



Israel National Defense College

Reading Materials

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46th Class

Course:

Strategy

Nikki Haley

Address on Iran and the JCPOA

“Ambassador Nikki Haley’s Remarks on Iran and the JCPOA”

American Enterprise Institute

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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery:

Thank you very much for hosting me here today. Arthur Brooks is one of the coolest people I know. His book, *The Conservative Heart*, was brilliantly written. I value his friendship and the contributions AEI continues to make.

I am here today to speak about Iran and the 2015 nuclear agreement. This is a topic that should concern all Americans as it has a serious impact on our national security and the security of the world. It’s a topic that comes up frequently at the United Nations.

And it’s a topic we have been looking at carefully, including recently visiting with the Iran nuclear monitors at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

We were impressed by the IAEA team and its efforts. Director General Amano is a very capable diplomat, and he is a serious person who clearly understands the critical nature of his task. In our discussion, Amano made an observation that stood out to me. He said that monitoring Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal is like a jigsaw puzzle. Picking up just one piece does not give you the full picture.

That’s a very appropriate metaphor and it goes well beyond the work of the IAEA. It goes to the entire way we must look at Iranian behavior and American security interests.

Many observers miss that point. They think, “Well, as long as Iran is meeting the limits on enriched uranium and centrifuges, then it’s complying with the deal.”

That’s not true. This is a jigsaw puzzle.

Next month, President Trump will once again be called upon to declare whether he finds Iran in compliance with the terms of the deal. It should be noted that this requirement to assess compliance does not come from the deal itself.

It was created by Congress in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, also known as the Corker-Cardin law. That's a very important distinction to keep in mind, because many people confuse the requirements of the deal with the requirements of U.S. law.

I am not going to prejudge in any way what the President is going to decide next month. While I have discussed it with him, I do not know what decision he will make. It is his decision to make, and his alone.

It's a complicated question. The truth is, the Iran deal has so many flaws that it's tempting to leave it. But, the deal was constructed in a way that makes leaving it less attractive. It gave Iran what it wanted up-front, in exchange for temporary promises to deliver what we want.

That's not good.

Iran was feeling the pinch of international sanctions in a big, big way. In the two years before the deal was signed, Iran's GDP actually shrunk by more than four percent. In the two years since the deal, and the lifting of sanctions, Iran's GDP has grown by nearly five percent. That's a great deal for them. What we get from the deal is much less clear.

I am here to outline some of the critical considerations that must go into any analysis of Iranian compliance. And I hope to debunk some of the misperceptions about the decision the President will face next month.

The question of Iranian compliance is not as straight forward as many people believe. It's not just about the technical terms of the nuclear agreement. It requires a much more thorough look.

Iranian compliance involves three different pillars. The first is the nuclear agreement itself, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.

The second pillar is UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal, but also restricted numerous other Iranian behaviors.

And the third pillar is the Corker-Cardin law, which governs the President's relationship with Congress as it relates to Iran policy.

Before diving into these details, it's important to lay a foundation for exactly what we're dealing with when we talk about the Iranian regime.

Judging any international agreement begins and ends with the nature of the government that signed it. Does it respect international law? Can it be trusted to abide by its commitments? Is the agreement strong enough to withstand the regime's attempts to cheat? Given these answers, is the agreement in the national interests of the United States?

The Islamic Republic of Iran was born in an act of international lawbreaking.

On November 4, 1979, a group of Islamic revolutionary students overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In violation of international law, they held 52 American Marines and diplomats hostage for 444 days.

For the 38 years since, the Iranian regime has existed outside the community of law-abiding nations. Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation or a cause.

Since 1979, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading revolutionary Shiite Islam by force. Its main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what it calls the Great Satan . . . the United States of America.

And the regime's main weapon in pursuit of its revolutionary aims has been the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.

Soon after the revolution, the IRGC was created to protect the revolution from its foreign and domestic enemies. The IRGC reported, not to the elected government, but to the Supreme Leader alone.

Soon after its own creation, the IRGC founded Hezbollah to spread Iran's influence and its revolution abroad.

Then came the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983. 63 Americans were killed.

Then came the bombing of the Marine barracks. 241 Americans killed.

Then the kidnapping and murder of CIA station chief William Buckley.

In 1985, a TWA airplane was hijacked. The body of a U.S. Navy diver was dumped on the runway at the Beirut airport.

In 1988, U.S. Marine Colonel Robert Higgins, a UN peacekeeper in South Lebanon, was kidnapped and executed.

Under the IRGC's direction, Hezbollah then expanded its lethal reach to Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas in search of victims to kill.

In 1994, a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires was bombed. 85 killed.

In 1996, a truck bomb blew up Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. airmen killed.

Throughout the Iraq war, the number one killer of U.S. troops was improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the deadliest of which were supplied by the IRGC. Thousands of American men and women were wounded or killed.

In 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated.

In 2011, the U.S. disrupted an IRGC plot to bomb an American restaurant less than two miles from here. The target was the Saudi Ambassador.

Today Hezbollah is doing the Iranian regime's dirty work supporting the war crimes of Syria's Assad. And it is building an arsenal of weapons and battle-hardened fighters in Lebanon in preparation for war.

This is the nature of the regime, and its quest to overturn the international order. Its power and influence has grown over time, even as it remains unaccountable to the Iranian people. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the Iranian regime, the IRGC, or its proxies do not touch.

In parallel with its support for terrorism and proxy wars, Iran's military has long pursued nuclear weapons, all while attempting to hide its intentions.

For decades, the Iranian military conducted a covert nuclear weapons program, undeclared and hidden from international inspectors. In 2002, Iranian dissidents revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment plant and heavy water reactor – both violations of Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The regime went on to break multiple promises to abide by international inspections and limits. It hid its nuclear weapons development and lied about it until it got caught.

In 2009, American, British, and French intelligence revealed the existence of a secret uranium enrichment plant deep inside a mountain, deep inside an IRGC base. The British Prime Minister summed up Iran's behavior well, calling it, quote, "the serial deception of many years."

It was soon after this that President Obama began negotiating a deal with Iran. The deal he struck wasn't supposed to be just about nuclear weapons. It was meant to be an opening with Iran; a welcoming back into the community of nations.

President Obama believed that after decades of hostility to the U.S., the Iranian regime was willing to negotiate an end to its nuclear program.

Much has been written about the JCPOA. I won't repeat it all here. Let's just say that the agreement falls short of what was promised.

We were promised an "end" to the Iranian nuclear program. What emerged was not an end, but a pause. Under the deal, Iran will continue to enrich uranium and develop advanced centrifuges.

We were promised “anytime, anywhere” inspections of sites in Iran. The final agreement delivered much less. The promised 24/7 inspections apply only to Iran’s “declared” nuclear sites. For any undeclared but suspected sites, the regime can deny access for up to 24 days. Then there’s the deal’s expiration dates.

After ten years, the limits on uranium, advanced centrifuges, and other nuclear restrictions begin to evaporate. And in less than ten years, they have the opportunity to upgrade their capabilities in various ways.

The JCPOA is, therefore, a very flawed and very limited agreement. But even so, Iran has been caught in multiple violations over the past year and a half.

In February 2016 – just a month after the agreement was implemented – the IAEA discovered Iran had exceeded its allowable limit of heavy water. Nine months later, Iran exceeded the heavy water limit again. Both times, the Obama Administration helped Iran get back into compliance and refused to declare it a violation.

If that’s not enough, the biggest concern is that Iranian leaders – the same ones who in the past were caught operating a covert nuclear program at military sites – have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites.

How can we know Iran is complying with the deal, if inspectors are not allowed to look everywhere they should look?

Another major flaw in the JCPOA is its penalty provisions. Whether an Iranian violation is big or small – whether it is deemed to be material or non-material – the deal provides for only one penalty. That penalty is the re-imposition of sanctions.

And if sanctions are re-imposed, Iran is then freed from all the commitments it made.

Think about that. There is an absurdly circular logic to enforcement of this deal. Penalizing its violations don’t make the deal stronger, they blow it up.

Iran's leaders know this. They are counting on the world brushing off relatively minor infractions, or even relatively major ones. They are counting on the United States and the other parties to the agreement being so invested in its success that they overlook Iranian cheating. That is exactly what our previous administration did.

It is this unwillingness to challenge Iranian behavior, for fear of damaging the nuclear agreement, that gets to the heart of the threat the deal poses to our national security.

The Iranian nuclear deal was designed to be too big to fail.

The deal drew an artificial line between the Iranian regime's nuclear development and the rest of its lawless behavior. It said "we've made this deal on the nuclear side, so none of the regime's other bad behavior is important enough to threaten the nuclear agreement."

The result is that for advocates of the deal, everything in our relationship with the Iranian regime must now be subordinated to the preservation of the agreement.

The Iranians understand this dynamic. Just last month, when the United States imposed new sanctions in response to Iranian missile launches, Iran's leaders threatened once again to leave the JCPOA and return to a nuclear program more advanced than the one they had before the agreement.

This arrogant threat tells us one thing. Iran's leaders want to use the nuclear deal to hold the world hostage to its bad behavior.

This threat is a perfect example of how judging the regime's nuclear plans strictly in terms of compliance with the JCPOA is dangerous and short-sighted. More importantly, it misses the point.

Why did we need to prevent the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place? The answer has everything to do with the nature of the regime, and the IRGC's determination to threaten Iran's neighbors and advance its revolution.

And that is where the other two pillars that connect us to the nuclear deal come into play.

The second pillar directly involves the United Nations.

When the nuclear agreement was signed, the Obama Administration took Iran's non-nuclear activity – the missile development, the arms smuggling, the terrorism, the support for murderous regimes – and rolled it up into one UN Security Council resolution – 2231.

Critically, included in this supposed “non-nuclear” activity is the IRGC's ongoing development of ballistic missile technology. You can call it “non-nuclear” all you want – missile technology cannot be separated from pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

North Korea is showing the world that right now.

Every six months, the UN Secretary General reports to the Security Council on the Iranian regime's compliance with this so-called “non-nuclear” resolution.

Each report is filled with devastating evidence of Iranian violations. Proven arms smuggling. Violations of travel bans. Ongoing support for terrorism. Stoking of regional conflicts.

The Secretary General's report also includes ample evidence of ballistic missile technology and launches. The regime has engaged in such launches repeatedly, including in July of this year when it launched a rocket into space that intelligence experts say can be used to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technology.

They are clearly acting in defiance of UN Resolution 2231 by developing missile technology capable of deploying nuclear warheads.

Unfortunately, as happens all too often at the UN, many member states choose to ignore blatant violations of the UN's own resolutions.

In this way, we see how dangerously these two pillars of Iran policy work together: The international community has powerful incentives to go out of its way to assert that the Iranian regime is

in “compliance” on the nuclear side. Meanwhile, the UN is too reluctant to address the regime’s so-called non-nuclear violations.

The result is that Iran’s military continues its march toward the missile technology to deliver a nuclear warhead. And the world becomes a more dangerous place.

That’s where the third pillar of our Iran nuclear policy comes in: The Corker-Cardin law.

As you recall, President Obama refused to submit the Iran deal to Congress as a treaty. He knew full well that Congress would have rejected it. In fact, majorities in both houses of Congress voted against the deal.

Among the NO votes were leading Democrats like Senators Chuck Schumer, Ben Cardin, and Bob Menendez.

Despite President Obama’s constitutionally questionable dodge of Congress, the legislative body did attempt to exercise some of its authority with passage of the Corker-Cardin law.

The law requires that the President make a certification to Congress every ninety days. But, importantly, the law asks the President to certify several things, not just one. The first is that Iran has not materially breached the JCPOA. That’s the one everyone focuses on.

But the Corker-Cardin law also requires something else; something that is often overlooked. It asks the President to certify that the suspension of sanctions against Iran is appropriate and proportionate to Iran’s nuclear measures, and that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States.

So regardless of whether one considers Iran’s violations of the JCPOA to have been material, and regardless of whether one considers Iran’s flouting of the UN resolution on its ballistic missile technology to be “non-nuclear,” U.S. law requires the President to also look at whether the Iran deal is appropriate, proportionate, and in our national security interests.

Corker-Cardin asks us to put together the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle.

Under its structure, we must consider not just the Iranian regime's technical violations of the JCPOA, but also its violations of Resolution 2231 and its long history of aggression.

We must consider the regime's repeated, demonstrated hostility toward the United States.

We must consider its history of deception about its nuclear program.

We must consider its ongoing development of ballistic missile technology.

And we must consider the day when the terms of the JCPOA sunset. That's a day when Iran's military may very well already have the missile technology to send a nuclear warhead to the United States – a technology that North Korea only recently developed.

In short, we must consider the whole picture, not simply whether Iran has exceeded the JCPOA's limit on uranium enrichment. We must consider the whole jigsaw puzzle, not just one of its pieces.

That's the judgment President Trump will make in October.

And if the President does not certify Iranian compliance, the Corker-Cardin law also tells us what happens next. What happens next is significantly in Congress's hands.

This is critically important, and almost completely overlooked. If the President chooses not to certify Iranian compliance, that does not mean the United States is withdrawing from the JCPOA.

Withdrawal from the agreement is governed by the terms of the JCPOA. The Corker-Cardin law governs the relationship between the President and Congress.

If the President finds that he cannot certify Iranian compliance, it would signal one or more of the following three messages to Congress. Either the Administration believes Iran is in violation of the deal; or the lifting of sanctions against Iran is not appropriate and proportional to the regime's behavior; or the lifting of sanctions is not in the U.S. national security interest.

Under the law, Congress then has sixty days to consider whether to re-impose sanctions on Iran.


During that time, Congress could take the opportunity to debate Iran's support for terrorism, its past nuclear activity, and its massive human rights violations, all of which are called for in Corker-Cardin.

Congress could debate whether the nuclear deal is in fact too big to fail.

We should welcome a debate over whether the JCPOA is in U.S. national security interests. The previous administration set up the deal in a way that denied us that honest and serious debate.

If the President finds that he cannot in good faith certify Iranian compliance, he would initiate a process whereby we move beyond narrow technicalities, and look at the big picture. At issue is our national security. It's past time we had an Iran nuclear policy that acknowledged that.

Thank you.



Council of the EU



PRESS RELEASE

251/18

09/05/2018

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU following US President Trump's announcement on the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA)

The European Union (EU) deeply regrets the announcement by US President Trump to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The JCPOA, unanimously endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and is crucial for the security of the region.

As long as Iran continues to implement its nuclear related commitments, as it has been doing so far and has been confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 10 consecutive reports, the EU will remain committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the nuclear deal.

The lifting of nuclear related sanctions is an essential part of the agreement. The EU has repeatedly stressed that the sanctions lifting has a positive impact on trade and economic relations with Iran. The EU stresses its commitment to ensuring that this can continue to be delivered.

The JCPOA is the culmination of 12 years of diplomacy which has been working and delivering on its main goal. The EU is determined to work with the international community to preserve it.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration.

*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

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EU announces legal entity to maintain business with Iran

[AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE](#)

UNITED NATIONS, SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 00:00 IST

UPDATED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 03:36 IST

The European Union (EU) said on Monday that its members would set up a payment system to allow oil companies and businesses to continue trading with Iran in a bid to evade U.S. sanctions.

Iran and the European Union (EU) announced their defiance towards U.S. President Donald Trump's administration after high-level talks at the United Nations among the remaining members of the accord. They said in a statement that they were determined "to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with Iran."

With the U.S. and the dollar dominating so much of global trade, the statement said the new mechanism would "facilitate payments related to Iran's exports (including oil) and imports, which will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran".

Course:

Israeli Society

תורה ודעה
ביד

TROUBLE
in
UTOPIA

THE OVERBURDENED POLITY OF ISRAEL

Dan Horowitz
Moshe Lissak

State University of New York Press

Introduction: Israel as a Social Laboratory

The State of Israel: A Threefold Historical Background

The establishment of the State of Israel was a historical turning point for the Jewish People, for the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel), as a territorial entity, and for the Yishuv,—the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine.

For nearly two millennia the Jews in the Diaspora had lacked a center of political authority and had been vulnerable to discrimination and persecution. Their plight eventually led to a search for a solution to what became known, in both Jewish and European Political discourse, as “the Jewish problem.” Various solutions were put forward,¹ among them Zionism—ideologically motivated Jewish immigration to Eretz Israel.²

The creation of the State of Israel had a major impact on the Land of Israel as a territorial entity. The partition of Palestine and the exodus of most of the Arabs from what become the State of Israel provided yet another chapter in the turbulent history of this small land, and resulted in a demographic and geographic upheaval that marked out the boundaries of a new “Israeli” collectivity.

It was in this arena of Jewish history that the Jews renewed their connection with the land as the Yishuv emerged in May 1948 as a fully-fledged political community. The social and political character of the Yishuv, a “state in the making” under the Mandate, enabled it to succeed in the armed struggle between Jews and Arabs, and facilitated the transition to statehood.³

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During the first four decades of Israel's existence, wars and waves of immigration (aliyot) were the major signposts of its development. Apart from the War of Independence, the most important war was the Six Day War of 1967. This war brought about further changes in the state's territorial boundaries and demographic balance, and created a significant gap between Israeli sovereignty and military control.⁴

These three historical entities—the Jewish people, the land of Israel, and the Yishuv—had global significance. Both Zionism and Arab nationalism were stimulated by and modeled on modern European nationalism. The initial intercommunal conflict between Jews and Arabs in Eretz Israel was played out in a region divided into British and French spheres of influence. The emergence of Israel and its neighboring Arab states as autonomous protagonists in their own Middle Eastern conflict resulted from the processes of decolonization after the Second World War. Subsequently, the continuous involvement of the superpowers in the Arab-Israeli conflict derives from the centrality of the Middle East in the global balance of power, stemming from its strategic position and its vast oil reserves. Zionism sought to transform the Jewish people from a passive object of the historical process into an acting subject whose sovereign decisions would influence global developments. This goal has been realized with a vengeance, perhaps more than is warranted for Israel's own good.

These unique historical circumstances have also attracted the attention of social scientists seeking theoretical and comparative lessons from Israel's exceptional social development. Indeed, Israeli society is unique in many respects but its uniqueness is a consequence of a rare combination of features each of which is not necessarily exceptional as such. However, some of these features are more pronounced in Israeli society than in most other societies, thus entailing more significant consequences for its functioning as a collectivity. It is, therefore, the combined effect of marked features that singles out Israel as a case worth studying in macro-sociology and macro-politology. The enumeration of these features provide an appropriate point of departure for the analysis of Israel's social and political system.

Non-Congruence of Territory, Citizenship, and National-Ethnic Identity

Most Jews live outside the State of Israel, while within Israel there is a considerable non-Jewish minority of Palestinian Arabs. For the indi-

vidual, this creates a problem of identity; for society, that of defining its boundaries. While the establishment of the state resolved some of the issues of collective identity, it retained some of the contradictions of bicomunal Mandatory Palestine. In particular, the identity of the Israeli entity as a state and as an ethno-national community was not fully defined.⁵

"Palestinian citizenship" under the Mandate was described as "nothing but a legal formula devoid of moral meaning."⁶ The State of Israel, at least until 1967, was closer than Mandatory Palestine to the model of an integral nation-state insofar as it had a clear-cut Jewish majority (85-90 percent). Still, it had to contend with the problems raised by the symbolic meaning of citizenship as opposed to national-ethnic identity. This problem intensified as a result of the extension of Israeli control after 1967 to territories inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, who in the West Bank were Jordanian citizens, but in the Gaza Strip were stateless. Thus, the problem of collective boundaries and identity links up with the broader Arab-Israeli conflict: Any decision about the ultimate disposition of the territories conquered in 1967 also entails a decision about the definition of an Israeli collective identity and the ethno-political identity of the Palestinian Arabs.

Mandatory Palestine deviated from the ideal type of the nation-state in every conceivable way. First, the country was governed by a foreign power through direct rule, without any representation of the local population. Second, it was in effect a binational entity in which one of the components, the Jewish community, established its own semi-autonomous and legally-recognized network of institutions. Third, each of the communities in Mandatory Palestine maintained ethnic-national, religious, and language ties to groups beyond its borders. Each one of these deviations from the model involved problems of identity and definition of boundaries of the collectivity.⁷

The primary loyalty of both the Jewish and the Arab communities was to their own people. But neither of these communities had clearly defined boundaries. For the Jewish community, there was the issue of the degree of involvement of world Jewry in building a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, a role which was formally recognized by the Mandate given to Britain by the League of Nations.⁸

In the Arab community, the problem of identity was expressed in terms of the concepts of "kawmiya"—pan-Arab nationalist consciousness, as distinct from "wataniya"—particularistic national identity linked to specific Arab countries.⁹ In the Arab community under British

rule, different groups placed different emphases on the panArab and the Palestinian components of their collective identity.

The partition of Mandatory Palestine and the exodus of most of the Arabs from the area under Jewish rule resulted in a clear-cut Jewish majority in the newly-established State of Israel. The status of the Arab minority remained ambiguous and its connection to the state could at best be expressed through citizenship, but certainly not in national-ethnic terms.

The establishment of the state added a new dimension to the identity of its Arab residents, who, in addition to being Arabs or Palestinians, became Israeli citizens. Israel's Declaration of Independence established the state as a "Jewish state in Eretz Israel," while upholding "full equality of social and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex."¹⁰ However, for the Arab minority, the ethno-national and citizenship components of Israeli identity were never fully integrated. This is also reflected in their position in the social structure.

The nation-state is a modern concept implying a high degree of congruence and harmony between territory, citizenship and ethno-cultural community.¹¹ Reality often falls short of this ideal type which is sometimes even further eroded by the existence of ethnic diasporas.¹² Thus, in many cases, ethno-national identity is not coextensive with the legal definition of citizenship. In principle, however, the criteria for citizenship are formally defined and are unrelated to a person's attitudes toward a particular social entity or one's cultural traits. Criteria for ethnic or national membership are vaguer, and are based on primordial factors and/or cultural-historical consciousness.¹³ Although the boundaries of ethno-national membership are more difficult to define, in many cases such membership engenders a stronger sense of group solidarity than does citizenship.

In Israel, ethno-national criteria lie at the base of the system of national symbols that express the collectivity's normative commitment to the Jewish people and order the response to the problem of national security anchored in the Arab-Israeli conflict. On its establishment, the State of Israel took over the anthem and the flag from the Zionist movement and adopted the seven-branched candelabrum of Jewish religious tradition as the official symbol of the state,¹⁴ thereby expressing the link to the Jewish people as a historic cultural-national entity. The specific commitment to the Zionist conception that places the immigration and settlement of Jews in Eretz Israel at the center of the Jewish national revival is embodied in the law of Return. This unique

law grants privileges to Jews who wish to become Israelis, but confers no privileges on Jewish citizens as against non-Jewish citizens.¹⁵

At the level of citizenship, the rights of non-Jewish groups to celebrate their holidays and to cease work on their traditional days of rest are guaranteed by law. The adoption of the Arabic language as the second official language of the state is also of symbolic significance.

The most prominent application of ethno-national principles in the sphere of national security is the exemption of all Israeli Arabs (except for the Druze) from compulsory military service.¹⁶ The exemption of Israeli Arabs from the draft is not specified in law, but implemented through the discretionary powers vested in the Minister of Defense.¹⁷

In contrast, civil rights—the formal equality of all citizens before the law—are defined in terms of citizenship. This fundamental principle of democracy is enunciated in Israel's Declaration of Independence and further elaborated in legislation,¹⁸ as exemplified by universal suffrage in local and national elections even from 1949 to 1966 when most Israeli Arabs lived in areas under military government.

Primordial affiliation has a significant direct impact on public life in Israel through laws governing marriage, divorce, and personal status. These are linked to specific religious communities, but without granting preference to any particular community.¹⁹ As a result, while there is no separation of religion and state, neither is there a state religion.²⁰

The territorial component of identity and membership that within the armistice lines of 1949 had been clear-cut became blurred as a result of the Six Day War. After 1967, the population to be included within the territorial boundaries of the collectivity differed according to the criterion used—sovereignty or military control.²¹ Moreover, the terms used to define these areas (e.g., "liberated" vs. "occupied" territories) reflected ideological preferences with regard to their ultimate fate: Whether they should remain under ethnonational Jewish control and be formally incorporated into the State of Israel, or whether they should ultimately revert to Arab rule.

The range of affiliations or connections to the Israeli collectivity can be represented by the various patterns created by the elements of citizenship, ethnicity, and territory, some of which reveal only minimal congruence. Maximal congruence is found among Jews who live under Israeli sovereignty and hold only Israeli citizenship. Weaker congruence is found among Israeli emigrants, Diaspora Jews, Arab citizens of Israel, foreign citizens living in Israel, and Jewish permanent residents of Israel who are not citizens.

The post-1967 war events resulted in an extension as well as in an intensification of the problem. The annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories added a new dimension to the problem. There were now in areas under Israeli control several groups whose association with the Israeli collectivity involved legal and political issues: Arab citizens of Jordan and Syria residing in territories where Israeli law applies, such as Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and Israeli Jewish settlers residing in territories where Israeli law does not apply.

Even the nationality of Jordanian citizens in Judea and Samaria and residents of the Gaza Strip is potentially problematic from the viewpoint of Israeli identity.²² As long as Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip have the status of occupied territories their populations are not participants in the Israeli identity. However, any change in the existing temporary status of the territories apart from the return to full Arab sovereignty, would raise the problem of the association between their population and Israel.

Lack of congruence between citizenship, ethnicity and territory is not unique to Israel: Very few countries approach the ideal-type of nation-state. However, Israel seems to be unusual in the range of patterns of partial congruence that it presents, involving a multiplicity of communities and diasporas, and vague definitions of religion, ethnicity, and territory.

Ideological Impetus

Prior to independence, the waves of immigration to Palestine were, for the most part, ideologically motivated. Indeed, ideological commitments fueled the separatist tendencies that made the Yishuv a quasi-autonomous society.²³ The revival of Hebrew as a living language which became the cultural common denominator in the Yishuv and in Israel, was inspired by ideology. After the establishment of the State of Israel, Zionist ideology continued to inform some of its fundamental political decisions, the most notable being the decision to facilitate and encourage mass Jewish immigration in the 1950s.²⁴ Despite the waning influence of ideology in more recent years, its impact is still keenly felt in many important political controversies such as conflict over the ultimate disposition of the territories conquered in the 1967 war.²⁵

Overall there remains constant tension between commitment to divergent ideological principles and the possibility of their realization

in a rapidly changing social reality. The dominant Zionist ideologies of pre-state colonization in Eretz Israel aspired to a just social order and therefore stressed the goal of social change—the subordination of current needs to future objectives, and preference for collective interests over those of the individual.²⁶ However, when the bearers of these dynamic ideological tendencies assumed control of the political structures of the state, the preservation of their rule became an end in itself. This, in turn, engendered conservative tendencies inimical to the striving for social change.²⁷

Political dominance was a source of material rewards, prestige, and power for members of the ruling elites. Responding to the demands of various groups to meet their immediate needs came at the expense of future-oriented commitments and bred acceptance of the status quo. The gap between ideals and reality was further widened by a political framework that made compromise between parties and movements the prime principle of political alliances.

The erosion of ideological commitment in Israeli society as a whole and within its various political and social movements has several aspects. First, it reflected an incomplete realization of ideology. This is characteristic of attempts to foster revolutionary and utopian ideological commitments under conditions of institutionalization and routinization, and is not peculiar to Zionism or to Israeli society.²⁸

In Israel, the absence of a sharp transition from a prerevolutionary to a post-revolutionary situation left a distinctive mark upon the problem of routinization and institutionalization. The social aspect of the Zionist revolution developed gradually with the shaping of a new social order from the waves of immigration. Likewise, the political climax of the Zionist revolution, the conclusion of the British Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel, was not the beginning of a process of political institutionalization, but the culmination of institution-building that had started earlier.²⁹

A second aspect of the erosion of ideology in Israeli society stems from the tension generated by the influence of the general intellectual climate of the "end of ideology." The pragmatic outlook of the new professional and technocratic elites that arose with the state was more compatible with the conception of the "decline of ideology" that marked Western societies in the 1950s and 1960s³⁰ than with the ideological prescriptions of the veteran movement elites.³¹ This gap between them resulted in compromises that at times meant adapting ideology to the need to get things done, or to merely paying lip service to ideology.

The third source of the erosion of ideology stems from the fact that Zionism, which sought to provide a broad basis of consensus in Israeli society, in practice offered only a limited common ground on such fundamental issues as the shape of the ideal social order, the place of religion in society and the response to the Arab-Jewish conflict. Author Amos Oz clearly grasped this problem when he wrote that "Zionism is a family name, not a proper name," with members of this "family" appearing as Labor Zionism, Religious Zionism, and so forth.³² Ideology thus became a divisive force in the political system and even a source of polarization, whose disintegrative potential could be blunted only through bargaining that entailed a compromise of principles.

Israeli society therefore provides an excellent example of the dual role of ideology in fostering social mobilization, on the one hand, and triggering political conflict, on the other.

Israel as a New Society

Israel is a "new nation" in terms of its population as well as its institutions. The only common historical connection shared by members of Israeli society is to the cultural and communal traditions of a "people without a land."³³ This clearly sets Israel apart from most, if not all of the new nations that emerged after World War II. Israel does not represent a case of "an old society in a new nation,"³⁴ but rather of "a new society for an ancient people." The social structure of Israel is therefore not the culmination of historical processes stretching over generations, but the product of recent developments related mainly to the Zionist settlement endeavor. Israel thus differs from most developing countries whose traditional structures served as a source of constraints on modernization.³⁵

Nevertheless, Israeli society was not a tabula rasa: It is unique among developing countries in that the diverse social and cultural traditions influencing behavior and values were, for the most part, imported with the immigrants from their countries of origin. Even the common core of Jewish religious observance and belief was overlaid with local or regional variations in lifestyle and behavior.³⁶

Many of the immigrants had previously not been exposed to the far-reaching influence of the secularization that accompanied industrialization and political modernization in Europe and the New World. For the most part, Middle Eastern and North African immigrants were not directly affected by secularization, industrialization, and nationalism until they came to Israel.³⁷ Once there, they had to adapt to a

society whose institutions were shaped by elites inspired by these revolutionary processes and who sought to mode Israel as a modern nation-state.

The encounter between the relatively modern institutions and values of the Yishuv and the traditional ways of life of many of the immigrants did not take place on equal terms. The system into which these newcomers were "absorbed," as Israeli terminology put it, was clearly socially and politically dominant.³⁸ As a result, the immigrants' particularistic traditions had little impact on the development and consolidation of Israeli society that took place rather rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike other developing countries in this crucial period, traditional forces hardly restrained modernization in Israel. The institutions of Israeli society could therefore develop synchronically without the troublesome lags that appeared elsewhere in the pace of development of the various spheres such as agriculture, industry, bureaucracy, the military, and the family.

However, when the bearers of traditional ways of life began to break out of their peripheral status in Israeli society and to demand a more central role, their particularistic values began to exert a greater influence on public life.³⁹ Education was especially influenced by this shift, as ultra-Orthodox approaches gained legitimacy and state financial support and as traditional religious influences penetrated the secular school system.⁴⁰ Some manifestations of particularistic religious expressions that were marginal in the 1950s, such as folk medicine and cults of pious religious figures, suddenly became popular.⁴¹

As in other Western countries, it became apparent in Israel too, that the traditional forces holding back modernization had a higher rate of survival than was thought possible when the foundations were laid for the modern nation-state.⁴² Thus Israel, despite the fact that it is a new society, has found that it cannot escape tensions between tradition and modernity, as traditionalist enclaves chip away at the cultural and political patterns that were dominant in the Yishuv and had shaped the emergent institutions of the State of Israel.

A Small Society

Israel is one of the smallest sovereign states in the world. Its population in 1985 came to about four and a quarter million, not including the Arabs in the occupied territories.⁴³ In area, Israel together with the occupied territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights comprise 7,391 square miles. The striking disproportion

between Israeli's small size and its international prominence is most apparent from the strategic perspective. Militarily, Israel is considered to be the most powerful state in the Middle East,⁴⁴ a region of central importance in international affairs, and one fraught with more regional military conflicts than any other since the Second World War.⁴⁵ Israel's combat-ready military prowess equals that of certain medium-size powers, and exceeds that of some considerably larger and wealthier states. Moreover, Israel is reported to have either nuclear weapons, or at least real nuclear potential, putting it in an exclusive category of states.⁴⁶

Israel's disproportionate international prominence is also linked to the concern for the Holy Land shared by Jews, Christians, and Moslems. Relations between the latter two faiths and the Jewish people are somewhat problematic. Christianity's ambivalence to the Jews has deep historical and theological roots, while the Moslem world sees Israel as an alien entity in the heart of a predominantly Moslem and Arab region.

The centrality of Israel for diaspora Jewry implicit in Israel's self-definition as a Jewish state, assumes wider significance from the fact that the largest Diaspora communities are located in the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ The prominence of Jews among the elites in Western countries further underlines Israel's importance.

These strategic and cultural factors have also influenced developments within Israel. A major consequence of the disproportion between Israel's size and its international prominence is the great diversity and intensity of its international ties, particularly its economic, political, and security dependence on the United States.⁴⁸ Israel's dependence on others has enabled it to mobilize resources for economic development and political support in its conflict with the Arabs.⁴⁹ The adaptation of Israel's institutional structure to the country's need for constant exposure to, and ties with, the outside world is manifest in the security and scientific spheres, as well as in culture and entertainment. Israel's disproportionately extensive and highly centralized bureaucracy owes part of its development to its role as an intermediary between Israel's institutions and citizens and various Jewish and other international organizations abroad.

Occasionally, the disproportion between Israel's size and its needs has added to the burdens of an already overburdened system. These burdens have not been borne equally: From the outset some sections of the population have been alienated from Israel's national tasks. For example, the manpower that can be mobilized for security needs does

not include Israel's Arab citizens and parts of the orthodox sector. This reduction of effective human resources further increases the disproportion between effective size and of population and overall state's capabilities.

*From Diaspora Communities to an
Emerging National Center*

Israel's existence as a national center alongside Diaspora communities is not the result of migration from the homeland but the reverse. Modern Israel was created by ongoing immigration from the widely scattered Jewish communities of the Diaspora.

Israel perceives the Diaspora as its hinterland, a source of human, economic, political, and moral support. Least problematic is the one-way flow of funds, from the Diaspora to Israel, with the donor enjoying symbolic rewards or political gains in return. These funds have enabled Israel to finance the absorption of mass immigration, economic development, and defense. This capital inflow made it possible for Israel to invest in economic growth, respond to the demands of various pressure groups and at the same time increase the standard of living.⁵⁰ It also had a direct political impact in helping to block the emergence of pressures that might have threatened Israel's democratic-pluralistic character.

The political dimension of Israel-Diaspora relations is more problematic and, on occasion, is manifested in conflicts of interest between Israel and Diaspora communities.⁵¹ For example, since the 1970s there have been differences of opinion between Israel and the American Jewish community over the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. While Israel has sought to direct all the emigrants to Israel, even to the point of making this a condition of their right to leave the Soviet Union, the American Jewish communal leadership has supported freedom of choice and the provision of aid to all irrespective of their final destination.

Israel's sense of responsibility for Jewish communities living under non-democratic regimes has on occasion come into conflict with its wider diplomatic interests, as was the case with the military regime in Argentina. Likewise, Israel's ties with South Africa, justified in terms of the need to protect the interests of South African Jewry and its ties to Israel, have made it difficult to establish relations with many black African states.⁵² On another plane, Israel as a Jewish state was able to

represent the Jewish people in claiming reparations from Germany on the legal grounds that it had taken in hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors, and brought Nazi war criminals to trial.⁵³

The premises of Zionist ideology that negate the Diaspora's status as an autonomous source of Jewish values and its capacity to ensure Jewish existence, and that regard Israel as the national-cultural center of the Jewish people, create problems for the symbolic dimension of Israel-Diaspora relations. However, this issue has waned somewhat over the years with the weakening among Israeli leaders of their advocacy of the doctrine of the "negation of the Diaspora." A feeling of partnership and common destiny between Israel and the Diaspora emerged in the wake of the destruction of the European Jewry in the Holocaust. The course of events expanded the interaction between Israel and the Jewish communities not directly affected by the war, particularly the American Jewry. These ties, formerly maintained mainly by the Zionist organizations, have widened and deepened to encompass organizations previously identified as "non-Zionist." The "negation of the Diaspora" doctrine was further muted by the waning of utopian aspirations and concomitant "normalization," making Israel less attractive to idealistic Western Jewish intellectuals.⁵⁴

The symbolic and demographic dimensions of Israel-Diaspora relations are interrelated. Israel's lack of success in attracting significant immigration from the West has impaired its central symbolic role. Jews from Western countries who were free to come and live in Israel simply stayed away.⁵⁵ To make matters worse, a growing stream of Israeli emigrants began to head for the West, particularly to North America.

Emigration (*yeridah*, literally "going down"—the opposite of *aliyah* or "going up" to Israel) is more problematic for Israeli society than for other societies. Emigration, even more than a lack of immigration, is viewed as undermining the fundamental goals of Zionism, and is striking evidence of its failure.⁵⁶ In a besieged Israel, emigration comes close to being regarded as desertion from the front lines. The problem of emigration gained particular prominence in the 1970s and 1980s with the decline in immigration and the rise in the proportion of Israeli-born and educated persons among the emigrants. It peaked in the mid-1980s when the annual number of emigrants exceeded that of immigrants.⁵⁷

Following the drastic decline in the potential for immigration from the countries in Europe and the Middle East where Jewish communities are threatened, Israel began to gather in the remnants of far-flung Jewish communities which had been cut off from the Jewish mainstream for generations. The best-known examples here are those

communities whose members have a high degree of physical distinctiveness from other Jews, the Bene Israel from India and the Beta Israel or Falashas from Ethiopia.⁵⁸

Immigration to Israel of Jews from the Diaspora heightened the tensions surrounding the definition and boundaries of individual and collective Jewish identity that derive from attempting to apply traditional Jewish religious law in a non-traditional democratic society. The controversy known as "Who is a Jew?" came into public focus because of the employment, for the purposes of immigrant rights under the Law of Return and in other legislation, of criteria of Jewishness that did not strictly conform to traditional definitions. Amendments to the Law of Return defining Jewishness did not settle the controversy as they raised the question of the validity in Israel of non-Orthodox conversions to Judaism performed abroad.

Israel is not the only society made up of immigrants, nor is it the only country that maintains connections with an ethnically-related Diaspora overseas. Israel's uniqueness is in the interaction between these elements, and in the fact that Israel arose through immigration from its Diaspora communities and not the other way around.

A Party to a Protracted Conflict

Israeli society functions under conditions of protracted external conflict. This conflict has two aspects: The first aspect concerns the national defense posture required in order to meet the strategic threat of all-out war waged by the regular armies of Arab countries and the immediate threats associated with the pursuit of security vis a vis acts of terror and border clashes (defined as "current security"). To meet this dual challenge, Israel has developed various mechanisms requiring the mobilization of considerable resources for national security. To mobilize the manpower necessary to overcome the sharp demographic imbalance between Israel and its potential enemies, Israel has developed a system of military service based on a small professional nucleus, supplemented by men and women doing their three and two years, respectively, of conscript service, and a reserve combat-ready force of men serving until the age of 55.⁵⁹ The economic burden imposed by the conflict requires the allocation of a defense budget which is among the highest in the world per capita, (covered partly by taxes and partly by American aid).⁶⁰ In addition, Israel has also developed the largest military-industrial complex in the world in relation to population and

GNP.⁶¹ The threats posed by current security problems have made a considerable impact on Israeli society. Israel was induced to introduce restrictions on civil rights such as the military government imposed in Arab areas until 1966 and take measures such as the emergency regulations that permit administrative detention and limitations on freedom of movement within Israel or in leaving the country.

The second aspect of the conflict is rooted in the political-ideological challenge to Israeli society posed by the confrontation between Zionism, the Jewish national movement, and the Palestinian Arab national movement supported by the entire Arab world.

From this challenge stem the problems of delineating the territorial limits on Zionist ideological aspirations, protecting Israel's international legitimacy, and regulating Arab-Jewish relations within the state of Israel proper as well as in the territories occupied in 1967.

With regard to the first aspect of Israel's involvement in a protracted external conflict, there is a firm consensus, at least within the Jewish population, that this conflict poses a potential threat to Israel's very existence. This accounts for the willingness to accept a high level of mobilization of resources for national defense and the acceptance of the burden imposed by the sacrifices demanded by frequent wars. This also accounts for the legitimacy accorded in Israel to limited military actions initiated during periods of "neither war nor peace" such as reprisal raids or the bombings of the Iraqi atomic reactor in Baghdad and the PLO headquarters in Tunis.

On the other hand, the question of Israel's response to the political-ideological challenge posed by the Arab-Israeli conflict has aroused considerable controversy. This controversy has several foci. The first concerns the recognition of Palestinian national rights, and the need to reach a compromise on this issue. Does the Jewish people have an exclusive right to "the Land of Israel," or is this a confrontation between two national movements, each with its own subjective conceptions of rights? Second, what is more important from the perspective of Zionist aspirations, the territorial integrity of Eretz Israel or assuring the overwhelmingly Jewish character of the population of the State of Israel? The positions taken on these two issues lead to differing conceptions of the nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Is this primarily a conflict between states, as it was perceived during the period between the signing of the cease-fire agreements in 1949 and the Six Day War of 1967,⁶² or is it primarily a conflict between national communities, as it was perceived during the period of the Yishuv and as perceived by the proponents of Greater Israel since 1967? Living

with the awareness of an external threat is not unique to Israel, but the sense of acuteness of the threat and its persistence is a characteristic of Israeli society. In these circumstances the conflict is perceived not only as a threat to Israel's existence, but also as a danger that can impinge on everyday life through acts of terror or by the possibility of another round of all-out war that could break out at any time.

Democracy under Pressure

Israel is a democratic society subject to severe pressures due to demographic changes, a protracted external conflict, and deep social and political cleavages. What sets Israel apart from the vast majority of the new states established after World War II is that it has maintained a multi-party democratic regime during its entire existence. Israel also differs from most democratic states in the range and magnitude of the pressures exerted on its political system resulting from a rare combination of rapid demographic expansion through immigration during its early years, a prolonged external conflict marked by several major wars, and a multiplicity of deep social and political cleavages.

The massive defense demands and the needs which arose from mass immigration have required the allocation of extensive resources to collective tasks placing Israel's democratic system under heavy cross-pressures. These collective burdens are augmented by the particularistic demands of groups, a common characteristic of democratic societies. Defense, immigrant absorption, and social welfare thus compete for the same reservoir of resources. Moreover, many of the newcomers who arrived during the mass immigration had no previous experience with democratic society, and were not acquainted with the dominant political culture of the Yishuv that had shaped the institutions and rules of the game in the new state.

Persistent involvement in an external conflict poses dangers to a democracy beyond the need to allocate large amounts of resources to security. Constant awareness of the external threat have helped push the military and defense establishment into a position of centrality, in terms of the share of the population directly and indirectly involved in the defense effort and the special status of the defense establishment in shaping national policy in spheres other than those concerned directly with security. Such a permeation of civilian spheres by defense activity and considerations poses a danger of what Harold Lasswell called a "garrison state," or a government controlled by "experts in violence."⁶³

Even if such danger is averted, as it has been in Israel, and such a regime does not emerge, the security sphere may, nevertheless, become preponderantly influential, even without direct control, through manipulation of the civilian decision-making system. To guard against this, the patterns of civilian control of the military characteristic of democratic regimes at peace are insufficient; Israel needed special formal and informal arrangements to balance democracy and national security.⁶⁴ Thus is developed a unique model of political-military relationships, that of "a nation in arms." The partial militarization of the civilian sphere—caused by the role-expansion of the military—is balanced by a partial "civilianization" of the defense sphere, arising particularly from its penetration by an extensive system of army reserve duty, and the linking of civilian and military elites in common social networks.⁶⁵

The capacity of Israeli democracy to withstand economic, political, and military pressures has depended, to a large extent, on social solidarity and a broad political consensus, no easy task in a society riven, since its inception, by salient national, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and ideological cleavages. These five sources of cleavage have weakened social solidarity by generating internal conflicts, some of which are intensified by being mutually reinforcing, as in the cases of the ethnic and socio-economic cleavages, and the religious and ideological cleavages. The fundamental national cleavage between Jew and Arab maintains constant potential for intense conflict.

Social conflicts and the frustrations of marginal groups have impeded the functioning of Israeli democracy to the point of exposing it to the danger of "ungovernability,"⁶⁶ making it difficult for the system to mobilize material resources and collective normative commitments. Varied mechanisms have been employed to cope with these conflicts. The conflict arising from the overlap of ethnic resentment and socio-economic inequality has been dealt with by allocating material resources through the public welfare and educational systems. This provided a minimal standard of living for the lowest strata and slowed growth of inequality that would have resulted from the free play of market forces without bringing about any basic change in social stratification.⁶⁷

The severe conflict potential of the secular-religious cleavage has been dealt with by accepting the principle of sub-cultural autonomy for both the modern Orthodox and the ultra-Orthodox camps. Similar to European "consociationalism," the system of "sub-cultural autonomy" granted group access to state resources.⁶⁸ This has been utilized

in particular to create and maintain a state religious school system for the modern Orthodox, and independent school system for the ultra-Orthodox and other religious educational institutions for children, youths, and adults. The particularistic needs of the religious communities have also been met by the exemption of religious women and yeshiva students from military service.⁶⁹

The ideological cleavages have been handled mainly by bargaining and compromise:⁷⁰ cooperation between political parties in government coalitions; deferring the resolution of divisive fundamental questions such as that of the constitution in the 1950s, and of the ultimate status of the administered territories since 1967; and the adoption of ambiguous or vague legal definitions in various laws, as occurred in the case of "Who is a Jew?"

The Jewish-Arab cleavage and conflict has been handled mainly by the development of mechanisms for the control and manipulation of Israeli Arabs, the most direct of which was military government. After its abolition in 1966, control mechanisms became more subtle resting mainly on the internal security services. Mechanisms of direct control were again resorted to after 1967 with the establishment of military government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.⁷¹

The Israeli political system is not the only democratic polity that has encountered difficulties in functioning while having to balance the effects of internal and external pressures. But it may be exceptional among democracies in the variety of sources of conflict in the system and in the intensity of tensions with which the system has had to cope.

The Conceptual Framework and Major Issues

The characteristics of Israeli society and the course of its development from ideological movement to community and from community to state, has attracted the attention of historians and social scientists. This interest accounts, in part, for the large number of studies on Israel—out of all proportion to its physical dimensions and population size. This also explains the use, on occasion, of the term "social laboratory" to describe Israeli society or the society of the Yishuv that preceded it.⁷²

This phrase, which appears both in ideological tracts and academic treatises, and which is metaphorical in any case, should nevertheless be subject to certain qualifications. Experiments in a laboratory are controlled and directed while social innovations are regarded as experiments only in retrospect. Nevertheless, this metaphor is apt in

several respects. The complexity and intensiveness of Israeli society has turned it into an attractive field of research for social scientists. Moreover, Israel is still characterized by a concentration of varied social phenomena in a small space, and by a large number of events stimulating social change within relatively short spans of time. Israel's small dimensions permit these phenomena to be studied without excessive investment of research efforts or resources. Indeed, the more a society resembles a community, the easier it is, at least from a communications perspective, to study it using a quasi-anthropological approach based upon participant observation. This is especially true for the social networks of the elites which occupy the social and political center. These may be studied with the aid of "tacit knowledge" in addition to the usual kinds of data, whether archival or statistical.

The special characteristics of Israeli society do not only lend themselves to a variety of research methods but also facilitate the formulation of central questions that are relevant to the macro-sociological and macro-political study of society as a distinct collectivity. These characteristics, as we recall, are that Israel is a small and new society; that it arose out of an ideological movement that stimulated migration from a Diaspora to an emerging national center; that it maintains a weak congruence between territory, citizenship, and ethnic-national identity; that its functioning is influenced by its involvement in a protracted external conflict; and that its democracy operates under the pressure of tensions generated by social ideological cleavages and by an imbalance between collective goals and available resources. These characteristics define the major problems of Israeli society, and provide our point of departure for examining the events and processes which have shaped it. A major question worthy of examination in the context of Israeli society is the degree of social cohesion and functional efficacy of a national collectivity whose boundaries are ambiguously defined and whose social and political institutions are overburdened with tasks and crosspressures. A number of topics derive from this question all of which merit thorough attention.

The first topic concerns the integrative and disintegrative processes operating in Israeli society under conditions of social and political pluralism which is rooted in multiple social cleavages laden with tensions. These processes are also related to the structure of elites and their role in shaping the consciousness of both social group affiliations and the national collective identity. This issue is discussed in chapter 2.

The second topic deals with the role of ideology and the characteristics of political culture in Israeli society. Ideology and political culture influence the commitments and loyalties of the various groups in Israeli society. These commitments and loyalties focus on the Israeli collectivity as such and also on particularistic entities such as national or ethnic communities, classes, ideological movements, and political parties. Chapter 3 deals with ideology as a both unifying and dividing factor in a political culture shaped by the genesis of Israeli society as an ideological movement.

The third topic deals with the rules of the game facilitating the fulfillment of the political system's functions of resource mobilization and conflict regulation. The rules of the game determine the extent to which Israel as a democratic polity is governable; or, in other words, the extent to which the over-burdened political institutions can deal with external pressures and internal conflicts without losing their ability to function. These matters are dealt with in chapter 4.

The fourth topic deals with Israel's involvement in a protracted external conflict, its strategic response to this threat to its security and the influence of this response on Israeli society as a democracy. Chapter 5 focuses on these security-related issues.

The impact of the transition from the Yishuv to the state, social and ideological cleavages, political culture, patterns of conflict regulation, and the involvement in a protracted conflict on the social cohesion of the Israeli collectivity and on the functional capacity of its institutions are examined in chapter 6. This chapter, which summarizes the arguments in the book examines not only past developments but also the major trends apparent at the end of Israel's fourth decade. Since the latter developments are still in flux, this chapter also discusses several alternative paths for Israeli society that could emerge from these trends.

These issues and questions may be examined in two ways that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They may be dealt with in the manner of those historians who examine events and processes as unique phenomena. They may also be dealt with by social scientists who define, describe, and analyze basic structures and processes in the light of theoretical issues. This approach requires analytical concepts to help bridge the gap between the historical treatment of unique phenomena and the generalizing and comparative tendencies of social science. Hence the reliance on conceptual frameworks to introduce order into this type of inquiry. These frameworks do not, as such, constitute comprehensive theories that enable the researcher to

predict or even to provide a complete explanation for social phenomena. However, conceptual frameworks are usually anchored in theoretical approaches whose underlying assumptions do not have to be made explicit as long as a particular conceptual framework serves only as a set of coordinates for mapping social phenomena.

Center and Periphery

The selection of a conceptual framework for the purpose of analyzing a particular society is naturally influenced by the unique characteristics of that society. Thus, for example, a conceptual framework that assumes an identity between the boundaries of a collectivity and the boundaries of a sovereign state would not be appropriate for analyzing the transition between the Yishuv and the State of Israel, nor for analyzing the boundary problems of Israeli society after the Six Day War of 1967 which created a gap between the boundaries of political sovereignty and physical control.⁷³ The approach that views the boundaries of a society as co-extensive with the boundaries of a nationstate, employed in many macro-political studies, would be appropriate for Israel during the period of 1949 to 1967 but, even then, only with serious qualifications. In order to study the changes that have occurred in Israeli society, we require a conceptual framework that permits a flexible definition of the boundaries of a given social system for various analytical purposes. For example, there may be groups with a partial attachment to a society placing them outside society according to one definition of its boundaries and inside it according to another definition.⁷⁴ In other words, we require a conceptual framework based not on rigid criteria for societal boundaries such as citizenship or territory, but rather based on the flexible notion of differential attachments of various groups to a society.

The concepts of center and periphery, taken from the model used by Edward Shils to analyze the development of new societies, meet this requirement.⁷⁵ These concepts permit the researcher to examine various groups' relations to the collectivity of the Yishuv and to the Israeli collectivity, since the concept of "center" entails political, institutional, and normative-cultural dimensions. The "center of society" is not necessarily co-extensive with the government of a given state since the center's sphere of attraction is not necessarily contained in the formal definition of governmental authority over a given population or territory. Moreover, the concept of center implies that the government is not necessarily viewed as the sole center of

legitimate authority. It is clear that a concept of a political and cultural center that is not identical with the formal structure of government is more ambiguous than the formal definitions of political institutions and roles in a sovereign state. Since this concept of center is not grounded in any sort of constitutional framework, it tends to resemble concepts such as the "establishment" or the "elite," which also lack clear-cut definitions. The significance of the center thus entails both institutional and normative dimensions. The center performs inspirational and representative functions, interprets and creates values, and serves as a locus of authority that rests on formal and informal sources of legitimacy among the collectivity that is attached to it and attests its loyalty to that center.

The second component of the center-periphery concept also requires some clarification. The periphery includes those sectors of society that are subject to the authority of the center, whether voluntarily or not, but have no active role in shaping the cultural and political contours of society. The concepts of center and periphery, in their basic sense, are not sufficient for analyzing complex social and political phenomena. This macro-structural concept does not provide an adequate guide to a complex society, particularly one containing many cleavages and subject to intensive processes of social change. The main shortcoming of this concept lies in the assumption that authority and enterprise in society are the exclusive province of a narrow elite identified with "the center," with the rest of society assuming a passive posture. Rejecting this elitist assumption requires us to abandon the simplistic model of center-periphery and to adopt a more sophisticated one in its place. The first modification required is to introduce the concept of sub-centers or secondary centers oriented to a societal center, but partially autonomous.⁷⁶ These secondary centers can act as partners in a national coalitionary center, or can act as partial sources of authority for groups emerging in the periphery. It is also possible that a counter-elite may crystallize around a secondary center with the aim of taking control of the national center or seceding from it (for instance, in the case of an ethnic or linguistic minority community seeking to attain sovereignty). Moreover, sectors, groups and individuals can be included in the sphere of influence of several secondary centers that may cooperate with one another. Groups can also maintain attachments to external centers outside the boundaries of their society (for instance, to motherlands exerting an influence on their diaspora communities, transnational centers such as churches, or ideological movements such as Communism.)⁷⁷

The second modification required in the basic center-periphery model relates to the differential attachments of sectors, groups, and individuals to the center. These elements should not be seen as identical in terms of their participation in cultural and political activity or in their acceptance of the authority of the center. Viewed from this perspective, different definitions of membership in society may be distinguished. Certain peripheral groups, therefore, such as diasporas or populations of occupied territories may in certain circumstances be considered part of the social system while in others they could be considered as external to it. The boundary between center and periphery is also ambiguous. Roles and institutions may, for certain purposes, be viewed as part of the center and for others may be viewed as outside the center. For example, the elites that run the system of mass communications may in certain contexts be included in the center, while in other contexts they may serve to articulate the views of the periphery vis a vis the center as representatives of secondary centers.

The third modification in the center-periphery model concerns the distinction between two aspects of the relationship between the center and groups and sectors in the periphery. The first aspect refers to the allocative function of the center, as the entity that determines "the authoritative allocation of values in society."⁷⁸ The second aspect refers to the center's function of mobilizing commitment and resources in order to realize society's collective goals.⁷⁹ In other words, the first aspect is related to the differential regulation of the needs of groups and individuals while the second aspect concerns what social scientists refer to as social and political participation.⁸⁰

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the difference between the original model of center-periphery and the revised model is that the latter deals with central and peripheral qualities along a continuum, rather than with center and periphery as dichotomic entities. The revised model which recognizes the vague boundaries of the center and the differential involvement of the periphery, can also be expressed in terms of the concept of "field of authority."⁸¹ This concept refers to a center's sphere of instrumental attraction and/or charismatic inspiration. Subject to such attraction or inspiration are those groups that need its services or feel loyalty toward it to one degree or another. In cases where groups have attachments to more than one center, we may speak of partial overlapping of fields of authority, as in the case of a diaspora community that maintains an attachment to a center outside the society in which it lives. Over-

lapping fields of authority usually occur as a result of attachments formed to external social and political systems. However, in non-sovereign political systems where a distinction exists between communal authority and sovereign authority, as in a colonial regime, the entire system is located within overlapping authority fields. There are also situations where a national center either delegates authority to secondary centers or permits a high degree of autonomy on their part. In these situations, the central authority field will exist alongside secondary authority fields which comprise social enclaves subject to the prevailing influence of the secondary centers. Such situations occur in deeply divided multi-communal societies in which the primary loyalties of members of a community are focused on the communal secondary center and not on the common center of formal sovereignty. On the other hand, in societies with a consociational structure, subcultures enjoy only limited autonomy and recognize the supremacy of their common center, which is usually coalitionary. Under these conditions, the enclaves or authority fields of the secondary centers will be limited in the scope and nature of their authority.

The concepts which distinguish between sectors and groups on the basis of the extent of their central or peripheral characteristics, are appropriate not only for analyzing the boundaries of the collectivity and the concentration and dispersion of authority within it, but also for studying integrative and disintegrative processes in society. Such an analysis does not focus on mapping the field of authority at any given moment, but rather on the dynamic processes of change in the relation of secondary centers and groups to their common center. In other words, a secondary center may change its position on the center-periphery continuum in relation to other secondary centers. We may thus distinguish between centrifugal movements that weaken the instrumental or normative attachment to the common center, and centripetal movements that strengthen these connections.⁸² Since the central or peripheral characteristics of secondary centers are expressed in two dimensions—in relation to either the allocative or commitment mobilizing functions of the center—shifts in a secondary center's position may also occur in several patterns. The secondary center may move either toward the common center or away from it in both dimensions simultaneously. Thus, the demands of the secondary center from the common center may either increase or decrease, and the willingness of the secondary center to respond to the common center's call to identify with and participate in the collective effort may also increase or decrease.

It is also possible for changes in only one of these dimensions to occur. For example, a change in the extent to which the secondary center makes claims on the resources of the common center, may either increase or decrease the overall burden of demands for resources on the common center, depending on the direction of change. On the other hand, a change in a secondary center's commitment to the common center and its willingness to be mobilized for collective goals, will either enhance or detract from the authority of the common center and either increase or decrease its ability to mobilize resources from secondary centers and the periphery, thus affecting the common center's overall capacity for maximum utilization of society's resources. In extreme cases, opposing trends in these two dimensions may occur thereby intensifying the effect on the common center. Changes in orientations to the social and political center on the part of the secondary centers representing groups and sectors thus influence the overall burdens assumed by the common center. If too many demands are imposed on the allocative functions of a center whose mobilizing function has been weakened, it may become over-burdened; while the opposite trend will enhance its capabilities and provide more room for maneuver and open up new options, without having to resort to coercive political measures. The latter situation usually promotes social cohesion, whereas an over-burdened center poses a threat to it. An over-burdened center tends to create problems in the functioning of the social system. These difficulties are reflected in the impaired ability of the center to deal with the consequences of social change or with conflicts between the needs of the entire system and the interests of various sub-systems. An imbalance between the allocative and mobilizing dimensions will thus harm the effectiveness of the political system. In societies afflicted with an extreme degree of instability, this imbalance may even lead to the disintegration of the center, thereby creating a revolutionary situation or widespread anomie.

The Impact of Social Cleavages

The conceptual framework of a common center, secondary centers, and periphery deals with the dispersion of authority and charisma among the various groups and sectors in society. However, it cannot explain the lines of social division that shape these groups and sectors. These social contours or lines of division may be relevant to questions of distance from the center, but they also relate to society's stratification

structure and its components such as class and status groups which are not necessarily identical with the center-periphery axis. The strata hierarchy and the center-periphery continuum represent two different points of departure for examining the impact of social cleavages on the functioning of the social system. The mapping of social groups according to their position in the status structure refers to the differential allocation of social rewards: economic rewards (class), prestige awards (status groups), and power rewards (position on the center-periphery axis).⁸³ There are two aspects to the center-periphery continuum, one which represents the dispersion or concentration of authority and influence in society, and the other which represents the extent of participation and social involvement. These two dimensions of social inequality are only partially related, so that one may not be reduced to the other. In pre-modern societies, with less differentiation between ownership of property, social status, and political power, the relation between these two dimensions is much closer than it is in modern societies. For example, it is possible in modern society for low status groups in respect of property, income, and prestige to have a dominant voice in public affairs as reflected in the concept of populism. Another point of departure for analyzing social divisions, also not necessarily co-extensive with the center-periphery axis, is division according to belief systems and ideologies. It is possible, as in the case of consociational societies, that membership in classes, status groups, religious communities, ethnic or linguistic groups, or ideological movements will be expressed in a dominant attachment to a secondary center such as a trade union, a church, or a political party.

Two sets of concepts deal with the division of society into groups, one related to the concept of social cleavages and the other related to the concept of social pluralism. These two concepts are, to a certain extent, interchangeable. Nevertheless, the usage of each of these terms in different countries to reflect different aspects of social divisions is still justified, since this follows the meaning originally attached to these concepts by certain social scientists.⁸⁴ The term pluralism was originally used to analyze social divisions based on ethnic, religious or linguistic membership, and not social class or ideological groupings. On the other hand, the term cleavage refers, as does pluralism, not only to primordial lines of division, but also to ideological and class or status divisions. Social classes are of course more amorphous than primordial or cultural groups, and in modern society they are also more open from the perspective of social mobility, but they cannot be ignored where such social divisions exist. This also applies to voluntary membership

groups such as political movements and parties that reflect ideological cleavages which are a major source of tension and conflict. The analysis of social cleavages therefore must refer to the entire range of factors dividing society into groups and sectors.

The concept of social cleavage refers to the broader parameters of social divisions, and not necessarily to the lines of division between specific groups. This distinction is important when there are a number of groups along a certain continuum, as in the case of political parties aligned on a left-right continuum or of social classes aligned on a stratum hierarchy. In these cases too, we will refer to "class cleavages" or "ideological cleavages," even though sometimes it is clear that we are referring to a number of cleavages based on single broad parameter.

Two sets of distinction have to be made in the mapping of social cleavages; between overlapping and crosscutting cleavages,⁸⁵ and between dichotomous and non-dichotomous cleavages.⁸⁶ The distinction between overlapping and crosscutting cleavages refers to the relationship between different parameters of social divisions. Modern societies are usually characterized by partially overlapping cleavages expressed statistically by correlations showing a partial association between membership in two or more cleavage groupings. On the other hand, the distinction between dichotomous and non-dichotomous cleavages refers to divisions within one basic parameter. The question here is whether the divisions along this continuum refer to just two groups or to more than two groups. The set of concepts related to social cleavages facilitates the mapping of social structure in terms of the relations between the various cleavages and the divisions along specific lines of cleavage.

In order to analyze the impact of social divisions on the extent of separateness or interconnectedness between groups we shall employ the set of concepts associated with the term social pluralism. The scholars who developed these concepts distinguished between institutional pluralism, cultural pluralism, and social pluralism.⁸⁷ It should be noted that these concepts refer to the interrelationships between various groups along one line of cleavage, such as members of various religious or ethnic groups. The distinction between institutional pluralism and the other two types is most important: Institutional pluralism is characterized by the co-existence of separate groups within the same system that are either antagonistic or estranged from one another. Moreover, institutional pluralism usually means that the contacts between the groups are regulated by norms and sanctions enforced by formal legal means. To describe those instances where the

clear-cut separation of groups is regulated by norms lacking formal legal status, we employ the term "quasi-institutional pluralism."

Cultural pluralism is reflected in differences in lifestyles or ways of life, including differences of language or accent. This concept can also reflect differences between ethnic groups or differences in patterns of socialization that are found, for example, between religious and secular groups. Social pluralism refers to more subtle differences between status groups usually related to the stratification cleavage. The distinction between social and cultural pluralism can be vague at times because social pluralism is also characterized by differences in lifestyles and behavioral codes. Social pluralism, however, is usually characterized by the restriction of group interrelations to secondary-instrumental contacts, as opposed to intimate personal relations. Still, such differences also appear in cultural pluralism. It seems, however, that the differences between social and cultural pluralism result from the differentiation that has occurred in modern societies between strata divisions and subcultural divisions. In pre-modern societies and those characterized by little or no social mobility, the two types of pluralism overlap to a large extent.

The nature of pluralism in a given society and the extent to which the cleavages provide a base for political mobilization are determined by the degree to which intergroup relations are ideologically articulated. The concept of ideology employed here is broad, and refers to a belief system linked to organized social action. Ideology is composed of three components: cognitive, normative, and prescriptive. In other words, an ideology contains a cognitive perception of the social or natural order, a normative evaluation of social phenomena, and prescribes what should be done to change or maintain that social order. This broad concept of ideology also entails a distinction between the fundamental and operative levels of discourse. The fundamental level contains basic positions and beliefs concerning the social and political order, while the operative level contains policies to be applied in a given time and place.⁸⁸ We may also distinguish between the substantive dimension of ideology, which refers to ideological issues arising in concrete historical settings, and the dimension of basic orientations of a more universal nature.⁸⁹ The first dimension refers mainly to positions concerning the allocation of social resources, type of regime, civil rights, religion and state, the boundaries of the national collectivity, and its relations to other national collectivities. The second dimension includes basic orientations to time, the relation between man and nature, and between the individual and society. These basic

orientations usually emerge on the fundamental level of ideology, but the fundamental level also determines the normative assumption to which the substantive positions are anchored. The substantive positions can also include evaluations and prescriptions of an operative nature.

The Political Regulation of Social Conflict

The impact of the tensions originating in social and ideological cleavages on social cohesion is determined to a large extent by the regulative capacity of the political system. The political system mobilizes and allocates resources and commitments and regulates social conflicts.⁹⁰ The political regulating frameworks are parties, pressure or interest groups, and ideological movements that are not full-fledged parties. Politics conducted by institutionalized parties in a democratic system are called "party politics" or "parliamentary politics." Politics conducted by organizations representing organized interest groups which are not parties, particularly in the economic sphere, are referred to as "corporatist politics."⁹¹ Politics conducted by ideological movements that are not parties are defined as "movement politics" and are usually extraparliamentary. The latter term is used here in a neutral sense without the connotation often attached that implies conduct violating the democratic rules of the game.

Another set of concepts relates to the forms of political regulation in democratic regimes. A distinction can be made between two basically different patterns of political regulation: one based on majority rule in which there is a clear distinction between the government, which is politically homogeneous, and the opposition, which provides an alternative ruling group; and the other based on bargaining and compromise in the framework of coalitionary arrangements as exemplified by the consociational model which allows considerable autonomy to subcultures. In this model, social enclaves tend to form around movements which acts a secondary centers that mobilize and allocate resources and commitments, receiving continuity through socialization and indoctrination.

The effectiveness of the political mechanisms of conflict regulation and resource allocation are determined mainly by the load placed on the political system. The load or burden borne by the system is an outcome of the balance between collective goals and group demands on the one hand, and available resources, on the other. A polity overburdened with goals and demands tends to become ungovernable.

However, the proper functioning of the system can be maintained by mobilizing the resources and commitments required to meet the needs determined by the collective goals and group demands. Group demands can be instrumental, and can therefore be satisfied by the allocation of material resources. However, these demands can also be normative, demanding fundamental decisions concerning the nature of society and its central symbols. Contradictory demands of a normative nature imposed on the political system can undermine the basis of political legitimacy.

A factor making for an over-burdened polity—as a result of an imbalance between group demands, collective goals and available resources—is involvement in a protracted external conflict. In this context the question arises as to the ability of the democratic regime to handle the tensions arising between a highly-developed military and the institutions of civilian government. Two of the factors that determine the relations between these two systems are the extent to which the boundaries between the military and civilian sectors are permeable and the scope of their interrelations. The conceptual refinement required to examine this issue is based on distinctions between permeable and integral boundaries, with fragmented boundaries serving as an intermediate category.⁹² Fragmented boundaries allow for permeable boundaries in certain areas of a system and integral boundaries in others. A typical case of fragmented boundaries between the military and civilian sectors is provided by a convergence between the civilian and military sectors which characterizes what has come to be known as the “nation in arms” model.⁹³ This is in contrast to the “garrison state”⁹⁴ in which there is a tendency to separate, in the normative and institutional sense, the military and civilian sectors and the elites that control them, thus creating more integral boundaries. However, in the “garrison state” model we find another important aspect of the relation between the military and civilian sectors, entailed in the concept of role expansion.⁹⁵ This describes the tendency of the military to broaden the areas of its activity beyond strictly military roles. Such tendencies are less pronounced in the case of the “nation in arms” where role expansion is often countervailed by political civilianization of the military.

Culture, Class, and Polity

In this chapter we have described the main characteristics of Israeli society. Central questions about Israeli society have been raised and an

outline of a conceptual framework has been presented in which the case of Israel may be understood in a comparative perspective, even though this particular task is not undertaken in this book. The sets of generalizing concepts that form the conceptual framework contain several theoretical assumptions that are not always detailed or explicit. A central assumption relating to problems of collective identity and the boundaries of the collectivity, and to the ideological dimension of social divisions, posits the autonomy of the cultural factor. Theoretical approaches that offer reductionist explanations of cultural factors, viewing them as reflections of economic or even political factors, can explain neither the primordial components of collective identity nor the power of ideology as a motivational force in social movements.⁹⁶ However, our conceptual framework is not based on the opposite assumption that views economic and political phenomena as derivations of cultural factors. Our conceptual framework assumes only that in a situation where a new collectivity is in the process of formation, the emergence or existence of common cultural ties must precede the creation of political institutions, which, in turn, is subject to constraints imposed largely by economic factors. These assumptions also permit the autonomous development of the political sphere and of power which serves as the medium of exchange in this area.⁹⁷ For example, the relation of the Arab population in the occupied territories to Israel is based on the exercise of military and political power and not on a consensus based on a sense of common primordial identity. Another area where the partial autonomy of political power holds concerns the activity of elites. Among the various institutional elites, and especially the political elite, considerations based on bureaucratic cliques and personal power play a considerable role. Nevertheless, this area of activity often evades conceptual analysis, and the only reasonably valid generalizations about it concern rules of the game and styles of leadership and management.⁹⁸ Class interests rooted in economic factors can of course play an autonomous role in social mobilization, but in contrast to Marxist assumptions, there can be societies, periods or situations where this factor plays a secondary role. However, even under such conditions, economic motivations can reinforce the cultural or political factors that stimulate people to engage in organized social activity. Access to economic resources can therefore influence the outcome of social and political conflicts.

Another assumption entailed in our conceptual framework concerns the importance of consensus for determining the boundaries of the collectivity and for explaining the extent to which particularistic

identities based on social cleavages are ideologically articulated. This assumption is related to another which maintains that the level of social cohesion is an appropriate point of departure for macro-social or macropolitical analysis. Social cohesion does not necessarily imply social homogeneity or harmony or absence of social tensions. Cohesion can at times be achieved through the effective regulation of conflicts. Moreover, the decision to focus on social cohesion and on processes of social integration and disintegration as a point of departure for this analysis does not imply a value preference for cohesion over lack of cohesion, or for stability over change. The preference in this case is methodological and not ideological.⁹⁹

The definition of the characteristics of Israeli society, the identification of its central problems and the elaboration of a conceptual framework based on certain theoretical assumptions has thus prepared us for an analysis of the varied social phenomena and historical changes that have made Israel into a veritable "social laboratory" and a fascinating field for research.