THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, DC 20319-5078

SYLLABUS

NDU 6000: Strategic Leadership Foundational Course

NWC 6001: Strategic Leadership Foundational Course II

Fall 2015
Academic Year 2015-2016

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Course Schedule NDU 6000

Strategic Leadership Foundational Course

Fall 2015, Academic Year 2015-2016

Course Schedule NWC 6001

Strategic Leadership Foundational Course II

Fall 2015, Academic Year 2015-2016

Week-6

Week-7

National War College Glossary
of
Fundamental Strategic Terms & Concepts

Assumption. Something taken as true or certain before there is proof. Assumptions fall into three basic categories: 1) aspects of the situation that are unknown/uncertain; 2) the dynamics of cause and effect or action/reaction inherent in any strategic approach; and contextual views, including ideology, resistant to change. Those assumptions most critical to a strategy's success in all three categories, along with their implications, should be identified explicitly.

Constraint. Significant limit on your strategic freedom of action.

Costs. The price, financial or otherwise, one has to pay to implement a strategy; costs include, among others, deaths, penalties, expenses, and/or missed opportunities.

Ends/Objectives/Goals. The desired outcomes of strategy, to include defending against threats and/or exploiting opportunities – written with verbs and adverbs; a strategy that identifies an overarching end or objective can also specify subordinate objectives.

Evaluation: Tests used to evaluate the risks of your strategic approach. Five measures include: Suitability, Desirability, Feasibility, Acceptability, and Sustainability.

Interest. A desired condition or "state of reality;" what you'd like the world to look like and/or what you'd like your relations with the rest of the world to be.

Means. Capabilities and/or resources that are available, or can be acquired/developed, and are appropriate and desired for resolving the strategic problem at hand; also referred to as the instruments of national power; the principal instruments are:

- **Diplomatic**

Fundamentally, the essence of the diplomatic instrument is achieving agreement, and it works principally via negotiation and compromise; its major components are negotiations, alliances, international organizations and international law.

- **Information**

Fundamentally, the information instrument involves the acquisition/exploitation of data, the assessment of that data, and the transmission of information both at home and abroad.

- **Military**

Fundamentally, the essence of the military instrument is compelling conformance, and it works principally through the threat/use of force; its major components are combat operations, stability/support operations, and military-to-military engagement.

- **Economic**

Fundamentally, the economic instrument involves creating prosperity and managing international economic activity, to include trade policy, sanctions, foreign and development aid, and financial policy

Opportunity. A favorable set of circumstances that may allow for the advancement of one or more interests; exists independently of the successful resolution of a threat to an interest.

Risks. Those things in your strategic design that could go wrong and work to your disadvantage.

Statecraft. Effective employment and integration/orchestration of all appropriate instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives.

Strategy. A plan of action to achieve a desired end.

Strategic Logic. The ordered, coherent thought process essential to developing an effective strategy; the fundamental elements of strategic logic are

- Analyzing the strategic context, and its international and domestic components
- Defining the desired ends
- Identifying and/or developing the means you need to bring to bear
- Designing the ways you're going to use the means to achieve the desired ends
- Assessing the risks and costs associated with your strategic design.

Threat. Condition, dynamic, actor, etc., that endangers one or more interests; something is a threat only if it puts an explicit interest in jeopardy.

Ways/Approaches/Orchestration. How the strategic design uses the available/acquirable/developable means to achieve stated objectives; generally expressed as courses of action, initiatives or policies; often a "way" entails a combination of two or more means and may be categorized by their purpose, to include persuasion, inducement, or coercion of foreign counterparts.

Course Overview

Strategic Leadership Foundational Course

Introduction

The corridors of Roosevelt Hall have stood in witness to the birth and evolution of America's National Security Strategy. Built between 1903 and 1907 to house the Army War College, Roosevelt Hall is a monument to the professionalization of the American military and to early 20th century military reform. From America's experience in the Second World War, U.S. civilian and military leaders recognized the need for a holistic approach to the security challenges of the post-war world; thus in 1946 the Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, agreed to move the Army War College to Carlisle Barracks in south-central Pennsylvania, and to make Roosevelt Hall the home of the National War College. It was during the first academic year of the National War College—from September 1946 through June 1947—that the college's Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs, George Kennan, penned his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Kennan's thinking established the foundation for America's policy of containment toward the Soviet Union and strongly influenced the newly created National Security Council (NSC). Under President Harry S. Truman the NSC produced what was arguably the first U.S. National Security Strategy document—the TOP SECRET NSC-68; it was a muscular version of containment underpinned by a large buildup of conventional arms.

In May 1953, shortly after Dwight Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President of the United States, Eisenhower authorized Project Solarium in which three teams would operate in secret at the National War College to propose various strategies for dealing with a Soviet Union that was projected to field an arsenal of thousands of thermonuclear weapons and missiles for delivering them. George Kennan headed Team-A of Project Solarium, and in July 1953 President Eisenhower attended a day-long conference at the White House to hear the various teams make their cases for their strategies.[1] Eisenhower opted for Team-A's approach, which was largely a continuation of the Truman administration's containment policy. By that autumn, as the National War College Class of 1954 was settling into its academic routine, Eisenhower's National Security Council would turn Team-A's proposal into NSC-162/2, which like NSC-68 strove to contain the Soviet Union, but unlike NSC-68, NSC-162/2 relied to a much greater degree on nuclear weapons and deterrence and less on an expensive conventional military force buildup. Although later administrations would produce updated National Security Strategy documents, the fundamental concepts developed in Roosevelt Hall in the early years of the Cold War remained the basis for American foreign policy and strategy to the Cold War's end.

In this course, you will continue the National War College's tradition as a place where bright national security professionals come to wrestle intellectually, practically, and realistically with the highest levels of national security policy and strategy. You will come to an understanding of, and an ability to apply, strategic logic and the five elements comprising it:

[1] Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 2012), p. 107.

- Analyzing the Situation
- Defining Ends to protect or further interests
- Determining Means available or to be obtained for a strategy
- Formulating Ways of using those means to achieve the ends of strategy
- Assessing the risks and costs associated with the strategy and testing it

You will need to read critically, think critically, creatively and strategically, and you will need to comprehend strategic leadership and how it differs from other types of leadership.

This course will serve as a foundation for the subsequent core courses in the National War College curriculum. As such, it will be important for you to gain a firm grasp of certain fundamental concepts, basic terminology, and habits of thinking that you will use repeatedly throughout the year.

Approach

The course consists of 27 sessions, usually lasting 3 hours, spread out over 7 weeks. The topics will be addressed through a combination of readings, videos, lectures, seminar discussions, papers, and student presentations. Required readings include passages taken from the following books issued to students:

a. Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

b. Richard Rumelt, *Good Strategy, Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why it Matters* (New York: Crown Business, 2011).

c. Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014).

d. Jeswald Salacuse, *Leading Leaders* (Washington: American Management Association, 2006).

e. Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

The remainder of the readings, strategy frameworks, and links to other course materials will be posted on the NDU 6000-NWC/NWC 6001 Blackboard site.

Student Learning Outcomes:

By direction of the National Defense University, the following student learning outcomes (SLOs) will form the basis of year-long learning, and students' achieving these learning outcomes will earn four credits toward a Master's Degree.

SLO 1 – Creative and Critical Thinking: Initial comprehension leading to analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of *key concepts, theories and analytical approaches that shape strategic judgment and choice.*

SLO 2 – Strategic Leadership: Initial comprehension leading to analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of *key principals of strategic leadership involved in the conduct of national security affairs.*

SLO 3 – Strategic Aspects of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): Initial comprehension leading to analysis, synthesis and evaluation of *inter-service, interagency, and international policy planning, decision-making, and implementation processes.*

These three Student Learning Outcomes (SLOs) map directly to and will be pursued through the following three course objectives.

Course Objectives:

By the end of the course, the students should be able to:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.

2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Requirements

Learning at the National War College is based on small seminars where diverse groups of students guided by a Faculty Seminar Leader (FSL) discuss and debate key concepts from the required readings, from lectures in Arnold Auditorium, and from other material defined in the syllabus, such as videos, strategy frameworks, and the syllabus itself. Therefore, the first ingredient for success at the National War College is your personal preparation for seminar. You will gain from your year at the National War College in proportion to the effort that you put into your studies. In the small seminar setting, it is difficult to mask a failure to prepare for any given day's topic, so prepare well and add value to the seminar through your contributions. Your contributions to seminar will serve as the basis for just over one-third of your grade in this course.

In addition to contributing to seminars, each student will be responsible for participating in two in-class exercises in which students will apply their knowledge to formulating strategy. An exercise evaluation rubric appears at the end of this syllabus.

Finally, half of your grade for this course will be based on a writing assignment and your ability to critique the written strategy of one of your classmates. The writing assignment will be due

near the end of the course, and will consist of your U.S. strategy for dealing with a real-world challenge to U.S. national security interests. Finally, you will receive a sanitized (i.e., anonymous) copy of a classmate's paper that you will be required to summarize and critique. Detailed instructions and guidance can be found near the end of this syllabus on pages 54-60.

Blackboard

This course will use the NDU Blackboard to post all necessary materials and communications. The syllabus will be posted there and each topic will have a section of the Blackboard containing links to the readings.

Readings

The students will be expected to read approximately 60-75 pages per topic. The supplemental readings are given for those wishing to delve deeper or for students to use when doing research to support presentations or papers.

Assessment policy

Students must demonstrate mastery of the stated course objectives to pass this course. Performance on the following will determine each student's final grade: seminar performance and contribution (35 percent), in-class exercises (15 percent), and a final strategy decision paper, including the ability to summarize and critique someone else's paper (50%).

The following grading scale will be followed:

Letter Grade	Descriptor	Grade Points
A	Exceptional Quality	4.00
A-	Superior Quality	3.70
B+	High Quality	3.30
B	Expected/Acceptable Quality	3.00
B-	Below Expected Quality	2.70
C	Unsatisfactory Quality	2.00
P	Pass	0.00
F	Fail/Unacceptable Quality	0.00
I	Incomplete	0.00

Students who fail to complete all course requirements in the time allotted will receive an overall grade of Incomplete (I). All incompletes must be completed according to the time frame agreed upon with the course director. Incompletes that are still unresolved at graduation convert to a grade of Fail (F).

A student who does not sufficiently meet course objectives as indicated by overall performance on course assessments will receive a grade of Unsatisfactory (C). In this case, the student will enter remediation to conduct additional study and raise his or her performance to an acceptable level. If a student refuses remediation or fails in the process, the grade will convert to Fail (F).

All students have the right to appeal their course grades. First, within a week of the release of the grade, the student must request a review by the course director. Should this review not lead to a satisfactory resolution, the student should follow the grade appeal process established by the National War College's grading policy.

Any student may appeal any course grade. First, within a week of the release of the grade, request a review by the course director. Should this review not lead to a satisfactory resolution, submit a written petition to the NWC Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs within two weeks of the release of the grade. The Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs will convene a faculty panel to conduct a formal review; the decision of that panel will be final.

Absence Policy

Regardless of absences, students must still meet all stated course objectives to pass the course. Thus students who have missed one or more class sessions may be required to complete compensatory assignments at the course director's discretion. Additionally, any student who has missed one or more classes and questions his/her ability to meet the course objectives regardless of compensatory work completed should ask the course director for further remedial assistance.

With the exception of absences due to required International Student Management Office (ISMO) events, any student who misses four or more sessions of a course will meet a faculty board that will consider whether to recommend disenrollment to the NWC Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs and the Commandant. The Board will consider both extenuating circumstances and the student's potential to meet the course objectives. The Commandant will make the final decision on the student's status.

The above policies apply equally to U.S. students and International Fellows.

Topic 1

Course Intro and Seminar on Strategy

Monday, 10 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Everyone needs a strategy. Leaders of armies, major corporations, and political parties have long been expected to have strategies, but now no serious organization could imagine being without one. Despite the problems of finding ways through the uncertainty and confusion of human affairs, a strategic approach is still considered preferable to one that is merely tactical, let alone random. Having a strategy suggests an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather than trees. Without a strategy, facing up to any problem or striving for any objective would be considered negligent.
>
> — Sir Lawrence Freedman,
> *Strategy: A History*

Overview

This course provides an introduction to strategy, strategic leadership, and critical thinking, so it is appropriate to begin the course with an examination of strategy—what it is and what it is not. Subsequent topics will delve into strategic leadership and how it is the same as, and how it is different from, other types of leadership. Under the heading critical thinking, other future topics will explore the workings of the human mind, perceptions, worldviews and cognitive biases that can affect the decisions of strategists and strategic leaders. Strategic leadership and critical thinking will be addressed soon enough, but for the first session the focus is on understanding the structure of the course, course assignments and due dates, and on examining the concept of strategy.

This syllabus is your guide to the course as a whole and for your preparation for each individual topic and assignment. By reading the Overview, Topic Objectives, and Issues for Consideration for each topic, you can sensitize your mind for spotting the key concepts in the Required Readings.

Topic Objectives:

1. Understand the structure of course NWC 6000, including its timeline, and the rationale for the course.

2. Comprehend course assignments and due dates.

3. Begin to get to know the people in your seminar.

4. Begin an exploration and analysis of strategy and strategic logic.

Issues for Consideration:

1. What is strategy? Is it a product, a process, a plan, a combination of the above or something else?

2. What are the similarities and differences among grand strategy, national security strategy, and foreign affairs strategy?

3. What is the relationship of strategy to policy?

4. If the term strategic logic is taken to mean the fundamental steps or elements common to strategy-making of all types, then what is strategic logic, i.e., what are the common steps or elements to making strategy (hint: review page 5 of this syllabus)?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 62 pages) [PDFs on Blackboard, under Topic-1 Tab]

a. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-32, "Introduction: Defining Strategy." (32 pages)

b. Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 1-16, "Introduction: The Meaning and Challenge of Grand Strategy." (16 pages)

c. Ross Harrison, *Strategic Thinking In 3D*, (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013), pp. 1-17. "Introduction – Demystifying Strategy." (12 pages)

d. David Tretler, "National Security Strategic Leadership," February 25, 2013. (2 pages)

Supplemental Reading

a. Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012). Especially Part I, Chapters 1-4, pp. 3-67.

Topic 2

Critical Thinking: Silent Evidence & Strategic Reasoning

Tuesday, 11 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future.
>
> — Yogi Berra

Overview

Before traveling too far down the path of exploring strategy, it is important to spend some time considering how people think. This lesson and the next one will highlight some of the pitfalls to strategic thinking, such as relying too heavily on past experience as a guide to thinking about the future and failing to examine the biases, worldviews and hidden assumptions that underpin decision-making processes. Awareness of such pitfalls is no guarantee of avoiding them, but it is a good first step.

Because making strategy requires our taking a long-term view for furthering our interests, we will examine the random forces that shape the strategic environment in which our strategies must be implemented. The readings provide some cautionary tales about the dangers of being too sure of knowing what we think we know and the difficulties of inferring cause-and-effect from our observations of the infinitely-complex world in which we live.

These first steps in improving our critical and strategic thinking will not arm us with surefire answers, but should suggest ways of thinking about the future, as well as some concepts, vocabulary, and questions to help recognize and uncover some common obstacles to making sound strategy.

Topic Objectives:

1. Understand the limitations of inductive thinking, the risks of drawing inferences from experience, and the concept of silent evidence.

2. Comprehend the importance for strategists and strategic leaders to understand the modes of human perception, knowledge, and thinking.

3. Comprehend how cognitive biases impact human perceptions of the environment in which they live.

4. Comprehend the value of scenario planning as a way strategists and strategic leaders can get beyond their own personal experiences and cognitive biases.

Issues for Consideration:

1. On what are we to base our critical and strategic thinking if not on experience?

2. What is silent evidence and what does it have to do with strategy?

3. If the past, and our own experience are insufficient guides for thinking about the future, then how should one try to conceptualize future possibilities?

4. Where do we get the images of the world in which we live and how do those images relate to the real world.

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 74 pages) [PDFs on Blackboard, under Topic-2 Tab]

a. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the HIGHLY IMPROBABLE* (New York: Random House, 2010), pp. xvii-xxviii "Prologue," pp. 40-45 and 50 "How to Learn from the Turkey," and pp. 100-121, "Chapter 8: Giacomo Casanova's Unfailing Luck: The Problem of Silent Evidence." (38 pages)

b. Daniel Kahneman, Dan Lovallo, and Oliver Sibony, "Before You Make That Big Decision…" *Harvard Business Review* (June 2011), pp. 51-60. (9 pages)

c. Peter Schwartz, "Developing & Using Scenarios," Global Business Network, pp. 5-33, excerpted from Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* (New York: Crown Business, 1996). (27 pages)

Supplemental Reading

a. Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

Topic 3

Assumptions, Worldviews and Cognitive Biases

Thursday, 13 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.
>
> — Mark Twain

Overview

Thus far, we have examined strategy as a concept and noted that strategists and strategic leaders must take a long-term view of the world in which they live. We have also considered the problems associated with assuming that past experience can serve as a reliable guide to the future, and we have considered techniques – especially scenario planning – for sensitizing our minds to, and for preparing us to cope with, the unexpected twists and turns that tomorrow, next week, and next year will surely bring. In this topic we will continue to advance our abilities as critical and strategic thinkers by exploring how strategists come to know what it is they know about the world in which they live, how worldviews shape their actions, and how mental processes can potentially trip them up.

As with the last lesson, the added awareness and newfound knowledge about human thinking and decision-making in this lesson provides less of a guide for what to do, and more a suggestion for ways of thinking and the types of questions to ask.

The point to contemplating human perception, thinking and decision-making is to aid us in future lessons as we endeavor to understand the importance of assumptions in the making of strategy. As the epigraph above from Mark Twain suggests, the greatest trouble for strategists lies in a failure to identify and explore our assumptions—especially when those assumptions masquerade as facts or things we are certain that we know. This topic will lead us to the next, wherein we will begin to explore the context or environment in which we live and we will start to think about the instruments of national power that strategists use to shape that environment.

Topic Objectives:

1. Improve students' critical and strategic thinking by giving them a deeper understanding of how humans perceive, think, and operate in the environment in which they live.

2. Comprehend the factors that shape our knowledge of the world in which we live.

3. Comprehend the importance for strategists and strategic leaders to understand the modes of human perception, knowledge, and thinking.

4. Comprehend how worldviews, mindsets, and cognitive biases impact human perceptions of the environment in which they live.

5. Comprehend the value of scenario planning as a way strategists and strategic leaders can get beyond their own personal experiences and cognitive biases.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Pick a place where you have never visited or studied deeply—perhaps the Ukraine, Russia, Mongolia, Brazil, India, China, Ethiopia, or South Africa—then ask yourself, How do you know what you know about it?

2. Have you ever known someone who was completely sure of something but also completely wrong—a way of doing something, a way of getting somewhere, an assessment or opinion of someone? How did that person's mistaken "knowledge" inhibit his or her effectiveness?

3. Have you ever been that person? When was the last time you were sure of something of significance in your personal or professional life that turned out to be based on incorrect facts or perceptions? What made you change your thinking?

4. What are the underlying differences in worldviews that underpin the different foreign policy prescriptions of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson? To what extent are these different worldviews reflected in today's policies, thinking, and approaches to foreign policy?

5. What happens when the mind switches from the contemplative mode, to the implementation mode? How do high-level officials, such as ambassadors and combatant commanders, with one foot in the policy-making world and another in the policy implementation world, operate effectively before and after "crossing the Rubicon"?

6. What mental algorithms guide the thinking of our political, diplomatic and military leaders? When might the lessons they've learned become dysfunctional? How might a strategist help his or her leaders recognize and overcome counterproductive modes of thinking and acting?

7. What conceptual biases are likely to interfere with sound foreign policy making? How might a national security strategist guard against conceptual biases so as to improve decision-making and strategy?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 70 pages) [PDFs on Blackboard, under Topic-3 Tab]

a. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922; reprint Free Press Paperbacks, 1997), pp. xi-xvi and 3-20. "Foreword" and "Chapter 1 – The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads." (22 pages)

b. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 29-55, Chapter 2: "The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson" (25 pages)

c. Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return," *International Security* 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-20 and 38-40. (15 pages)

d. Video Riding a Bike: http://dailyliked.net/backwards-brain-bicycle/ (8 min)

e. Keith Suter, "Thinking about the Future: The Value of Scenario Planning," Global Directions, c. 2001. (8 pages)

Supplemental Reading

a. Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

Topic 4

Context / Understanding the Environment

Friday, 14 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> The evil that is in the world almost always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence if they lack understanding.
>
> — Albert Camus

Overview

The world today is as complex and potentially dangerous, if not more so, as at any time since the end of the Cold War. In an effort to develop "agile adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision, and critical thinking skills necessary to keep pace with the changing strategic environment," General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged the development of, and ultimately approved, six Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs).[2] First among these DLAs was "The ability to understand the environment and the effect of all instruments of national power."[3] In this lesson, we will begin to consider our infinitely complex and potentially dangerous strategic environment.

In the field of national security strategy, strategists and strategic leaders can never cease in their efforts to gain a sufficient appreciation of the strategic environment and its workings. As British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman noted, it is impossible for any one person to hold such a commanding grasp of world affairs so as to measure up to the standards of the strategy-pundits' mythical Master Strategist. Political leaders, Freedman averred, "would therefore have to rely on the quality of their judgment to identify the most pressing problems arising out of the current state of affairs, plot a means of advance to a better state, and then improvise when events took an unexpected turn."[4] But where do political leaders and their strategic advisors gain that "judgment to identify the most pressing problems arising out of the current state of affairs," much less the knowledge and wisdom needed to "plot a means of advance to a better state"?

Throughout the upcoming academic year, we will strive to advance our "ability to understand the environment and the effect of all instruments of national power" operating in that environment. For this lesson, we can at least begin to appreciate the nature and scale of the challenge in gaining a sufficient understanding of the strategic environment and developing the judgment needed to decide and operate effectively in that environment.

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[2] CJCS Notice 3500.01, "2014-2017 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance," 10 October 2013, p. 3.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 244.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs) and the first of the "Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations."

2. Comprehend the nature and scale of the challenge for strategists and strategic leaders in understanding the strategic environment.

3. Comprehend how one's ability to understand the strategic environment contributes to the strategic logic for dealing with national security challenges.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Why would the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that understanding the environment should be the primary Desired Leader Attribute?

2. Can there be a science of strategy? Why, or why not?

3. In an infinitely complex and potentially dangerous environment, how does a strategist or strategic leader "identify the most pressing problems arising out of the current state of affairs"?

4. How might you use what you learned in earlier lessons (about the limits of relying on past experiences, the fallibility of cognitive processes, and the prevalence and impact of biases and worldviews) to sharpen your critical and strategic thinking as you work to understand the strategic environment?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 72 pages) [PDFs on Blackboard, under Topic-4 Tab]

a. CJCS Notice 3500.01, "2014-2017 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance," 10 October 2013, p. 3. (1 page)

b. *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (Suffolk, Virginia: Joint and Coalition Operations Analysis, 2012), pp. 1-6. (5 pages)

c. Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 237-244, "Chapter 17: The Myth of the Master Strategist." (7 pages)

d. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 35-72, "The International Strategic Environment." (37 pages)

e. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 77-90, 95-100, 106-112, 117-120 "The Domestic Context for Strategy." (22 pages)

Topic 5

Strategic Logic and Elements of Strategy

Monday, 17 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Strategy is concerned with how one applies one's resources to achieve one's aims.
>
> — Thomas G. Mahnken, *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century*

Overview

Toward the end of the Introduction to this syllabus is the claim that strategic logic is comprised of five elements:

- Analyzing the Situation
- Defining Ends to protect or further interests
- Determining Means available or to be obtained for a strategy
- Formulating Ways of using those means to achieve the ends of strategy
- Assessing the risks and costs associated with the strategy and testing it

That claim suggests strategy-making at any level and for any purpose ought to involve these five elements, starting with analyzing the situation.

Analyzing the situation begins with understanding the environment—the international and domestic **contexts**—but it goes beyond that. Analyzing the situation also entails identifying the enduring **interests** one has at stake in the current state of world affairs, and recognizing threats to those interests as well as opportunities to further those interests. Analyzing the situation requires one to explicitly identify and test key **assumptions** about the environment, about oneself, one's allies and partners, one's competitors and adversaries, and about the way the world works, that is, about cause and effect relationships. Somewhere in the course of conducting such analysis, one should make a determination or assumption about whether time is on one's side, or if it favors one's adversary.

In defining ends, one should be careful to ensure there is a clear connection between the ends sought and the interests at stake. In later lessons, we will parse our terminology to differentiate among similar terms, such as goals, end-states, ends, and objectives. For now we can consider the term ends as encompassing goals and objectives. To reiterate, the important point is to make sure the ends one decides to pursue either counter a **threat** to one's interests or create or take advantage of an **opportunity** to further one's interests. A good strategist must have a solid ***theory of the case***—that is, a cogent explanation of how achieving one's ends will protect or advance one's interests. A good strategist also ought to consider **negative objectives** or outcomes to be avoided. Particularly when considering strategies for competition or conflict between great powers, strategists and strategic leaders should be explicit in defining their

negative objectives. For example, whatever positive aims the United States might have had in Vietnam, lurking in the background was the negative objective of avoiding massive Chinese intervention on the side of North Vietnam. In the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961, the negative objective of avoiding nuclear war with the Soviet Union loomed large. Strategists and strategic leaders would do well to state explicitly their negative objectives and prioritize them along with their positive objectives. Ends should always be listed in priority order.

The next two elements of strategy, determining means and formulating ways, should be inextricably linked to one another and tied to specific ends. Accomplishing or attaining meaningful ends will require resources, or means. Because national security strategy deals with the pursuit of long-term goals, a national security strategist ought to consider means that can be obtained over time (e.g., new allies, new capabilities, new leverage or asymmetrical advantages) rather than being content with the means on hand today. And just as a strategist should have a solid *theory of the case* liking ends to interests, a strategist should also have very clear, realistic ideas of how using specific means in certain ways will lead to the attainment of the ends being sought. Simply stated, lists of ends, ways, and means do not make a strategy. A good strategy should make clear what exactly one intends to do, and why.

The final element of strategic logic entails the very difficult task of judging the costs and risks associated with a strategy and subjecting the strategy to other tests. Costs come in many forms: economic, political—foreign and domestic, human lives or resources, temporal (i.e., time). Real costs almost always involve tradeoffs and/or opportunity costs, not only in the present, but against the future as well. Invariably, therefore, limiting costs is in one's interest, and one should eschew the pursuit of ends whose value is exceeded by the costs to achieve them. Unfortunately for the strategist and the strategic leader, the calculation of costs and of the value of ends one wishes to pursue cannot be made precisely, objectively, or easily, if it can be done at all.

Risks are similar to costs in that the greater they are, the worse they are, potentially, for one's interests. As difficult as it might be to assess the costs of a given strategy, assessing risks is even more difficult because risks are based less on known factors and are instead contingent on unknown factors. Even those risks that can be anticipated or foreseen might not materialize, so assessing risk and determining acceptable levels of risk is a tricky business. The concept of risks is sometimes confused with that of threats, but strategists should try to make a clear distinction between the two. A threat poses a perceivable danger to one's interests; it might be a serious danger or a minor one, a near-term danger or one in the more distant future. With risks, the danger or cost to be borne is latent, contingent or imperceptible. Think of threats as extant in the strategic environment and as existing in relation to one's interests. Think of risks as potential, or not yet extant, and think of them relating to a given strategy in one of three ways: 1) risks *to* the strategy (things that could cause the strategy to fail, the objectives to be lost); 2) risks *from* the strategy, that is, latent or unforeseen threats or costs brought forth by the strategy; and 3) risks resulting from invalid assumptions.

In addition to assessing strategies according to their associated costs and risks, strategists can and should test their strategies in other ways, including *Red-Teaming* to detect vulnerabilities, flaws, or weaknesses that an adversary could exploit, and tests for a strategy's feasibility, desirability, suitability, acceptability, and sustainability.

Topic Objective: Comprehend the elements of strategic logic.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Which of the five elements of strategic logic is most important? For instance, is it more important to analyze the situation properly, including getting the assumptions right, or is it more important to get the objectives right?

2. Are the *Ways* in the *Ends-Ways-Means* equation really the crux of a strategy? Why or why not?

3. One critique of some of the strategy frameworks is that they are too linear. Explain why you agree or disagree with that critique and apply your reasoning to the NWC National Security Strategy Framework that appears just after the Supplemental Readings for this lesson.

4. The cognitive biases studied in earlier lessons would appear to be relevant to several, if not all, of the elements of strategic logic. Under which element(s) of strategic logic should a strategist be most concerned about the effects of cognitive biases, and what should a strategist do to guard against their negative effects?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 46 pages)

a. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, *Regaining Strategic Competence* (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009), pp. 15-19, Chapter 2: "What is Strategy?" (5 pages)

b. Paul Bracken, "Net Assessment: A Practical Guide," *Parameters* (Spring 2006), pp. 90-100. (10 pages)

c. William C. Martel, "The Making of Future American Grand Strategy," *The National Interest*, January 27, 2015. (32 pages)

d. NWC 6000 Strategy Framework (2 pages)

e. "Appendix I – Guidelines to Strategy Formulation," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol II National Security Policy and Strategy*, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Ed., (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), pp. 413-418. (5 pages)

f. Review: David A. Tretler, "National Security Strategic Leadership" February 2013 (2 pages)

Supplemental Reading

a. Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History and Practice* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012).

Framework for National Security Strategy

Context

- International Political Context
- Domestic Political Context
- Military Context (if applicable)
  - Character and Nature of this War
  - Trends / History of this conflict/crisis/war

} Identify critical uncertainties

U.S. Interests at Stake (What's it all about? What's the problem?)

- Threats to U.S. Interests
- Opportunities to further U.S. Interests

Assumptions

- About links between potential objectives, actions and U.S. interests
- About critical uncertainties in the future (vs. Facts or Assessments of present)
- About the role of time
- About the consequences of not acting

Goals / End-States / Objectives (+Negative Objectives)

Political Center-of-Gravity Analysis: Ours (Friendly's) and Theirs (Adversary's)
Objectives: Start with a verb (make it strong, clear, and achievable)
Negative Objectives (what you wish to avoid)
Prioritize all objectives, positive and negative

Ends	***Ways*** (consider phasing)	***Means***
Pol. Obj. #1	by _____ (doing what?, answer the "how?")	with $M_{1.1}$ with $M_{1.2}$ with $M_{1.3}$ with $I_{1.1}$ with $I_{1.2}$ with $D_{1.1}$
Pol. Obj. #2	by _____ (doing what?, answer the "how?")	with $D_{2.1}$ with $D_{2.2}$ with $I_{2.1}$ with $I_{2.2}$ with $E_{2.1}$ with $E_{2.2}$

This illustrates the top priority objective being pursued primarily through the use of three Military means, supported by Information and Diplomacy, e.g., Deter Russian military aggression against NATO's Baltic allies.

This illustrates the second most important objective being pursued primarily through the use of Diplomacy, supported by Information and Economic means, e.g., Secure EU backing for economic sanctions against Russia.

Constraints

- Adversaries' or neutrals' red-lines to be respected
- Prohibitions against using certain ways
- Prohibitions against using certain means

- ROE, Sanctuaries / No-go areas

Costs – Quantify (money, foregone opportunities, time, people or forces, public opinion, allied support, relations with third-parties)

Risks to your strategy
from or because of your strategy
if your assumptions are flawed/incorrect

Strategy Tests (-ilities): Suitable, feasible, desirable, acceptable, and sustainable
Is the strategy coherent? Do proposed actions support interests, flow from assumptions, and complement one another?

Red Team: How could the adversary counter this strategy, other critiques (e.g., of assumptions, of strategic concept, of time/costs, assessments of capabilities)

Think globally. Think like POTUS or the National Security Advisor

Topic 6

National Interests—What Are They and Who Says So[5]

Tuesday, 18 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> However, when political formulas such as "national interest" or "national security" gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all.
>
> —Arnold Wolfers, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1952

Overview

National interest is a familiar term, but one without a self-evident meaning…or at least not a meaning on which everyone would agree. Political leaders and academics have long used certain adjectives to indicate the relative importance of specific national interests; at the highest level of importance are a nation's *survival* interests. For a large and powerful country such as the United States, survival interests are most closely associated with large numbers of ballistic missiles armed with thermonuclear weapons. For a small state, such as Israel, Syria or Yemen, a broader range of challenges could threaten its survival interests. Next in priority come *vital* interests, followed by *important* interests, and finally *peripheral* interests. However, such adjectives invite debates over their meanings and questions about where important interests end and vital interests begin. National interests can also be categorized according to whether they involve a nation's security, prosperity or economy, preservation of its values and way of life, or the projection of its values. But are these separate and distinct, or do they overlap? Is there some point where a threat to America's prosperity become a threat to its security? In this lesson and the next we will begin to wrestle with these concepts.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the elements of strategic logic.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. As a general rule, are security interests more important than prosperity interests? Why, or why not? How might the security of one's ally affect your assessment (e.g., the security of Estonia affects U.S. security because Estonia is a member of NATO, but how

[5] This topic title is borrowed from the title of Chapter 8 in Bernard Brodie's *War & Politics* – "Vital Interests: What Are They, and Who Says So?"

significant must a threat to Estonia's security become so as to match or surpass the importance of a direct threat to America's economic wellbeing)?

2. Is there a litmus test or defining characteristic that distinguishes a vital national interest from and important interest?

3. Who decides whether any given national interest is a vital interest or a lesser interest?

4. To what extent do categories of national interests—i.e., security, economic or prosperity, value preservation, and value projection—overlap?

5. Does it make sense to try to define national interests in the abstract, or do such terms only take on meaning in specific contexts, with specific threats and opportunities?

6. What is the best way to state a national interest? How can you tell if a national interest has been defined well or not?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 70 pages)

a. Mark M. Lowenthal, *National Interests and U.S. Foreign Policy*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 5, 1994. (8 pages)

b. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 67, no. 4 (Dec., 1954), pp. 481-502. (21 pages)

c. James F. Miskel, "National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases," *Naval War College Review* LV, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), 96-104. (8 pages)

d. Bernard Brodie, *War & Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 1973), pp. 341-374 Chapter 8: "Vital Interests: What Are They and Who Says So?" (33 pages)

Topic 7

National Interests—Threats and Opportunities

Thursday, 20 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing to be a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities, an intricate knot of…[hyphenated Americans], each preserving its separet [sic] nationality, each at heart feeling more sympathy with…[countrymen] of that nationality than with the other citizens of the American Republic.
>
> —Theodore Roosevelt

Overview

Writing in the second half of the 1990s, the renowned American political scientist Samuel Huntington used an abbreviated version of the epigraph above in a provocative article for *Foreign Affairs* that argued America's national interests were being eroded from within by forces of multi-culturalism and ethnic and racial division. At the time Huntington wrote that article, "The Erosion of American National Interests," U.S. foreign policy appeared to be based less on countering threats to America's interests from within or from abroad, and more on seizing the opportunity to expand American prosperity through trade and commerce. But to critics of the Clinton administration, that seemed like a pattern or theme in American foreign policy, not a coherent strategy. The Berlin Wall had come down a decade earlier, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was approaching its sixth anniversary. Absent a global enemy, the United States appeared to struggle to define its national interests and to prioritize its foreign policy objectives.

To be fair, any observer with a historical perspective would note that even during the Cold War presidents, policy-makers, and scholars endeavored to strike the balance between physical security, economic prosperity, and American values. Some worried that too much emphasis on physical security would lead America to become what sociologist Harold Lasswell called a "'garrison state,' a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society."[6] American society and values would be twisted and damaged—in essence to secure America, political-military elites would end up destroying America. Others, such as President Eisenhower, were apprehensive over the costs of the Cold War. In an attempt to make American security more affordable, Eisenhower downsized the U.S. Army and relied heavily on nuclear weapons and deterrence. In his farewell address in 1961, Eisenhower warned of the "grave implications" of "the military-industrial complex," which threatened not only America's

[6] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (January 1941), pp. 455-468.

economy, but its "liberties…democratic processes," and even "the very structure of our society."[7]

This topic on threats and opportunities bridges between the last lesson, on the concept of national interests, and the next lesson, which will address goals, end-states, and objectives in national security strategy.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the elements of strategic logic.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. What are the most important threats to U.S. national interests (e.g., cyber, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate change, infectious diseases, fiscal insolvency, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea)?

2. To what degree are threats objective realities rather than perceptions? Who determines whether there is a threat to U.S. national interests, and on what basis should such a decision be made?

3. Is there a relationship between threats and opportunities, is one just a different way of looking at the other, or are they more likely to be separate and distinct?

4. To what extent should national security strategists concern themselves with domestic threats to U.S. interests, such as deficits and the Federal debt, erosion of traditional American values and identity, or the state of education in America?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 77 pages)

a. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 123-156, Chapter 4: "Interests, Threats, and Opportunities" (33 pages)

b. Samuel Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs* 76, No. 5 (September/October 1997), 28-49. (21 pages)

c. James R. Clapper, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 26, 2015, pp. 5-25. (20 pages)

d. Michèle Flournoy and Richard Fontaine, "Economic Growth Is a National Security Issue," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 27, 2015, p. A13. (3 pages)

[7] Eisenhower's Farewell Address (Press Copy), January 17, 1961. Accessed Friday, July 10, 2015: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Eisenhower%27s_farewell_address_(press_copy)

Topic 8

Goals, End States, Objectives & Subordinate Objectives

Friday, 21 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Defining a national interest is meaningless if not dangerous unless there is also a plan for advancing or defending that interest.
>
> —Mark Lowenthal, *National Interest and U.S. Foreign Policy*,
> Congressional Research Service, 1994

Overview

Setting goals and objectives is, arguably, a good place to begin a plan for advancing or defending national interests.[8] A national security strategist ought to define ends or objectives tied directly to the threats to national interests or to the opportunities for furthering national interests. Recall from the discussion from Topic 5 in this syllabus that a strategist ought to have a cogent explanation of how achieving one's ends will protect or advance one's interests. We called this the *theory of the case*, linking a strategy's ends to national interests.

While we have used the terms goals, ends and objectives interchangeably up to this point, we should now note that one of the great challenges of national security strategy is developing concrete, achievable objectives. Lofty, long-term goals may not be achievable directly but must instead be pursued in stages. A number of implications follow from this observation. One is that broad, ambitious goals, such as achieving a stable, peaceful, democratic Middle East, are not suitable guides to action, no matter how much they would seem to advance America's interests. More helpful would be concrete objectives about neutralizing the threat from the so called Islamic State or the threat from and Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Another implication is that objectives ought to be prioritized, so that the most important objectives are pursued foremost and that precious resources are not exhausted on lesser objectives. A third implication is that timing and time are elements of strategy. Some objectives can be pursued simultaneously with others, but some objectives are best pursued sequentially or in stages, perhaps requiring a strategy with multiple phases. Finally, objectives can sometimes be hierarchical, with tactical objectives supporting operational objectives that in turn support strategic objectives.

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[8] I say "arguably" because Richard Rumelt argues that strategy-making begins with apprehending what he calls the *kernel*, which consists of 1) a diagnosis, 2) a guiding policy, and 3) a set of coherent actions. As Rumelt notes: "I call this combination of three elements the *kernel* to emphasize that it is the bare-bones center of a strategy…It leaves out visions, hierarchies of goals and objectives, references to time span or scope, and ideas about adaptation and change." We will have accomplished Rumelt's diagnosis in the process of analyzing the situation: identifying national interests, threats and opportunities related to those interests, critical uncertainties and key assumptions. It is unclear how one should produce Rumelt's "guiding policy" and "set of coherent actions," without first establishing objectives. Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy* (New York: Crown Business, 2011), pp. 77-79.

Recall, too, from the discussion under Topic 5, that in furthering one's interests it is important to identify the outcomes one wishes to avoid. These *negative objectives* can be as important as, or more important than, the positive objectives a strategy is meant to achieve. Thus negative objectives should be prioritized along with positive objectives. Strategists and strategic leaders should recognize latent threats at play and develop strategies that avoid or mitigate the consequences of bringing those latent threats into being. This is a topic we will revisit later in this course when we cover the concept of risk.

For the purposes of this course, terms related to strategy-making and their definitions can be found at the back of this syllabus and on Blackboard. Our aim at the National War College is to educate national security practitioners, not to develop academics, theorists or philosophers, and not to establish a unique National War College doctrine. Having said that, we should note that certain members of the faculty and student body have had a great deal of training and experience as strategists and planners—although most students have not done so at the highest levels of national security strategy. Those faculty members and students have been trained to use certain terminology with a degree of precision worth exploring in seminar. For instance, some will be familiar with the DOD Dictionary, which defines an *end state* as: "The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives." According to the same source, an *objective* is: "The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed."[9] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) borrowed heavily from DOD doctrine and instructions for planning when developing its own methods for strategic planning, so our DHS colleagues might also be familiar with those DOD definitions. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development also have people engaged in strategy and planning and they may have different ways of using the same or similar terms related strategy-making. The same might be said for members of the Intelligence Community and other departments and agencies. Discussions about the meaning and use of terms related to strategy-making can be worthwhile, especially if those discussions aim to improve one's understanding of others, to clarify thinking and to improve strategy.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the elements of strategic logic.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. How should national security objectives be related to national interests, threats and opportunities?

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[9] Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 June 2015). Available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ or in PDF at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

2. Is there a place for ambitious vision statements in strategy? Why or why not?

3. Are Richard Rumelt's concepts of the *kernel* and proximate objectives useful for strategists?

4. What does Ross Harrison tell us about primary goals and subsidiary goals? Are Harrison's subsidiary goals the same as Rumelt's proximate objectives?

5. Why might political leaders favor ambiguous goals over specific goals?

6. What are negative objectives? In thinking about a U.S. strategy toward Russia, do any negative objectives come to mind?

7. Why should a strategist prioritize national security objectives? Could there be a downside to prioritizing objectives?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 63 pages)

a. Ross Harrison, Strategic Thinking In 3D, (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013), pp. 21-33. "Chapter 1 – Setting Strategic Goals." (12 pages)

b. Richard P. Rumelt, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy (New York: Crown Business, 2011), pp. 32-57, 77-94 and 106-115, Chapter Three: "Bad Strategy," Chapter Five: "The Kernel of Good Strategy," and Chapter "Seven: Proximate Objectives." (51 pages)

Topic 9

Assessing Goals and Objectives (Historical)

Monday, 24 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Even in hindsight, it is often difficult to tease out the precise contribution strategy made to the eventual result.
>
> — Barry D. Watts, "Barriers to Acting Strategically" in *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century*

Overview

This lesson will examine some real-world national security strategy documents from the Cold War era and serve as an opportunity to assess the clarity with which the National Security Council staff defined and prioritized goals and objectives. This should improve our abilities to develop appropriate ends for a current national security current challenge facing the United States, which will be our task in the next two lessons.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the elements of strategic logic.
2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Which document more clearly stated goals and objectives, NSC 162/2 or NSDD 32?
2. Which document did a better job of prioritizing objectives?
3. Did either document contain passages that contradicted or confused goals and objectives or their priorities?
4. How might the goals and objectives in these two documents been made clearer?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 60 pages)

a. John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," *The National Interest* (Winter 1987/8), pp. 19-35. (16 pages)

b. NSC 162/2: Basic National Security Policy, October 30, 1953. (27 pages)

c. NSDD 32: U.S. National Security Strategy, May 20, 1982 and NSDD 75: U.S. Relations with the USSR. (17 pages)

Topic 10

Determining Goals and Objectives (Current-Russia)

Tuesday, 25 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

Overview

When most Americans were preparing to celebrate Thanksgiving in 2013, a crisis brewing in Ukraine took a serious turn as then-President Viktor Yanukovych, under pressure from Moscow, abruptly withdrew from an agreement that was to bring Ukraine into closer association with the European Union. The months that followed saw protests by Ukrainians who opposed Yanukovych's sudden lurch toward Moscow, violence against those protesters, Yanukovych's disappearance and reappearance in Russia, and Russian intervention into eastern Ukraine in support of Russian-speaking separatists. By March, Russia had annexed Crimea, with its naval and air bases on the Black Sea, and was fomenting a civil war in Ukraine.

Today's lesson will explore, via seminar discussion, the U.S. national interests at stake with respect to Russia and its actions in Ukraine, the threats or opportunities related to those interests, and objectives the United States should pursue to counter those threats or to exploit those opportunities. In the next lesson, students will work in small groups of three or four, to develop their groups' recommended objectives for a U.S. strategy toward Russia, including an explanation of how their recommended objectives would further U.S. interests—that is, their *theory of the case*.

Topic Objectives:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.

2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. What long-term national security interests does the United States have at stake with regard to Russia and its actions toward Ukraine? Are these vital interests? Why, or why not?

2. To what extent did the United States provoke Russia's actions toward Ukraine? Did the United States, through its actions in Ukraine, pose a threat to Russia? Why, or why not?

3. Should the United States and others acknowledge and respect a Russian sphere of influence, giving it special status, rights and privileges in its near-abroad? Why, or why not?

4. Should Russia be opposed or placated? Is Russia more likely to be satisfied if others recognize its sphere of influence, or will Russia's appetite for a larger sphere of interest grow?

5. Should U.S. strategists and strategic leaders be mindful of any negative objectives as they formulate a strategy for Russia?

6. What should the United States endeavor to achieve? What should be the ends or objectives of U.S. strategy for Russia?

7. What special challenges confront America's strategic leaders in this situation—i.e., challenges that are not generally shared by leaders at lower levels? What challenges confront the commander of U.S. European Command? The Secretary of Defense? The Secretary of State? The President?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 56 pages)

a. The White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015. Do word search for "Russia," first page of President Obama's cover letter, then pp. 2, 4, 5, 10, 16, 19, and 25. (~1 page)

b. Douglas Feith, "The Temptation of Vladimir Putin," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 5, 2014, p. A17. (3 pages)

c. Robert M. Gates, "Putin's Challenge to the West," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 25, 2014. (3 pages)

d. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp. 77-89. (12 pages)

e. Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, "A New European Security Order: The Ukraine Crisis and the Missing Post-Cold War Bargain," note n˚15/2014 (8 December 2014) Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique. (6 pages)

f. Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, "The looming New Cold War and its consequences," *Survival* Editor's Blog, February 5, 2015. (3 pages)

g. "What Russia Wants: From cold war to hot war," *The Economist*, February 14, 2015. (8 pages)

h. National Institute for Public Policy, *Russia's Nuclear Posture* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2015). (5 pages)

i. Paul Sonne, "Putin Details Crimea Takeover before First Anniversary," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 2015, p. A7. (3 pages)

j. Ambassador Samantha Power, "My Remarks to the Ukrainian People," *Huffington Post* (POLITICS: THE BLOG), June 11, 2015. (12 pages)

Topic 11

Application: Analyzing Situations to Setting Objectives (U.S. Strategy toward Russia)

Thursday, 27 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

Overview

In this lesson, students will work in small groups of three or four, to develop their groups' recommended objectives for a U.S. strategy toward Russia, including an explanation of how their recommended objectives would further U.S. interests—that is, their *theory of the case*.

Topic Objectives:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.
2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.
3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. What long-term national security interests does the United States have at stake with regard to Russia and its actions toward Ukraine? Are these vital interests? Why, or why not?
2. To what extent did the United States provoke Russia's actions toward Ukraine? Did the United States, through its actions in Ukraine, pose a threat to Russia? Why, or why not?
3. Should the United States and others acknowledge and respect a Russian sphere of influence, giving it special status, rights and privileges in its near-abroad? Why, or why not?
4. Should Russia be opposed or placated? Is Russia more likely to be satisfied if others recognize its sphere of influence, or will Russia's appetite for a larger sphere of interest grow?
5. Should U.S. strategists and strategic leaders be mindful of any negative objectives as they formulate a strategy for Russia?

6. What should the United States endeavor to achieve? What should be the ends or objectives of U.S. strategy for Russia?

7. What special challenges confront America's strategic leaders in this situation—i.e., challenges that are not generally shared by leaders at lower levels? What challenges confront the commander of U.S. European Command? The Secretary of Defense? The Secretary of State? The President?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 33 pages)

a. World Economic Forum, *Scenarios for the Russian Federation*, (USA: World Economic Forum, 2013), pp. 3-23, 34-35, and 42-43. (20 pages)

b. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (USA: National Intelligence Council, December 2012), pp. i-xiv, "Executive Summary." (13 pages) www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends

Topic 12

Defining Power and Instruments of Power

Friday, 28 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> The only way to predict the future is to have power to shape the future.
>
> —Eric Hoffer

Overview

In *Foreign Affairs Strategy*, Terry Deibel claims that: "Power is the motive force of statecraft, the capacity to act in foreign affairs. It is necessary in order to get things done, to accomplish one's purposes, to carry out one's own will despite the resistance that accompanies all strategic endeavors." In this lesson, we will explore various ideas about the meaning and nature of power. This will serve as a basis for the next lesson, which examines the instruments of power in statecraft.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend elements of strategic logic.
2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. According to David Hoffmann, former Moscow bureau chief for *The Washington Post*, when Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, "he felt it was a shame that a nation so richly endowed, so brimming with natural resources and human talent endowed by God, was living so poorly compared with the developed countries of the world."[10] Less than six years later, despite the awesome power of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and other armed forces, despite being one of the world's greatest producers of oil and natural gas, the Soviet state could no longer pay or feed its people and the Soviet Union collapsed. What does that suggest about power in the international system?
2. How can a strategist gauge the power of his state or other states? Which is more important absolute power or relative power?
3. Can net assessments help illuminate the relative power of states?

[10] David Hoffmann, *The Dead Hand* (New York: Doubleday, 2009), p. 399.

4. In international affairs, is obtaining power a national interest, a goal, a means, or something else? Why?

5. Can soft power be wielded or employed, or does it just happen? What are the implications of your answer for how strategists should think about soft power?

6. Are the second and third faces of power described by Nye fundamentally different from the first face of power or hard power? How should a strategist think about the concept of co-optive power?

7. Joseph Nye "defined smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies." Does that mean that skilled strategists and processes for employing their talents is an element of a state's power?

8. Which aspects of U.S. power are most fungible, and which are least fungible?

9. How do perceptions of one's power affect one's power?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 66 pages)

a. David Jablonsky, "National Power," *Parameters* (Spring 1997), pp. 34-54. (20 pages)
b. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), pp. 3-24. "Chapter 1 – What Is Power in Global Affairs?" (21 pages)
c. Richard N. Haass, "The Politics of Power: New Forces and New Challenges," *Harvard International Review* Vol. XXVII No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 60-65. (5 pages)
d. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 157-178, the first 20 pages of Chapter 5: "Power and Influence." (20 pages)

Review:

a. Paul Bracken, "Net Assessment: A Practical Guide," *Parameters* (Spring 2006), pp. 90-100. (10 pages)

Topic 13

Determining Means (available or to be obtained)

Monday, 31 August 2015, 0830 - 1130

> In fact, so close is the relationship between ends and means that the very nature of a goal itself will remain unclear until the instruments to be used in its pursuit (and the *ways* they are to be used…) are specified.
>
> —Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy*

Overview

The third element of strategic logic involves determining means, available or to be obtained, that are necessary to achieve one's ends. As we saw in the last lesson, *means*, which we will also refer to as the instruments of state power or simply instruments of power, are related to the concept of a state's power, but they are not quite the same thing as power. In this lesson we will continue to explore the relationship between means and power and we will begin to examine the relationship between means and ends in strategy.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend elements of strategic logic.
2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. What is the difference between U.S. power and U.S. instruments of power?
2. Should national security strategy be constrained by the *means* available, or should *means* be obtained to implement national security strategy? Why? When should a nation's *ends* be adjusted to existing *means* and when should *ends* drive *means*?
3. Is diplomacy a *means* or instrument of power? Is diplomacy a category for a certain class of *means* – the diplomatic instruments of power? Is diplomacy a *way* of employing instruments of power?
4. Net assessments during the Cold War helped U.S. policy-makers get beyond static comparisons of orders of battle, or raw numbers of tanks, planes, and ships. How might

net assessments be used to help a strategist think about *means* or instruments of power in strategy?

5. What asymmetric advantages or competitive advantages does the United States enjoy vis-à-vis Russia, and what do those advantages suggest about the *means* the United States might employ in a strategy for Russia?

6. Joseph Nye "defined smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies." Does that mean that skilled strategists are in some way a means to be employed?

7. Ross Harrison describes linchpin capabilities as being "the most important capability for executing a given strategy." Can you think of examples of linchpin capabilities at the highest levels of strategy? What might be considered a linchpin capability for U.S. grand strategy or national security strategy?

8. Harrison also said that linchpin capabilities can be one's Achilles' heel. Can you think of an example of such a linchpin capability for U.S. grand strategy or national security strategy?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 84 pages)

a. Ross Harrison, *Strategic Thinking in 3D* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013), pp. 35-47. Chapter 2: "The Primacy of Capability." (11 pages)

b. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 207-280, Chapter 6: "The Instruments of State Power." (73 pages)

Topic 14

Formulating Ways of Using Means to Achieve Ends

Tuesday, 1 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Just as each objective in a strategic plan should be explicitly connected to the interests it serves (and the threats and opportunities it addresses), so each objective must also have its own instruments and ways of using them specified.
>
> —Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy*

Overview

The fourth element of strategic logic involves formulating ways of using means to achieve one's ends. Terry Deibel, in his book *Foreign Affairs Strategy*, considers five different aspects of formulating ways: conditionality, secrecy, breadth, number, and order. Conditionality refers to whether the use of an instrument of statecraft is *actual* or *prospective*; for instance, does the strategy envision using military force to achieve an objective (*actual*), or does it merely threaten the use of force to achieve an objective (*prospective*). Secrecy refers to whether the ways are covert or overt. Breadth refers to how broadly or narrowly an instrument is applied, e.g., economic sanctions can be designed to target an entire country and its society, or they can be more narrowly focused on the country's ruling elites. Number refers to how many different instruments will be brought to bear to achieve one's ends. And, finally, Order refers to when and how various instruments of power are orchestrated across time.

There are other ways to think about *ways*. In *Strategic Thinking in 3D*, Ross Harrison devotes 35 pages, by far his longest chapter in that book, to what he calls "Strategy in the Dimension of Systems," which he says "aims to adapt or shape the environmental context in order to improve one's competitive advantage."[11] Harrison would call Deibel's approach "Strategy in the Dimension of Opponents," which is another chapter in *Strategic Thinking in 3D*. According to Harrison, some advantages to strategy in the dimension of systems is that it is an indirect way of influencing a target's behavior, the target is not confronted directly, is less likely to resist as strongly, and might not even detect the workings of the strategy. The creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions following the Second World War might be seen as an application of Harrison's strategy in the dimension of systems. Another example might be the creation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Accords. These institutions shaped the post-war economic and political environment in ways that favored America's interests and constrained the Soviet Union.

Yet another way of thinking about *ways*—indeed, in thinking about strategy—is the competitive strategies approach. In *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century*, Stephen Peter

[11] Ross Harrison, *Strategic Thinking in 3D* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013), p. 52.

Rosen argues that the "competitive strategies approach…differs from other approaches to strategy," and he goes on to explain: "Competitive strategies try to get competitors to play our game, a game that we are likely to win. This is done by getting them to make the kind of mistakes that they are inclined to make, by getting them to do that which is in their nature, despite the fact that they should not do so, given their resources."[12] The competitive strategies approach depends on knowing a lot about a competitor's leaders and bureaucratic organizations, on knowing enough to be able to predict certain behaviors or responses of those leaders and bureaucracies. There are other ways to think about *ways* in strategy, but for now it should suffice to note the interaction among ends, means, and ways and to conclude that strategy-making is more iterative than linear and more art than science.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend elements of strategic logic.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Are asymmetrical advantages that a nation enjoys in foreign affairs more likely to stem from capabilities (*means*) or from *ways* of using means that other nations might also possess?

2. How are the selection of *ways* in national security strategy affected by the fact that one's adversary or competitor will almost certainly be an intelligent, resourceful opponent determined to achieve outcomes that favor that opponent's interests and harm one's own interests?

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using indirect approaches?

4. In what *ways* can one wield soft power? Can soft power be wielded or employed, or does it just happen? What are the implications of your answers for how strategists should think about soft power?

5. What asymmetric advantages or competitive advantages does the United States enjoy vis-à-vis Russia, and what do those advantages suggest about the *ways* the United States might employ its means in a strategy for Russia?

6. How might net assessments inform a strategist's choice of *ways*?

[12] Stephen Peter Rosen, "Competitive Strategies: Theoretical Foundations, Limits, and Extensions," in *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice*, ed. Thomas G. Manken (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 12.

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 72 pages)

a. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), pp. 207-234, Chapter 7 – "Smart Power." (27 pages)

b. Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy* (New York: Crown Business, 2011), pp. 124-141, Chapter Nine: "Using Design." (26 pages)

c. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 302-321, Chapter 7" "Linking Ends and Means" remainder of chapter starting from section titled "2. Means: Choose Instruments to Accomplish Objectives." (19 pages)

Review:

a. Paul Bracken, "Net Assessment: A Practical Guide," *Parameters* (Spring 2006), pp. 90-100. (10 pages)

Supplemental Readings:

a. Ross Harrison, *Strategic Thinking in 3D* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013), pp. 51-86. Chapter 3 "Strategy in the Dimension of Systems." (35 pages)

b. Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History and Practice* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012).

Topic 15

Linking Interests, Ends, Ways and Means

Thursday, 3 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> When you look closely at either the 2002 or 2006 [U.S. National Security Strategy] documents, all you find are lists of goals and sub-goals, not strategies.
>
> —Barry Watts, "Why Strategy? The Case for Taking It Seriously and Doing It Well"[13]

Overview

Too often, when asked to produce a strategy, inexperienced national security strategists formulate separate lists of ends, ways, and means that have at best some implied relationship to one another. Separate lists of ends, ways, and means do not make a coherent strategy. A good national security strategy will make clear how using specific means, employing specific capabilities, in well-defined ways, ought to produce certain outcomes or lead to the attainment of desired ends that in turn advance national interests.

One technique a strategist can use to link ends, ways, and means is to first identify the threats and opportunities potentially affecting national interests, and then to construct statements about the objectives one would pursue to counter those threats or take advantage of those opportunities, including *how* those objectives would be achieved (ways) and *with* what resources or capabilities (means).

Borrowing from former faculty members of the National War College, we could employ a template such as the following:

> *To address specific threat or opportunity X, we should… (objective), by…. (ways), with or using…(means).*[14]

The objective should begin with a verb, such as prevent, destroy, disrupt, punish, deter, dissuade, strengthen, or reassure, and should be as concrete and specific as possible. The clause beginning with *by*, should answer the *how* question, and it is difficult to address that *how* question without describing the means one intends to employ. The final clause, which one can begin with *using* or *with* completes the statement by spelling out all of the means to be employed in pursuit of that objective.

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[13] Cited in Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy* (New York: Crown Business, 2011), p. 34.
[14] I am grateful to Ambassador Bill Wood and Ms Karen Aguilar, also of the State Department, for introducing me to this way of linking ends, ways, and means.

It is very difficult to graphically map all of the links among the ends, ways, and means in a strategy. That is one reason it is recommended that you construct statements as described above, rather than try to depict the links on a PowerPoint slide. To illustrate the point, consider that a strategy could well involve more than one approach or way to attain a desired objective, in which case separate statements should be constructed to differentiate among the various ways. Moreover, multiple means will almost certainly be employed in support of each way, and those means need not all come from the same category or same type of instrument of national power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, economic, etc.). To complicate matters further, a given capability or means might be used in different ways to support different objectives or ends. Attempting to depict this graphically usually results in a baffling bunch of lists and lines that fails to communicate the workings of the strategy.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend elements of strategic logic.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Consider recent NATO military deployments to the Baltic and Black Sea regions; what ends, ways, and means were at play and how would you describe the links among them, the threats or opportunities they were meant to address, and the U.S. national interests served by the deployments?

2. How were non-military instruments of power used to complement or support the military deployments?

3. Consider U.S. and EU economic sanctions against Russia; what ends, ways, and means were at play and how would you describe the links among them, the threats or opportunities they were meant to address, and the U.S. national interests served by the sanctions?

4. How were non-economic instruments of power used to complement or support the economic sanctions?

5. Consider the diplomacy of U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power; what ends, ways, and means were at play and how would you describe the links among them, the threats or opportunities they were meant to address, and the U.S. national interests served by her diplomacy?

6. How were instruments of power besides diplomacy used to support Ambassador Power's diplomacy?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 54 pages)

a. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 281-302, Chapter 7: "Linking Ends and Means" through section 1. "Ends: Draw up a Preliminary List of Objectives" (21 pages)

b. Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy* (New York: Crown Business, 2011), pp. 257-275, "Chapter Seventeen: Using Your Head." (18 pages)

c. Barry D. Watts, "Barriers to Acting Strategically: Why Strategy is So Difficult," in *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History and Practice*, Thomas G. Mahnken, ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 47-62. (15 pages)

Topic 16

Historical Assessment of Strategy (Reagan Administration)

Friday, 4 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Even in hindsight, it is often difficult to tease out the precise contribution strategy made to the eventual result.
>
> — Barry D. Watts, "Barriers to Acting Strategically," *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century*

Overview

In 1994, less than three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Peter Schweizer published a remarkable book with the title *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. The book was remarkable because it purported to reveal the contents of highly classified documents, which the author listed by name and number, and it purported to describe covert operations. Now, more than twenty years later, many of the classified documents Schweizer described have been declassified, have been studied by scholars, and are available on the Internet for anyone to examine. In this lesson, we will look at some of Schweizer's claims, the historical documents from the 1980s produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, and the historical assessment of Hal Brands. Our goal is to analyze this material and make our own assessment of the Reagan administration's grand strategy and its national security strategy.

Topic Objectives:

1. Analyze the strategic logic at work in the Reagan administration's strategy for the Soviet Union in the later stages of the Cold War.
2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.
3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. How would you assess the Reagan administration's strategy toward the Soviet Union?
2. How did President Reagan perform in fulfilling the roles and responsibilities of a strategic leader depicted in the NWC Strategic Leadership Framework?
3. How did the Reagan administration define the U.S. interests at stake vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Cold War?

4. What threats and opportunities were most prominent in the Reagan administration's strategy? Were there threats or opportunities that were implied or left implicit that should have been made explicit?

5. What were the key assumptions underpinning the Reagan administration's strategy? Were they all made explicit in the strategy, or were some left implicit or implied?

6. What were the priority objectives of the strategy? Were there any negative objectives? Was there a clear theory of the case showing how attainment of the objectives would further U.S. interests, or was that assumed or left implicit? Did the objectives change over time? If so, how, and why?

7. What were the strategy's primary means and ways? Did the strategy clearly link ends, ways, and means?

8. Although this course has yet to address costs and risks, how would you assess the costs and risks of the Reagan administration's strategy? Was the expected outcome worth the costs? What risks were associated with the administration's strategy?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 63 pages)

a. William J. Casey, "Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Economy and Possible Policy Initiatives for the US," DCI Remarks to the President's Economic Advisory Board, 18 March 1982 (8 pages)
b. NSDD 75: U.S. Relations with the USSR, 17 January 1983. (9 pages)
c. Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), pp. xviii-xix and 281-284. (5 pages)
d. Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 102-143. Chapter 3: "Was There a Reagan Grand Strategy: American Statecraft in the Late Cold War." (41 pages)

Review:

a. NSDD 32: U.S. National Security Strategy, May 20, 1982. (8 pages)

Supplemental Reading

a. Peter Schweitzer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).
b. Herbert E. Meyer, "What Should We Do About the Russians?" Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, NIC#03770-84, 28 June 1984.

Topic 17

Costs and Risks

Tuesday, 8 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Cost is popularly defined as whatever must be given, sacrificed, suffered or forgone to secure a benefit or accomplish a result, the necessary loss or deprivation related to something gained, or the unavoidable penalty of an action. More specifically, it is simply the amount paid for anything bought – the price.
>
> —Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy*

Overview

The fifth and final element of strategic logic begins with the difficult task of judging the costs and risks associated with a strategy. (This overview repeats points made in this syllabus in the Topic 5 Overview.) Costs come in many forms: economic, political—foreign and domestic, human lives or resources, temporal (i.e., time). Real costs almost always involve tradeoffs and/or opportunity costs, not only in the present, but against the future as well. Invariably, therefore, limiting costs is in one's interest, and one should eschew the pursuit of ends whose value is exceeded by the costs to achieve them. Unfortunately for the strategist and the strategic leader, the calculation of costs and of the value of ends one wishes to pursue cannot be made precisely, objectively, or easily, if it can be done at all.

Risks are similar to costs in that the greater they are, the worse they are, potentially, for one's interests. As difficult as it might be to assess the costs of a given strategy, assessing risks is even more difficult because risks are based less on known factors and are instead contingent on unknown factors. Even those risks that can be anticipated or foreseen might not materialize, so assessing risk and determining acceptable levels of risk is a tricky business. The concept of risks is sometimes confused with that of threats, but strategists should try to make a clear distinction between the two. A threat poses a perceivable danger to one's interests; it might be a serious danger or a minor one, a near-term danger or one in the more distant future. With risks, the danger or cost to be borne is latent, contingent or imperceptible. Think of threats as extant in the strategic environment and as existing in relation to one's interests. Think of risks as potential, or not yet extant, and think of them relating to a given strategy in one of three ways: 1) risks to the strategy (things that could cause the strategy to fail and the objectives to be lost); 2) risks from the strategy, that is, latent or unforeseen threats or costs brought forth by the strategy; and, 3) risks resulting from invalid assumptions.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the elements of strategic logic, specifically consideration of costs and risks.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. In calculating the costs of a war, say the U.S. war in Iraq War that began in 2003, is it fair to include the costs of the equipment and personnel involved, or were those costs that were going to be paid regardless of the war in Iraq?

2. Was the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-2000s a cost of the 2003 Iraq War? Should the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban have been seen in advance as a risk of the 2003 Iraq War? In 2002, which was seen as the greater risk in Afghanistan, having too few troops and thus potentially paving the way for the Taliban's return, or having too many troops and thus being seen as foreign occupiers and having more Americans for the Taliban and others to target?

3. In developing the 2008 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attempted to balance the risks of not spending and doing enough to prevail in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan against the potential of spending and doing so much that America would be unable to afford the force necessary to counter other, high-end threats in the future. Did the United States strike the correct balance? Why, or why not?

4. Today the U.S. Army is making significant personnel cuts. How should a strategist understand these cuts in terms of costs and risks for the near term? How do such cuts affect costs and risks in the decade from 2020 to 2030?

5. What are some of the political costs and risks the United States has accepted in imposing economic sanctions on Russia over its annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine? What ends does the United States hope to achieve through those sanctions and are those ends worth the costs and risks?

6. What costs and risks are involved in U.S. support for its NATO allies in the Baltic region? What ends does the United States hope to achieve in the Baltics, and are those ends worth the costs and risks?

7. How do third-parties affect one's calculations of costs and risks (consider China as a third-party in the U.S. strategy for Russia)?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 50 pages)

a. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 322-353, "8 – Evaluating Courses of Action." (31 pages)

b. Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 88, No. 1 (January/February 2009), pp. 28-40. (12 pages)

c. Robert Gates, *Duty* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), pp. 119-126 (costs and risks of procuring MRAPS). (7 pages)

Topic 18

Tests of Strategy ("-ilities" tests, *Thinking in Time*)

Thursday, 10 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.
>
> —Winston Churchill

Overview

Even before the results of a strategy are known, strategists and strategic leaders should endeavor to test a strategy. Strategy should be tested to see if it is based on sound assumptions. Strategists and strategic leaders should ask themselves what is known, unclear, or presumed to be true. What new evidence would convince a strategist that the presumptions or assumptions were wrong? Has the problem been defined correctly? What historical analogies might be affecting people's thinking and how does the current situation resemble or differ from the historical analogs? Strategic leaders should pose questions designed to discover and avoid biases in a proposed strategy (as discussed in Topic 3). Strategy should also be tested to determine whether it is feasible, desirable, sustainable, suitable, and acceptable. These five tests are collectively called the *"-ilities"* tests, because they are tests of feasib*ility*, desirab*ility*, etc.

The test of *feasibility* is a test of ends and means in that it seeks to assess whether attainment of the ends is realistically achievable and whether one has the means to achieve those ends. The test of *desirability* is also one of ends and means, except that it is meant to determine if the value of the ends sought are worth the costs or means that one expects to expend in attaining those ends. The test of *sustainability* addresses the questions about whether the proposed strategy will retain the requisite political support (foreign and domestic), public support, and resources or means over the time needed to attain the ends. The test of *suitability* is a test of ends and ways, for it examines whether a strategy would in fact achieve the desired ends, and given the existing circumstances whether it would do so in a way that is consistent with broader national interests and with other priority ends, policies and strategies. The test of *acceptability* is one that addresses whether or not a strategy would garner needed political and public support, whether it is legal, moral and ethical, and whether it comports with the nation's values and self-image. A good technique for strategist is to realistically apply these tests and score each as high, medium, or low. Far more important than the scoring, however, is for the strategist to explain in a sentence or two **why** the strategy was scored as it was.

Strategies should be checked for coherence and should be challenged by people who are not involved in making the strategy—i.e., a red team. Strategies can lack coherence for a number of reasons, for instance, different assumptions could contradict one another, or the ways employed in the strategy might not work with the means selected for the strategy. Red teaming involves using people who are not invested in a strategy to critically examine it, to consider its vulnerabilities, and to think about how an adversary might counter the strategy. For strategists

and strategic leaders, testing a strategy should not end with the strategy's approval; rather, testing should—as Churchill advocated—continue through implementation, as the results become known.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the elements of strategic logic, specifically ways of testing a strategy.

2. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. How do assessments of a strategy's costs and risks affect judgments in the *"-ilities"* tests? Which of the *"-ilities"* tests is most susceptible to assessments of cost and risk?

2. How important are a strategy's assumptions for judging the *"-ilities"* tests? Can you think of a strategic failure caused in large measure by flawed assumptions? Where the assumptions flawed from the beginning, or did something change to render previously valid assumptions no longer valid? Why were the flawed assumptions not recognized in time to save the strategy? How could the strategy have been altered for a better outcome? (You might wish to consider U.S. strategy during the Vietnam War, Soviet strategy in Afghanistan, Argentina's strategy during the Falklands War, Israel's strategy in the 2006 Lebanon War, U.S. strategy for engaging China by President Nixon in the 1970s, or by President Clinton in the 1990s).

3. Do we really need five *"-ilities"* tests, or can some of them be subsumed under others, as the Army War College strategy framework suggests?

4. Can you think of an example of incoherence in strategy? Is it coherent to assume Brazil will continue to be governed by populist, socialist governments, will continue to experience high levels of corruption, and that it will enjoy a rapidly growing economy? What about U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in 2009, involving a surge, a counterinsurgency strategy, and a pre-announced deadline for withdrawal after a few years?

5. Can you think of a strategy that failed (or may currently be in the process of failing) because of a misdiagnosis of the problem?

6. Can you think of examples where historical analogies impeded the development or execution of effective strategy?

7. Are you aware of examples where red-teaming or war-gaming proved valuable in shaping a strategy, including decisions to avoid taking certain actions?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 45 pages)

a. Terry Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 353-365, "8 – Evaluating Courses of Action." (12 pages)

b. Defense Science Board Task Force, *The Role and status of DoD Red Teaming Activities*, September 2003, pp. 1-18. (17 pages)

c. Tests of Strategy briefing and paper produced by COL Greg Schultz, USA (Ret.), a former member of the NWC faculty. (2 pages)

d. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time* (New York: FREE PRESS, 1986), pp. 232-246. Chapter 13: "What to Do and How: A Summary." (14 pages)

Topic 19

Analyze the 2015 National Security Strategy

Friday, 11 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> President Obama's new national security strategy is many things but a strategy isn't one of them.
>
> —David Rothkopf, "Rice Pudding"

Overview

There are many reasons why a U.S. administration would not wish to publish a substantive national security strategy in an unclassified format. The challenge for this lesson is to analyze the *2015 National Security Strategy* and to assess how well it fulfilled the functions of strategy and adhered to the elements of strategic logic. We will also consider the potential for the president to use the national security strategy document as a tool for strategic leadership, that is, to help guide Executive Branch departments and agencies.

Topic Objectives:

1. Analyze the 2015 National Security Strategy and assess its adherence to strategic logic as described in this course.

2. Comprehend the potential for the president to use the national security strategy document as a tool for strategic leadership.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Does the 2015 National Security Strategy clearly identify U.S. national security interests in the world today?

2. Does the 2015 National Security Strategy clearly identify threats to U.S. interests and opportunities to advance U.S. interests?

3. Does the 2015 National Security Strategy outline the salient features in today's strategic environment? Does it clearly identify critical uncertainties, key unknowns and assumptions?

4. Does the 2015 National Security Strategy prioritize goals and objectives? Does it clearly link goals and objectives to threats, opportunities and U.S. national interests? Are the 2015 NSS objectives clear, realistic and attainable?

5. Does the 2015 National Security Strategy contain any negative objectives? If not, should it, and what should they be?

6. Does the 2015 National Security Strategy clearly link ends, ways, and means, and tie them to specific threats or opportunities?

7. To what extent does the 2015 National Security Strategy address costs and risks and weigh those against expected gains from the strategy?

8. Is the 2015 National Security Strategy feasible, desirable, acceptable, suitable, and sustainable?

9. Should one expect an unclassified National Security Strategy document to contain a complete and coherent strategy? Why, or why not?

10. How could a president use an unclassified national security strategy document as a tool for strategic leadership? Did the 2015 National Security Strategy serve as a tool for strategic leadership? If yes, then how so? If no, could it have, and how?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 48 pages)

a. The White House, *2015 National Security Strategy*, February 2015. (29 pages)

b. David Shlapak, "Towards a More Modest American Strategy," *Survival*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (April-May 2015), pp. 59-78. (19 pages)

Review:

a. Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy* (New York: Crown Business, 2011), pp. 32-57 (Chapter Three: "Bad Strategy"), pp. 77-94 (Chapter Five: "The Kernel of Strategy"), and pp. 106-115 (Chapter Seven: "Proximate Objectives").

Supplemental Reading

a. White House, "Fact Sheet: The 2015 National Security Strategy," February 6, 2015. (4 pages)

b. Peter D. Fever, "Grading Obama's National Security Strategy 2.0," *Foreign Policy* February 6, 2015. (4 pages)

c. David Rothkopf, "Rice Pudding," *Foreign Policy* February 6, 2015. (5 pages)

Topic 1 NWC 6001 / Lesson 20

Strategic Leadership: Chief Strategist and Decision-maker

Monday, 14 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> There is more truth than jest in the statement that, to any soldier, what he does is tactical and what his next senior does is strategic. This is generally expressive from the private all the way up to the theater commander.
>
> —Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy*

> One of the challenges of being a leader is mastering this shift from having others define your goals to being the architect of the organization's purposes and objectives.
>
> —Richard P. Rumelt, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy*

Overview

As noted earlier in this course, in the realm of national security strategy, strategic leadership involves "two fundamental tasks: 1) developing national security strategies to deal with the nation's security challenges; and 2) getting those strategies carried out."[15] In this topic we will focus on both tasks, but with a slight emphasis on the first by examining the nature of strategic leadership and the strategic leader as chief strategist, goal-setter, and decision-maker. In the next lesson, we will shift our emphasis to the task strategic leaders face in implementing strategy; although to be sure there is a lot of overlap between the two topics.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

Issues for Consideration:

1. How does strategic leadership differ from leadership at lower levels when it comes to formulating national security strategy?

2. Why does Salacuse in his book *Leading Leaders*, say that the field of politics rather than those of sports or the military offer better analogies for understanding leadership? Do you agree? Why, or why not? (Try to focus on strategy-making rather than implementation.)

[15] David Tretler, "National Security Strategic Leadership," February 2013.

3. Do you agree with Salacuse that leading at higher levels is more about relationships than about developing a particular skill or talent as a leader?

4. In Salacuse's fourth chapter "The Seven Daily Tasks of Leadership," he states that the foremost task of a leader is to set the direction or goals for her or his organization. In the next chapter, "Task No. 1: Direction—Negotiating the Vision," he describes the importance of "forging a single vision." To what degree does this presuppose the leader is a strategist or ought to engage in strategy?

5. In *Leading Leaders*, Jeswald Salacuse says "Your primary function as a leader is to ask the right questions….In leading leaders…the most effective instrument is not an order but the right question." How would you relate this idea to the article from Topic 3 on cognitive biases by Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony? Are the authors of the different works talking about the same sorts of questions? Why might they be different?

6. How do Salacuse's ideas about setting direction and representation—leading outside the organization—compare to the roles and competencies on the NWC Strategic Leadership Framework?

7. To what extent should a strategic leader be the chief strategist? Why do strategic leaders have strategists working for them? How should the role of a strategic leader in formulating strategy differ from that of other strategists in her or his organization?

8. What are the most significant challenges to overcome in the transition as a leader from lower levels of leadership to becoming a strategic leader? Can you think of strategic leaders who succeeded in this transition? Can you think of leaders who apparently failed to make the transition?

9. How might this course contribute to your ability to support strategic leaders in the future? How might this course support your development as a future strategic leader?

10. How might you use the rest of your year at the National War College to better contribute to your own ability to support strategic leaders in the future? How might you use the rest of your year at the National War College to support your own development as a future strategic leader?

11. How might you contribute to your NWC classmates' development as strategic leaders?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 73 pages)

a. Stratified Systems Theory, 1-page graphic and 2-page explanation (3 page)

b. National War College Strategic Leadership Framework and Overview (3 pages)

c. Jeswal W. Salacuse, *Leading Leaders* (Washington: American Management Association, 2006), pp. 1-8, 15-16, 19-33, 59-65, 67-88, and 169-189. (67 pages)

Topic 2 NWC 6001 / Lesson 21

Strategic Leadership: Implementer of Strategies

Tuesday, 15 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> Good business leaders create a vision, articulate the vision, passionately own the vision, and relentlessly drive it to completion.
>
> —Jack Welch

Overview

National security strategies, like foreign policies, are not self-implementing. It can be, and usually is, a huge challenge to transmit priorities and directions from strategic leaders of large organizations through bureaucracies to the individuals actually executing the organization's mission. As if the formulation of strategy were not difficult enough, strategic leaders are also responsible for seeing to the implementation of strategy. As noted earlier, there is no clean break between strategy formulation and implementation; the two overlap considerably. Despite this reality, in this lesson we will emphasize the implementation aspects of being a strategic leader.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

Issues for Consideration:

1. How does strategic leadership differ from leadership at lower levels when it comes to implementing national security strategy?

2. What does Salacuse say about the role of trust in leadership? Do you agree that the essence of trust is "confidence that…interactions with other people will not harm our interests."? Why, or why not? What does Salacuse concept of trust have to do with General Dempsey's fourth desired leader attribute (DLA): "Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command)"?

3. Which of Salacuse's five obstacles to trust seem most applicable to national security strategic leadership—1) lack of time, 2) the perceived untrustworthy act, 3) an overly competitive environment, 4) leadership mobility, or 5) the exaggerated leadership ego?

4. Is Salacuse's art of a strategic leadership conversation convincing? When should such thinking be employed to implement strategy? Are there risks to Salacuse's approach?

5. Salacuse says that: "Psychologists have found that all people have two basic social needs: a need for autonomy and a need to belong." This leads to what he calls "the follower's dilemma": "How much should I cooperate with the leadership to allow integration to happen and how much should I assert my own individual interests so that I can pursue my own professional goals?" Can you think of examples where leaders have convinced talented individuals that an integrated organization, involving their full participation and commitment, "meets their interests better than one that is not integrated"?

6. How might a strategic leader overcome Salacuse's seven barriers to integration—1) no perceived common interest, 2) lack of felt shared history, 3) too much bad history, 4) poor internal communication, 5 cultural differences, 6) spoilers (who "prevent change by blocking agreement"), and 7) divide-and-conquer leadership?

7. How might this course contribute to your ability to support strategic leaders in the future? How might this course support your development as a future strategic leader?

8. How might you use the rest of your year at the National War College to better contribute to your own ability to support strategic leaders in the future? How might you use the rest of your year at the National War College to support your own development as a future strategic leader?

9. How might you contribute to your NWC classmates' development as strategic leaders?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 71 pages)

a. Jeswal W. Salacuse, *Leading Leaders* (Washington: American Management Association, 2006), pp. 191-207, 35-58, 91-108, 151-166. (71 pages)

b. Watch Video (~10 min) Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations on leadership: http://tedxtalks.ted.com/video/Chief-of-Naval-Operations-Jonat

Supplemental Readings:

a. Jeswal W. Salacuse, *Leading Leaders* (Washington: American Management Association, 2006), unassigned chapters: pp. 111-130, Chapter 7: "Task No. 3: Mediation—Settling Leadership Conflicts," and pp. 131-150, Chapter 8: "Task No. 4: Education—Teaching the Educated." (38 pages)

b. Colin Powell, *It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership* (New York: Harper Collins, 2012).

c. *Strategic Leadership Primer, 3rd Ed*., Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College, 2010.
Available at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/orgs/SSL/dclm/pubs/slp3.pdf

Topic 3 NWC-6001 / Lesson 22

Implementing Strategy (DOD's GEF, 3-D Planning Guide)

Thursday, 17 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

> But to speak of foreign affairs strategy as a written plan should not be taken to mean that any strategy will be implemented just as it is written. …In practice, therefore, strategy formulation and revision proceeds in parallel with policy implementation.
>
> — Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy

Overview

As challenging as it might be, developing a strategy is not the end of the process. Indeed, implementing a strategy could turn out to be a tougher challenge than developing it. At the highest levels of government strategy implementation could be overseen by a Task Force established by the National Security Council (NSC), as when the Clinton administration set up a Balkans Task Force. Alternatively, implementation could be overseen by the NSC itself or delegated to the Deputies Committee of the NSC, and in some cases a lead-department or lead-agency is named. When it comes to the National Security Strategy, executive branch departments and agencies have devised processes and products intended to guide their respective organizations. Within DOD, there is a National Defense Strategy (which can appear either as a standalone document or as Section 2 of the Quadrennial Defense Review report) and a National Military Strategy. DOD also promulgates a top-level policy document called the Guidance for Employment (GEF) of the Force detailing all manner of strategic guidance, including priority objectives for combatant commanders, key assumptions, contingency planning guidance, and direction for assessing implementation. While DOD issues the GEF to guide the use of existing forces, the Department also issues the Strategic Planning Guidance (check to confirm latest name of this document) which guides all DOD components in procuring the capabilities needed for the future. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff adds his strategic direction through documents and processes such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Chairman's Risk Assessment. In similar fashion, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development conduct the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and they lead processes in Washington DC to review Mission Strategic Plans and Development plans from U.S. embassies around the world. The Department of Homeland Security has conducted a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and of course the Intelligence Community supports all of these efforts through National Intelligence Estimates, Threat Assessments and other intelligence products.

Many of the documents and processes described above may be unfamiliar to students at the National War College, and the documents might at first glance seem less than substantive or useful—indeed, some of them may not be very substantive or useful. Certainly they are not of central importance to leading battalions, squadrons, or individual ships. Whether familiar or not, many of the documents described above are important for establishing priorities and for guiding federal departments and agencies in implementing the National Security Strategy. Perhaps as

important as the documents themselves are the processes for producing them, and for the processes together with the documents to inform and guide the thinking of strategic leaders within the executive branch and their staffs, for as the epigraph above from Deibel notes, strategy formulation and revision go hand-in-hand with implementation.

Topic Objectives:

1. Comprehend strategic logic.

2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Can you think of an example where one of the documents or processes discussed above or in the readings had an impact on your unit's or your organization's mission?

2. Can you think of barriers to the effective implementation of strategy? How might a strategic leader overcome those barriers?

3. How might the size of organizations, the means at their disposal, and their training and experience affect the implementation of strategy for better or for worse? What might a strategic leader do leverage organizational strengths, enhance organizational agility and mitigate negative impacts from organizational rigidities?

4. How might bureaucrats in the headquarters of various executive branch departments and agencies impact the implementation of strategy for better or for worse? How might strategic leaders use bureaucracies to their benefit and curb the harmful effects of bureaucracy?

5. What is the role of planning in strategy implementation?

6. You may wish to use a portion of this lesson to organize and prepare for the seminar exercise scheduled to take place in the next lesson.

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 49 pages)

a. Patrick C. Sweeney, "A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and Global Force Management (GFM)" 6 December 2013 (18 pages)

b. "3D Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense," 31 July 2012, pp. 4-9 and 11-37. (31 pages)

Topic 4 NWC-6001 / Lesson 23

Application: Putting It All Together

Friday, 18 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

Overview

Think of this lesson as a table top exercise to help your seminar formulate a U.S. strategy for Russia. At this point in the course, you should have mastered the concepts of strategy and strategic logic, and you should possess the basic skills for applying those concepts to real-world national security challenges. Throughout the course you have been assigned readings designed to familiarize you with the recent history of U.S.-Russia relations and to provoke your thinking about a variety of possible ends, means, and ways for furthering U.S. interests. Now it is time to put it all together, as a group, to produce the best strategy possible. Time and effort invested in this lesson should help inform your thinking for your Strategy Decision Paper. Be sure to think long-term, where do we want to be ten years from now in 2025? Think globally: think about China, the Middle East, non-proliferation, etc. While you may wish to refer back to the objectives developed in Topic 11, you should not be overly attached to them as you have undoubtedly learned a few things in the intervening three weeks.

Topic Objectives:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.

2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Do you understand the strategic context, the environment, in which your strategy would be implemented? Have you properly analyzed the situation, including identifying U.S. national interests at stake, threats to those interests, and opportunities to further those interests? Have you identified the critical uncertainties about the future and the key assumptions that will underpin your strategy? What new information would convince you that an assumption was incorrect? What information might you have next year that you wish you had now, and can you get any of that information now? Have you properly diagnosed the situation, what it is really all about?

2. Have you set clear goals and realistic, achievable objectives that will further U.S. interests? Did the author come up with any negative objectives? Did the author

prioritize your objectives? Do you have a clear theory of the case linking your objectives to threats or opportunities for America's national interests?

3. Have you identified specific means and ways of using those means for each objective? Does America enjoy any asymmetric advantages in means or in ways of employing them? Do you understand Russia well enough to anticipate its responses to your strategy over time and if so, can you use that understanding to inform your strategy? Have you considered the six elements of a Net Assessment in formulating your strategy?

4. Is your strategy coherent? Do any of your assumptions contradict other assumptions? Do the assumptions make sense in light of the chosen ends, means, and ways, and vice versa? Are the means chosen being used in ways that are likely to work, that is, will using the means in the ways proposed by the strategy likely to achieve your objectives?

5. What are the expected costs associated with the strategy? What are the risks to your strategy, from your strategy, and what risks would result if your assumptions proved invalid?

6. Can you articulate the expected value of achieving the strategy's stated ends? Is your resulting strategy feasible, desirable, sustainable, suitable, and acceptable?

7. Have you red-teamed your strategy? What is the worst thing Russia might do to counter the strategy? What are the likely things that you would expect Russia to do in response to your strategy? How might you adjust your strategy to capitalize on likely Russian responses or to mitigate the negative impacts of Russia's attempt to counter your strategy?

Required Readings: (Total Readings: 37 pages)

a. Jim Nichol, Coordinator, *Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests*, Congressional Research Service Report RL33407, March 31, 2014, Summary and pp. 49-76. (29 pages)

b. Eugene Rumer, "Russia—A Different Kind of Threat," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 20, 2015. (5 pages)

c. Siegfried S. Hecker and Peter E. Davis, "Why the U.S. should keep cooperating with Russia on nuclear security," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist,* May 29, 2014. (3 pages)

Topic 5 NWC 6001 / Lesson 24

Strategy Decision Papers Due

Monday, 21 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

Overview

Your task is to produce a cogent written strategy, using prose rather than bullets, diagrams or other graphics. The paper should be not more than 3,600 words and should follow the format below, which includes recommended budgeting of words per section. Use 12 point font (Times New Roman, Bookman Old Style, or Georgia recommended). Margins should be one inch all around. Cite sources when using other people's ideas, data, or evidence; although citations may be appropriate in any of the paper's sections, most citations should probably appear in the Assessment of the Situation section. Use footnotes, not end notes, and use the format recommended by Kate Turabian (issued to students); further details and common examples appear on the next page. You do not need citations for your own analysis and logical argumentation, nor do you need it for commonly known facts, e.g., the date Russia annexed Crimea.

Summary (200 words or fewer)

Present a brief overview, suitable for a senior decision-maker, capturing the gist of the strategy. Outline the problem and the recommended strategy to address that problem.

Assessment of the Situation (500 words or fewer)

Clearly define the problem
Present analysis of only the most relevant aspects of the international and domestic context
Identify the U.S. national interests at stake
Identify threats and opportunities
Identify critical uncertainties or unknowns, key assumptions and thoughts on evidence that would convince you that your assumptions were incorrect

Goals and Objectives (300 words or fewer)

Prioritize the objectives
Explain how the objectives address threats or opportunities and how they further U.S. national interests (theory of the case)
Consider negative objectives, their priority, and constraints they impose on the strategy

Ends, Ways, and Means (1,500 words or fewer)

Begin with the top priority objective and work down the list

Describe the ways specific means will be used to attain each objective
Describe constraints for avoiding negative objectives

Costs, Risks, and Tests of Strategy (approximately 500-1,000 words)

Describe expected costs, whether they are based on data or estimates, and any relevant assumptions
Describe the most likely and most significant risks to your strategy, from your strategy, and risks associated with key assumptions that turn out to be incorrect; consider ways to mitigate those risks
Assess the feasibility, desirability, sustainability, suitability, and acceptability of the strategy, rating each as high, medium or low and explaining why you arrived at those ratings

Counterarguments (approximately 300-500 words)

Select two or three of the best criticisms of your strategy or best alternative approaches, briefly analyze each in turn and convince the reader why on balance your proposed strategy is better

Strategic Leadership Challenges (approximately 300-500 words)

Briefly describe the three most significant strategic leadership challenges the President of the United States would confront in implementing the proposed strategy and what might be done to overcome or mitigate those challenges; choose one challenge from the international political context, one from the domestic political context, and one other, e.g., bureaucratic impediments, organizational rigidities, acquiring resources, challenges related to time or sequencing

Sample footnotes:

For a book: Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 30.

For subsequent references use Kissinger, p. 31, unless you are citing more than one source by Kissinger, in which case you need to also indicate a portion of the title to distinguish which source you are using, e.g., Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 31.

Any time you have two consecutive citations from the same source, you should use the Latin abbreviation Ibid. If the citations are from the same page, then all you need is Ibid. If the citations are from different pages, then use Ibid. followed by the page number, e.g., Ibid., p. 32. Note that because Ibid. is an abbreviation it is followed by a period and when citing a different page from the previous citation, the period is followed by a comma then the page number.

For a chapter by one author in a book edited by another author: Stephen Peter Rosen, "Competitive Strategies: Theoretical Foundations, Limits, and Extensions," in *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice*, ed. Thomas G. Manken (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 12.

For an article in a journal or magazine: Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return," *International Security* 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-8. Note that the article title appears in quotation marks and the journal title appears in italics. The number 36 following the journal refers to the Volume number and it is acceptable to use Vol. 36 or just 36.

For a newspapers and magazine: Newspapers and magazines are cited the same way as journals, except that newspapers and some magazines do not have Volume or Issue numbers and the dates are given more precisely and without parentheses, e.g., Douglas Feith, "The Temptation of Vladimir Putin," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 5, 2014, p. A17. (Note if the source was found online, rather than in a printed edition, one may not know the page number and should include the URL to the source and date accessed, e.g., Accessed Friday, February 13, 2015: http://www.wsj.com/articles/roger-altman-stopping-putin-without-firing-a-shot-1423613561.)

Topic Objectives:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.

2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Do you understand the strategic context, the environment, in which your strategy would be implemented? Have you properly analyzed the situation, including identifying U.S. national interests at stake, threats to those interests, and opportunities to further those interests? Have you identified the critical uncertainties about the future and the key assumptions that will underpin your strategy? What new information would convince you that an assumption was incorrect? What information might you have next year that you wish you had now, and can you get any of that information now? Have you properly diagnosed the situation, what it is really all about?

2. Have you set clear goals and realistic, achievable objectives that will further U.S. interests? Did you come up with any negative objectives? Did you prioritize your objectives? Do you have a clear theory of the case linking your objectives to threats or opportunities for America's national interests?

3. Have you identified specific means and ways of using those means for each objective? Does America enjoy any asymmetric advantages in means or in ways of employing them? Do you understand Russia well enough to anticipate its responses to your strategy over time and if so, can you use that understanding to inform your strategy? Have you considered the six elements of a Net Assessment in formulating your strategy?

4. Is your strategy coherent? Do any of your assumptions contradict other assumptions? Do the assumptions make sense in light of the chosen ends, means, and ways, and vice versa? Are the means chosen being used in ways that are likely to work, that is, will using the means in the ways proposed by the strategy likely to achieve your objectives?

5. What are the expected costs associated with the strategy? What are the risks to your strategy, from your strategy, and what risks would result if your assumptions proved invalid?

6. Can you articulate the expected value of achieving the strategy's stated ends? Is your resulting strategy feasible, desirable, sustainable, suitable, and acceptable?

7. Have you red-teamed your strategy? What is the worst thing Russia might do to counter the strategy? What are the likely things that you would expect Russia to do in response to your strategy? How might you adjust your strategy to capitalize on likely Russian responses or to mitigate the negative impacts of Russia's attempt to counter your strategy?

8. What strategic leadership challenges would the President face in implementing the strategy? How might those challenges be overcome or mitigated?

Topic 6 NWC 6001 / Lesson 25

DRW – Students Prepare for Capstone Exercise

Tuesday, 22 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

Overview

The goal for the remaining lessons of this course is for students to apply what they've learned to evaluating other students' strategies. Each student in seminar will be given a classmate's paper that has been sanitized, such that no student in the seminar should know whose paper she/he has been given. In the final two sessions of the class, each students will present a brief summary of the strategy he or she was given. Students should not rely solely on the Summary section of the paper – particularly if the Summary section failed to adequately outline the problem and the strategy, or if the discussion in the body of the paper differed from the outline of the problem and strategy described at the front of the paper. After summarizing the strategy, each student should then critique it for its completeness, coherence, and persuasiveness. The critique should focus on the substance of the strategy more than on the beauty of the prose; however, students should note—in a helpful, professional and collegial manner—if the quality of the writing presented problems in understanding the content of the strategy. The papers by International Fellows (IFs) for whom the English language is not their primary language should be identified as such and should be given special consideration (i.e., assume the best about the IF's intellectual abilities and level of understanding; it might help for American students asked to critique an IF's paper to consider for a moment which foreign language they would most like to write their next NWC paper). Each student should prepare a written outline of the summary and critique that should fit on one side of one sheet of paper using 12 point font and one-inch margins. Students should include their names on the outline summaries and critiques, and each student should bring at least 15 copies to seminar – one copy for each member of the seminar, one copy for the Faculty Seminar Leader, and one copy for each faculty back-seater.

Topic Objectives:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.

2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.

3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

Issues for Consideration:

1. Did the author understand the strategic context, the environment, in which his or her strategy would be implemented? Did the author properly analyze the situation, including identifying U.S. national interests at stake, threats to those interests, and opportunities to

further those interests? Did the author identify the critical uncertainties about the future and the key assumptions that will underpin his or her strategy? Did the author describe the kind of new information that would convince him or her that an assumption was incorrect? Was the situation properly diagnosed?

2. Did the author set clear goals and realistic, achievable objectives that will further U.S. interests? Did the author come up with any negative objectives? Did the author prioritize objectives? Was there a clear theory of the case linking objectives to threats or opportunities for America's national interests?

3. Did the author identify specific means and ways of using those means for each objective? Did the author describe possible American asymmetric advantages in means or in ways of employing them? Did the author understand Russia well enough to anticipate its responses to his or her strategy over time and if so, was that understanding used to inform his or her strategy? Did the author considered the six elements of a Net Assessment in formulating the strategy?

4. Is the strategy coherent? Did any assumptions contradict other assumptions? Do the assumptions make sense in light of the chosen ends, means, and ways, and vice versa? Were the means chosen being used in ways that are likely to work, that is, will using the means in the ways proposed by the strategy likely to achieve the desired ends/objectives?

5. What were the expected costs associated with the strategy? What were the risks to the strategy, from the strategy, and what risks would result if the assumptions proved invalid?

6. Did the author articulate the expected value of achieving the strategy's stated ends? Were you convinced by the author's assessments and explanations as to whether the resulting strategy was feasible, desirable, sustainable, suitable, and acceptable?

7. Did it appear that the author red-teamed the strategy? What is the worst thing Russia might do to counter the strategy? What are the likely things that you would expect Russia to do in response to the strategy? Did the strategy address ways to mitigate the negative impacts of Russia's attempt to counter the strategy?

8. Did the author address the strategic leadership challenges the President would face in implementing the strategy? How those challenges might be overcome or mitigated?

Topic 7 & 8 NWC-6001 / Lessons 26-27

Capstone Exercise: Students Summarize & Critique Papers

Thursday/Friday, 24-25 September 2015, 0830 - 1130

Overview

Each student will be given a maximum of 10 minutes to present a summary and critique of the strategy given to that student. Recall that each student is to prepare a written outline of the summary and critique that should fit on one side of one sheet of paper using 12 point font and one-inch margins. Students should include their names on the outline summaries and critiques, and each student should bring at least 15 copies to seminar – one copy for each member of the seminar, one copy for the Faculty Seminar Leader, and one copy for each faculty back-seater. There will be no use of PowerPoint, whiteboards or other graphics.

Topic Objectives:

1. Apply strategic logic to deal with a national security challenge.
2. Comprehend the role of strategic leadership in developing and executing national security strategies.
3. Apply critical thinking to the examination of national security strategy issues.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

The mission of the National War College is to "educate future leaders of the Armed Forces, Department of State, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy and command and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy." Implicit in this mission is the task of honing the abilities of NWC graduates to lead at the national security strategy level.

There is no published DOD definition of strategic leadership; however, most would accept that, generically, ***strategic leadership is***: *the art of assessing the environment, grasping its important implications, and envisioning the role an entity should play as a result; then communicating that vision in a manner that allows it to be both understood and acted upon.*

Given its charge to produce military and civilian national security leaders with special expertise in national security strategy, NWC narrows its focus to a specific subset of strategic leadership – ***national security strategic leadership,*** *which entails playing a principal role in directing the nation's effort to deal with the security challenges it faces.* Drawing from the generic definition of strategic leadership above, it's clear then that the challenge for the national security strategic leader comprises two fundamental tasks: 1) developing national security strategies to deal with the nation's security challenges; and 2) getting those strategies carried out.

Breaking down these two fundamental tasks further yields the following list of essential abilities for national security strategic leaders. This is a basic metric against which we can judge the performance of national security strategic leaders.

- Formulate/analyze national security strategies
  - Apply strategic logic
  - Work effectively individually or in group

- Get national security strategies carried out
  - Communicate strategic analyses/solutions
    - Written or oral
    - To superiors, subordinates and peers
  - Oversee execution of strategic designs
    - Delegate responsibilities/assign tasks as needed
    - Stay focused on the strategic aim
    - Adapt to changing circumstances; remain poised and balanced in the face of uncertainty and/or adversity
    - Work effectively with partners in the strategic design
  - Direct a major organizational element in the national security establishment
    - Orient the organization
    - Define requirements and acquire/allocate resources
    - Coordinate/cooperate with the rest of the national security establishment
    - Inspire subordinates to follow
  - Institutionalize strategic changes for succeeding administrations

By far the most challenging – and most crucial – task required of national security strategic leaders is formulating/analyzing strategies to deal with the nation's security challenges. This task is the focus of the National War College core curriculum. Key to carrying out the task of formulating/analyzing strategies is applying strategic logic – the ordered, coherent thought process essential to developing a plan of action to achieve a desired end. The fundamental elements of strategic logic are relatively simple and straightforward: analyze the **situation** you face; define the **ends** you wish to achieve; determine the **means**/capabilities you want to employ; formulate the **ways** by which you're going to use your means to achieve your ends; and assess the **risks/costs** of the strategic you eventually adopt. Applying this logic is the essence of strategic thinking, and it demands that you think purposefully, holistically, opportunistically, historically and with the aim of producing distinct, workable options.

Because it's grounded in the application of a time-tested, widely accepted model of strategic logic, the first fundamental task of national security strategic leadership – formulating/analyzing strategies – is relatively straightforward. The second fundamental task, however – getting strategies carried out – is far more amorphous. How you go about getting a strategy carried out is heavily situation and personality dependent. Getting a strategy carried out requires dealing with an essentially unique problem and set of circumstances, and doing so with an equally unique set of personality traits, strengths and weaknesses. Any approach to carrying out a strategy must fit both the nature of the problem and situation confronted *and* the personality of the leader. Could any two national security strategic leaders have been more different than George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte, or Abraham Lincoln and Fidel Castro, or Winston Churchill and Vladimir Putin, or Vo Nguyen Giap and David Petraeus.

Across the ten months of the NWC core curriculum, as you dig into understanding and applying strategic logic, we also will present you with illustrative cases that allow you to assess the exercise of national security strategic leadership, particularly the fundamental leadership task of getting strategies carried out. In each case, you can use the breakdown of leadership abilities above to make judgments and generate insights about what did or didn't work for national security strategic leaders of widely different characters, in different sets circumstances, facing different types of problems, and at different points in time and space. There is no single right answer, however, for how to get a particular strategy carried out. We leave it you to judge what insights make most sense for you, given your personality and the types of problems and circumstances you think you're most likely to confront.

In a sense, you could argue that the entire NWC academic program is about national security strategic leadership. It teaches you a tried and true approach for developing/analyzing national security strategies, and it gives you the chance to analyze and assess numerous examples of the various ways different national security strategic leaders have approached the challenge of getting national security strategies carried out. Honing your abilities at those two fundamental tasks are the keys to becoming successful national security strategic leaders after you graduate.

DT / 25 February 2013

NWC Strategic Leadership Framework

Strategic Environment

Internal

- Climate - Culture - Structure/Process
- Adaptable / Learning Organization
- Budget Constraints

External

- Global - Volatile - Domestic Politics
- Uncertain - Complex - Ambiguous
- Interagency - High Risk - Multi-Cultural

Strategic Leadership

Roles & Responsibilities

- Develop & Communicate a Vision
- Align Vision, Strategy, and Operations
- Shape Organizational Culture/Climate (includes ethics and values)
- Build and Shape Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National Relationships
- Build and Lead Effective Teams
- Lead Strategic Decision Making Process
- Promote Organizational Agility and Resilience
- Lead Organizational Change and Transformation
- Represent the Enterprise & Negotiate on its Behalf
- Develop Senior Leaders

Competencies & Skills

- Technical Skills:
  - Systems Thinking
  - Scanning
  - Joint, Interagency, Multinational Understanding
  - Leveraging Technology
- Conceptual Skills:
  - Frame of Reference Development
  - Critical & Creative Thinking
  - Visioning
  - Intellectual Openness
- Interpersonal Skills:
  - Listening / Communicating
  - Negotiating
  - Promoting Consensus & Collaboration
  - Leveraging Power and Politics
  - Self-assessing

GENERAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS BY ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL (SST*)

STRATUM	TIME SPAN	GENERAL TASK REQUIREMENTS	DOMAIN
VII	20+ YRS	CREATES COMPLEX SYSTEMS ORGANIZES ACQUISITION OF MAJOR RESOURCES CREATES POLICY	SYSTEMS / STRATEGIC
VI	10+ YRS	OVERSEES OPERATIONS OF SUBORDINATE SYSTEMS APPLIES POLICY	
V	5+ YRS	DIRECTS COMPLEX SYSTEMS	ORGANIZATIONAL
IV	2+ YRS	TAILORS RESOURCE ALLOCTIONS TO INTERDEPENDENT SUBORDINATE PROGRAMS OR UNITS	
III	1+ YRS	DEVELOPS AND EXECUTES PLANS TO IMPLEMENT POLICY / MISSIONS	DIRECT
II	3+ MONTHS	DIRECTS PERFORMANCE OF WORK ANTICIPATES / SOLVES CURRENT PROBLEMS	
I	LESS THAN 3 MONTHS	HANDS-ON WORK PERFORMANCE USES PRACTICAL JUDGMENT TO SOLVE ONGOING PROBLEMS	

* SST stands for Stratified Systems Theory