

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE WASHINGTON, D.C.



CORE COURSE 6400

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING

ACADEMIC YEAR 2015-2016 (SPRING)

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DR DAVID C. ARNOLD
Course Director
Department of Security Studies

DR DAVID TRETLE
Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs
Professor of Strategic Studies

Core Course 6400

Academic Year 2015-2016

Course Director

Dr David Arnold
Room 146
Roosevelt Hall
(202) 685-3657

Deputy Course Directors

COL John Hall
Room 236
Roosevelt Hall
(202) 685-3704

Research Analyst

Ms. Marcy Dupalo
Room B118
Roosevelt Hall

COURSE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

This course examines the U.S. domestic context of national security decisions as well as various national security decision processes. The premise of this course is that national security strategy, and strategic decisions, are not made in a vacuum. Instead, they are in part shaped by, and help shape, domestic political debates and processes occurring at the time of the decision.

By this point in the year you should be familiar with the concepts associated with devising strategies. In the abstract, a strategist confronted with a novel international situation will identify and prioritize national interests, identify threats to those interests, set goals, and come up with appropriate and effective courses of action given available military and non-military means, all while anticipating the risks and international consequences of those courses of action. This process should be familiar from your initial course work here at the National War College.

Yet a strategist may design the perfect strategy and tactics to deal with a particular international circumstance, only to find that the strategy is not viable for domestic political reasons or becomes altered as it moves through the U.S. national security decision process. Or the strategist may discover that implementing a particular course of action may change the domestic political debate in unforeseen ways, with implications for the sustainability of that strategy. For pragmatic reasons, then, understanding and anticipating domestic influences on and the implications of strategic decisions are vital to successful strategizing.

Perhaps that is for the best. From a normative perspective, some might argue that strategy should reflect national values and interests, and the best way to assess those things is to understand the domestic arena and the desires of one's polity, either expressed directly or through elected officials. In that sense, it is appropriate for the domestic context to shape the development and implementation of national security strategy. Indeed, advocates of good governance would argue that strategists should base their decisions on exactly such a calculus.

Course 6400 will develop your analytic capabilities with regard to U.S. domestic politics, constraints, and opportunities and help you anticipate how domestic debates and processes influence strategy. More importantly, it will enhance your ability to **assess the domestic viability of a proposed or given U.S. strategy**. By the end of the course, you should be capable of achieving the following objectives that are fundamental to successful United States strategy:

- Analyze how U.S. domestic traditions, conditions and processes influence the formulation and execution of national security strategies.
- Assess the implications of the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies for the viability of a proposed strategy.
- Assess the suitability of the structure and process in the U.S. for national leaders to implement national security strategies.

COURSE OVERVIEW

The course is organized into three main blocks focused on different facets of the strategy and policy processes as they relate to the U.S. domestic context. Though each block reviews but one part of the U.S. domestic context and national security decision-making, each one builds on what came before it.

Block A – CONTEXT: The founding context and its lasting implications provide a basic introduction to the historical political traditions and conditions of the United States of America. In **Topic 1**, we introduce the central question and the organization of the course as well as “Politics in America” by reviewing what one strategist sees as an ideal form of interagency cooperation and comparing that to the reality of policy-making in the U.S. system. **Topics 2 and 3** review the U.S. Constitution. We first explore the constitutional context in **Topic 2**: the political, cultural, economic, and military events that took place between the early 1770s and the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that helped shape national debates over the country’s future. **Topic 3** reviews the various constitutional compromises agreed upon by the Founding Fathers. The next block continues by looking at the institutions and branches of government that influence national security decisions and the power that each branch possesses. **Topic 4** reviews legislative power: what it involves, how it varies between congressional chambers, and when it is most likely to be used. **Topic 5** considers executive power: its foundations in the Constitution, the powers accrued over time by successive presidents, and the art of appealing to the public. We discuss Article III’s power of judicial review in **Topic 6**, with a look in our readings on court review of national security decisions and a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court to hear from Justice Anthony Scalia. **Topic 7** examines the fundamental nature and distinctive characteristics of civil-military relations in the U.S. The next two topics move beyond government institutions. **Topic 8** explores the role of the media either as an independent actor in the policy arena or as a tool used by government officials to advance a policy agenda. This topic provides opportunities to assess U.S. civil-military relations, the U.S. national security decision-making process, and strategic leadership in an illustrated case study. We conclude Block A with **Topic 9**, which explores the election process, cycles, public opinion, and its implications. Here we will consider how U.S. foreign policy is influenced by public sentiment and what elections mean for future U.S. national security policy.

Block B – CONSTRUCTS: This section of 6400 explores the national security establishment. This portion of the course examines the concept of bureaucracy, the notion and process of the interagency decision-making, the distinctive nature of the U.S. civil-military relations as well as the role and process of strategic leadership within the domestic context. **Topic 10** looks at how the “inter-agency” of executive branch functions or how the process of the interagency is intended to work and how it actually works in a crisis. The main focus of **Topic 11** is to provide an in-depth review of the National Security Council (NSC), detailing the history of the NSC process and staff organizations from President Harry S Truman through our current Commander-in-Chief Barack H. Obama. **Topic 12** examines the powers of lobbyists and interest groups to determine how they influence politics, policies, and U.S. national security decision process. **Topic 13** introduces some of the basics of bureaucracy, with an examination of organizational biases and procedures as well as how to understand actions of bureaucratic entities by examining the leadership as well as the political, bureaucratic, and popular viability of President Obama’s Afghanistan surge.

BLOCK C -- CONDITIONS: The final portion of the course evaluates how current conditions can affect the formulation and execution of U.S. national-level policies and strategies. This block allows for the examination of various factors -- though not all -- that might shape national security policies and strategies. **Topic 14** reviews the federal budget process and examines how the U.S. national debt and deficit impact current and future national security strategies and policies. **Topic 15** explores the domestic politics and policies of energy security and the political and economic dynamics involved in domestic policy decisions. In **Topic 16**, we bring together some recent NWC graduates and talk about what you can expect when you're expecting to go work in the Interagency. In **Topic 17**, we'll talk about leadership in the Interagency at the most senior levels with a senior leader in the Intelligence Community. **Topic 18** concludes the course by talking about how strategic leadership practitioners navigate and cope with the power, people, process, preference, and precedents of the domestic context.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Participation

Course 6400 contains a mixture of lectures, seminars, in-class presentations, and case studies. We strongly encourage you to participate actively in all venues. You will have the opportunity to ask questions of our lecturers at the conclusion of each lecture. Take advantage of that opportunity and ask thoughtful and thought provoking questions. Your regular participation in seminar is crucial to the success of Course 6400. You and your seminar colleagues will learn more through active engagement than you will through passive listening. Moreover, the seminar environment is a perfect opportunity for you to explore innovative and possibly controversial ideas in a nonjudgmental setting. At the same time, we would ask that you not speak just to hear yourself think. Keep your comments on target, and remember to listen to what your colleagues are saying in response. Finally, the course contains opportunities for individual presentations and group case studies. Full participation is critical for your success and the success of group efforts.

Reading Assignments

Course 6400 meets 21 times. The average assigned readings per meeting is less than 60 pages. That equates to well less than 1,400 pages of readings for the whole course. While the average reading load is manageable, the assigned readings for first portion of the course are moderately challenging. We encourage you to get ahead of the curve during the first week to establish a firm foundation for the rest of the course.

Summary of Graded Requirements

<i>Graded Events</i>	<i>Percentage of Overall Grade</i>	<i>Due Dates</i>
Participation	30%	Daily
Exam	40%	20 Feb 2015
Presentation #1	30%	1 st – 26 Jan 2015
Presentation #2	--15%	2 nd – 10 Feb 2015

As mentioned during the first part of course requirements, active seminar participation is critical for your success and the success of your seminar teammates in 6400 and will make up 30% of your course grade.

In addition to full seminar participation, the following assignments will account for 70% of the course grade:

The first graded assignment (15%) in 6400 is an individual writing and combined presentation task. For Topic 3, you will provide an analysis of an assigned Federalist or Anti-Federalist paper and present your assessment to your seminar in a briefing paper for a senior policy-maker. You will turn provide a written summary of your assessment to your FSL, who will combine them and send them out to everyone. FSLs will provide any additional instructions in seminar.

The second graded event (15%) is a similar task. During Topic 11, you will provide an analysis of an assigned National Security Council and present your assessment to your seminar in a briefing paper for a senior policy-maker. You will turn provide a written summary of your assessment to your FSL, who will combine them and send them out to everyone. Your FSL will provide specific instructions in seminar.

Individual Assignment: Take-home Exam

You will be given a take-home exam toward the end of the course to assess the degree to which you have met all three 6400 learning outcomes. The exam will be available on the Blackboard system after 1200 on Wednesday, 18 February. **You must submit the completed exam via the Blackboard system by 0730 on Friday, 20 February. The exam will count as 40 percent of your course grade.**

The exam will contain two short essay questions and a longer essay. Your answers must comply with the strict word limits listed in the exam. We will assess your ability to incorporate the course material into a series of logically consistent, concise and persuasive arguments. These are exercises in analysis more than they are exercises in writing but if you have an incomprehensible analysis, it will not do a senior leader much good.

Short Answers: Each short essay will count for 25 percent of the *exam* grade.

Longer Essay: The longer essay will count for 50 percent of the *exam* grade.

The exam should be your individual work. Please do not collaborate or consult with *anyone* on this exam. Do not share your exam ideas with other classmates. The exam is open book and open note and will be based on the course materials and readings. Though you should not have to conduct outside research to complete the exam, you are free to do so should you so desire. Either way, **do not plagiarize**. Again, the exam should be your own work. You must include a citation if you quote someone, use passages from someone’s written work, or even include their original ideas in your answers. Be careful about including material you have read elsewhere, and never cut and paste long passages directly from the internet.

As this is an exam, we will not be providing you with a detailed assessment rubric in advance (that would give away the specifics of the questions, after all). That said, the exam rubric will look something like the following table. (Your FSL will include comments in the appropriate cell based on your exam performance, so you will not get back a blank table.)

Core Course 6400 Exam Rubric, AY 2015

Core Course Objective:	Exceptional (A): Thorough and insightful	Acceptable (B): Minor shortfalls in thoroughness and insight	Unacceptable (C): Major shortfalls in thoroughness or insight	Percent of Exam Grade
Analyze how U.S. domestic traditions, conditions and processes influence the formulation and execution of national security strategies.				25%
Assess the implications of the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies for the viability of a proposed strategy.				25%
Assess the suitability of the structure and process in the U.S. for national leaders to implement national security strategies.				50%

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Topic 1
Thursday, 22 January 2015, 0900
Course Introduction
Politics in America -- Lecture and Seminar (LS)

Man is a political animal.

~Aristotle

We are imperfect. We cannot expect perfect government.

~President William Howard Taft

In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way.

~President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Politics has different meanings to different people. Common dictionary definitions of *politics* include the art or science of government or governing; or the activities engaged in by a government. If something is *political*, it is something that relates to government, politics or the state. By extension, *politicians* are those who are actively involved in politics, or who seek or hold political office. All this sounds very benign and value neutral, which is comforting to advocates of good governance, yet these definitions do not reveal much. After all, nothing in these dictionary entries tells us what government does or what is involved in governing.



Many of us have a more cynical view of politics and governing. Part of that preconception may come from the definition of the word *politic*, the root word of politics, political, and politicians. “Politic” is an adjective that signifies intrigue or maneuvering within a group. If something is politic it is shrewd or artful, prudent or judicious. The implication for our thinking about politics, the political, and especially politicians, is that each is somehow calculating, cautious, and perhaps even less than honest. Yet while there are certainly examples of calculating and/or dishonest politicians, most politicians endeavor to do the right thing as they see it.

What is needed is a definition of politics that incorporates the meaning of politic and the activities involved in governing, and that does not predispose us to automatically think the worst of politicians. For the purposes of this course then, think of politics as *the nonviolent battle for scarce resources*, whatever those resources might be (e.g., material goods, influence, etc.). Politicians are those who engage in such battles. By this definition, *you have all been politicians at some point in your careers.*

Government policy is the product of politics, and as such diverges from what we might think of as an optimal policy. This makes sense. If politics is the fight for scarce resources, there is the possibility for winning (or losing) that battle outright. More often, however, the fight for resources

in our governmental system yields some sort of compromise, which by definition diverges from what we might think of as a “pure” outcome.

Today’s session applies that lesson to the question of interagency coordination on national security policies. Proposals for improving interagency coordination number in the dozens, if not hundreds. The question is the degree to which any of them are politically feasible given the domestic context within which national security decisions are made in this country. We will begin to answer that question today; return to it again after a review of historical, structural, and procedural contextual factors; and then re-visit it once more during the final portion of the course.

Objectives:

- Understand the role of politics in the U.S. national security process.
- Understand the structure and themes of the course.

Today’s Tip: In 6100 you discussed the differences in strategic worldviews, assessments of national interest, and judgments about strategic approaches. Part of today’s readings examines the *politics* of those debates from a domestic context and demonstrates how domestic conditions can shape judgments on strategic approaches.

Questions for Discussion:

- What is your definition of politics?
- Can politics be a worthy endeavor?
- To what extent is politics ubiquitous to U.S. governance since the country’s founding?
- According to the readings, which domestic actors and processes are most likely to influence the context of U.S. security policy?
- How and when is politics useful? When is politics counterproductive? What standard are you using when answering these questions?

Reading (78 pages total):

1. Dean Acheson, “Formulation of Policy in the United States,” remarks presented at the National War College, December 16, 1947, pp. 1-31. [Reprint]
2. Julian E. Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), pp. 1-8. [Reprint]
3. Jonathan Rauch, “Rescuing Compromise,” *National Affairs* 17 (Fall 2013), pp. 115-127. [Reprint]
4. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 258-286. (Chapter 8: “Transition”) [Student Issue]

Topic 2
Friday, 23 January 2015, 0830
The Founding Context (LS)

*Is life so dear or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?
I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!*
~Patrick Henry, patriot

Don't fire unless fired upon. But if they want a war, [then] let it begin here.
~John Parker, militia Captain, Lexington, Massachusetts, April 19, 1775

*We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.*
~Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776

Today begins a two-session consideration of the founding of the United States and the establishment of the U.S. system of government. Today we will review the historical setting within which the Founding Fathers rebelled against the British, established local governance in North America, and eventually developed the Articles of Confederation. In our next session we will read the Constitution itself and the arguments supporting its ratification in the various states, and we will analyze the principles and compromises it contains.

The events surrounding the war of independence are crucial to understanding how the United States government took the form that it did. The move toward independence involved a series of economic disputes over material circumstances in the British colonies, yet it was about much more than taxation, tariffs or profit margins. The independence movement represented a fundamentally novel form of social upheaval, pitting conceptions of equality and opportunity against privilege and rigid class structures. The independence movement also was a political struggle of republican versus monarchic conceptions of governance. Combined, the eventual War of Independence was an unprecedented war of ideas; ideas not associated with religious debates but instead associated with a new conception of the state and its relationship to society. As John Adams noted in 1818, “The revolution was affected before the war commenced. The revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.”

The revolutionary period was a time of experimentation. Indeed, the government structure that resulted from American independence bore little resemblance either to the British monarchy or to what exists in the U.S. today. The Articles of Confederation were a reaction to the perceived excesses of the British monarchy but were themselves subject to criticism for producing an ineffective, overly decentralized, and weak national government. As we shall see in our next session, the consequences of a weak central federal government eventually required further action on the part of our Founding Fathers in the form a constitutional convention.

Finally, remember that the American countryside of the 1770s was by no means unanimously in favor of independence, and the terms of the day reflected that division. Consider that the British, and those opposed to secession, roughly 20% of the population of the colonies, called themselves “loyalists” and called the Founding Fathers “rebels” or “traitors.” Those in favor of secession, roughly 20% of the colonial population, called themselves “patriots,” a term we still use today, but patriots to the Continental Congress rather than the crown. (The remaining 60% did not feel as strongly either way.) At hostility’s end, it fell to the Continental Congress and the various state governments to heal the deep societal divisions produced by the war and to knit together the country into a cohesive whole. As we shall see in these two sessions, the Founding Fathers were only partially successful in their initial attempt.

Objective:

- Analyze the philosophical, historical, and constitutional foundations of the U.S. national security establishment and process.

Today’s Tip: In 6200 and 6300 you discussed the differences between a nation and a state. Arguably, the Articles of Confederation did a good job of creating the former but not the latter.

Questions for Discussion:

- What were the root and proximate causes of the patriots’ grievances and eventual rebellion against the British government?
- To what extent was the rebellion inevitable? What would you have advocated if you were advising Samuel Adams and the other patriots on how to reconcile with the crown? What would you have advocated if you were advising King George III and the loyalists?
- What are the core principles of republican government? To what extent did the emerging U.S. system of government embrace such principles?
- Where was power concentrated (i.e., individual people, localities, state legislatures, governors, the Continental Congress, the executive, etc.) as the patriots began creating a new system of governance? To what extent did the locus of power shift over time?
- What were the key principles of the Articles of Confederation? What were the strengths and weaknesses of that system?
- What parallels exist, if any, between the founding of the United States and the creation of new government systems in Iraq and Afghanistan? If parallels exist, do they involve similarities of principle, of circumstance, and/or of tactics?

Readings (99 pages total):

1. Gordon Wood, *The American Revolution* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), pp. 4-74, 91-106, with particular attention to pp. 65-74 (State Constitutions and Articles of Confederation), and pp. 91-106 (Virtue, Glory and Equality). [Student Issue]
2. “The Declaration of Independence,” Library of Congress, available from http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (4 pages).
3. Thomas Hutchinson, “Strictures Upon the Declaration of the Congress at Philadelphia, London, 1776,” National Humanities Center, 2010, available from www.nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/ (9 pages).

Topic 3
Monday, 26 January 2015, 0830
Constitutional Compromises -- Instructor-Led Seminar (IS)

As new discoveries are made . . . institutions must advance to also keep pace with the times.

~Thomas Jefferson

The Constitution ... is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.

~Edward S. Corwin, 20th century social scientist

The U.S. Constitution is an inherently political document, as we have defined politics, in that it describes a purposeful horizontal distribution of power across three branches of government and a vertical distribution of power between the federal government and the states. It is a political document in another sense as well, in that it was produced by a convention, not by any one person. Individuals like James Madison and George Mason introduced hugely influential draft language to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, but the final document submitted for state ratification represented a series of compromises and trade-offs that diverged significantly from the ideas of any one individual.



The Philadelphia delegates sought to remedy the defects in the Articles of Confederation. The confederation was hobbled from within and faced potentially hostile European powers eager to gain advantage from the weak American nation. By 1787, it was clear that the Founders had overreacted in their initial zeal to avoid creating a new form of monarchy. They determined some form of centralization actually was needed. The question was how to create an effective government that was acceptable to its constituent parts but did not replace one tyranny with another. The result was a radical departure from both the British system and the Articles of Confederation.

In this session you will focus on the compromises and trade-offs that exist in the U.S. system of government. To do so we ask that you read the key events which led up to the Constitutional Convention, the Constitution itself, a summary of the debates that occurred during the Constitutional Convention and the rationale for specific Constitutional provisions as discussed during the ratification debate.

Objective:

- Analyze the philosophical, historical, and Constitutional foundations of the U.S. national security establishment and process.

Today's Tip: Examining the Constitution is the domestic equivalent of understanding the international strategic structural environment, as you discussed in course 6100 and will discuss in 6500.

Questions for Discussion:

- What key events led to the Constitutional Convention?
- In the *Federalist Papers*, James Madison discusses the dangers of factions and the tyranny of the majority. What did he mean by each and how are the concepts different?
- To what degree are the separation of powers and federalism collective solutions to these dilemmas?
- How is the U.S. presidency different from most European counterparts? Why is understanding this difference crucial to understanding perceptions of American security policy?
- Why did the Founders create a bicameral legislature?
- How efficient is the U.S. constitutional system in terms of the government's ability to make or change national security policy when compared to the Articles of Confederation or the British parliamentary system?
- Why do you think the Bill of Rights was not contained in the original Constitution? How would the inclusion of such provisions have complicated the drafting and ratification of the original document?
- What vision did the Founding Fathers share or did not share, how did their views on human nature shaped their perspective on the Constitution?

Readings (~80-90 pages per student total):*The Constitution:*

1. "The Constitution of the United States," in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (Westminster, MD, USA: Bantam Dell Publishing Group, 1982), pp. 433-445. [Online: <https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/doc/Detail.action?docID=10279233>]

2. Gordon Wood, *The American Revolution* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), pp. 139-166. [Student Issue]

Justification of the Constitution:

3. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. *The Federalist Papers*. (Westminster, MD: Bantam Dell Publishing Group, 1982)
 - a. *Federalist 1 and 2*
 - b. *Federalist 10*
 - c. *Federalist 47-48*
 - d. *Federalist 51*
 - e. *Federalist 70*
 - f. *Federalist 78*

Arguments against the Constitution:

4. *Anti-Federalist: An Abridgment of the Complete Anti-Federalist*, edited by Storing, Herbert J. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) [Online: <https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/doc/Detail.action?docID=10433766>].
 - a. *DeWitt 1 & 2*
 - b. *Centinel 1*
 - c. *Brutus 11, 12, 15*
 - d. *Cato 5*
 - e. *Melancton Smith Speeches 6/20-6/27/88*

Topic 4
Tuesday, 27 January 2015, 0830
Article I: Legislative Power (LS)

All politics is local. Never forget from whence you came.

~Rep. Tip O’Neil, former Speaker of the House (D-MA)

I will not deny that there are men in the district better qualified than I to go to Congress, but gentlemen, these men are not in the race.

~Rep. Sam Rayburn, former Speaker of the House (D-TX)

Suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself.

~Mark Twain

Ancient Rome declined because it had a Senate, now what's going to happen to us with both a House and a Senate?

~Will Rogers

Today will start with a review of the organization and powers of Congress. Understanding how Congress works requires appreciating the differences between the two legislative chambers. In the House, the legislative process is tilted in favor of what the majority party’s leadership wants. By contrast, the Senate protects the minority party’s rights to the extent that a single senator can obstruct legislative action on an issue he or she disagrees with. These differences explain why the House can act quickly and decisively while the Senate often needs a super-majority to pass even mildly controversial measures. Such differences also explain why it is so hard to enact major legislative initiatives, particularly during periods of divided government.

Committees also play a vital role in congressional business. Committees perform three basic functions. First, they conduct oversight of the executive branch, usually (though not always) when deciding what tasks each executive agency should perform and how much those tasks should cost. This is (again usually) the job of the authorizing committees (i.e., Armed Services, Foreign Relations, etc.). Second, the Appropriations Committee in each chamber decides how much money the federal government actually will spend on discretionary programs like national defense. This power of the purse can be immensely powerful in influencing or deciding and implementing national policy. Third, committees consider and formally draft substantive legislation before it is considered on the floor. In this way, committees serve as gatekeepers for the chamber as a whole, providing an initial vetting of the thousands of bills introduced during each congressional session.

Until recently, Congress has been relatively silent on questions of national security. Through 2006, the continuing post-9/11 threat environment and Republican control of the legislative and executive branches reinforced historical congressional deference to the president on national security. Republican controlled Congresses gave only a cursory examination to the administration’s creation of Northern Command and the Department of Homeland Security, two of the largest changes to U.S. security policy in decades. Similarly, these Congresses argued over the distribution of the foreign aid budget rather than the need for a whole-scale change in our

nation-building capability. Yet this pattern started to change in the 110th Congress (2007-2009), when Democratic majorities in each chamber became more assertive on Iraq and Afghanistan, detainee policy, and surveillance of U.S. citizens, and has continued into the current Congress.

Certainly the staff infrastructure exists to support congressional activity. The proliferation of congressional support staff and news media facilitate congressional activism and provide individual members an incentive to be involved in major national security legislation. That is a dramatic change from 50 years ago. In the 1950s, national security decisions essentially were made by a handful of powerful committee chairmen. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in reaction to Vietnam and Watergate and the growth and complexity of the federal government, Congress increased the number of congressional oversight subcommittees and their associated staffs, and created two legislative branch research entities: the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service. Combined with the existing Government Accountability Office, these resources gave members of Congress the means to become assertive on security issues. At the same time, the proliferation of media outlets and the explosion of interest groups gave members of Congress an incentive to speak out. Today's members are adept at harnessing television coverage and using social media interacting with interest groups to get their points across. In short, individual members now have both the means and an incentive to challenge the president's foreign policy priorities. Indeed, virtually every member of Congress can now become involved to some degree in national security debates.

It is unclear, however, whether these trends can overcome structural biases toward congressional inaction. Consider that there are inevitably differences between the majority and minority parties on major issues, to say nothing of the often-heated negotiations between the two congressional chambers. Within each chamber, there are jurisdictional disputes between the authorizing and appropriating committees, and between different authorizing committees. Moreover, a large number of committees are involved in complex issues like homeland and cyber security, requiring consensus from each committee before legislation can be sent to the president. And lest we forget, initiatives challenging presidential priorities often must be passed with veto-proof majorities, which raises the bar to effective action even higher.

Objectives:

- Analyze the *philosophical, historical and Constitutional foundations* of the U.S. national security establishment and process.
- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.
- Comprehend the dynamics of *effective individual and group decision-making* in a national security context.

Today's Tip: Key congressional powers are listed in Article I of the Constitution. Keep in mind today's discussions and compare the powers of Congress to those of the Supreme Court and the President in Topics 5 and 6.

Questions for Discussion:

- Is it better for members of Congress to be career professionals at politics or part-time amateurs? How do lawmakers act differently if they are not seeking reelection?
- How would you define “leadership” in Congress and what are the keys to leadership in such context?
- To what extent are the differences between chambers a product of Constitutional design or of each chamber’s internal procedures?
- Compare and contrast the rules in the Senate and House from the standpoint of national security considerations such as timeliness, right of dissent (minority rights), and Constitutional roles.
- Should Senate and House rules be streamlined to promote more efficient handling of national security legislation? What if the price is a dilution of rights for the minority?
- Where is the balance of power between the executive and legislative branch on issues of national strategy? To what extent does that balance depend on the issue being addressed?
- To what extent should the legislative branch authorize all use of military force?
- To what extent does the legislative branch have authority to terminate the use of force?
- In this era of prolonged and diffuse security threats as well as extended foreign involvement, how should Congress decide on the balance between domestic and international activities? How should we best provide for homeland defense, health, transportation, and economic challenges?

Readings (98 pages total):

A. *The Constitution:*

1. Review Article I of the Constitution

B. *Congress and Security Policy:*

2. Gerald Felix Warburg, “Congress: Checking Presidential Power,” in Roger George and Harvey Rishkof, *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 227-246. [Student Issue]
3. Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek, and Francis E. Lee, *Congress and Its Members* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010, 12th ed.), pp. 437-470. [Reprint]

4. James Lindsay, “The Shifting Pendulum of Power: Executive-Legislative Relations on American Foreign Policy,” chapter 12 in Eugene Wittkopf and James McCormick, eds., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), pp. 183-194. [Reprint]
5. David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, “Congress and National Security,” in David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, *Congress and the Politics of National Security* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 3-17. [Reprint]
6. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 3-24 (in Chapter 1: “Summoned to Duty”), 579-584 (in Chapter 15: “Reflections”). [Student Issue]

Topic 5
Thursday, 29 January 2015, 0830
Article II: Executive Power -- Panel Discussion and Seminar (PD/S)

I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have the sense to do without my persuading them. That's all the powers of the President amount to.

~President Harry S. Truman

Being president is like being a jackass in a hailstorm. There's nothing to do but to stand there and take it.

~President Lyndon B. Johnson

Today we will focus on the rise of executive power as embodied in the Office of the President. The Founding Fathers originally crafted the Articles of Confederation without a chief executive. They soon realized that the country needed greater central authority in the federal government, and designed the presidency in response, as described in Article II of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton was the main champion among the Founders of a powerful and energetic presidency. You will read about his background and some of the events that contributed to his beliefs, all of which helps explain the content of Article II and *Federalist 70*, each influenced or written by Hamilton.

Both Article II and the *Federalist Papers* concentrate on the president's *inherent* powers, which derive directly from the Constitution. Such powers include serving as Commander in Chief and the nation's chief negotiator, appointing high government officials, rejecting unwanted legislation with presidential vetoes, and being the nation's chief executive in charge of the executive branch of government.

Separately and combined, these powers afford the president significant control over national security policy. In and of themselves, however, these powers cannot explain the huge powers wielded by modern presidents. For that, we much consider *accrued* presidential powers, which are derived from statutes, habits, and a lack of resistance from other branches of government.

One example of such power comes from presidential direction of the federal bureaucracy. Some argue that presidential power arguably increases as the federal government grows in size and responsibilities. If that is true, then President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) contributed tremendously to the rise of the modern presidency by increasing the size of the federal government. It was under Roosevelt that much of the federal government and regulatory state was created, to include New Deal programs like Social Security, as well as a 12 million person military during the Second World War.

Presidents also have taken advantage of authority delegated to them by the Congress, particularly during crises, by using that delegated authority for their own purposes. President Roosevelt initiated a series of new government programs to respond to the Great Depression and World War II, with rubber stamp approval from Congress. In addition to responding to these crises, many FDR programs had the added benefit of achieving unrelated administration goals (such as creating

the interstate highway system, to cite just one example). Or consider that the modern budget process was initially created by Congress to improve the congressional ability to control spending. Yet in doing so, Congress greatly increased the president's control (via the Office of Management and Budget) over annual agency budget submissions.

The latter half of the 20th Century also saw presidents taking steps to improve their control over the federal bureaucracy. The chief vehicle has been the White House staff and the National Security Council staff, both of which report directly to the president alone. Over time, individuals in both have been increasingly chosen for their ideological and personal loyalties to the president rather than on the basis of their expertise. Decision-making on crucial issues has become increasingly centralized in the Office of the Presidency, to the annoyance of the permanent bureaucracy, Congress, and even many senior political appointees in federal agencies.

Another example of an accrued power is the president's ability to speak directly to the nation, what President Teddy Roosevelt called using the "bully pulpit," and what modern social scientists have dubbed "Going Public." Presidents in the age of cable and satellite television and the 24 hour news cycle are able to reach the average American much more easily and frequently than could a president from Teddy Roosevelt's time. At the same time, however, theirs is but one of many voices sent over the cacophony of internet blogs and proliferating media outlets.

Finally, many would argue that presidential power is whatever the president can get away with. Specifically, presidents accrue power by taking advantage of power vacuums left by inaction or delegation from other parts of government. We will return to this subject when we discuss the national security decision-making process and strategic leadership.

Objectives:

- Analyze the *philosophical, historical, and Constitutional foundations* of the U.S. national security establishment and process.
- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.

Today's Tip: Understanding today's topic requires a review of executive branch powers from Topic 2 – *Founding Context*, and Topic 3 – *Constitutional Compromises*.

Questions for Discussion:

- What was Alexander Hamilton's justification for a strong president? Was it motivated by his perceptions of the requirements imposed by foreign policy, domestic policy, or some combination of the two?
- What factors led to the expansion of executive power in the past decade? To what extent did the legislative and judicial branches acquiesce or resist?

- What are the advantages of having a large, politicized White House staff? What are the associated perils?
- What are limitations of “going public” in terms of the president’s relations with the public and with the Congress?

Readings (96 pages total):

A. *Origins of Executive Power:*

Review Article II of the Constitution from Topic 3. [Student Issue]

1. Gordon Wood, “Alexander Hamilton and the Making of the Fiscal-Military State,” Chapter 4 in *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 121-140. [Reprint]

B. *President and War:*

2. Michael Nelson, “Presidents, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy,” in James McCormick ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 179-188. [Reprint]
3. Louis Fisher, “Presidents Who Initiate Wars,” in James McCormick ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 189-207. [Reprint]
4. James P. Terry, “The 2011 Libya Operation: War Powers Redefined?” *Joint Force Quarterly* 71 (Fall 2013): 25-29. [Reprint]
5. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 515-523 (in Chapter 13: “War, War...and Revolution”) [Review from 6100], 589-592 (in Chapter 15: “Reflections”). [Student Issue]

C. *Executive Power and the Public:*

6. John Yoo and Louis Fisher, “Executive Power,” in Rishikof, et al, *Patriots Debate: Contemporary Issues in National Security Law* (Washington: American Bar Association, 2012), 3-14. [Reprint]
7. Amos Guiora and Monica Hakimi, “A Legal Framework for Targeted Killing,” in Rishikof, et al, *Patriots Debate: Contemporary Issues in National Security Law* (Washington: American Bar Association, 2012), 161-177. [Reprint]

Topic 6
Friday, 30 January 2015, 0830
Article III: Judicial Power (Capitol Hill Offsite)

It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.

~Justice John Paul Stevens, 2000

Those in power need checks and restraints lest they come to identify the common good for their own tastes and desires, and their continuation in office as essential to the preservation of the nation.

~Justice William Douglas, 1956

Whenever you put a man on the Supreme Court he ceases to be your friend.

~President Harry S Truman

The courts play three important roles in national security affairs. First, the courts have the power to rule on the constitutionality of legislation enacted into law. This can be a tremendous check on the legislature's power. Second, the courts can ensure that the executive branch implements laws consistent with the intent of the originating Congress. Third, the courts can serve as a check on the actions of the executive branch when the Congress provides aggrieved or interested parties with standing before the courts.

The courts do not actually have to take action to influence political behavior. The mere possibility of court action can force executive branch officials to anticipate court challenges and alter their behavior as a result. Yet for there to be a realistic chance of court action depends on answering the questions of "ripeness," "standing," and "political questions." Ripeness refers to whether the courts need to take action now or whether there is time for the parties to dispute or to work out a compromise absent court intervention. Courts will not take up an issue that is not ripe for consideration. Standing refers to who has the right to petition the courts for redress. In some cases that might include individuals or groups that have been enfranchised into the policy process via legislation. In other cases that might be Congress itself. A court petition goes nowhere without proper standing. Finally and most importantly for questions of national security is whether the issue at stake involves a political question between the branches of government. In most cases the courts will avoid such questions, but that may be changing, as the 2000 election outcome demonstrated. We will explore these and related questions today as we discuss court review of detainee policy and other relevant issues.

For today's lesson, we are going to go to the Supreme Court of the United States to hear from one of the nine justices who sit on the highest court in the United States. We will have a presentation, some Q&A, and then a seminar of the whole class to discuss what the justice said. In the afternoon, we will hear from a member of Congress.

Your FSL will have logistics details for you.

Objectives:

- Analyze the *philosophical, historical and Constitutional foundations* of the U.S. national security establishment and process.
- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.

Questions for Discussion:

- Does the Constitution positively provide the judiciary with power to decide national defense and national security issues?
- How do you understand executive power and its relation to surveillance in the national security context?
- Should the judiciary be prudent in becoming involved in national security issues?
- What should be the proper role of international law in U.S. jurisprudence?
- What are the implications of the executive branch targeting Americans inside the United States and abroad?

Our *notional* agenda for the offsite is as follows:

- 0830: Travel to Supreme Court via Metro/other means
- 0915: Assemble at Supreme Court steps, proceed through security
- 1000: Court visit with Justice Scalia in the Supreme Court chamber
- 1130: No-host lunch at venue of your choice
- 1245: Assemble at the Jefferson Building of the Library of Congress, 10 First Street, SE between Independence Avenue and East Capitol Street at the carriage entrance located underneath the exterior staircase. Proceed through security
- 1330: Collective session with Cong. Chris Gibson (R-NY19)
- 1530: Depart Capitol Hill

Note that **this is a notional schedule**. Your seminar leader will provide you with an updated, final schedule.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY IS SERVICE DRESS/CLASS A/EQUIV.

Readings (33 pages total):

A. *The Constitution:*

Review Article III of the Constitution from Topic 3. [Student Issue]

1. Harvey Rishikof, "The United States Supreme Court: The Cult of the Robe in the National Security Enterprise," chapter 12 in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., *The National Security Enterprise* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp.247-263. [Student Issue]

B. *Courts and Its Influence on National Security:*

2. Ashley Deeks, "Courts Can Influence National Security Without Doing a Single Thing," *New Republic*, October 21, 2013 [Online: <http://www.newrepublic.com/node/115270>].
3. Laurence H. Tribe, "The People's Court: A Law School Dean Urges That Constitutional..." *New York Times*, October 24, 2013. [Reprint]
4. Rick Pildes, "Does Judicial Review of National-Security Policies Constrain or Enable the Government?" *LAWFARE*, August 5, 2013 [Online: <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/does-judicial-review-of-national-security-policies>].
5. Eric Posner, "The NSA's Metadata Program Is Perfectly Constitutional," <http://www.slate.com/>. December 30, 2013 [Online: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/12/judge_pauley_got_it_right_the_nsa_s_metadata_program_is_perfectly_constitutional.html].
6. Barry Friedman and Dahlia Lithwick, "Judge Leon's NSA #Slatepitch," <http://www.slate.com/>. December 30, 2013 [Online: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/12/nsa_data_collection_ruling_judge_richard_leon_is_right_that_we_expect_more.html].
7. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, available from <http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx>, accessed 2 October 2014.
8. Biography of Rep. Chris Gibson (R-NY19), available from <http://gibson.house.gov/biography/>, accessed 2 October 2014.

Topic 7
Monday, 2 February 2015, 0830
Civil-Military Interactions (LS)

There isn't a general in Washington who isn't political, not if he's going to be successful, because that's the nature of our system. It's the way in which we formulate foreign policy. It's the way in which we get approval for our policy.

~Colin Powell

There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

~ Sun Tzu

The term “civil-military relations” conjures up at least two broad meanings. The most common use of the term refers to the chain-of-command relationship between military officials and their civilian counterparts. The guiding principle in this country is that civilian officials make defense/security policy and the military implements those decisions to the best of its ability. Failure to implement lawful orders is considered insubordination.

However, the situation is never this straightforward. It is much harder to identify a civil-military disconnect if civilian orders are ambiguous or vague, if civilians delegate significant discretion to the military in terms of implementation, or if the military is forced to improvise due to an evolving situation on the ground. And finally, the U.S. military can be given contradictory orders by its two masters. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and nominates all commissioned officers, and is at the end of the chain-of-command. But that said, Congress provides the funding for the military, raises and regulates the armed forces, alters the end-strength of the military, and confirms military appointments. What constitutes insubordination in this complex relationship? The answer is relatively clear should the military disobey identical orders of both civilian masters. The situation is less clear if obeying the instructions of one branch of government contradicts the orders of the other branch. Defining insubordination is most difficult when neither civilian master has given the military clear orders.

A second conception of civil-military relations does not refer to the chain-of-command, from civilians to military, but to the degree of coordination between the military and their civilian agency counterparts during a foreign operation as well as institutional interests of their respective organization. Among recent examples of such a relationship are the interactions of civilian and military officials in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, the interactions between the uniformed joint force leadership and the DoD's civilian officials during the various strategic reviews.

Yet the domain of civil-military relations encompasses more than the two concepts above. Today, we will explore additional conceptual questions from our reading assignments related to U.S. civil-military relations. Additional concepts to consider:

- What degree of military influence is appropriate in a liberal society such as the United States?
- What is the appropriate role of the military? Is the military establishment's purpose to fight and win the nation's wars or to engage in constabulary actions?
- What pattern of civil-military relations best ensures the effectiveness of the military instrument? All of the other questions mean little if the military instrument is unable to ensure the survival of the state. If there is no constitution, the question of constitutional balance doesn't matter.
- Does effectiveness require a military culture distinct in some ways from the society it serves?
- What impact does the pattern of civil-military relations have on the effectiveness of strategic decision-making processes?
- Who serves? Is military service an obligation of citizenship, or something else?
- How are enlisted members recruited and retained? How should the U.S. military address issues of "diversity" in the force?

Finally, our guest speaker today will address the influencing factors around the central question: What accounts for the friction between presidents and the military when planning and executing military operations?

Objectives:

- Analyze the *philosophical, historical and Constitutional foundations* of the U.S. national security establishment and process.
- Examine *civil-military relations* in a democracy.
- Analyze how the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies can affect the viability of proposed strategies.
- Assess the role of *strategic leadership in the domestic viability* of a U.S. national security strategy and policy

Today's Tips: As you consider Civil-Military relations, review the Constitution and bureaucracy topics to help guide your discussions in seminar.

Questions for Discussion:

- What should military officers do when they disagree with lawful orders from civilian officials?

- In your own opinion, what constitutes insubordination?
- What things do you think might actually lead you to resign rather than saluting smartly and carrying out orders?
- Compare how dissent is voiced in military channels vs. civilian channels. How do the cultural differences affect strategic planning?
- Dr. Janine Davidson characterizes the cultural differences between civilian and military cultures as being surmountable, given educational focus. Do you think the National War College provides the environment to overcome these cultural barriers?
- How should a military officer react when given directions that he or she believes are just “wrong” or even dangerous?
- What is the responsibility of a military officer when it comes to providing best “military” advice to civilian officials?
- What constitutes the politicization of the military?
- What factor(s) drive(s) inter-service competition?
- What is the impact of a fiscal constraint environment on Civil-Military Relations?

Readings (54 pages total):

1. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 67-85. [online: <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1ef74daf-ebff-4aa4-866e-e1dd201d780e/What-Military-Officers-Need-to-Know-about-Civil-Mi>].
2. Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency, Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, (March, 2013), pp. 129-144. [Reprint] Also available from <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/docview/1368907236?accountid=12686>.
3. Lt Col James H. Baker, “Military Professionalism: A Normative Code for the Long War,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 44 (Jan 2007), pp. 69-73.
4. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 432-445 (Chapter 12: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”), 573-577 (in Chapter 15: “Reflections”). [Student Issue]

Topic 8A
Tuesday, 3 February 2015, 0830
The Fourth Estate: Media Power (PD/S)

Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech or of the press....

~Amendment 1 to the U.S. Constitution

One of the basic troubles with radio and television news is that both instruments have grown up as an incompatible combination of show business, advertising, and news. Each of the three is a rather bizarre and demanding profession.

~Edward R. Murrow, journalist

I am rather inclined to silence, and whether that be wise or not, it is at least more unusual nowadays to find a man who can hold his tongue than to find one who cannot.

~Abraham Lincoln, February 14, 1861

The media is often referred to as the Fourth Estate, implying that it is an institution on par with the three formal branches of government. The number of media outlets has grown tremendously in the last few years. The media as a whole, however, has become less coherent and more diffuse with the advent of cable and satellite television, talk radio, and social media. These trends have led to a heated debate over the role of the media in policy debates.

One school of thought sees the media as a biased advocate. At the end of the 19th century, there was no such thing as neutral, independent media outlets. Most print media were controlled by or affiliated with political parties or local political organizations, which led to charges of “yellow journalism” in competing newspapers. That changed with the advent of government regulation requiring fair and balanced reporting – beginning with the Communications Act of 1934 and then expanded under the Federal Communications Commission’s “Fairness Doctrine” of 1949 – reinforced by the development of professional media standards. With the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987 and the proliferation of media outlets since then, coverage has once again taken on ideological overtones. Anyone who knows of *FOX* or *MSNBC* knows how biased the media can be toward a particular point of view.

Another perspective is that the media is simply a neutral part of the policymaking environment, eager for stories, to be sure, but more akin to a force of nature that one has to contend with rather than an extension of a political movement. The main concern here is that media coverage of sensational events (wars, natural disasters, scandals, controversy, etc.) will drive the policy agenda by raising public awareness, which will eventually translate into public pressure on elected officials to “do something.” For example, this so-called CNN effect seemed to hold true during the coverage of famine in Somalia. From this perspective, one has to be aware that the media possesses biases (for sensational stories) and standard operating procedures (news cycles, attribution of sources, etc.), but one does not have to worry about overt ideological spin to the news.

Finally, a third school of thought sees the media as a tool of policymakers. This perspective combines the fact that portions of the media may be ideologically biased and thus more amenable to particular types of stories, with the belief that all media outlets want sensational stories to sell papers and perhaps set the national agenda. The difference here is that agenda setting via the media is by the design of government officials. Policymakers consciously use the media as a tool to advance their policy agendas. Techniques for using the media vary from coordinating targeted messages in particular media markets, to selectively leaking information to support or undermine a policy initiative. Today we will explore all three of these schools of thought in an effort to understand media power and the media's role in policy making.

Objectives:

- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.
- Evaluate how national security strategies and policies are *formulated and implemented, and how that process is changing* over time.

Today's Tip: In course 6300 you discussed the international uses of the media to further *public diplomacy* efforts. Here our focus is on the media's role as an independent domestic actor or as a tool of elected officials to guide U.S. public opinion.

Questions for Discussion:

- What rules are there for conversations with the press? How can a government official establish or strengthen such rules?
- How do elected officials use the press to advance their agendas? How does such use fit your conception of good governance?
- What is narrowcasting and how has it been used in the past?
- When, if at all, should classified information be leaked to the press? If leaks are acceptable, who should have the power to decide what is leaked?
- To what extent is the press biased in its coverage of politics and political events? What form does that bias take?
- Is media bias a bad thing, and if so, what could be done to limit media bias?
- What is the impact of unconventional media on politics, elections, and the overall domestic context? Will politics and policy be able to keep pace with future media?

Readings (71 pages total):

A. *Introduction:*

1. John Diamond, "The Media: Witness to the National Security Enterprise," in Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 301-327. [Student Issue]

B. *Interacting with the Press:*

2. Richard Haass, "Relations with the Media," *The Bureaucratic Entrepreneur* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 155-164. [Reprint]
3. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 487-492 (in Chapter 13: "War, War...and Revolution"). [Student Issue]
[Review from 6100]

C. *Government Use of the Press:*

4. Reid Cherlin, "The Presidency and the Press," *Rolling Stone* (14 Aug 2014), 33-37. [Reprint]

D. *Future of Journalism:*

5. Karen Parrish, "Pentagon Spokesman: Public Affairs Must Change With Times," American Forces Press Service, 25 July 2013, available from <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120522>.
6. Tom Price, "Social Media and Politics," *CQ Researcher*, vol. 22: 36, October 12, 2012, pp. 865-888. [Reprint]

Topic 8B
Tuesday, 3 February 2015, 1330
Case Study: GEN Stanley A. McChrystal and *Rolling Stone* (IS)

The seminar will focus on the interaction between the media and government, with particular focus a particular case in which government officials and the media interacted, resulting in the end of a military career. The focus of the seminar is a Case Study based on the events surrounding the firing of GEN Stanley McChrystal from his post in Afghanistan following the publication of an article in *Rolling Stone* magazine.

This session gives you a chance to discuss the role of the media in National Security and the relationship of the government in a free society to the media. The focus is on whether the media are biased, and/or independent or a tool used by government officials to advance an agenda. How should strategists view the press, as a partner, enemy, or as an objective observer?

Objective:

- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.

Questions for Discussion:

- How have you interacted with the media in your career?
- Did President Obama make the right choice?
- Do the media have a right to access military operations or senior military members?
- Do you Executive Branch members trust the media? Do you think they trust you?
- How do you address setbacks or failures with the media?

Readings (24 pages total):

1. Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," *Rolling Stone* (8 Jul 2010), 91-97, 120-121, <http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/608094151?accountid=12686>, accessed 6 Aug 2014. [Reprint]
2. U.S. Federal News Service, "Defense Secretary Gates Issues Statement on McChrystal Profile" (23 June 2010), <http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/507897469?accountid=12686>, accessed 6 Aug 2014. [Reprint]
3. Karen DeYoung & R. Chandrasekaran, "McChrystal allies say article broke ground rules," *The Washington Post* (26 Jun 2010),

<http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/520747079?accountid=12686>, accessed 6 Aug 2014. [Reprint]

4. Eliot A. Cohen, "Why McChrystal has to go," *Wall Street Journal* (23 June 2010), <http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/507709478?accountid=12686>, accessed 6 Aug 2014. [Reprint]
5. James Kitfield, "McChrystal: A Warrior Undone," *National Journal* (25 June 2010), <http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/521196927?accountid=12686>, accessed 6 Aug 2014. [Reprint]
6. Ed O'Keefe, "McChrystal to retain rank in retirement," *The Washington Post* (30 June 2010), A15, <http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/527843646?accountid=12686>, accessed 6 Aug 2014. [Reprint]
7. General Stanley A. McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin, 2013), 379-380, 387-390. [Reprint]
8. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 487-492 (in Chapter 13: "War, War...and Revolution"). [Student Issue] [Review from T-8A]

Topic 9
Thursday, 5 February 2015, 0830
Elections: Implications for Security (PD/S)

If men of wisdom and knowledge, of moderation and temperance, of patience, fortitude and perseverance, of sobriety and true republican simplicity of manners, of zeal for the honor of the Supreme Being and the welfare of the commonwealth; if men possessed of these other excellent qualities are chosen to fill the seats of government, we may expect that our affairs will rest on a solid and permanent foundation.

~Samuel Adams, November 27, 1780

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed.

~Abraham Lincoln, August 21, 1858

The more you read and observe about this Politics thing, you got to admit that each party is worse than the other. The one that's out always looks the best.

~Will Rogers, 1924

The first two quotes reprinted above present conflicting views as to the need for public support of government initiatives. To help you decide between these perspectives – or to decide that this is a false dichotomy – your readings for today document some provocative relationships between public opinion, elections, partisanship, and security policy.

As background for today's session, consider that, all rhetoric aside, elected politicians must win office if they want to affect policy directly. As a result, officials must represent their constituents' views (whether district, state, or national) to maintain office. This sets up two dilemmas that can affect policy. First, the pressures of the election cycle raise the possibility of a politician having to choose between serving his or her particular constituency and the national interest, should the two be in conflict. Should politicians take positions and advocate policies that will keep them in office but possibly harm the nation, or should they support policies that advance the national interest, even if that means they suffer electoral defeat and lose influence over future policy? Second, local interests often conflict in ways that make compromise difficult, leading to polarized policies, possible deadlock, and further harm to the nation's interests. The tension here is between the demands of representation and those of pragmatic governing. The former requires advocacy. The latter requires accommodation of differing views and interests.

Complicating this picture is the question of partisanship. We often hear that today's government is more partisan than ever before. But to understand what that means we need to distinguish between partisanship and political parties. *Partisanship* (i.e., Democrat and Republican identification) is sometimes thought of as a useful short-hand label, or brand name, for particular sets of values, ideology, beliefs and interests that exist in the country at large. *Political parties* are formal organizations, with officials, recruitment strategies, outreach, etc. Political parties are made up of partisans who have (more or less) similar beliefs about the world. But their purpose is to win and hold elective office and use that power to advance their partisans' agenda.

Though by no means conclusive, evidence suggests that partisanship of the electorate may be declining nationwide, while becoming more geographically distinct. Roughly one-third to two-fifths of the electorate identify themselves as Independents. Geographically, the map of “red” and “blue” America shows Republican southern and rural areas, Democratic coasts and urban areas, and more Independent or swing voters in the Midwest. Yet despite these trends, only the two main political parties are represented in government in any significant numbers, and these party representatives have become increasingly polarized. A combination of partisan gerrymandering, the need to raise vast amounts of money to mount a successful campaign, and the frontloaded presidential nominating process have created sharply divided political parties in government, seemingly incapable of agreeing on anything.

Our readings for today consider the partisan divide in this country as well as the linkage between public opinion and our perspectives on health care, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the economy, and the implications of that linkage for the recent election cycle.

Objective:

- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.

Today’s Tip: In course 6200 you read Clausewitz, who wrote about the importance of national will. Relate his discussion to the U.S. national debate over potential future U.S. involvements in the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Pacific.

Questions for Discussion:

- What were the implications of the 2012 and 2013 elections for U.S. National Security policy?
- Will compromise be even more challenging as the Democratic and Republican parties prepare for 2016 elections?
- What is the relationship, if any, between election cycles and foreign affairs initiatives?
- How long is it possible to sustain public support for a military intervention? Why is that the case?
- Given that both parties in government have become increasingly polarized, what does this say for the possibility of achieving public consensus on a way forward for U.S. Defense strategy and policy?
- To what degree do we need public support when responding to developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria, or elsewhere? How would you build public consensus for new security initiatives? Or is consensus no longer possible or necessary?

Readings (45 pages total):

1. Miroslav Nincic, "External Affairs and the Electoral Connection," in James McCormick ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 139-154. [Reprint]
2. David A. Dulio, "Inside the War Room: Political Consultants in Modern Campaigns," chapter one in Robert P. Watson and Colton C. Campbell, eds., *Campaigns and Elections: Issues, Concepts, Cases* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 17-29. [Reprint]
3. Girish Gulati, "Super PACs and Financing the 2012 Presidential Election," Springer Science, 21 August 2012. [Online:
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/36332143p5864821/fulltext.pdf?MUD=MP>].
4. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 287-297 (in Chapter 9: "New Team, New Agenda, Old Secretary"). [Student Issue] [Review from 6100]

Topic 10
Monday, 9 February 2015, 0830
Interagency Leadership (LS)

We came to the conclusion – soon confirmed by experience – that any extended military effort required over-all coordinated control...but we never had comparable unified direction or command in Washington.... And even in the field our unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in doctrine, in communication systems, and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington.

~Harry S. Truman
President of the United States

In this session, we will examine the U.S. federal bureaucracy, often called “the interagency” and attempt to make sense of it. The term “interagency” is more an adjective than a noun. While there are interagency organizations, the term interagency is often described as a systematic approach to U.S. national decision-making; a process to ensure that U.S. national decision-making is conducted in an organized and orderly manner. However, the nature of the interagency process is bureaucratic and is characterized by complex institutional interests, culture, and politics as well as inter-organizational competition.

Today’s readings will expose you to the history and the structure, as well as challenges of the interagency process. The readings will also provide a sense of how the interagency process functions. Furthermore, we will examine the process in action and ways to make the process more effective. Finally, our guest speaker will share his personal experience leading interagency teams and explain what it means to provide interagency leadership.

Objectives:

- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.
- Comprehend the dynamics of *effective individual and group decision-making* in a national security context.
- Comprehend the interagency process and interagency **strategic leadership**.

Today’s Tip: Review the 6100 materials on effective leadership. Today’s topic also serves as a starting point for our examination of the National Security Staff.

Questions for Discussion:

- What aspects of the “interagency” constitutes organizational structure and what parts of it is simple process? Does it matter? What are the implications?

- To what extent does policy really depend on who sits in which bureaucratic position? Would replacing a cabinet secretary change the behavior of his/her agency in any fundamental way?
- Why are personalities so important in interagency? Are personalities a more important determinant of interagency behavior than are bureaucratic positions?
- Who has more power, career bureaucrats or political appointees?
- Why is it important to know who runs individual agencies or agency component parts?

Readings (70 pages total):

1. Jon J. Rosenwasser and Michael Warner, "History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States," in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., *The National Security Enterprise* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp.11-30. [Reprint]
2. White House Memo, "The 21st Century Interagency Process," March 18, 2009. [Reprint]
3. David Rothkopf, "A Thousand Envoys Bloom," *The National Interest*, May/June 2009, pp. 15-26. [Reprint]
4. Janine Davidson, "Making Government Work: Pragmatic Priorities for Interagency Coordination," *Orbis* (Summer 2009), pp. 419-438. [Reprint]
5. SKIM Allan Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick Smith, and Elizabeth McKune (2011), *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*, NDU (Research Report, August 15, 2011 Annual update), pp. 44-65. [Reprint]
6. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 49-57 ("Washington Battlespace"), 80-92 (Chapter 3: "Mending Fences, Finding Allies"). [Student Issue]

Topics 11A and 11B
Tuesday, 10 February 2015, 0830/1330
The Evolving National Security Council
and Staff (Part I [IS] and Part II [L])

One of the great challenges in the implementation and execution of foreign policy is to prevent daily challenges and cascading crises from crowding out the development of broader strategies in pursuit of long-term interests. That's why, from the outset of the Administration—in the very first days—the President directed those of us on his national security team to engage in a strategic assessment, a truly global examination of our presence and priorities.

~Tom Donilon, former National Security Advisor

I would rather be alone and a loud voice for action than be silent.

~Susan Rice, National Security Advisor to President Obama

We are all the President's men.

~Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor

Following bureaucracy and the interagency topics, we will focus our attention to the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 and was placed in the Executive Office of the President in 1949. There are two components to the NSC. First is the committee itself, which is chaired by the President and normally meets in the White House Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. In addition to the President, statutory members include the Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, the Director of National Intelligence (intelligence advisor), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (military advisor). The National Security Advisor is not a statutory member but traditionally has the responsibility of organizing NSC meetings. Depending on the subject, NSC meetings may be attended by other senior officials, such as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. NSC Principals meet without the President as the so-called Principals Committee (PC); their Deputies meet as the Deputies Committee (DC).

As you have read, the NSC is used differently by different Presidents. In some administrations, the NSC has met regularly under the chairmanship of the President. In others, the President has sought advice from less formal mechanisms, such as President Kennedy's Executive Committee (EXCOMM) during the Cuban Missile Crisis or President Johnson's Tuesday lunches. The focal point for NSC work is typically the DC, chaired by one of the Deputy National Security Advisors and may meet once or twice a day, two or three days a week, or more often in crisis. The DC receives recommendations from subordinate interagency groups and makes recommendations to the PC. PC recommendations may be brought to the President at an NSC meeting or privately by the National Security Advisor.

The second component of the NSC is its staff, currently called the National Security Staff (NSS). The NSS, housed in the West Wing and the adjacent Eisenhower and New Executive Office Buildings, includes some 200 plus staffers under direction of the National Security Advisor, formally known as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The NSS, which is organized into regional and functional directorates, is a mixture of political and career officials, with many of the latter detailed from other parts of the government, including State, Defense, and the Intelligence Community. The NSS also includes the White House Situation Room, charged with keeping the President and his senior advisor informed of breaking events affecting the nation's security.

The role and prominence of the National Security Staff varies between and during the course of Administrations, reflecting the operating style of the President and the National Security Advisor. In general, the NSS is charged with helping the President develop and implement the national security strategy, including its regional and functional components. It does so through coordinating the development and execution of national security policies and decisions, while ensuring they reflect Presidential priorities. As Presidential staff, the NSS supports the President's involvement in national security affairs, whether by preparing talking points for Head of State phone calls or by keeping the President informed of breaking events. As coordinators of the interagency process, the NSS organizes and supports meetings of the NSC, PC, DC, and subordinate committees, preparing agendas, position papers, and chairing many of the meetings.

After 9/11, a Homeland Security Council (HSC) was established in parallel to the NSC with its own homeland security staff and advisor to the President. The HSC has since been merged into the NSC and the two staffs combined, reflecting recognition that homeland security is an integral part of our national security. The NSS is a *policy* staff, though it may also coordinate the operational activities of various agencies. Trouble can arise when the NSS gets directly involved in operations, as it did in the case of Iran-Contra.

The National Security Advisor and members of the NSS staff are not subject to Senate confirmation and cannot be subpoenaed to testify regarding the advice they give to the President. Nevertheless, they have ready access to the President and their advice may at times carry more weight than that of confirmed Cabinet members. Today and next day we will have the opportunity to compare and contrast how previous administrations set-up the NSC process.

Objectives:

- Evaluate how national security strategies and policies are *formulated and implemented, and how that process is changing* over time.
- Comprehend the dynamics of *effective individual and group decision-making* in a national security context.

Today's Tips: Think back to our discussions on executive power, Topic 6 and the interagency, Topic 11 as you ponder the role of the NSS in the interagency process.

- Analyze how the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies can affect the viability of proposed strategies.
- Assess the role of strategic leadership in the domestic viability of a U.S. national security strategy and policy

Questions for Discussion:

- How have presidents used the NSC staff and its Director, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs? Are any trends apparent over time?
- Which NSC staff members seem to have been the most effective? How do you define “effective” in this context?
- Based on the readings, is it more important for a president to design the right organizational structure for the NSC staff or to find the right people for the staff, regardless of structure?

Readings:

A. *Topic 12A (IS)*

1. NSPD-1: Organization of the National Security Council System, February 13, 2009. pp. 1-5. [Online: <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=34560>]
2. David Rothkopf, *Running the World* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). [Student Issue]
 - a. EVERYONE reads: 3-8, 391-2; then, just read your president:
 - b. Truman, pp. 4, 51-60, 65
 - c. Eisenhower: pp. 65-72
 - d. Kennedy, pp. 79, 84-86, 90-92, 95, 97, 423
 - e. Johnson, pp. 99-103, 116
 - f. Nixon: pp. 114-120
 - g. Carter, 8, 165-169, 172-175, 182-183, 185, 192-193, 196, 200-201, 311
 - h. Reagan: pp. 210-221, 225-228, 242-248, 257-258
 - i. Bush (41): pp. 261-271, 273-274, 291-299

- j. Clinton: pp. 310-316, 323, 364-368
- k. Bush (43): pp. 390-392, 402-410, 413-415, 418-424, 436-437, 441-442
- l. Obama (This info is not in Rothkopf. The student assigned Obama needs to look in Whittaker, et al, and in Marsh, DeYoung and Allen.)

B. *Topic 12B (L):*

- 1. David Auerswald, "The Evolution of the NSC Process," chapter two in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., *The National Security Enterprise* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp.31-50. [Student Issue]
- 2. Allan Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick Smith, and Elizabeth McKune (2011), *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*, NDU (Research Report, August 15, 2011 Annual update), pp. 12-43. [Reprint]
- 3. Gregory L. Schulte, "Revisiting NATO's Kosovo Air War: Strategic Lessons for an era of Austerity," *Joint Force Quarterly* 71 (fall 2013): 14-19. [Reprint]

Topic 12
Thursday, 12 February 2015, 0830
Lobbying and Interest Group Power (LS)

Those who do not know the plans of competitors cannot prepare alliances. Those who do not know the lay of the land cannot maneuver their forces. Those who do not use local guides cannot take advantage of the ground.

~Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

Okay, you've convinced me. Now go out there and bring pressure on me.

~President Franklin D. Roosevelt (In response to a business delegation)

Lobbying involves an attempt to influence politicians in the hopes of furthering particular interests. The term “lobbyist” originally referred to individuals who would wait in the lobbies or halls of Congress in the hopes of speaking to lawmakers. Lobbyists exist because a wide variety of groups have an interest in policy outcomes and want their views heard by government officials. That interest may be emotional, such as in ethnic ties with certain countries. It may be financial, reflecting trade or investment concerns. The interest may be linked to broad policies, such as human rights, population control or environmental protection. Or it may be targeted at very specific provisions in pending legislation or federal regulations.

Lobbying is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution and has been practiced since the early days of the Republic. Perhaps as a result, lobbying has become an expensive, sophisticated, precise application of influence at all levels of government. According to *The Washington Post*, there were almost 34,800 registered lobbyists in Washington as of June 2005, more than double the 16,300 registered in the year 2000.¹ As their numbers have grown, so has the money devoted toward lobbying.

Given the amount of money at stake in a roughly \$2.5 trillion dollar federal budget, it is no surprise that some have been caught up in scandal. The Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal of 2006 implicated former Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) as well as Bush administration White House staff. In another case, former Representative Randy “Duke” Cunningham (R-CA) pled guilty to influence peddling involving defense contractors and lobbyists.

These scandals notwithstanding, lobbyists come in all kinds and styles, from grassroots activists to Washington policy wonks. Whatever their background or interests, lobbyists have become a major factor in national security deliberations, and utilize sophisticated strategies to achieve their goals. In procurement decisions, for example, lobbying plans (defense industry) may be designed totally outside the Pentagon structure, quietly with one of the Services, or in concert with OSD. Lobbying on other issues may involve grass roots organizing, the provision of crucial information to decision-makers, or pressure tactics coordinated with unions, local and national business groups,

¹ Jeffrey Birnbaum, “The Road to Riches is Called K Street,” *Washington Post*, 22 June 2005, p. A1.

and military support organizations. There are as many tactics as there are lobbyists. Today we will explore the world of lobbying.

Objectives:

- Explore how *domestic cultural and political circumstances* influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy and policy.
- Explore how *economic conditions and resource limitations and prioritization* shape national security strategies and policies.

Today's Tip: Review *Federalist 10* (Topic 3) and relate your discussion of lobbyists to problems associated with "factions."

Questions for Discussion:

- To what extent is lobbying consistent with American cultural traditions?
- Are some citizens or groups represented more vigorously than others as a result of lobbying? Is that desirable?
- To what extent, if at all, does lobbying by the defense industry distort the procurement process?
- How have special interests influenced U.S. policy to combat terrorism and post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq?
- To what extent does lobbying distort the policy process away from "pure" strategic considerations?
- Is there a remedy to lobbying that does not violate the First Amendment?

Readings (76 pages total):

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, "On the Use Which the Americans Make of Associations in Civil Life," in *Democracy in America, Volume 2* (New York: Harper and Row / Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 513-517. [Reprint]
2. Gerald Felix Warburg, "Lobbyists: U.S. National Security and Special Interests," in Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 269-289. [Student Issue]

3. John Newhouse, "Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2009), pp. 1-13. [Reprint]
4. James M. McCormick, "Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy," in James McCormick ed., *The domestic sources of American foreign policy: insights and evidence*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 67-87. [Reprint]
5. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby," in James McCormick ed., *The domestic sources of American foreign policy: insights and evidence*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 89-103. [Reprint].
6. Richard H. P. Sia and Alexander Cohen, "The huge drone that could not be grounded," The Center for Public Integrity, 16 July 2013 (24 September 2013), available from <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/07/16/12969/huge-drone-could-not-be-grounded>.

Topic 13
Friday, 13 February 2015, 0830
National Security Decision Making – Afghanistan Troop Surge (LS)

Elected officials are hardwired to ask for options first and then reverse-engineer objectives. And the military is hard-wired to do exactly the opposite. Now what do we do about that situation? Nothing frankly. But that is the environment that we live and work in. I learned that pretty early on. I learned it by reading [Bob Woodward's] Obama's Wars [Simon & Schuster, 2011].

~GEN Martin E. Dempsey

"So What's my option?" the president asked his war cabinet, seeking alternatives to the Afghanistan commander's request for 40,000 more troops in late 2009. "You have essentially given me one option...It's unacceptable."

~Bob Woodard, *Obama's Wars*

Today we move beyond context, construct, structure, and process of national security decision making to analyze a real-world case, to determine the domestic viability of strategies and policy decisions. We will apply the concepts from previous topics, including decision-making models to estimate the domestic political, bureaucratic, and popular viability of President Obama's Afghanistan surge strategy. In addition, we will examine the role of strategic leadership played in this particular decision.

During the late 2009 Afghanistan strategic review process, the military establishment held fast on its request for an additional 40,000 troops, with no timetable for withdrawal. The Obama administration wanted another, more flexible option with fewer troops, less expense, and a built-in date to start withdrawals. Ultimately, the military did not provide a different, viable alternative, though it did offer variations of its original proposal and the president gave the military most of what it requested, including a surge of 30,000 troops. However, the President did issue a pledge to start withdrawing U.S. forces by July 2011. Today, we will explore the rationale, process, and politics behind the Obama administration's decision on the surge to determine what domestic factors drove the policy as well as the viability of the final strategic approach.

For our case study today, we will ultimately be asking you a key question that puts you into the shoes of a strategic leader in the White House in those fateful months: *What would you do?* We will analyze the situation by examining three of the decision-making models from Graham Allison's famous set, applying them to this case and asking what they say about the reasons for the decision. Given what was known at the time, and given what a strategic leader must take into account when making such a choice: *What would you do, and why?*

Objectives:

- Estimate the *domestic political, bureaucratic, and popular viability of* a proposed U.S. national security strategy and policy.

Today's Tips: Integrate strategic frameworks (6100) & the instruments of power (6200 & 6300) into your analysis of the surge.

- Analyze how the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies can affect the viability of proposed strategies.
- Assess the role of *strategic leadership in the domestic viability* of a U.S. national security strategy.

Questions for Discussion:

- Who were the strategic actors and what were their policy preferences?
- What were the various domestic-context variables that affected the ultimate decision?
- Describe the dynamics of civil-military relations during the surge decision-making process.
- What were the (if any) civil-military issues involved?
- How did the economic conditions, resource limitations, and prioritization of national resources shape the final decision?
- What were the broad opinions, trends, dynamics, or orientations, etc., within the U.S. public or the U.S. media concerning the surge? Did those factors affect the receptivity of proposed the surge strategy?
- Explain the key role strategic leadership played in crafting the strategy, the troop levels, and the timelines for the Afghan surge
- What were some of the assumptions made in the text regarding the surge strategy?
- Would you characterize the final surge strategy as a compromise between a narrow counter-terrorism policy and a counter-insurgency strategy?
- What were some of the other possible strategic options?

Readings (65 pages total):

A. Review from 6200:

“The Obama Administration and the War in Afghanistan, 2009-2012,” in Allan R. Millet, Peter Maslowski and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607-2012* (New York, The Free Press, 2012), p. 672-679.
[Student Issue in 6200]

B. Review from 6100:

Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 352-385 (Chapter 10: “Afghanistan: A House Divided”). [Student Issue]

C. *National Security Decision Making:*

1. Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010) pp. 161-174, 186-196, 222-233, 250-253, 273, 283, 385-390. [Student Issue]
2. Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Pentagon Team,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 31:4 (fall 2008), 59-76. [Reprint]

Topic 14A
Tuesday, 17 February 2015, 0830
Defense Budget Process and Implications
for National Security Strategy (LS)

History is not, of course, a cookbook offering a pretested recipe. It teaches by analogy, not by maxims. It can illuminate the consequences of actions in comparable situations, yet each generation must discover for itself what situations are in fact comparable.

~Henry Kissinger

U.S. President Barack Obama's second term is likely to be one of outsized historic importance, given that it coincides with shifts in global economic and political influence. These shifts will require a dramatic change in US strategy if Americans are to safeguard their global leadership position and interests.

~Frederick Kempe, President & CEO, Atlantic Council

Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.

~Winston Churchill

The national security budget process moves through three large phases. In the first phase, the defense and foreign assistance budgets are drafted, coordinated, and scrubbed by the executive branch. The intense rivalries for resources, the political trade-offs, and the constituency fights within the executive branch are usually masked by secrecy. In the second phase, Congress goes through a similar procedure. But in contrast to the executive branch phase, the congressional budget process is conducted largely under public scrutiny. In the third phase, the executive branch implements the programs established by the resulting budget, also largely out of the public view, at least for national security programs.

Total U.S. defense spending reached nearly \$700 billion in fiscal year 2013, which translates to the Department of Defense spending approximately \$1.3 million dollars per minute, 24 hours a day, every single day in defense of America's national interest. As the U.S. budget deficit continues to grow and the costs of U.S. mandatory entitlement programs will become unsustainable, there will be even greater political pressure to rein in U.S. defense spending. As the largest slice of the U.S. federal discretionary funds, the defense budget will certainly be scaled back. Barring any unforeseen security threats, the real buying power of the defense budget will likely be reduced. Ultimately, political fog and friction within the economic context will shape, if not drive, future national security strategies.

Today's reading assignment takes the position that the United States should not—and need not—accept the inevitability of decline to the status of one power among many, but rather seek to extend its position of global primacy. With an eye toward how this might best be accomplished, the readings examine the most effective ways to navigate and sustain a defense strategy while coping with uncertain security challenges and stagnant or declining resources.

Your task today is to help chart the way forward and explore alternatives for a U.S. national security in austerity. We will ultimately be asking you a key question that puts you into the shoes of a strategic leader or advisor on the National Security Staff: *How do we sustain our global position while facing the prospect of relative decline and an extended period of fiscal austerity?*

Objectives:

- Examine how *economic conditions and resource limitations and prioritization* shape national security strategies and policies
- Evaluate how national security strategies and policies are *formulated and implemented, and how that process is changing* over time

Questions for Discussion:

- Who has the most influence over the defense budget: the Secretary of Defense, the individual services, Congress, or defense contractors?
- How much more (or less) resources should the U.S. allocate for defense?
- What are some of the ways to employ defense resources more efficiently?
- Why did the last administration not include war costs in the annual DOD budget and instead used supplemental appropriations requests?
- What are the critical impacts of sequestration and what are the likely public responses to them?
- What does enhancing force effectiveness mean? How?
- As overall discretionary spending levels decrease, where should we reduce our spending: on *equipment* to fight the global war on terrorism, funding the personnel-related areas of the defense budget, such as pay, pensions, healthcare, and other benefits, or future procurement?
- Where can the U.S. take risks and divest commitments?

Readings (67 pages total):

1. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 311-322 (in Chapter 9: “New Team, New Agenda, Old Secretary”), 453-465 (in Chapter 12: “Meanwhile, Back in Washington”), 546-552 (in Chapter 14: “At War to the Last Day”). [Student Issue]
2. Todd Harrison, “Analysis of the FY 2015 Defense Budget,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2014). Read the 3-page Executive Summary and skim the rest. [Reprint]
3. Michèle Flournoy and Eric Edelman, “Cuts to defense spending are hurting our national security,” *Washington Post*, 18 September 2014. [Reprint]
4. Mitt Romney, “The need for a mighty military,” *Washington Post*, 4 September 2014. [Reprint]
5. Robert J. Samuelson, “America’s neglected defense,” *Washington Post*, 7 September 2014. [Reprint]

Topic 14B
Tuesday, 17 February 2015, 1330
Case Study: The Federal Budget (IS)

...you have to understand the way people in this city make decisions. Also, you must understand that most big decisions are made in conjunction with budget cycles, not in conjunction with current events. If you want to change something in our system of government, you change it in the budget. Can you do things in between budgets cycles? Of course you can; we built in a certain amount of flux, but big changes are [usually] made in budget cycles, and that includes big changes in campaigns.

~GEN Martine E. Dempsy

A billion here, a billion there—sooner or later it adds up to real money.

~Sen. Everett Dirksen (R-IL)

If we define politics as the battle for scarce resources, the budget process is politics in its purest form. The modern budget process did not exist until the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act. This legislation allowed the president to collect and reconcile each agency's individual budget requests and in so doing submit an overall executive branch budget request to Congress. The new process gave the president much greater control over the federal bureaucracy. There came a time, however, when a president (Richard Nixon) overplayed his hand, refusing to spend money appropriated by Congress. Congress reacted by creating its own budget review process in 1974, allowing the congressional Budget Committees to set overall discretionary spending levels for major federal programs, and setting out a budget timetable for each fiscal year.

The budget process has gone through various iterations since then. In the 1980s and early 1990s, budget deficits forced Congress and the executive branch into a series of ever more coercive, self-enforcing mechanisms, culminating in various balanced budget plans. These mechanisms created the budget surpluses of the late 1990s, the first in decades. Current national security and economic crises have led Congress to relax or ignore many of these mechanisms. Spending ceilings, budget timetables, and mandatory annual reductions have been replaced by supplemental appropriations bills that provide the president with considerable budgetary flexibility to respond to crises. At the same time, tax cuts, the sluggish economy and increased defense and homeland security spending have combined to create budget deficits once again.

People normally divide the federal budget into revenues (i.e., taxes) and outlays (i.e., spending). In terms of revenue, the federal government collects taxes from individuals and businesses, tariffs from trade, and fees for various services. Spending comes in a few large categories: non-discretionary entitlement programs (Medicare, Social Security, farm subsidies, etc.), interest on the debt, non-defense (domestic) discretionary spending, and defense discretionary spending. We will do an exercise today to illustrate the difficulties associated with changing allocations to any of these categories. In seminar you will be asked to review the budget process and consider spending implications for current policies. Your FSL will provide you the details.

Objectives:

- Explore how *economic conditions and resource limitations and prioritization* shape national security strategies and policies.
- Evaluate how national security strategies and policies are *formulated and implemented, and how that process is changing* over time.

Today's Tips: As you consider the budget process, remember that budgets are a tool often used to control bureaucratic agencies or win bureaucratic battles. Refer back to Topic 10 *Leadership in the Interagency*, for reasons why that might be the case.

Questions for Discussion:

- What are the key milestones in the budget process?
- Is the budget built from the bottom-up or dictated from the top-down?
- In the national security arena, which players have the most influence: agencies, the White House, Congress or outside interests?
- What effect do deficits have on the budget process?
- What are the short and long-term impacts to Congress extending the status quo and not dealing with mounting deficits?
- Which do you consider to be a greater threat to the federal budget: the largest defense budget in the world or the long-term demographic challenge confronting Social Security and Medicare?

Readings: TBD



Topic 15
Wednesday, 18 February 2015, 0830
Energy Security (LS)

In a tightly contested global economy, where a secure energy resource is a national must, we should be able to act with speed and agility.

~Former National Security Advisor General James Jones

Americans should be outraged about the potential implications for our national security because the (Keystone XL) pipeline keeps us hopelessly addicted to oil...Keystone is essentially going to maintain the status quo for another 25 years.

~Retired Brigadier General Anderson,
Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
for the Multi-National Force in Iraq (2006-2007)

Balancing our energy portfolio is a real chance to reduce energy bills, revitalize rural America, slow global warming and strengthen our energy security.

~Senator Tom Udall (D-NM)

For nearly four decades, the United States has struggled to enhance its “energy security” and if current growth trend in world energy demand continue, the U.S. will face even greater challenges to raise the capital required to build the energy infrastructure to sustain economic growth. In addition, for each of the primary energy sources in the U.S. such as oil, natural gas, and coal, there are multiple factors that determine how vulnerable the nation is in terms of its energy security. These factors include disruptions in the world energy market and their potential effect on energy prices in the United States; the ability of energy suppliers to respond to disruptions if they occur; and the ability of energy consumers to shift to other, less expensive sources of energy. U.S. consumers and the economy are most vulnerable to disruptions in oil markets because the U.S. has no current viable alternatives for oil in providing fuel for transportation.

In contrast, the U.S. markets for natural gas, coal, nuclear power, and renewable energy either are less prone to long-term disruptions or have significant spare production and storage capacity. Because of the global nature of the oil market, no policy could eliminate the costs borne by consumers because of disruptions.

Yet, in “GLOBAL TREND 2030: Alternative Worlds,” a publication of the National Intelligence Council,

In a likely tectonic shift, the United States could become energy independent. The US has regained its position as the world’s largest natural gas producer and expanded the life of its reserves from 30 to 100 years due to hydraulic fracturing technology. Additional crude oil

production through the use of “fracking” drilling technologies on difficult-to-reach oil deposits could result in a big reduction in the US net trade balance and improved overall economic growth. Debates over environmental concerns about fracturing, notably pollution of water sources, could derail such developments, however.

The United States now is projected to be the world’s top producer of oil and natural gas this year. During today’s seminar, we will explore what it means for the United States to be “energy independent” and implications of energy self-sufficiency for securing energy supplies and national security. Still, given the interdependent nature of the global oil market and the U.S. energy consumption rate, Michael Levi, a senior fellow for energy at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its program on energy security and climate change asserts that “achieving American energy self-sufficiency wouldn’t make us independent in the way that people like to think it would.” He makes the argument that as the US weans itself from foreign oil, the Pentagon will still need to remain focus on energy security and “shouldn’t be driven by a mistaken belief that we no longer need to worry about the security of energy supplies.”

Objectives:

- Analyze how U.S. domestic conditions influence the formulation and execution of national security strategy.
- Analyze how the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies can affect the viability of proposed strategies.
- Assess the role of strategic leadership in the domestic viability of a U.S. national security strategy.

Today’s Tips: Review Topic-13, Lobbying and Interest Groups, on the power of factions as it relates to domestic energy politics and policies.

Questions for Discussion:

- What is Elkind’s definition of energy security? What is your definition? How would you define U.S. energy independence?
- What are the potential domestic-context implications (political, economic, and social) of the U.S. gaining energy independence?
- Will achieving energy self-sufficiency decrease U.S. vulnerability in energy or other areas? Explain.
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of traditional energy sources vs. alternative forms of energy?
- What is the “Dark Side” of energy independence?

Readings (73 pages total):

1. Benjamin Alter and Edward Fishman, “The Dark Side of Energy Independence,” *New York Times*, 27 Apr 13. [Reprint]
2. Michael Levi, “America's Energy Opportunity How to Harness the New Sources of U.S. Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 92, Issue 3 (May/June 2013), pp. 92-104. [Reprint]
3. Jonathan Elkind, “Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda,” in Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind eds., *Energy Security* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) pp. 119-148. [Reprint]
4. Congressional Budget Office, “Energy Security in the United States,” (Washington DC: CBO, 2012) pp. 1-30. [online:
<http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/05-09-EnergySecurity.pdf>]

Topic 16
Friday, 20 February 2015, 0900
What to Expect When You're Expecting...
To Work in the Interagency (L)

We should seek by all means in our power to avoid war, by analysing possible causes, by trying to remove them, by discussion in a spirit of collaboration and good will.

~Neville Chamberlain

Colonels run the Air Force.

~Gen. John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command

Today we spend some time talking about the practice of Interagency coordination at the levels at which many of you will find yourselves after NWC or after your next assignment after NWC. Most bureaucrats, echoing back to the start of the course, endeavor to “do the right thing.” Bureaucratic politics also can be characterized as “non-violent battle for scarce resources, materiel, influence, etc.” In many ways, bureaucratic politics are much like national politics. But there are some important differences.

Objectives:

- Understand the role of bureaucratic politics in the U.S. national security process
- Understand the importance of agency cultures.

Questions for Discussion:

- *What is your definition of bureaucratic politics? To what extent does it differ from the definition of politics given in the syllabus?*
- *To what extent is politics ubiquitous to U.S. administration?*
- *According to the readings, which domestic actors and processes are most likely to influence the context of U.S. security policy?*
- *Is there any way to avoid bureaucratic politics?*
- *How and when is bureaucratic politics useful? When is bureaucratic politics counterproductive? What standard are you using when answering these questions?*

Readings (49 pages total):

1. White House, *2015 National Security Strategy*, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed 11 Feb 2015.
2. LTC Rickey L. Rife and Rosemary Hansen, FSO, “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security” (Palo Alto: Stanford University SSC Fellows, 1998). Available from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3Dada351032&ei=5h58UtOeIfbK4AON4oGwDw&usg=AFQjCNHOq7tSnXmcaBFurXhL0x22xtWIA&sig2=X4TvzEFOz_x5xUa4tPYjZg&bvm=bv.55980276,d.dmg
3. (Skim) Richard Haass, “Finding Your Way,” in *The Bureaucratic Entrepreneur* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 1-14. [Reprint]
4. (Skim) Morton Halperin, “Why Bureaucrats Play Games,” Reprinted in *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, 3rd ed.), pp. 70-90. [Reprint]



Topic 17
Monday, 23 February 2015, 0830
Cyberspace (LS)

Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only increased. The reason of this is that we do not gain all our experience at once, but by degrees; so our determinations continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experience; and the mind, if we may use the expression, must always be under arms.

~Carl von Clausewitz

Leadership is a slippery phenomenon that eludes both common sense and social science...what leaders do is hardly self-evident.

~Dr. Phillip Selznick, noted social scientist

Today we focus on the *practice* of strategic leadership in national security decision-making with the context of cyberspace as our background. Our guest speaker today, Admiral Michael S. Rogers, will discuss the difficulties of strategic leadership in the domestic context. The speaker will look at the influence of domestic, cultural and political circumstances on the formulation and execution of policy, including the effect of resource limitations.

While there are multiple conceptualizations of strategic leadership, there are also some common overlapping themes in the various definitions. Emerging strategic leadership themes include Envisioning (charting the strategic course); Enabling (providing the resources and authorities needed and fostering a climate of innovation to accomplish tasks); and Enacting (the agility to take the necessary actions to achieve objectives). The readings from the Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer on strategic leadership present a view what a strategic leader has to do in order to be minimally competent.

The remaining readings for today are focused on an issue that will continue to engage you for the rest of your careers: the need to rethink the structures and processes of our national security system to improve coordination across the interagency and inter-governmental spectrum. It is for you to decide the range of changes needed from piece-meal reform to large-scale reorganization. While you may never be directly involved in cyberspace strategy or policy directly, as the cyberwarriors like to say, “Everyone has a role to play in cyberspace.”

Finally, we conclude where we began the course. To what degree can we have “pure” or ideal interagency coordination on national security policies in a government system rife with politics and the necessity for compromise? To what extent is interagency coordination politically feasible given the domestic context within which national security decisions are made in this country?

Objectives:

- Evaluate how national security strategies and policies are *formulated and implemented in a changing operating environment.*

- Analyze how the processes for formulating and implementing U.S. national security strategies and policies can affect the viability of proposed strategies.
- Assess the role of *strategic leadership in the domestic viability* of a U.S. national security strategy.

Today's Tips: As you consider the national decision making-process as a complex adaptive system, refer back to the leadership lessons from 6000, 6100, and 6200 and consider how those are related to today's topic.

Questions for Discussion:

- How is strategic leadership defined?
- What is the new role of a strategic leader in the national security system?
- What are the key leadership tasks in in the national security system?
- What is the relationship between the leader and follower in such system?
- Is it the military's job to defend all of the U.S.?
- In the national security arena and within the U.S. domestic context, what are the unintended consequences of adapting to such leadership framework?
- What is the relationship between strategic leadership in national security strategy and the concept of Mission Command?

Readings (63 pages total):

1. Greg Nojeim and Orin Kerr, "The Data Question: Third-Party Information," in Rishikof, et al, *Patriots Debate: Contemporary Issues in National Security Law* (Washington: American Bar Association, 2012), 73-88. [Reprint]
2. Stewart Baker and Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Cyberwar," in Rishikof, et al, *Patriots Debate: Contemporary Issues in National Security Law* (Washington: American Bar Association, 2012), 179-203. [Reprint]
3. Stephen J Gerras, ed., "Appendix A," *Strategic Leadership Primer* (USAWC, 2010), pp. 58-66.
4. Biography, Admiral Michael S. Rogers, US Navy, available from http://www.nsa.gov/about/leadership/bio_rogers.shtml

Topic 18
Tuesday, 24 February 2015, 0830
Strategic Leadership / Concluding Seminar (IS)

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan - to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.

~President Abraham Lincoln, 2nd Inaugural Address, 4 March 1865

It is my earnest hope – indeed the hope of all mankind – that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past, a world founded upon faith and understanding, a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance and justice.

~General Douglas MacArthur, in Japan, 1945

I know it is hard when you're up to your armpits in alligators to remember you came here to drain the swamp.

~President Ronald Reagan, 10 February 1982

We conclude the course where we began the course. To what degree can we have “pure” or ideal interagency coordination on national security policies in a government system rife with politics and the necessity for compromise? To what extent is interagency coordination politically feasible given the domestic context within which national security decisions are made in this country?

The concluding readings and assignment for today are focused on an issue that will continue to engage you for the rest of your careers: the need to rethink the structures and processes of our national security system to improve coordination across the interagency and inter-governmental spectrum. It is for you to decide the range of changes needed from piece-meal reform to large-scale reorganization.

Objectives:

- Evaluate how national security strategies and policies are *formulated and implemented, and how that process is changing* over time.
- Comprehend the dynamics of *effective individual and group decision-making* in a national security context.
- Examine *civil-military relations* in a democracy.
- Debate the bounds and forms of *legitimate dissent* in the national security arena.

6400 Central Question for Discussion:

- What is the most effective way of evaluating the domestic viability of a proposed U.S. strategy and policy?

Readings (83 pages total):

1. Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 115-148 (in Chapter 4: “Waging War on the Pentagon”), 566-594 (Chapter 15: “Reflections”). [Student Issue]
2. Robert Komer, Summary, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam,” [Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 1972], pp. v-xiii. [online: <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf>]
3. Francis Fukuyama, “America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction,” *Foreign Affairs* (SEP/OCT 2014), available from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141729/francis-fukuyama/america-in-decay>, accessed 9 October 2014.

