets. Broadly speaking, this is termed “International Political Economy” (IPE).

**Required Readings**

Matthew Watson: “Global trade and global finance” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th ed: 417-429.

Ngaire Woods: “International political economy in an age of globalization” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th: 243-257.

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 213-225.

**Optional Readings**

Thomas Oatley, *International Political Economy* (Glenview, IL: Pearson Education, Inc., 2012).

Trebilcock, Michael J., and Robert Howse. *The regulation of international trade*. Psychology Press, 2005.

Glyn, Andrew*. Capitalism unleashed: finance globalization and welfare*. Clarendon Press, 2006.

Moncarz, Pedro. “The World Trade Organization. A very short introduction.” (2006): 1154-1155.

Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. “International organization and the study of world politics.” *International Organization* (1998): 645-685.

Woods, Ngaire. *The globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers*. Cornell University Press, 2006.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Freefall: America, free markets, and the sinking of the world economy*. WW Norton & Company, 2010.

**Issues for Consideration**

* To what extent and why did the Bretton Woods framework breakdown?
* Are MNCs “stateless”? They have physical mailing addresses but are they nationalistic? Should they be?
* Does rational choice theory explain actors’ preferences?
* What vulnerabilities has the 2008 crisis exposed?
* How much control do states have to affect their economies?
* How can economic tools become an instrument of power?
* Does the WTO promote genuine trade or does it favor some nations?
* Can foreign direct investment (FDI) become a tool of development?

**Topic 13: Transnational Actors: Armed Non-State Actors**

In international law, only states are accorded the privilege of wielding force, and all other forms of organized violence is outlawed. Yet armed non-state actors utilize force all the time. Some do it for political reasons while others are more profit driven. Eitherway, they have political outcomes. Examples of armed non-state actors include terrorists, insurgents, drug cartels, international criminal organizations and mercenaries. Sometimes strong states uses these groups for proxy warfare or hire them to augment their national armies. Often these groups are laws until themselves, even co-opting states to their purposes, such as “narco-states.” Armed non-state actors challenge and change world order.

**Required Readings**

Peter G. Thompson, *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): 53-102.

Sean McFate. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 8-18, 150-159.

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 137-152.

Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds., *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2013): 75-96, 149-170.

**Optional Readings**

C. Marez, *Drug Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics* (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2004).

Phil Williams, “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security,” *ISN ETH Zurich*, 2008, 4-18: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=93880&lng=en

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual and Guidelines for Practitioners*, Chapter 2.3: Characteristics of Armed Groups.

Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, “Transnational Crime,” in Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2nd edition), 429-444.

Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, *The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Report, December 2002), 1-26.

Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” *SAIS Review* 24, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2004): 49-61.

Peter G. Thompson, *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): 1-27, 103-138, 171.

Sean McFate. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 19-60, 160-168.

**Issues for Consideration**

* How can we best define the armed non-state actor or armed group? Is the concept a useful one?
* Are networks replacing states in some regions?
* Does privatizing war change international politics?
* What are the different subtypes of armed non-state actors? What characteristics do they share? How do they differ?
* Do warlords and drug gangs engage in strategy?
* Do armed non-state actors pose an existential threat to strong states?
* We frequently discuss war as a political activity rather than a commercial one. How relevant is this distinction?
* Can international law regulate armed non-state actors? How would armed non-state actors be policed?

**Part III: Global Security Challenges**

**Topic 14: The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict**

Some have argued that today “irregular” warfare is more regular than the “regular” warfare. The range of potential conflict—from low intensity stabilization operations to high intensity conventional and even nuclear war—is much broader than it was in the 20th century. The last part of this course explores some of the trends challenging global security governance, starting with: “what is war?”

**Required Readings**

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012): 25-44.

McFate, Sean. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. (Oxford University Press, 2015): 91-100.

Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics* (Columbia University Press, 2012): 1-14.

Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946–2012,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (2013): 509-521.

**Optional Readings**

Neil E. Harrison, ed., *Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2006).

T.X. Hammes, “How Will We Fight?” *Orbis* 53, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 365-383.

Colin Gray, “How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War,” *Parameters* (Spring 2005): 14-26.

**Issues for Consideration**

* Define the contemporary spectrum of conflict. What types of conflict should be excluded? What should be included?
* What are the practical applications of the concept of a spectrum of conflict? Is it useful? Why or why not?
* What are the costs and risks associated with a broader spectrum of conflict?
* What are hybrid wars and how should be defined and addressed from a strategic perspective?

**Topic 15: The Role of Force**

What is the role of force in the contemporary spectrum of conflict? Traditionally, the Security Studies literature has defined four uses of force: defense, deterrence, compellence, and show of force (also called “swaggering” or “signaling”). The emphasis on each of these uses has waxed and waned as the threats and opportunities have shifted in the international system and as new capabilities have emerged to change the ways in which force could be used. The end of the Cold War produced one such change with the use of force for peace operations. After 9/11, preemption was added to the uses of force. Today there are some, notably Sir General Rupert Smith, who argue that the utility of force has fundamentally changed. He argues that in the contemporary security environment, force serves four functions: destruction, coercion and deterrence, containment, and amelioration.

**Required Readings**

Robert J. Art, “The Four Functions of Force,” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,* 4th edition, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), 3-11.

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 25-44.

Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 3-28.

Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Exploring the Utility of Force: Some Conclusions,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 423-436.

**Optional Readings**

Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” In *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,* 7th edition, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 3-21.

Howard, Michael. “Military Power and International Order.” *International Affairs* 85, 1 (January 2009): 145-155.

Troxell, John F. “Military Power and the Use of Force,” ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr, *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, (2012): 217-244.

**Issues for Consideration**

* In addition to the four functions of force, as laid out by Art, some discuss preemption and preventative force. Are these different words to describe the same thing or are they actually two more functions?
* How do the traditional uses of force compare with Rupert Smith’s uses of force?
* How should force be employed in the contemporary security environment? Do the traditional uses of force still have utility? Are Smith’s concepts more accurate or useful?
* Force has long been viewed as the primary instrument of statecraft. Does it still merit that distinction? If not, what other instruments have replaced it?
* Do the traditional uses of force have utility for non-state actors?

**Topic 16: Globalization**

Globalization has widened and hastened the impact of worldwide interconnectedness. Some scholars believe globalization will have no effect on geopolitics and the contemporary world order. Some believe that this “hyper-connectedness” is bringing about the demise of sovereign nation states and the ability of governments to control their own economies and societies. Still others believe a globalization of politics will emerge in which the distinction between domestic and international affairs is not meaningful. The effects of globalization and the dissemination of borders can be seen most explicitly in a security setting; the global arms trade, expansion of transnational terrorism, cyber hacking and attacks, the spread of knowledge and technology for the proliferation of WMD’s and growth of transnational private military companies are all results of globalization. No matter the impact of globalization on world politics, globalization will certainly have consequences for human and national security.

**Required Readings**

Steve Smith: “Introduction” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 1-15.

Anthony McGrew, “Globalization and global politics” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 15-35

Andrew Linklater: “Globalization and the transformation of the political community” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th*: 497-513.

**Optional Readings**

James D. Kiras, “Terrorism and Globalization” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 357-371.

Peter G. Thompson, *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): 37-46.

**Issues for Consideration**

* What is globalization?
* What are “distant proximities” and how do they affect international relations?
* What is “fragmegration”?
* What is “convergence”? How can we best study and understand complex network today?
* How does cultural globalization differ from economic, political, and technological globalization?
* How do current trends of urbanization and population growth affect global security?
* How has globalization impacted the state? How does it affect non-state actors? Do states and non-state actors benefit from globalization or are they weakened by it?
* How has private security been affected by globalization?
* How is global security affected by globalization? And what types of shifts will we witness in global security governance?

**Topic 17: Human Security and Development**

“Human security” is an alterative security paradigm that views security and development as inexorably linked and mutually reinforcing. The concept emerged in the UN during the 1990s, and emphasizes the welfare of individuals above states. Tellingly, the idea emerged from the UN’s development agency (UNDP) rather than the peacekeeping or military wing of the UN (UNDPKO). In channeling U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, former UN Secretary Kofi Annan declared human security is, “Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security.” Human security encompasses personal security, economic security, health security, political security, community security, food security, environmental security and other areas common to development. Critics lambast the idea, saying the notion of “human security” is too broad, not implementable, the securitization of development, or redundant with traditional national security. Not surprisingly, human security has broad appeal for liberals while realists generally dismiss it. However, human security remains an influential concept in international relations, and therefore important to understand.

**Required Readings**

Tony Evans and Caroline Thomas: “Poverty, development and hunger” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations,* 6th: 430-448.

Amitav Acharya “Human security” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th ed: 448-463

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World, Second Edition*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 119-134, 195-212, (Chs. 7, 11).

**Optional Readings**

Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, *Human Security in a Borderless World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011).

Andrew Jones, *Human Geography* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

Peter Hough, *Environmental Security: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

David Chandler, “Review Essay: Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (August 2008): 427-438.

M. Strong, “The Prospects for Global Environmental Security”, *Canadian Journal of Policy Research*, Isuma 3(2). 2002: 11-16.

S. Dalby, S. “Security and Ecology in the Age of Globalization,” *Environmental Change and Security Project*, Issue 8 (available at http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/Report\_8\_Dalby.pdf )

Asfaw Kumssa and John F. Jones, “Climate Change and human security in Africa,” *International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology* 17, no. 6 (December 2010): 453-461.

**Issues for Consideration**

* Does the human security approach necessarily undermine the concept of state sovereignty?
* Can human security and state-centric security be reconciled conceptually and in practice?
* What is the relationship between governance, security and development?
* What are the local, regional and global effects of human insecurity?
* What is the relationship between human security, human rights, and the neoliberal worldview?

**Topic 18: The Rise of Intrastate Wars**

An estimated 90 percent of casualties today are civilian. Increasingly, militaries no longer battle other militaries and nonstate actors do the fighting and dying. War is shifting from interstate to intrastate and is accordingly fought in fragile or failed states that have by definition lost their monopoly of force. There are many names for this type of warfare––ethnic, civil, war amongst the people, irregular, etc.––none of them exclusively accurate. Nonetheless, whatever it is called, it’s on the rise. In contrast to “Westphalian” warfare, most fighting today is civil war, ethnic conflict, insurgency, rampant violent crime, warlordism, and general lawlessness. This topic will focus on the rise of “ethnic warfare,” as a subset of this larger issue.

**Required Readings**

Peter G. Thompson, *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): 29-48.

John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-14.

Stefan Wolff, “What Causes Ethnic Conflicts,” in *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 59-88.

**Optional Readings**

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, 1 (February 2003), 75-89. http://wand.stanford.edu/courses/polisci350c/classonly/fearon\_laitin2003.pdf

Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies III* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

Jonathan Fox, “Counting the Causes and Dynamics of Ethnoreligious Violence” *Religious Fundamentalism & Political Extremism* (2004): 122-148.

Neal G Jesse and Kristen P Williams, *Ethnic Conflict: A Systematic Approach to Cases of Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010).

Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses* (New York: Polity, 2010).

**Issues for Consideration**

* What is the relationship between ethnicity and warfare?
* How are ethnic conflicts distinct from other forms of conflict?
* What are the causes of ethnic conflict? Which causes are internal to the group?
* Why are comparative group worth and legitimacy central to ethnic conflict?

**Topic 19: World Order in Transition?**

Strategy can be difficult to comprehend, and even more difficult to do well. Prior to any articulation of strategy, it is essential to understand global security governance, the architecture of world politics, and its inherent challenges. Failure to do so may result in strategic surprise. However, as the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said “Everything changes and nothing stands still.” This is especially true to geostrategy, making it difficult to master. This course sought to provide you the analytical tools to recognize and comprehend the nature of this change so that you can better articulate strategy. This final topic invites you to ponder the world order in transition and postulate what it means to be “secure.”

**Required Readings**

Andrew Hurrell, “Rising powers and the emerging global order,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 304-319.

Ian Clark, “Globalization And The Post-Cold War Order,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th: 513-526.

Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr., *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, Second Edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 247-260.

**Optional**

McFate, Sean. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. (Oxford University Press, 2015): 72-90.

Peter G. Thompson, *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): 173-199, 201-213.

Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds., *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2013).

**Issues for Consideration**

* Will states become more or less important in the 21st century?
* How will militaries be used in the coming decades?
* Describe the future of global security governance.
* Will the world become more or less globalized?
* How important is “legitimacy” for world order? Who decides what it is, and who has it?
* What’s the future of war?