

***Dwight D. Eisenhower School
for National Security and Resource Strategy***

***Acquisition and Innovation
Core Course***

***Lesson 9
The Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System
(JCIDS)***



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A&I Position Update

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Block 0: Introduction

A&I 1: Introduction to A&I

Block I: Mobilization

A&I 2: Economics of Mobilization: WWI

A&I 3: Mobilization as Public Policy: WWII

A&I 4: Law and Politics of Mobilization: Korean War

A&I 5: Mobilization During the Cold War

A&I 6: Mobilization in Post Cold War Globalized World

Block II: Requirements and Resource Allocation

A&I 7: Political Realities of Acquisition and Innovation

A&I 8: Ethics and Politics in A&I: Tanker Case Study

A&I 9: Choosing Strategic Capabilities: JCIDS

A&I 10: Resourcing Decision-Making in Action: Trident Case Study

A&I 11: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

A&I 12: Strategic Resource Allocation

A&I 13: Risk within the President's Budget

A&I14: The Purse and the Sword: The Congressional Budget Process

Block III: Innovation and Acquisition

A&I 15: Understanding Sources of Military Innovation Part I

A&I 16: Understanding Sources of Military Innovation Part II

A&I 17: Defense Acquisition System

A&I 18: Current Trends in Acquisition

A&I 19: Contracting and Acquisition Strategy

A&I 20: Acquisition Strategy in Action: MLRS/CUC-V

A&I 21: Acquisition in Support of Urgent Wartime Requirements

A&I 22: Acquiring Services & Operational Contract Support

A&I 23: Life Cycle Logistics and Supply Chain Management

A&I 24: International Acquisition and Cooperative Programs

A&I 25: Defense Trade and Technology Security

A&I 26: Program Evaluation Paper Team Outbriefs

BLOCK IV: Strategy and Resource Alignment

A&I 27: Resourcing Trade-Offs

A&I 28: Strategy and Resource Analysis - Practicum

A&I 29: Strategy and Resource Analysis - Practicum

A&I 30: Course Wrap-up





Today's Reading


United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees

WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

Detailed System Engineering and Product Development Positioning for Success

CRS REPORT
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

GAO-17-77



Informing the Congress

Defense Acquisition: How DOD Acquires Weapons and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process

Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition

May 23, 2014

A Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet takes on fuel from a USAF KC-135 over Iraq on Sept. 28 during a mission for Operation Inherent Resolve.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council makes the tough decisions on what's needed and what's affordable.

School


Operation Eagle Claw—the 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages by Iran at the busy in Tehran—was an operation how difficult it had been for forces to operate and to accomplish. An after-action report especially the use of the operation.

revealed between the In some commanders' radios

54 MARCH 2017 • WWW

CJCSI 5-31 AUGUST

CHARTER OF THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (JROC) AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (JCIDS)



JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20318



Lesson Objectives

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- Analyze and evaluate the roles and relationships of the joint community and individual Services in determining force capabilities and managing the defense resources needed to execute the National Military Strategy.
- Understand, analyze, and evaluate the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and the behavior of its governing body, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
- Analyze and evaluate how the JCIDS process and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council influence the acquisition and budgeting processes within DoD.



Issues For Consideration

- How does the “**capabilities-based approach**” used in the JCIDS decision making support system shape and influence the way DoD allocates defense resources and the type of forces each Service organizes, trains and equips?
- Through their Title X responsibilities, the services are charged with equipping the services. How does JCIDS support these responsibilities? How might it hamper the Services in performing these functions?
- Does today’s environment necessitate we acquire defense capability in a more unified manner? Does this change the role the Services should play? The Joint Staff? The Combatant Commanders? The Secretary of Defense and other senior civilian DOD leaders?
- Is it the responsibility of the joint community to better integrate capability requirements, funding, and acquisition decisions? If not the joint community, then whose responsibility is it? Where does Goldwater-Nichols place the acquisition decisions? Is this the most appropriate place?
- Is the current balance correct or should control over requirements be more or less centralized? Is there benefit in a centralized approach or should the Services be given increased freedom to make investment decisions? Why?




- **Requirements Definitions**
- **Getting Requirements Right**
- **The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System**
- **The Joint Requirements Oversight Council**



Requirements

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www.dilbert.com scottadams@aol.com




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JCIDS / PPBE / DAS: “Big A” - An Interactive Processes



Source: Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, February 2006, p. 4.


- As set forth by statute and regulation, from concept to deployment, a weapon system must go through a three-step process of identifying a required weapon system, establishing a budget, and acquiring the system.
- These three steps are organized as follows:
 - The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (**JCIDS**) for identifying requirements.
 - The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (**PPBE**) for allocating resources and budgeting.
 - The Defense Acquisition System (**DAS**)—for developing and/or buying the item.

“Together, the three processes provide a means to determine, validate, and prioritize capability requirements and associated capability gaps and risks, and then fund, develop, field, and sustain non-materiel and materiel capability solutions for the Warfighter in a timely manner.” CJCSI 5123.01H



Three Decision Support Systems

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This lesson focuses here

Approximately half of spending on DoD contracts is now here (We'll discuss more in a later A&I lesson)

*Services Requirements Review Boards



What is a Requirement?


A **necessary attribute in a system**, a statement that identifies a capability, characteristic, or quality factor of a system in order for it to have value and utility to a customer or user.

The Requirements Engineering Handbook by Ralph R. Young

A capability required to meet an organization's roles, functions, and missions in current or future operations. In JCIDS this is also called a "Capability Requirement"

Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 31 Aug 2018

Example: Student must transit between home and school for classes





What is a Capability?

The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.

Charter of the JROC and Implementation of the JCIDS 31 Aug 2018

Example: There are many choices available for transit between home and school





What is a Capability Solution?

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A material solution and/or non-material solution to satisfy one or more capability requirements and reduce or eliminate one or more capability gaps.

Charter of the JROC and Implementation of the JCIDS 31 Aug 2018

**Example: Student purchases a car and drives to school
(Material Solution).**





What is a Non-Material Capability Solution?

Changes to:

Doctrine,

Organization,

Training,

(fielded) materiel,

Leadership and education,

Personnel,

Facilities, and/or

Policy,

Example: Instead of purchasing a car, the student decides to take the metro and walk from the station to school



...implemented to satisfy one or more capability requirements (or needs) and reduce or eliminate one or more capability gaps, **without the need to develop or purchase new materiel capability solutions.**

Also known as a **DOTmLPF-P** solution.



What is a Capability Gap?

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The inability to meet or exceed a capability requirement, resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated.

The gap may be the result of no fielded capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in a fielded capability solution, or the need to replace a fielded capability solution to prevent a future gap.

Charter of the JROC and Implementation of the JCIDS 31 Aug 2018

Example: If spouse starts a new job, and a new transportation need may create a capability gap.






Getting Requirements Right

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S. Adams



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Pentagon Wars



Getting Requirements Right

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Requirements ... **provide the basis for all of the development work that follows.** Once the requirements are set, developers initiate the other technical work: system design, development, testing, implementation, and operation.

Data from a NASA study provides a clear and powerful message: **projects that expended** the industry average of **2% to 3%** of total **project cost/effort** on the (full life cycle) requirements process **experienced an 80% to 200% cost overrun,**

while **projects that invested 8% to 14%** of total project cost/effort in the requirements process **had 0% to 50% overruns.**

The Requirements Engineering Handbook by Ralph R. Young



Getting Requirements Right

The Eisenhower School

“Some acquisition reform proponents believe that unplanned changes in program requirements — **‘requirements creep’** — after the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has approved the requirements and handed them off to the acquisition community are a *primary cause of these ongoing cost and schedule problems in many programs.*”

“[W]e found that **cost and schedule growth** in major acquisition programs were not necessarily a direct result of requirements changes, but were instead more *directly related to a lack of discipline and rigor in the process of defining and understanding a program’s initial requirements.*”

*Weapon System Requirements:
Detailed Systems Engineering Prior to Product Development Positions Programs for Success
GAO November 2016*

Sheep Specs



Getting Requirements Right

The Eisenhower School

For a program to deliver a successful product with available resources, high levels of knowledge—informed by systems engineering—must be demonstrated before significant commitments are made.

While it would seem that taking such an approach would be axiomatic, we have found that it is not. On the contrary, we have previously found that **there are strong incentives within the culture of weapon system acquisition to overpromise a prospective weapon's performance while understating its likely cost and schedule demands.**

Competition with other programs vying for defense dollars puts pressure on program sponsors to project unprecedented levels of performance (often by counting on unproven technologies) while promising low cost and short schedules.

*WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Detailed Systems Engineering Prior to Product Development Positions Programs for Success
GAO November 2016*



Getting Requirements Right

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Of the programs we studied, the three that began development with more modest requirements and had conducted detailed systems engineering generally had good outcomes.

Avg Cost Increase: -7%

Avg Schedule Increase: 11 months



The three programs with some requirements challenges that conducted systems engineering analysis to mitigate associated risks experienced moderate cost and schedule outcomes.

Avg Cost Increase: 13%

Avg Schedule Increase: ~10 months



Finally, the three programs in our sample that began development with challenging requirements and had done little systems engineering generally reported poor outcomes.

Avg Cost Increase: 58%

Avg Schedule Increase: 45 months



Weapon System Requirements:

Detailed Systems Engineering Prior to Product Development Positions Programs for Success

GAO November 2016



JCIDS Overview

Motivations RGS vs. JCIDS JCIDS Process





A Problem Statement

"Snowflake"

The Eisenhower School

March 19, 2002 7:17 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Requirements System

As Chairman of JROC, please think through what we all need to do, individually or collectively, to get the requirements system fixed.

It is pretty clear it is broken, and it is so powerful and inexorable that it invariably continues to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be required.

Please screw your head into that, and let's have four or five of us meet and talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-1

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02




Threat Based vs Capability Based Planning

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
Threat Based

Requirements Generation System (RGS)- ~30 years of experience



Capability Based

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) – Est. June 2003





JCIDS Goal

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- The Goal of JCIDS is to:
 - Provide the Joint Force with capabilities needed to perform across the full range of military operations and challenges through a deliberate planning process
 - Put “the right tools in the toolbox” for the COCOMs
 - Support the JROC in its Title 10 responsibilities
 - Conduct cost, schedule, and performance trades
 - **Prioritize joint military requirements** in shaping the force
 - Capability documents provided for guidance
- JCIDS is supported by:
 - Integrated, collaborative review process across the entire DoD
 - Expertise from integrating with other Gov’t agencies (DoS, DHS)
 - Joint Concepts (i.e., anti-access/area denial, new Joint Operating Environment)



JCIDS along with the Defense Acquisition System and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process form the principal DOD decision support processes for developing and acquiring capabilities required by the military forces to support the national defense strategy



To enable the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to execute its statutory duties to **assess joint military capabilities**, and **identify, approve**, and **prioritize gaps** in these capabilities, to meet applicable requirements in the National Defense Strategy as specified in Title 10 U.S.C. § 181.

Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System – 30 August 2018




Four “First Order” Principles that Underpin the Joint Requirements Process

- The role of the **Chairman**, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the Principal Military Advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council (HSC).
- The role of **Combatant Commanders** as the principal employers of joint and combined warfighting capabilities;
- The responsibility of the **Military Services** to organize, train and equip joint warfighting capabilities under Title 10
- The governance and oversight roles of **DoD civilian leadership**, through the Administration and Congress, to set acquisition policy and allocate resources to procure capabilities necessary to fulfill the national security needs of the nation.



JCIDS – The Central Process For Capability Solutions





Three JCIDS Process Lanes

JCIDS Lanes	Operational Timeline	JCIDS Documents	JCIDS Staffing Timeline
Ongoing Contingency Lane	Urgent Need (<2 Years)	JUON	15 days
Anticipated Contingency Lane	Emergent Need (<2 Years)	JEON	31 days
Deliberate Lane	Future Need (>2 Years)	ICD, CDD	97 days, 103 days


Figure A- 1: JCIDS Process Lanes



Where it all starts - Deliberately: Capabilities Based Assessment

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
The CBA process outlined in the JCIDS Manual can be summarized into **three major efforts**:
Needs Analysis, Gap Analysis, and Solutions Analysis.





Capabilities Bases Assessment


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JCIDS Deliberate Process

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
Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System – 30 August 2018





JCIDS Urgent/Emergent Process

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Joint Urgent Operational Need



Joint Emergent Operational Need





The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

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JROC Mission/Responsibilities

10 U.S. Code § 181 - Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

Assist the CJCS in:

Assessing joint military capabilities*, and identifying, approving, and prioritizing **gaps in such capabilities**, to meet applicable requirements in the national defense strategy

Deleted per Section 831 NDA 2019

Reviewing performance requirements for an existing or proposed capability that the CJCS determines should be reviewed by the JROC

Reviewing and validating whether a capability fulfills a gap in joint military capabilities*

INPUT FROM COMBATANT COMMANDS:
JROC shall seek and consider input from commanders of combatant commands in carrying out its mission as defined in Title 10 USC 181

Identifying new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation

Establishing and approving joint performance requirements* that ensure interoperability and are deemed necessary by the CJCS to fulfill capability gaps

INPUT FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF:
JROC shall seek and strongly consider the views of the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces, in their roles as customers of the acquisition system, on matters pertaining to a capability proposed by the armed force, Defense Agency, or other entity of the Department of Defense and joint performance requirements*

Identifying alternatives to any acquisition program that meets approved joint military capability requirements for the purposes of 2366a(b), section 2366b(a)(4), and section 2433(e)(2)

Address other matters assigned to it by the President or Secretary of Defense

* As defined in 10 USC 181, the term "joint military capability" means the collective capabilities across the joint force, including both joint and force-specific capabilities, that are available to conduct military operations. The term "joint performance requirement" means a performance requirement that is critical or essential to ensure interoperability or fulfill a capability gap of more than one armed force, Defense Agency, or other entity of the Department of Defense, or impacts the joint force in other ways such as logistics.



A Few New Statutory Definitions

The Eisenhower School

Performance Requirements as the Responsibility of the Armed Forces

The Chief of Staff of an armed force is responsible for all performance requirements for that armed force and, **except for performance requirements [that the Chairman of the JCS determines should be reviewed OR that are joint performance requirements]**, such performance requirements do not need to be validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

10 U.S. Code § 181 - Joint Requirements Oversight Council



A Few New Statutory Definitions

The Eisenhower School

Performance Requirement

A performance attribute of a system considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability.

10 U.S. Code § 181 - Joint Requirements Oversight Council



A Few New Statutory Definitions

The Eisenhower School

Joint Performance Requirement (JPR)

[A] a performance requirement that is critical or essential to ensure interoperability or fulfill a capability gap of **more than one armed force, Defense Agency, or other entity** of the Department of Defense, or **impacts the joint force** in other ways such as logistics.

10 U.S. Code § 181 - Joint Requirements Oversight Council



JROC Organization

In general, the JROC is composed of the following:

- **JROC CHAIR: The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

- *The principal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for making recommendations about joint military capabilities or joint performance requirements.*

- **Council Members:**

- *An Army officer in the grade of general**
- *A Navy officer in the grade of admiral**
- *An Air Force officer in the grade of general**
- *A Marine Corps officer in the grade of general**

- **Advisors:**

- *The Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Policy*
- *The USD for Intelligence (Newly added)*
- *The USD for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E))***
- *The USD for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S))***
- *The USD (Comptroller)*
- *The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation*
- *The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation*
- *The commander of a combatant command when matters related to the area of responsibility or functions of that command are under consideration by the Council.*



** Members of the Council shall be selected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, from officers in the grade of general or admiral, as the case may be, who are recommended for selection by the Secretary of the military department concerned*

*** Statute states USD for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, but that has been split into USD (R&E) and USD(A&S)*



Organizational Structure of JROC

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


Figure 2. JROC Subordinate Boards and Related Organizations



Requirements Challenges

Finding the balance between:

COCOM near-term requirements -
CONPLANs / current missions

and

Services' long-term vision &
investment plans

Growing demands

and

Fiscal & political constraints

Versatile, joint systems

and

Systems optimized for Service
missions

Geographic specificity

and

Worldwide applicability

Ambitious technology

and

Executable acquisition

Quantity

and

Quality



If JCIDS as currently constituted is not the answer what capability requirements process would you recommend?

- What are your beliefs or assumptions about the behavior of individuals and institutions?
- Who should make the decisions?
 - *Role of civilian leadership?*
 - *Role of military leadership?*
 - *Role of Service, COCOM & OSD leadership?*
- Who should dominate the process? The *suppliers* of capabilities (Services & Agencies) or the *consumers* of capabilities (COCOMs)
- How should decisions be made?
 - *How centralized should the process be?*
 - *How much institutional competition if any should be allowed?*
 - *How much should the process depend upon cooperation among Services and other defense institutions?*

“It is difficult to make a political argument to sacrifice something now for a benefit that may or may not pay off for 10 or 20 years.” Todd Harrison, CSIS



Next few Classes:

A&I-11: PPBE Lecture. Baruch – **7 Feb** (Thurs) at 13:30

A&I-10: Trident Case Study – **12 Feb** (Tues)
(See Blackboard for Guidance)

A&I-12: Strategic Resource Allocation – **14 Feb** (Thurs)



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Back-Up Slides



Critique of JCIDS Performance



GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate

September 2008

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

DOD's Requirements
Determination
Process Has Not Been
Effective in
Prioritizing Joint
Capabilities



GAO-08-1060



- 67% of “JROC interest” ICDs submitted to JCIDS by services (Jul 03 – May 08)
 - Services– 60*
 - DOD Agencies – 7*
 - Joint Community - 23 (COCOM – 12, JS – 8, FCB – 3)*
- **Virtually all capability proposals have been validated—or approved** (140 validated, 57 in-process, 6 inactive)
- **Process has proven to be lengthy—taking on average up to 10 months**
- DOD **lacks an analytical approach to prioritize joint capability** needs and determine the relative importance of capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS process
- Functional capabilities boards have not been staffed or resourced
- Services retain most of DOD’s analytical capacity and resources for requirements development.
- DOD officials : determining how best to integrate COCOM and service capability perspectives will be challenging because of differences in roles, missions, and time frames.




Average JCIDS Staffing Times

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Figure 5: Average JCIDS Staffing Days Required for “JROC Interest” Capability Documents

Status of capability proposals



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Source: U.S. General Accountability Office. DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060. Washington, D.C.: September 2008



- Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, **Congress directed the JROC to seek and consider input from the commanders of the COCOMs** on proposed joint military requirements
- COCOMs reported that they generally took advantage of opportunities to participate throughout the development of joint requirements
- **COCOMs questioned the value of what they described as a resource-intensive and time-consuming process** that is not always responsive to their more immediate capability needs
- COCOMs also questioned the value of a joint requirements process resulting in decisions that, while influential, are advisory to acquisition and budget processes driven by service investment priorities. In addition, JROC approval is only the first step toward fielding a new capability--the development and acquisition of the capability may take several more years.



GAO

United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees

June 2011

DOD WEAPON SYSTEMS

Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews




GAO-11-502



Missed Trade-Off Opportunities

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AOA's Relationship to JROC Requirements Reviews



Source: GAO analysis of DOD policy.

- **Most significant trade-offs are made by the military services during the AOA**, which occurs between the JROC's review of an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and its review of a Capability Development Document (CDD)
- The **JROC does not formally review the trade-off decisions made as a result of an AOA** until it reviews a proposed program's CDD. As a result, the **JROC does not have an opportunity to provide military advice on trade-offs and the proposed solution before it is selected**, and a significant amount of time and resources can be expended in technology development



GAO Findings - FY2010

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- The **military services did not consistently provide high-quality & reliable resource estimates to the JROC** for proposed programs.
- In most cases, the **military services had not effectively conducted uncertainty and sensitivity analyses or examined the effects of changing assumptions and ground rules**, all of which could further the JROC's efforts to ensure that programs are fully funded and provide a sound basis for making cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs.
- The **JROC does not currently prioritize requirements, consider redundancies across proposed programs, or prioritize and analyze capability gaps in a consistent manner.**
- A DOD review team examining the JROC's requirements review process is considering changes that would address the prioritization of requirements on a department-wide basis



2012 Reforms



What JROC Has Done

Take the Lead in Shaping the Force:

- *Debate the difficult issues and **make difficult choices earlier***
- *Better upfront fidelity on cost/schedule/performance tradeoffs*
- *More analytic rigor and risk/portfolio analysis*
- *Stronger emphasis on prioritizing requirements/capabilities*
- *More dynamic/iterative process throughout a program's lifecycle. (Revisit as necessary...strategy shifts, threat changes, etc.)*

Create a more dynamic and iterative process...Make difficult choices throughout the requirements process continuum!!!



JROC Changes

- **Limit the audience so determinative discussion/ decisions can be made**
 - ***More Tank-like***
 - ***JROC Principals+1, COCOM Principals+1***
 - ***Statutory Advisors or their Deputy (AT&L, CAPE, OT&E, OSD(P), OSD(C),)***
 - ***FCB Chair briefs the JROC***
 - ***Minimal others by invitation only...***
- **Cost vs. Capability vs. Risk – better upfront analysis of alternatives**
 - ***Review of Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) prior to Milestone A***
 - ***Limited page length of ICD (10) / CDD (45) / CPD (40)***
 - ***Highlight non-materiel approaches as alternative or in conjunction with materiel solutions***
 - ***FCB Chair tees up the appropriate debate***
 - ***Tougher decisions on the 80% solution (i.e. knee in the curve)***
 - ***More portfolio analysis to determine risk***
 - ***Include Special Access Programs in the portfolio review, created JRAD***
- **Solution centric vice document/process centric – faster timelines (83 days)**
- **Tripwires – Return to JROC or JCB for cost growth over 10% (current baseline) or 25% (original baseline), and for schedule slips of 12 months or greater, and for quantity reductions greater than 10% (of targets set in document validation JROCM)**



JCIDS/JROC

Major Changes Summary

- Updated CJSIs 5123.01G JROC Charter, 3170.01I JCIDS and JCIDS Manual
- Three lanes – deliberate, emergent, urgent
- JROC added CCMDs as full members of JROC; more tank-like; added decision points
- JCIDS documents – ICD, CDD, CPD, DCR **page count restricted (10, 45, 40, 30)**
- Staffing – streamlined...deliberate (**97 days**); urgent/emergent (**15 – 31 days**)
- Role of FCB strengthened – **FCB Chair/Lead briefs JROC, not the Sponsor/PM**; FCB will review AoA results prior to JCB/JROC
- Prioritization – new process; FCBs will prioritize capability requirements within their portfolios
- KPPs – six “mandatory” (Force protection, survivability, sustainment, net-ready (major changes), training, and energy); if not used, must justify why not
- **Draft CDD required for Milestone A** – not submitted to KM/DS; supports TD phase
- **Affordability** – cost will be considered in document review and validation processes
- **Tripwires** – Return to JROC or JCB for **cost growth over 10%** (current APB) or 25% (original APB), ***and*** for IOC or FOC slips of 12 months or greater, ***and*** for quantity reductions greater than 10% (of targets set in document validation JROCM)