Impressions and Insights from a recent trip to UAE and Bahrain (Joshua Krasna)

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In the last two weeks in March, I visited the United Arab Emirates (Dubai and Abu Dhabi) and the Kingdom of Bahrain. The goals of my visit were to see the reality in these countries, meet with analysts and scholars to discuss local and regional developments – especially regarding relations with other regional players, the United States, Russia and Israel - and to develop contacts for future cooperation and collaboration.

But, more deeply, my goal was to connect to the region and to “breathe Arab air”. During thirty years of analyzing strategic, political and societal developments in the Middle East from Israel, my ability to engage directly with the region has necessarily been sorely limited. The fact that they cannot visit the vast majority of the 22 Arab states, much less Iran, does not exempt Israeli analysts from trying to understand them in depth, to both understand current policies and predict future developments. But such knowledge is of necessity indirect, through media, reports, interviews, expert meetings; knowledge of the language and culture is crucial to understand the region, but in no way sufficient. I was lucky enough to have visited Jordan many times, and even served in the Israeli embassy in Jordan for two years: even there, while the experience tremendously enriched my insights, security and other limitations circumscribed my ability to understand the country “through my feet”.

This is one of the great opportunities furnished by the wave of normalization between Israel and some Arab states, often paraphrased as “the Abraham Accords”.

A string of significant regional developments preceded and accompanied my visit. A month before I arrived, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Abu Dhabi; the week before, Iranian missiles struck Irbil; two days before, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Dubai (ostensibly to visit the Syrian pavilion at Expo 2020 on Syria’s national day, which happened to have been the anniversary of the Deraa riots, considered the beginning of the Syrian Civil War) and Abu Dhabi, and met with their leaders. While I was in the Gulf, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed met with Sisi, King Abdullah of Jordan and Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi in Aqaba; Houthi missiles struck Saudi Arabia; terrorists killed civilians in three separate attacks in Israel; the foreign ministers of Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Israel and the U.S. met in Sde Boker in the Negev. Ukraine continued to resist Russian aggression, the West continued to impose sanctions, and energy markets were in turmoil. These issues, and more generally, U.S. global and regional policy, and the present and future of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states and the Arab world, were the subjects of the vast majority of my conversations in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Manama.

 

Dismay from Biden Administration Policy

In my meetings (some nineteen, with former officials, analysts – most with government connections, foreign diplomats, and scholars), one refrain that recurred constantly was confusion, even dismay, regarding U.S. policy globally, and especially regarding Iran. My Emirati and Bahraini interlocutors stressed the incomprehensibility of Washington pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran in Vienna, de-listing the Houthis as a terrorist movement, and considering de-listing the IRGC, while at the same time, virtually ignoring attacks by the Houthis on regional allies in Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, and even direct missile attacks by Iran against U.S. installations in Irbil (the unoccupied new consulate building). Most of them explained the apparent dichotomy in political/personal terms, with the Biden Administration referred to as the “Third Obama Administration”, with figures who took leading roles in the previous JCPOA negotiations directly involved in the new ones.  As one Bahraini put it succinctly: “this part of the world does not trust Democrats in the White House: We suffered immensely in 2011”.

Some contacts also expressed concern about current U.S. policy towards Russia. In Dubai, especially, they noted that the U.S., in its attempt to assert global hegemony, had “weaponized” its control of many of the levers of the international economy: “FIFA had become a player”. There is diminishing trust in the U.S. as a rules-keeper worldwide. For example, it was noted that the United States dispossessed by fiat Russian citizens of their property, without legal recourse (this of course has especial resonance in Dubai, which as an international entrepot, is a lodestone for oligarch wealth). The U.S. has polarized the international system, especially with its policy towards China, but now towards Russia as well. The UAE sees danger in an “acute bipolar order” in which the U.S. uses its control of global economic and technology infrastructure to pursue sanctions: Emirati future strategy is based on positioning itself as a global center in transportation (including through DP World), finance and fintech, movement of talent, and data. This is leading Emirati circles to examine the need to diversify and shift some of their economic infrastructure to channels (for instance, those which China is developing) that cannot be manipulated for American interests. American (and British) pressure on Saudi Arabia and UAE to break OPEC+ production agreements to lower oil prices in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, are seen as an attempt to break OPEC, and to shatter the control mechanisms painstakingly constructed in recent years with Russia, directly negating Saudi and Emirati interests (in order to reduce domestic criticism of Biden’s Russia policy due to rising gasoline prices). 

 

Relations with the Region

Regarding UAE-Turkish relations, most of those I spoke to in the Emirates (Western expatriate scholars, with a few exceptions,) note that the UAE seems to have recognized that its adventurist policy of the past decade has not been successful (“things did not go so well on the battlefield”), and that there is a need to restore regional relations. The major threat, the Muslim Brotherhood, is perceived as being in retreat and as a spent force: “the Islamic menace has declined”. Turkey is seen as having failed in the regional policy it pursued in the past decade, as well as being in dire straits economically; This is the stage at which it should be re-engaged (“bought cheaply”). Turkey is seen as having taken the first step; UAE is willing to come towards them, and capitalize on Ankara’s weakened position to the utmost.

On Iran, as expected, there were different perspectives in UAE and Bahrain. My partners in both countries see an Iranian threat, which is not being countered by the United States. In UAE, an Emirati interlocutor saw the need to engage Iran and encourage its modernization, rather than its collapse. In Bahrain, Iran is seen as a direct and existential threat, which has a long-term strategy of destabilizing and toppling the Bahraini regime, and which still has substantial support among the Shi’i majority. U.S. policy in 2011 is seen as betrayal, with the Obama Administration calling for the fall of the monarchy and opposing the Saudi intervention. My contacts also present Bahrain as “Saudi Arabia’s little sister”, and as key to Saudi security, as well as that of UAE and the other GCC states, as the geo-strategic shield which protects them from Iran. Bahrain is also to a large extent dependent on Saudi Arabia, for security and economically: most of Bahrain’s oil income comes from an oil field shared with Saudi Arabia, which is produced by Aramco, and the vast majority of visitors to Bahrain each year (10+ million, 95+ percent) are Saudis.

The emerging axis between Iraq, Jordan and Egypt is reported to have the blessing of UAE and Saudi Arabia, as a means of separating Iraq from Iran, de-emphasizing the sectarian struggle (including by encouraging Muqtada al-Sadr) and increasing Arab influence there (the quadrilateral summit in Aqaba on March 25^th seems to bear this out). Similar arguments are used regarding Syria, and the need for Arab engagement there to reduce the Iranian presence. One well-informed contact said that the Assad visit was not long-planned: another source told me that the impetus for the visit came mostly from the Syrian side.

Some of my sources spoke of Dubai as having gained back significant influence since the low point of 2008, due to positive economic developments, especially bearing on their more liberal policy (compared to Abu Dhabi) regarding COVID, which enabled a high level of business activity over the past two years. In their view, this, combined with Dubai’s strong mercantilist orientation, may be a significant factor in the more moderate steps seen in recent Emirati policy regarding Iran and Syria.

Several of the academic foreign policy experts I met described the policy of the Emirati leadership (in practise, the Abu Dhabi leadership) as “always about being first and taking the lead”. The UAE is extremely supple in its policy, and likes to seize opportunities, take action, and be the driving force (“[they] shake things up…[they] lead, don't follow”), in the forefront of big and surprising diplomatic initiatives and regional developments. It recognizes that Turkey and Syria are weak, and sees that fact as a critical opportunity to score political and economic gains and to take the lead. One UAE-based academic described it as a policy to “"move fast and break things … put the turn signal on after the sharp left”.

Another noted that there is not really a policy development and analysis process in Abu Dhabi (where UAE federal national security and foreign policy are made); Though the bureaucratic structures for such might exist (“recommendations of Western consultants”), it is not really a state of institutions. Policy is announced before thought is given to implementation, and is preceded by little staff work, such as cost analysis. All the significant figures (such as National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed, or Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed) have their own staffs made up of trusted advisors (many of them childhood companions) on the side of the formal structures, who function as operational staff, conduits for information, and special envoys. There is little place within the system for critical discussion or “pushback” on initiatives that the leader wants (risk aversion): innovation is prized more than implementation, and initiative at lower levels is not encouraged.

 

Relations with Israel

I delved with those I met on the local perceptions of the normalization with Israel. I was told that in UAE, there is not much public enthusiasm for the step, but also little opposition: “There is an undercurrent [against the normalization], but it is deeply buried”. The population seems to trust the ruler and support his policy, and the government is “legitimately popular”; the caveat is of course that there is no organized political opposition in the state, and overt criticism is not tolerated, so it is hard to gauge the level of discontent. It was noted that Emiratis abroad have been critical of the Accords, a fact that might reflect trends inside the Emirate. There was little anti-Israeli ideology in school in the past (unlike in other states), and the Palestinian issue was not stressed much. One source speaks of the regime as being “militantly tolerant”: they note the move from Friday to Sunday as a step which passed without public outcry, but which must be unpopular among more conservative and religious Emiratis.

In Bahrain, I heard that even before the Abraham Accords the government had been ready for normalization, the King really wanted normalization, and bilateral relations had developed to almost their utmost level. Manama “didn’t want to go first”, but did not need encouragement to follow the UAE; it did need, and received, the nod from Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, I heard that Bahrain “was the only of the Abraham Accords countries which didn’t get anything”: Morocco got recognition of their claim to Western Sahara, Sudan (which hasn’t actually normalized yet) got removal from the U.S. terror list and release of loans, and UAE got arms deals.

Several Bahrainis described Saudi Arabia as the “secret partner to the Abraham Accords”, which is torn between its self-perception as the leader of the Islamic world, and its national interests. One explained that Saudi Arabia is an ally of Bahrain and UAE, and they are now allies of Israel, so there is an “indirect alliance” between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

My contacts assessed that a majority in Bahrain are unhappy with normalization. One source noted David Pollock’s recent study of Bahraini public opinion for the Washington Institute, which showed that only 39% of respondents had a strongly negative view of the normalization accords; however, that study shows that 20% had a very or somewhat positive view and there was a drop - from 44-45 to 18-20 % - in the past two years in the percentage who say that the Abraham Accords will have “a positive effect on the region.” Several noted that there is not much of an age differentiation regarding support of normalization, with younger people and students taking a “woke” approach to the Palestinian issue. They divided the anti-normalizers into three groups: the majority of the Shia (especially pro-Iranians and supporters of al-Wifaq); older Arab nationalists, many of whom were educated in front-line Arab states, and religious individuals (who see the relations as haram); and “woke”, pro-Palestinian youth. The hard-line anti-normalizers are assessed at 30-35%, with another large group are opposed but largely indifferent. Several noted that the majority’s opposition to normalization is not deeply held, and based on “second-hand emotions” and empathy with the Palestinians, and that while the majority may be unhappy, they would not be willing to confront the state on the issue. These could be affected by developments in the Palestinian and Israeli political spheres (for instance, there was an upsurge of demonstrations during the May 2021 disturbances in Jerusalem). It was noted that the large percentage of the population who work in the public sector (approximately 37% of employed Bahraini nationals) is probably neutral or supportive of government policy towards Israel.

In addition, several of my interlocutors noted that the Bahraini government does not generally explain its policies to the public, and this is true of the Abraham Accords as well: the signing of the agreement with Israel was announced with a general justification, but the regime has not laid out the strategic rationale in detail. The merits of normalization were not made clear. There does not currently seem to be an effort or plan to expand the relations from the government-to-government to the people-to-people level. This may be due to innate conservatism and risk aversion of the government.

The feeling in Bahrain (and my own feeling) is that Bahrain is overshadowed in Israeli perception by fascination with UAE and Morocco, and apart from the extremely significant defense cooperation realm, is largely ignored. Israelis in my Bahraini interlocutors’ view do not differentiate between UAE and Bahrain, and Israeli firms are making mistakes in UAE and Bahrain, due to their ignorance of cultural norms and local ways of doing business (“the Israelis are coming here after being excluded for 70 years: they don’t realize that we didn’t spend those years just waiting for them”). They note that Bahrain is actually a more relevant prototype for Israel for future normalization with other Arab states, since it is more typical (with ~50% Bahrainis) than UAE (with more than 85% expats). The “fruits of peace”, they opine, are not at all apparent to the people; there is a serious risk of the “Egyptian scenario of cold peace. Peace, it was noted, brought cherished “peace” to Israel but not to Bahrainis, who never really saw Israel as an enemy. The normalization process in general is perceived is only helping security forces and authoritarians, not people. A foreign diplomat worried that Bahrain is taking too many overt hostile steps towards Iran (visits of Israeli Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Foreign Minister; the security cooperation agreement signed in February; the Bahraini Deputy Foreign Minister’s statement that Mossad is active in Bahrain;  the Negev Summit), and may be inviting Iranian retaliation. Israel may not  be doing Bahrain many favors in its policy of extreme openness.