Date : 9/17/2019 6:32:56 PM
From : "Edward Brady"
To : ormatan@mail.gov.il
Subject : Fwd: Yom Kippur War


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From: Edward Brady <edward.a.brady@gmail.com>
Date: September 17, 2019 at 7:35:44 PM GMT+3
To: ormatan@gmail.com
Subject: Fwd: Yom Kippur War



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From: "Aaron Brady" <edward.a.brady@gmail.com>
Date: September 7, 2019 at 12:00:08 AM GMT+3
To: <nimrod.hagiladi@mail.huji.ac.il>
Subject: Yom Kippur War

Lt Col Hagiladi,

 

Sir, hello. I presume that BG Segolie gave you some background on the information I’m seeking. In general, I’m looking to dive deeply into the operational and tactical structures that connected IAF and ground force operations in the 1973 war. Most of the information that I’ve found goes into great detail on the war for air superiority. What I’ve found about air-to-surface missions tends to be more anecdotal in nature. The main sources I’ve found are Ehud Yonay’s No Margin for Error, multiple works by David Asher but especially Inside Israel’s Northern Command, Eliezer Cohen’s Israel’s Best Defense, and a transcript from Benny Peled’s presentation on the war in 1975. I’ve been restricted to English language sources which may be an issue with answering some of my questions.

 

Here are my refined questions. Any sources or insights you could provide are greatly appreciated:

 

  1. What do you think I should ask? What is something you know that may not be well known, especially in the USA?
  2. How did the IAF approach interdiction and close support between 1967 and 1973 from a training, doctrine, or acquisition perspective?
  3. What role did the Six Day War and the War of Attrition play in establishing that perception?
  4. What was a typical interdiction or close support mission like during the 1973 war? Did a normal mission flow change during the course of the war?
    1. How was mission planning accomplished?
    2. What was the nature of tactical C2?
    3. How was ground coordination accomplished, if at all?
  1. Were there specific targeting guidance or rules of thumb for interdiction missions during the war? For example, were pilots directed to attack logistical targets first, then tanks? If there were specific guidelines, who set them?
  2. In the absence of higher guidance, how did flight leaders select targets for their flights?
  3. What was the ground force’s perception of IAF performance during the 1973 war?
  4. Do you know how the Arabs perceived the impact of IAF operations?
  5. If you could go back to the days just prior to the war breaking out, what critical pieces of information would you give yourself?

Thanks very much for your time.

Very respectfully,

Maj E. Aaron “Nooner” Brady, USAF

Edward.a.brady@gmail.com

+1 909-921-4613