**State**

Geographically bounded entity, governed by a central authority that has the ability to make rules, laws and decisions and also to enforce the decisions within its boundaries. Traces its origins to the disintegration of the univerlistic Holy Roman Empire and signing of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 after Thirty Year War. Geographically fixed self-governing autonomous bodies exercising control over territory and inhabitants regardless of religions as opposed to the Papal authority exercising control. Characteristics of a State are

(a) Territory with boundaries with international recognition, even if boundary disputes exist.

(b) People living in an ongoing manner and permanent basis.

(c) Economic activity and organised economy.

(d) Power of social engineering such as education.

(e) Government exists providing public services and police power.

(f) Has sovereignty, with no other state having power over its territories.

The State is the supreme legitimate authority entrusted with the exercise of violent force over people, within the definable jurisdictional purview ie. Territory. It is thus, also charecterised by

(a) Monopoly over the exercise of force.

(b) Legitimised as International law.

(b) Institutional structures to perform government functioning, including and not limited only to the use of force.

(c) Exercising control over territory – complete or partial.

**Nation**

The nation need not have geographically bounded territories or be legally defined. A group of people interlinked with ideas or cultural, linguistic or religious identity could be considered a nation even in the absence of territorial control eg. Jewish nation prior to independence. Nationalism is derived from the ide of a nation, reflecting a sense of binding and pride in their identity.

Actors with autonomy ie ability to behave independently in a manner to having consequences for the others in the international arena. The actor must have the legitimate authority to participate in international politics and represent the people.

(a) **Sovereign Nation State**. The ultimate reference point to settle internal issues and the single voice to interact with external entities. It is the primary actor in international politics.

(b) **Supranational Actors**. International bodies, empowered to regulate autonomy of nation state and other actors through multilateral consensus, legislation and evenuse of force. Nationalism generates contradictions in a pluralistic international environment and needs to be resolved to allow the survival of the international order. Interdependence necessitates regulation and legitimises the existence of supranational bodies. Historically rooted in non-governmental and non-political domain of international relations such as Danube River Commission 1856, International Committee of the Red Cross 1864 etc. found acceptance role in relation to nations post the Great Wars (League of Nations and UN).

(c) **Transnational Actors**. Politically significant organisations acting across the territories of numerous states, having far reaching effects that the international system has to reckon with such as religious/ non-secular agencies (Roman catholic Church), clandestine and terrorist organisations, business agencies such as MNCs and NGOs.

(d) **Sub National or Non State Actors**. Groups operating within the confines of a single State but yet impacting one or more State in the international arena eg. LTTE.

(e) **Individual Actors**. Individual personalities who have the ability to influence international politics by their vision, influence and commitment eg Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela.

**National Interests**

The concept of National Interests developed with the Realist Theory of geopolitics. Hans Morgenthau being its primary proponent. It enabled wider and more comprehensive concepts of National Security and State power encompassing all national endeavours in the pursuit of a state’s well-being, existence and legitimate aspirations of growth.

**National Values**

**National Philosophy**

**National Aim**

**National Mission**

**National Interests**. National mission should identify the key areas for the nation and national interests hinge upon securing success in these key areas. It has been defined as **‘what is good for a nation as a whole in international affairs’.** Globalisation and interdependence for developmental resources results in National Interests across a wide spectrum of governmental endeavours wherein stakes are held. **National Interests are therefore, those ‘Key Areas’ of national endeavours, securing of competitive advantage in which is essential for a nation’s survival, growth and ultimate realisation of national aspirations and values.** Numerous definations exist:

“National Interest is an interest which the states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other.” – Dyke.

“It is the sum total of all the national values.” – Joseph Frankel.

“National Interest is the political tradition & the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy.” – Hans Morgenthau

“The meaning of national interest is survival—the protection of physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states”—Morgenthau.

Preservation of the physical identity translates to protection of territorial integrity and integrity of the nation while political identity entails preserving the politico-economic regime. The protection of cultural identity would imply the ethnic traditions and values of the nation state. National Interests provide a framework as instruments of political action for justifying, denouncing or implementing policy. It eventually becomes a popular basis for action. Interests of a nation can be further classified into

(a) **Primary Interest**. These are the vital interests of a nation like that of security & survival. These includes the preservation of physical, political & cultural identity of the state against the possible encroachment from outside powers. These are permanent interests and the states must defend them at all costs and cannot be compromised.

(b) **Secondary Interest**. These are less significant than the first category but quite important to the existence of the state. These include the protection of the citizens abroad, protection of the diplomatic immunities to the diplomatic staff, etc.

(c) **Permanent Interest**. These refers to relatively the long- term interests of the state which rarely changes. For example, Great Britain wanted to maintain the freedom of navigation for many centuries for the protection of her overseas colonies & growing foreign trade. To cite another example, to be a economically self-reliant nation is the permanent interest of every nation.

(d) **Variable Interest**. Refers to those interests of a nation which are considered vital for national good in a given set of circumstances. These are largely determined by the crosscurrents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests & partisan politics, and so on.

Behaviour of nation states in the international arena is guided by endeavours to influence the world environment to its advantage in consonance with its national interests. Policy orientation and consistency of response to situations are guided by national interests. National power and interests share a complimentary symbiotic relationship. National power provides the tools to achieve national interests while fulfilment of national interests generates national power.

Familiar **methods or instruments employed by nations to achieve national interests** are **Diplomacy, Propaganda, Economic Aid & loans, Treaties and Alliances & Coercive means like wars**., etc. Similar postulations have been made in **Kautilya’s Arthasastra**, a classical work of political theory and International Relation theory, composed around 321 BCE during the Mauryan Empire bringing it to the zenith of power in ancient India. It is the oldest and most **exhaustive treatise on statecraft and on issues of diplomacy, war, peace, intelligence, security, and political economy**.[[1]](#footnote-1) Kauṭilyan ideas and concepts are a reflection of the **realist tradition.[[2]](#footnote-2) Kautilya’s Arthshastra parallels Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince,** as an ‘exposition of monarchical statecraft, realpolitik in inter-state balances of power, and the practices of war and peace.’[[3]](#footnote-3) The **four upayas or approaches, expedient, device, ways of realising aim or object of diplomacy** exist since the period of the epics.[[4]](#footnote-4) The **upayas postulated are 1) sāman (friendliness, cooperation) 2) dāna (gift, ingratiation) 3) bheda (divide et impera) 4) daṇḍa (use of force).**  Mirror images of these concepts are seen in 20th century pioneer of **Power Politics theory by Hans J. Morgenthau. The chapter of different methods of balance of power has sections on divide and rule, compensation, armaments and alliances.** The four sections are very close to **bheda (divide and rule), dana (compensation), danda (armaments) and sama (alliance)** of the Arthasastra.[[5]](#footnote-5)

(a) **Conciliation (Sama)** by emphasising advantages accruing to both sides and extolling common relationships.

(b) **Rewarding (Dana)** with material gains or may even involve mutual security guarantees. These are of five kinds:

(i) **Relinquishing what is owed.**

(ii) **Continuing a payment already made.**

(iii) **Return of something received.**

(iv) **Giving something new out of one’s own wealth.**

(v) **Permission to take something from the enemy.**

(c) **Sowing dissension (Bheda) among enemies** by creating mutual suspicion between them or threatening one of them. It is an important constituent of depriving the enemy its consolidated power. Dissension and mistrust in public results in weakening the legitimacy and state power derived from the seven constituents **(Prakrits)**.

(i) Recent protests in Iran, resulting from hardships of economic sanctions displays fragility of state power. A reported crackdown on spies is a manifestation of weakening internal structures and growing mistrust.

(ii) Similarly, measures to create dissension between Iran and Russia over Syria will be essential in limiting the combined power potential of the alliance emerging between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah under the overall umbrella of the Russians.

(iii) Attempts by Qatar, as per reports in The Jerusalem Post on September 03, 2018 to create influence lobbies in the US are just one example of measures undertaken as per this ancient postulation.[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Use of Force (Danda)** once all efforts at peace or for enforcing it’s will have been expended. It also serves to establish the writ of its strategic capabilities displaying benefits of allying with, remaining neutral or submitting to peace on own terms.

**NEED TO INCORPORATE FROM CDM**

**West is in relative economic and political decline, Jewish Diaspora in demographic decline, West’s ability to maintain order and prevent nuclear proliferation in Middle East diminishing, rising Islamic fanaticism and contracting Western support for Israel characterise the security scenario.** Occupation, extremism and religious fundamentalism rising in Israel will only further erode its support base. Arab nationalism is being overtaken with tribalism, failed states and extremist movements. Rising Shia-Sunni competition results in Arab preoccupation with malaise, neutralising their ability to threaten the existence of Israel. However, with no Arab leader capable of assuming leadership and degeneration of political Islam in delivering prosperity to the people, venting of ire against the sworn enemy and infidels provides the escape route raising the spectre of greater violence. The new danger is the Arab chaos combining Islamic-Arab discontent from without and desperate Palestinian upheaval from within (410, Shavit).[[7]](#footnote-7)

The era of relative peace cannot be treated as normalcy in the reality of Israel as it is a Jewish state in an Arab world, democracy in region of tyranny and Western culture in an Islamic world. Rise of Iran, growth of Hezbollah in North and Hamas in South and territories from where Israel withdrew becoming sources of violence aimed at Israel are the primary threat it has to contend with. Avi Shavit describes **the concentric circles of threat to the Jewish state as follows:[[8]](#footnote-8)**

**External circle** – **Islamic representing religious animosity**, amplified by occupation of Jerusalem and West Bank. It is against the very existence of a non Islamic state in a land sacred to Islam and surrounded by Islam, creating tension. Alliances with moderate states, secret and commercial alliances with some for strategic partnership and mutual interest arrangements to prevent the regional conflict into a religious on. The sweep of radical Islam has made the threat more omnipotent.

**Intermediate Arab circle – a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab world**. Arab nationalism makes every effort to **prevent the existence of Israel** but failed because of their internal corruption and weakness. Superficial recognition and regional stability (Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties) being threatened as **moderate regimes being overcome by radical elements or becoming failed states (Iraq, Syria & Lebanon)**.

**Third circle – Palestinian**, with moderate elements waning and radical elements rising. Weakness of Israel will allow forceful eruption of Palestinian sentiments, with pragmatism to accept co-existence being the victim of **rising mass and convergence of radical Islam and Palestinian radicalism.** Unilateral **withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza** have only allowed those territories to be **exploited for anti Israel activities**. Similar **withdrawal from West Bank** would bring the presence of **Iranian backed elements bringing security threat to the doorstep of the coastal plains**. Wise diplomacy prevented a consolidated political entity capable of strangulating Israel, the military might kept the Arabs at bay and sophisticated intelligence prevented internal destabilisation by Palestinians. An Iranian nuclear bomb has potential of galvanising Arab hostility.

The **internal threat circle of Palestinians within Israel**, who have a simmering tension but only kept in check due to the relative prosperity vis-à-vis counterparts in the Middle East.

The **mental threat circle of the will and ability of the Israeli generation weakened by lack of utopia and kibbutz dream of old Israel.** The question of collective psyche capable of sustaining the onslaught against Israel’s existence will become a reality.

**Moral threat circle of turning fascist or militaristic from the liberal democracy due to endless war.** Growing Arab minorities breeding xenophobia and racism leading to deterioration of humane Zionism threatens the values of the revolutionary Zionism which established the State and ensured its existence in the face of ruthless onslaught.

**Identity threat** is exacerbating the split and internal struggle affecting the core of the nation and its ability to sustain.

The existential threat to the existence and occupation co-exist. Intimidation and occupation are the pillars defining the condition of Israel.[[9]](#footnote-9) The apprehensions faced by the nation are an unending Palestinian conflict, challenge to the regional strategic hegemony, erosion of the legitimacy of the Jewish state, transformed Israeli society being divided and polarised, crumbling of the liberal democratic foundation and inability of dysfunctional governments to deal with the challenges.

Avi Shavit in his book writes about **Lydda, which at the time of independence was an inherent contradiction to a Jewish state which could not coexist, particularly in the vicinity of the airport**. Operation Larlar in 1948, resorting to expulsion with brutal force. Here lies the **inherent contradiction of Israel. A state formed on the foundation of people facing persecution and homeless, instigated a human catastrophe, dispossessing the inhabitants with brutal force.** The schism to reject Zionism because of Lydda or accept it alongwith Lydda will be the searching question.[[10]](#footnote-10)

The **euphoric victory of the Six Day War** gave the **national religious community the platform to espouse the cause of Greater Israel** by settling Judea and Samaria to make them an integral part of the Sovereign state of Israel. The Labor government did not allow the expansionist desires to succeed, but the **traumatic experience of the Yom Kippur War weakened the Labor establishment who gave in to the mass movement** ambivalently allowing the **establishment of a worker’s settlement at Ofra,** as a protective response to uphold the Jewish state.[[11]](#footnote-11) However, a **contradiction has been born as Ofra becomes symbolic of making the Israeli movement as one of colonialism**. It intended to **save lives of one people by dispossessing the other**. The contradiction at the core of Zionism was handled as a **conflict between emigrant community and a native population being converted to one between sovereign states**. The **settlement movement resulted in reversing the perception.[[12]](#footnote-12)**

**The inherent problem with peacemakers became that the issue of occupation became synonymous with peace. The problem of realisation exists as the partner for peace is not there, with complete rejection by the Arabs of the reality and existence of the Jewish state. Mistake in belief that ending occupation will bring peace.** Moshe Dayan, in 1956 at the funeral of a security officer Roy Rotenberg, recognised the hatred exists as a result of Arab dispossession but at the same time warns of the reality that weakness will result in Israeli destruction “The Sword shall Devour Forever”.[[13]](#footnote-13)

The **pivotal years of Israel’s history 1967, 1973 and 1977 saw extraordinary victory, distressing defeat and monumental political upheaval** **with right-wing Likud Party sweeping into power resulting in occupation and its institutionalisation**. 1973, probably the most defining moment, bringing deep distrust of the State, government and leadership. The most **peaceful period of strategic stability, with no Arab force attack ensued l**ikely as a result of **Dimona and its enabler the Begin Doctrine, overwhelming Israeli air superiority, corruption fuelled Arab stability, peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, decline of Russia, American hegemonic status**.[[14]](#footnote-14)

**Arabs**. It is perceived that they are not involved in nation building. The post-colonial era gap with the modern world has increased exponentially. It is attributed to cultural weakness being non-pluralistic and harbouring a deep-seated victimisation complex. The negative change is resulting in increasing radicalisation. No acceptance of the State of Israel, despite being given a nation state, refuse to accept the reality of Israel.

Israeli security doctrine has **indelible imprints** of the **existential nature of threat**, attenuated by the **experience of the anti-Semitism of the 19th century in Europe and the near wiping out of Jewry during the Holocaust**. Israeli strategic doctrine, both at the military and politico level have often been driven by a sense of catastrophic magnitude, not unjustifiably, and its existential nature. The reprisal raids and Unit 101 actions at Qibeyeh on October 14, 1953 being extrapolated as counter city and subsequently Moshe Dayan’s transition to counter force is symptomatic of Israeli psyche impacted by the existential nature of their survival.[[15]](#footnote-15) The declaration of Independence in May 1984 by Israel responded with the invasion of the combined armies threatening their nascent existence shaped the initial strategic concept towards survival ‘how not to lose the war rather than how to win it’.[[16]](#footnote-16) Israel was faced with early **international isolation** which shaped its strategic concepts. An adverse international environment marked by declining British and French power and global superpowers vying for Arab favour perpetuated **Arab hostility** and conviction that denying Israel peace and pursuing war would not invite intolerable international penalty.[[17]](#footnote-17) The **lack of demographic mass to withstand the combined Arab population**, besides the Zionist philosophy and formulation of Jewish state, necessitated immigration. At the same time the **social distress** resulting from immigration management resulting in alienation, deprivation and insecurity became a paradox/ It shaped the defensive doctrine impacting military capabilities, threats and commitments, external alignments and use of force.[[18]](#footnote-18) **Preservation of status quo** with existence and establishment of Israel legitimised based on a UN Declaration and Partition Plan is at the core of its doctrine. Political Zionism from the early stages envisioned the **necessity of leading power patronage as indispensable** to both revival and survival of the Jewish national state. Dr Herzl sought Ottoman and imperial German sponsorship, without avail, while Dr Chaim Weizmann and Ben Gurion leaned towards British and American patronage.[[19]](#footnote-19) The **geography of Israel itself makes it strategically vulnerable** with its elongated shape, narrow waistline, lack of depth making surprise invasion by Arabs and inability to mobilize reserves in time an existential threat. Freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba, thus became a *Casus Belli* for war.[[20]](#footnote-20) The arming and development in 1950s of the Egyptian forces by Russian and Czech capabilities made the deterrence by denial concept untenable, transiting from the infantry/ point defence (*nekhud)* to speed and firepower for deterrence by punishment. However, early resort to offensive first strike action often needed to be balanced against seeking alliances.

Only a forceful policy could persuade the Arabs of the existence of the Jewish state and that its reversal by force is not implementable. Israel is convinced that the Jewish state would need to be forced upon the unwilling Arabs, backed by the capacity to inflict punishment, dissuading resort to war. The policy hinged around **dividing the Arab world incapable of converging their potential into vast power**. A resolve and aggressive determination to overcome the humiliation and submission of the two millennia of dispersal was necessary to force a change in Arab calculus.[[21]](#footnote-21) The ideological complexion of Arab regimes has not been of great consequence, rather it is the domestic affairs driving policy which often impact Israel’s security.

**Deterrence by enunciating a first strike doctrine became the cornerstone of Israeli security policy**. Military objectives to deter capture of Gaza and Hebron as deterrence against infiltration, capture of Straits of Tiran to ensure freedom of navigation and Egyptian guarantee and advancing upto the Litani River and establishing an autonomous region under a Christian dominated government in Lebanon.[[22]](#footnote-22)

The outcome of the Kadesh operations in 1956, though not completely successful, gave Israel a status of emerging power, allowed unhindered development of Eliat and expanded its presence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The principle of breaching of red lines being responded with an unhesitating Israeli response was based on IDF capacity.

**Casi Belli**. Yigal Allon, in A Curtain of Sands written in 1959, enunciated declaratory casi belli which included a unified Arab command incorporating Jordon and/ or Lebanon, entry into West Bank or south of Litani River, Syrian interference in the Huleh and water utilisation of the Jordan River, and interference with movement to Latroun enclave, Mount Scopus or navigation through Straits of Tiran or Suez Canal[[23]](#footnote-23). These were considered as precipitants, but not declared casi belli.

The **search for alliances and security guarantee has been at the core of Israeli security doctrine even though its military prowess had created adequate deterrence**. It needed **uninterrupted flow of arms alongwith strategic supplies of wheat, oil and uranium**. Israel embarked on a **policy of containment ie. political arrangements which would act as effective countervailing forces to the Arab and Soviet allies**.

**Offensive Military Doctrine**. The choice of first strike deterrence capability is reflected in the build up of the air arm, despite the defensive Hawk system provided by the Americans. Similarly, reliance on the armoured capability over the defensive line of Auja – Rafah gap on the Egyptian border was indicative of an offensive military doctrine becoming the cornerstone of deterrence.[[24]](#footnote-24)

**Mobilisation – An Instrument of Deterrence**. Mobilisation, besides an essential aspect of force build up in crisis management and war execution, is an important instrument of deterrence which underscores Israeli resolve.

**Necessity of Superpower Patronage**. The overwhelming 1967 victory and the ensuing credibility of Israeli military prowess would have underplayed the Ben Gurion vision of necessity of superpower patronage to withstand the constant onslaught of Arab hostility. On the one hand, a security guarantee would instill a clear asymmetry in favour of Israel’s military prowess, making the existence of Israel an irreversible political reality underwritten by the Americans. However, subservience to American interests, often not converging or developments considered detrimental by Israel not eliciting similar alarm would create friction. Caution or limiting action was likely to undercut deterrence. Israel, now seen as a strategic asset, had access to military arms and economic aid. Moreover, the retreat of the US from Vietnam itself did not make it a completely trustworthy power. Adverse public opinion towards commitment of American troops would unlikely find favour. The captured territories provided a strategic depth, affording a security guarantee besides a bargaining chip for future peace. The rapid progress and reported fruition of the Israeli nuclear programme added considerable weight to its deterrence and as a bulwark for the West in the Middle East and against Soviet expansion. Kissinger’s American policy, under the Nixon administration, viewed the Middle East arena as an offset to reverse the decline of US power after the Vietnam debacle.[[25]](#footnote-25) Consolidating its control over the oil states and oil weapon had become an American imperative. Thus, necessity for a formal written alliance gave way to defacto strategic relationship in the Israeli calculus. The American airlift of equipment without having a formal alliance, during the 1973 moment of peril, and declaration of worldwide alert deterred Soviet intervention. The support ensued despite Israeli continuation of ingress West of the Canal even after the October 22, 1973 ceasefire. The credibility and limits of superpower intervention on both sides was clearly established, indicating the depth of commitment. On the other hand, consultations with the Americans not indicating favour for pre-emption prior to the Yom Kippur War prevented the leadership from allowing mobilisation. This imposed limitation resulted in enormous losses before the tide could be stymied.[[26]](#footnote-26) Notwithstanding, the need for a formal alliance resurfaced. The availability of leverage during the critical camp David negotiations resulted in eliciting a formal collateral agreement/ commitment to act in response to Egyptian violations[[27]](#footnote-27). The Memorandum of Agreement on March 12, 1979, even though an executive direction with no formal Congress approval requirement and limited only to the Egyptian front was a step in the direction of a codified agreement, though short of a formal alliance. The ill-conceived Memorandum of Strategic Understanding (MSU) in November 1981 faltered as a result of the Golan Annexation Law.[[28]](#footnote-28) However, Israeli-American relationships had assumed a strategic dimension as they did not falter in the face of severe friction. The resilience despite unilateral actions such as bombing of Osiraq, invasion of Lebanon and securing West Beirut despite American assurances to the contrary to the PLO reflect the dimensions of support, irrespective of a formal alliance.[[29]](#footnote-29) **What is the formal alliance now.#########**

**Superpower Confrontation**. The war of attrition, post the 1967 loss, indulged and unleashed by Egypt and retaliatory air strikes, deep in Egypt resulted in Egypt seeking Soviet intervention and being reduced to a protectorate. Soviet calculus balanced guarding credibility of its commitment vis-à-vis direct confrontation and involvement in actual hostilities. It resorted to supplying hardware, training and passive defense measures. Emergent measures extended to Egyptian planes flown by Russian pilots to provide an invisible umbrella due to Israeli reluctance to take a superpower head on. The protective umbrella over the Egyptian rear got extended to the Canal area and had the potential of unhinging Israeli defence, thin on ground, bereft of its air superiority. Thus, its deliberate air ambush of an Egyptian sortie flown by Russian pilots on July 30, 1970 ended its doctrinal reluctance of confronting a superpower. Russian denial of active participation and the shield of American intervention ensured controlled escalation. Subsequently, deployment of the SAMs and resultant nullifying of the air superiority provided Egypt the ability to breakout over the canal and undertake the October offensive. **It needs to be analysed if the role of the superpowers in contemporary Syria and Lebanon, providing support to Iranian backed proxies and Iran establishing a hostile presence, will be seen through the prism of the events of 1973. Thus, breaching of Israeli red line being treated as a casus belli and outbreak of hostilities will need to be visualised. Alternately, Russia may decide to limit its support and Iranian presence to the extent that Israel does not consider it a violation of an enunciated red line. Thus, avoidance of outbreak of hostilities, would preserve Russian interests as resultant American intervention would likely undo the gains achieved before consolidation.**

**1973 – Arab Motivations**. The pre-1973 scenario, having inflicted a humiliating defeat in 1967, interpreted Israeli aversion to casualties, split in society over discrimination against oriental Jews (Ashkenazi versus Sephardic) and settlements as creeping annexation of Arab lands would have likely motivated the 1973 war. **In contemporary times, the internal debate of Nation State Law, growing internal rift in society, a hardline right government with a propensity to push for settlements, debate on military expenditures and defence cuts with the Gaza protests as a parallel to the attrition war could have ominous reflections of the strategic paradigm.**

**Demography/ Population and Domestic Compulsions**. The importance on reliance on mobilisation of reserves due to a demographic/ population limitations can feel the tensions in event of prolonged embodiment as in case of the Lebanon War in 1982.[[30]](#footnote-30) Reservists were in uniform for periods extending two years, taking a toll on individual businesses/ professional interests. Thus, ensuring unequivocal domestic public support for military actions is an imperative to sustain the war efforts and insulate against drawdown of strategic goals when faced with an acrimonious domestic environment. The delayed call up of reserves before the Yom Kippur War, to some extent resulting from economic costs and likely adverse public backlash, saw the incorporation of numerous measures to enhance mobilisation as a fallout.

**Oil Weapon**. The Arab states ability to form a cartel and exponentially escalate the price of oil resulted in a massive availability of resources in the Arab world. The economic stress of the price rise was mitigated by the West by way of undertaking massive weapon exports, fueling an arms race and possibly spurring conflict.[[31]](#footnote-31)

**Vulnerabilities which need to be Guarded Against**

**(a) Geography – makes Israel extremely vulnerable.**

**(b) Demography – Vastly outnumbered (6 and half million against 350 million Arabs), not enough people to defend the state.**

**(c) Asymmetrical representation in the UN (Arabs vs Israel).**

**(d) State of unending wars, cannot rest after a victory, campaign between wars.**

**(e) Will not become the Berlin of the Middle East**

**(f) No second opportunity:-**

**(i) Very narrow margins of security with no room for mistakes.**

**(ii) Avoid war when it can be prevented.**

**(iii) React even if a price has to be paid.**

**(g) Strategy of maintaining status quo.**

**(h) Deterrence in strong military capability – conscription and reservist.**

**(i) Maintain strategic deterrence (Begin Doctrine – Osiraq, Syria).**

**(j) Overwhelming reliance on American support and consultation.**

**(k) Need to build relationships and support.**

**(l) Preventive intelligence.**

**(m) Need for a high but balanced expenditure on security (5-6% of GDP).**

**(n) Ensure defensive measures – Home Front, Iron Dome, shelters in apartments.**

**(o) Conventional threat has reduced.**

**(p) Sub conventional or nuclear a contemporary realty.**

**(q) Globalistion and proliferation of technology amplify the ability of the individual to cause harm.**

**(r) Amorphous borders – ideology, cyber threats etc expands the threats.**

**(s) Focus on Prevention by utilisation of kinetic, cyber, political, economic capabilities and alliances/ cooperation.**

**Israel’s National Interests**

1. **Political**.

(a) To preserve and enhance freedom to act independently.

(b) Build & sustain capabilities which necessarily have to be disproportionate to size & population.

(c) Build & maintain an alliance with the most effective power.

(d) Ensure strong relationship with Jews across the world.

(e) Anticipate changes in world and regional scenario and align accordingly.

(f) Prevent enemies from forming effective coalitions so as to never to face a large number of adversaries at one time.

(g) Reinforce global integration (prevent isolation) while maintaining national interest and identity.

(h) Internal cohesion and strength by means of stable government, good governance and continuity in policies.

(j) **Greater Israel**. Nation building more important than seeking justice. The Zionist/ Jewish state sought existence and only bought and took places where there was no Arab presence and of no biblical or historical significance. Purchase of land in the N shape territory and did not seek Judea & Samaria where there was Arab presence. Nation building is top priority, then need to sacrifice whatever diverts efforts from it.

(k) Engage separately with each Palestinian formation.

(l) Stability in the middle east and engage moderate Sunni countries.

(m) Isolate regional non state actors and Iran.

2. **Defence**.

(a) **External**.

(i) Secure borders, vital interests and secure peace.

(ii) Strategy against non-state actors.

(iii) Deter aggression; prevent, defuse, and manage crises.

(iv) Effective and secure utilisation of IW assets.

(v) Establish and maintain infrastructure and operating capabilities in consonance with national interests.

(vi) Ensure that local and regional instabilities do not threaten the security of Israel.

(vii) Reduce the threat & proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(b) **Internal**. Law enforcement to combat terrorism, crime, and drugs trafficking.

3. **Economic**.

(a) To have economic prosperity by expanding exports, open markets and assisting business.

(b) Sustain R & D to retain technological edge.

(c) Promote indigenisation.

(d) Prevent economic isolation eg guard against BDS.

(e) Strengthen currency.

(f) Reduce economic gap in society.

4. **Social**.

(a) Need to ensure maintenance of identity as a Jewish democratic state ?

(b) Maintain of a high degree of internal cohesion.

(c) Maintain a strong army influence on society and nation building.

(d) Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and disaster.

(e) Foster a healthy and educated population.

(f) Reduce gaps and inequalities in income, occupation distribution, education and social influence.

(g) Integration of ultra-orthodox and Arabs.

**Power (need to incl pgs 60-69 CDM)**

As per the **dictionary**, power means the ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not. According to **Max Weber,** power is the ability of a person or group of people to exert their will on others. The ability to control is often associated with possession of resources and hence power could be defined as possession of population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military force and political stability.[[32]](#footnote-32) **Exercise of power entails** “art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation-state, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to serve national objectives and interests.” **Diplomacy** would involve influencing behaviour of others by direct / indirect communication to reach mutually beneficial solution. The techniques would involve persuasion, punishment, rewards, force. **Economic statecraft** involves positive (carrot) or negative (stick) sanctions. The **use of force** would likely involve compellance (to get Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait) or deterrence through a credible second-strike capability. Power is **characterised** by

(a) Concentrated in hands of States, NSA, MNC, liberation movements, organisations (amnesty, green peace).

(b) Power is a deterrent – active / passive.

(c) Power can be relative or absolute.

(d) Power is static (limited time & space) and dynamic.

(e) Power is subjective or objective.

(f) Power is a process to be analysed on case to case basis, cost analysis.

The distillation of Kautilya’s Arthashastra espouses the importance of an active foreign policy for the welfare of the State. It lays down the principles for interaction with numerous states, itself the main protagonist utilising allies to deal with numerous antagonists. Securing security and interests of the State inherently envisages expansion of power and is thus paradoxically the aggressor or conqueror. The ability of the State in the conduct of foreign policy and furthering its national interests is vested in six constituents (Prakrits) viz. king, ministers, the city, population, treasury and the army. **This is akin to the Pillars of National Security envisioned in Israel’s policy framework ie. Government, Military, Economy and Society**. The strength of the State is not the mere outcome of the measurable power of each constituent but the cumulative effect of an intelligent application of intangibles such as judgement and just policies. Power of a State is a complement of military and economic might, intellectual power in application and morale. The Kautiliyan paradigm envisages interdependence of power with place and time of battle with caution to proceed only if superiority is assured and gains expected weighed against assessed losses. Guarding against the possibility of tracheary in the form of being let down by allies, internal dissensions amongst the government or populace, becomes an essential prerequisite of a campaign.

A power equation based on relative strength of states dictates or guides policy formulation and measures to be undertaken in expanding state interests and security. It aims at isolating and limiting the power potential of the enemy state and initiating a military campaign after achieving stable conditions. It aims at guarding against decline of power and transiting to stability and progress. The policy framework is six layered based on war, peace, neutrality, invasion, alliance and dual policy (war with one and peace with another). The policy to be adopted matches the dynamics necessitated by environmental realities of the State. War is advocated against a weaker adversary, maximising gains at minimum costs. The guidelines are summarised as follows:

1. Build up capabilities and capacities which allow expansion of state security.

2. Need to neutralise and eliminate enemies.

3. Intellectual prudence to guide choice of policy.

4. Peace is preferable to war if outcome is the same and not detrimental.

5. Treat those who help as allies and those who hinder as enemies. There is no permanency in behavioural choices but subject to relative power and shaped by perceptions of the aggressor state.

The criticality of the power base has shifted over time with population as a means to generated taxes and military power giving way to technological, educational and economic growth. A constant tussle between power sources occurs due to growing interdependence. Economic strength has the ability to generate physical/ military security means but on the other hand an absence of adequate security may hamper or stymie economic growth.

Power sources are not evenly distributed with nations facing deficiencies in some field or the other. The broad range of power resources include military, economic, scientific, cultural and ideological. Proof of power does not rest only in abundance of resources but the ability to change behaviour of states and control the political environment. Even with growth of power resources providing leverage, the ability to exert pressure over the entire system may not be unchallenged due to the interdependence and growth of numerous actors. In his 1975 speech Henry Kissinger said “we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling…the world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.” However, over the decades simultaneously primacy of traditional security is also reaffirmed. Importance of other actors with transnational and multinational corporations at times having economic resources equivalent to some nations is a reality eg. Apple recently achieved a capitalisation mark of #### which is equivalent to ##. In modern times complexities of non-state actors has multiplied manifold. National Security has become more complex with a shift from military to economic, ecological and other domains. Alternative methods to achieve National Security goals using resources other than military forces exist and at times are more effective. Needless to say that backing of adequate military power with a credible intent and will of use it accords greater compliance capacity to the power source being exploited. At the same time resource diversion for building military power needs to be carefully balanced. Interdependence is characterised by an uneven balance in different spheres and nations will strategize to link power sources giving advantages while isolate them from spheres where relative weakness exists. The scope of dealing with issues is sought to be defines in a manner best suiting national interest. The **traditionalist** seeks the goal of security and instrument of military force to be linked to a strategy of balancing power while seeking to limit relative power of other states. Distribution of power depends upon the sphere. Military power is primarily unipolar with emerging challenges from China & Russia. However, in trade multipolarity exists in the form of EU, India, China etc. challenging American pole position. The **transfer of power ie. fungibility is not assured.** Direct use of force for economic gains does not necessarily follow proportional patterns eg. Japan has the economic means to shift to a militaristic power but the political costs (domestic and international) may outweigh the gains.

Transnational and non-state actors have a significant impact eg. Multinational corporations can significantly impact the economies of a country causing the nation to align its policies and affecting a shift of its own national interests. To show the effect of the impact of such measures in recent developments post Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal and announcement of reintroduction of the sanction regime, a spate of withdrawals from Iran by leading firms like the French auto giant, Renault withdrew from the $400 million Iranian enterprise zone despite no stake in the US. Its decision was likely a result of its majority stakeholder Nissan Motor Company seeking to insulate its interests in the $19 Trillion American enterprise zone. The economic war unleashed by Trump may be having effects with protesters in Isfahan on July 31, 2018 chanting “No to Gaza, No Lebanon, I give my life for Iran” to oppose massive expenditures to fund Hezbollah and Hamas activities. The Rial plummeted to 122,000 to the dollar and labour unrest with teachers protesting low salaries being indicators of mood on the ground.

Interdependence can spur collective and cooperative action in non-competitive areas such as health and ecological changes. Traditional instruments of power and strategies would unlikely be sufficient to deal with dilemmas of the emerging order. Smaller states are obtaining disproportionate leverage in such arenas.

Information becomes power, gaining weightage over capita. Intangibles such as organisational skills and flexibility gain greater weightage. Technology and communication have made geography less relevant. The military sphere itself is being transformed with surveillance capabilities gaining ground over traditional kinetic capabilities.

**Dimensions of Power**

**Hard power**

**Soft Power**

**Military power can be hard or soft**

**Economic power can be hard or soft.**

**Five faces of power are power (psychological with consequences of hostile action), influence (as a result of US alliance), force (physical coercion), manipulation (use of social media) and authority (control over West Bank). Power** can be defined as the **ability to exert will on others while Force is defined as ability to cause damage.** **Influence** is the rational **persuasion** to make one understand or believe that his **obedience pays off in terms of his benefit and interests** whereas **Authority** was **persuasion** due to **acceptance of the person's position to give the order.** **Manipulation** he stated was **creating obedience by emphasizing on the importance of the person in command**.

2. The **five faces of power** are relevant to human activity which is studied as **Political science** in 4 sub disciplines viz.

(a) Political thought or Philosophy,

(b) Comparative Politics,

(c) International Relations and

(d) Public Administration.

3. The general **power relations between nations are determined by the basic national power,** comprised of **endurance and strike force**. **Endurance comprises all** **human and materialistic resources of a nation**; Its territory, geopolitical state, spiritual, technological and political assets and values; Above all motivation, a result of a sense of unity of purpose and consensus in regard to national aspirations. In other terms Military National power.

4. **Strike Force**. Is a **manifestation of potential put into practice**.

5. **Military Power Relation.** National Military Power is based on strike force and is based on allocation of resources. **Outcome of war is based on strike force capability and endurance.**

6. **Boundaries of Force.** These depend upon **relative strength of enemy, alliances of self and enemy, importance attached to area of interest, national will and motivation.**

**Sources of Power in Israel**

1. **Military**. Proven capability in all scenarios, technological edge, training and intelligence, IW capability, allocation for defence at ### percent of GDP.

2. **Diplomacy**. Special relationship with the US, growing ties with Russia, India, East Asia and Africa, stable relations with Egypt and Jordan, covert relations with Sunni Arab countries, strong ties with Jewish Diaspora and enhanced acceptance In the world.

3. **Economy**. Natural resources with gas finds off the Mediterranean coast, minimal inflation, increasing exports being trade surplus, improved Balance Of Trade with India and China, R&D, technology edge spurring growth, Forex Reserves increasing, strong & stable Shekel.

4. **Society**. Strong nationalistic feeling and will, common identity, free media, value for Human Rights, stable political set up and strong leadership.

There is a need to, however, guard against some vulnerabilities. These are identified as

(a) Social gaps in society can tear the country apart.

(b) Social and economic gaps further fuel a growing widening of the gap (more income and resources allows generation of greater wealth. Thus, wealthy continue to grow while the poor are stuck in ensuring daily existence)

(c) Unemployment – need to maintain restriction on foreign labour which will reduce wages for the poorer sector. Need to maintain minimum threshold of wages.

(d) Negative Income Tax ????

(e) Prepare for the next crisis – need to reduce debt.

(f) Lack of competition – especially banking.

(g) **Housing Crisis**. Purchase of property for investment purpose drove prices. There is a need for higher taxation on second or third property (investment purpose).

(h) Control on cost of land by the Government (Loss of income vs Control) and need to ensure money transfer to rural/ far flung areas.

(i) Growth – security produces stability which allows economic growth and provides level playing field for market forces.

(j) Technology spurs growth of economy, allows cooperation (a leverage as technology is sought by others) and favours international economic alliances.

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, REAL FUNCTIONS**

1. **Smart Power** is the combination of three ways to influence others viz. **Coercion (sticks), Payments (carrots), and Persuasion (soft power)** either with the use of **hard power, soft power or a combination** of both.

2. **Soft Power**. It is the **ability to get "others to want the outcome that you want" and "it rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”**

Sources of Soft Power are **Culture, Political values and Foreign Policy (legitimate and moral).**

Soft power is an **attribute or relations**;

lies in the **eyes of the beholder**, it has **no material value, its situation based and requires time to be created.** Hard Power ?

3. **Hard and Soft Power a**re they **mutually dependent and supportive of each other. There is no consensus** on the subject. Power can be applied in terms of behavior, resources and policy either militarily, economically or as soft power.

4. **Smart Power**. It is a **combination of hard and soft power**. **Simon Anholt's Nation Brand Hexagon model** which has six aspects viz. **tourism** (selling the country abroad), **Exports** (quality of satisfaction with goods produced in a country), **Governance** (Human Rights, Corruption, etc), **Investment and Immigration** (would to like to immigrate or invest in the country), **Culture and Heritage** (what to expect) and **People** (what behavior to expect).

5. **Public Diplomacy**. It is an **instrument governments use to communicate with and attract public of other governments** & NSA **rather than merely their governments to enhance their interests**. Could be **cultural, media, exchange, psychological, sport**, etc.

6. **History**. 1883 – French after loss in Franco Prussian War promoted their literature. After WWI offices for PD established. 1920 – radio expanded the scope, 1938 – division of cultural relations US govt,

7. **PD in information age**. Plenty of information leads to scarcity of attention. Those who can **distinguish valuable information from background clutter gain power**. Politics in an information age **“may ultimately be about whose story wins”**. **National credibility** at times under the scanner.

8. Main **Theoretical Debates** include Whether **Propaganda vs. Public Diplomacy** are the same, **Identity Crisis : official/ governmental vs. non-official/ non governmental**; **Political advocacy vs. Cultural Communication**, **Integration with Foreign Policy**? And **Efficiency**

9. Three **conceptual models of PD** viz **targeting foreign societies** by govt, **targeting and tracking activities of non govt organisations** and third **hiring PR firms / lobbyists** to achieve aim.

10. Dimensions of PD are **daily communication, strategic communication and developing long term relations (exchange programmes – MABAL)**.

Layers of PD are monologue, dialogue and cross-national collaboration.

Taxonomies include listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and International broadcasting.

**Soft Power**. Joseph Nye defines a country’s hard power as coercion, largely a function of military or economic might while soft power is based on attraction arising from positive appeal of a country’s culture, political ideas and polices as also a vibrant civil society. Another way of achieving the outcomes is by getting the other to ‘want what it wants’ in contrast to the hard or command power of ordering others what it wants. It implies the power of attractive ideas or ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework in a way that shapes preferences.[[33]](#footnote-33) Intangible power sources such as culture, ideology and institutions are emerging. Though it must be clarified that conceptually, soft power has been enduring in the communist ideology, myth of inevitability etc.

The nature of use of power is less coercive, ranging from diplomatic to economic threats to coercion. Use of force, in an economically interdependent world has graver implication in the economic and military domains. There would be perceptible shift or preference towards the non-threatening forms of power.

**Co-optive Power**. It is the ability of a country to structure a situation such that other countries develop a preference or define interest in ways consistent with their own. Cultural, ideological and institutional attractions can provide such power eg. IMFs tendency to embody and gravitate towards liberal and free market principles due to American impact on its structures. Attractiveness of a culture can shape power eg. American dream, sof Indian tolerance, values of democracy and openness to immigration.

**Sharp Power**. Influencing efforts of authoritarian regimes which are not hard in coercive terms are also not soft.[[34]](#footnote-34) It involves employing similar tools such as people-to-peole contact, cultural exchanges, educational programmes eg Confucius Institutes, Russia Today etc to influence activities and alter international views. Such measures and institutions bear the stamp of state control and self-censorship in order to normalise regime behaviour in the international arena. In such utilisation of power, action is deemed necessary and ideas will be found to justify it. Dismissiveness of authoritarian influence allows expansion of array of influence techniques, tking advantage of globalisation while raising barriers to limit ingress of external political and cultural influences. The objective is to make democracy less attractive, masking its own shortcomings. It seeks to penetrate the political and information environment, distorting information and manipulate their targets as opposed to goals of soft power to win hearts and minds. It seeks to exploit tools, taking advantage of open political and information environments of democracies. Democratic assumptions of integration with repressive regimes would inevitably change their behaviour allows sharp power to flourish. The sharp power is informed by their reliance on soft power paradigm and hence suffer from counters. Exercising extreme control on information lies at the heart of sharp power projection. Reports of Google developing a Chine specific search engine would be yet another tool in the arsenal of sharp power. There is a need to inoculate against malign authoritarian influence and adopt an assertive posture to counter such power.[[35]](#footnote-35)

The Visegrad Group, comprising Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, forged an alliance evoking a 1335 trade treaty signed there by the kings of Hungary, Poland and Bohemia. Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa joined their Hungarian colleague Jozef Antall in Visegrad Castle on the Danube in creating the alliance challenging Russia.[[36]](#footnote-36) It is this group, which is now at the forefront of opposition to the European Union on the contentious issue of forced immigration quotas. Israel seems to have found common ground in shaping relationships to obtain leverage in the European Union. A sort of strategic inversion of the Cold War is occuring wherein Central Europe, which once armed Israel’s enemies is now being armed by Israel. They are seeking Israeli expertise in border protection technologies, cyberwarfare and anti-terror capabilities, faced with Russian resurgence and immigration influx. Poland’s $1 billion purchase of David Sling anti-missile system, Lithuanian $500 million Samson missile launchers and Croatia’s $500 million purchase of F-16 jets serve to cement the relationship.[[37]](#footnote-37)

Notwithstanding, military power still retains fungibility and a relevant asset. American protective role of the oil rich gulf and guarantor of European security provides substantial bargaining power and influence. In the case of Israel, faced with an existential threat and a concentric circle of extreme hostility which attenuates the strategic vulnerabilities rests on a security policy resting on the military pillar in capacity and the credible intent of unleashing the power at the first sign of hostile intent. New elements are diffusing power for erstwhile poles. Emerging trends resulting in the diffusion or diversification of sources and centres of power are economic interdependence and globalisation, transnational actors, emerging nationalism in states with weak power structures, growth and availability of technology. Some factors will have direct and specific bearing on security while others may be contributory factors in conjunction with other facets. Certain trends, beyond the traditional security paradigm, which will shape the global perspective are an ageing population in rich nations while the poorer nations have a younger demography. Growing imbalance in male-female population, particularly in Middle East, India and China can have drastic effects on internal stability resulting in rise in crimes against women. The focus of the economy is shifting towards Asia and technology is accelerating growth, but the growing disparity is accentuated by global connectivity. Governance is becoming increasingly harder with increased risks of conflict beyond traditional battlefields – cyber attacks and terrorist strikes causing greater disruption. The Pew Research Center survey (www.pewglobal.org) identifies the top challenges to global peace and security as :-

(a) ISIS and terrorist actions with growing Shia-Sunni sectarian divide.

(b) Extreme weather events and Climate Change.

(c) Cyber attacks and data fraud or theft.

(d) Condition of global economy, underemployment / unemployment or financial institutional failure.

(e) Refugee crisis.

(f) US, Russia and Chinese power and influence.

In Isreal’s case growth is attributed to the high tech boom which accrued as a result of decades of sophisticated military production – “to beat swords into plowshares”.[[38]](#footnote-38) The **military infrastructure generated human capital and developed cutting edge technology** which eventually trickles to high-tech industry and propels it forward. Israeli ethos of **innovation coupled integration of knowledge in small teams** with benefits of **skills brought by Russian immigrants** led to the success story of high-tech revolution. Other reasons for **success of Israeli economy** which grew at 5.2 percent 2004-08 and 4.7 percent during the global economic crisis. These, as per Avi Shavit are **reducing government spending (42 percent in 2011 from 51 percent in 2002 of GDP), reduced national debt, maintaining a conservative and responsible financial system and fostering conditions for high tech industry to flourish**. **Four problems** faced by Israel are **deterioration of education endangering ability to sustain technological excellence, low employment amongst ultra-Orthodox and Arab men, restricted competition with fewer than twenty businesses controlling local markets** (355, Shavit). **Reversal of demographics** will result in **secular Jewish majority turning a minority by 2030** since school aged children in ultra-Orthodox schools is 20 percent and in Arab schools is 28 percent and 14 percent modern Orthodox with only 38 percent secular. **Welfare spending on expanding demographic non-working minorities disincentivises modern democratic education** (356-357, Shavit).

**Dan Rieter and Allan C.Stam, Democracies At War, pp 193 -205**

Democratic nature does not preclude war as democracies do **indulge in wars for national interests and even empire building**. Clausewitz observed ‘*war is nothing but continuation of policy with other means*’ making **war initiation, prosecution and termination** deeply political in nature with **political motives and a political choice to advance political goals**. It is has been argued by Dan Rieter and Allan C.Stam in Democracies At War that democracies are likely to have higher probabilities of success and attributed to two key dimensions: [[39]](#footnote-39)

**Skeleton of democracy** ie. political institutions that hold democratic leaders accountable to the consent of the people and the **spirit of democracy** with emphasis on development of individual rights, responsibilities and initiative.

**Power and family of democracy**, the other characteristics of democracy, are **relatively lower in priority** in contributing to the **success of democracies in conduct of war**. Democratic nations are **less likely to aid or intervene on behalf of the other**. Success of democracies in outcome of wars is **not attributed to ability to forge alliances of liberal states or performance of their industrial base (power and family)**, but to the **skeleton and spirit of democracy**.

**Public consent is an empowering characteristic**. Democratic leaders are restrained by the **need to seek consent** for their actions, thus building pause into decision making and **avoid impulsive indulgence** in risky and costly military adventures. Being dependent on **public consent, which could evaporate** rather quickly, they **strive for short duration wars seeking early conclusion**. They are likely to embark on military adventures and would only do so when **reasonably assured of success**, displaying risk aversion, being **sensitive to costs of war and potential foreign policy disasters**. Domestic politics heavily affects *casus belli,* and monitor public opinion with preference for **strategies to ensure quick victory and avoid prolonged entanglements**. **Freedom from need to generating consent and pursuance of best interests of the state** and to be held accountable after the event have been **argued against**. Early federalists losing the political war at the founding of America **brought to fore the inadequacy of claims** of Alexander Hamilton’s landed class and Thomas Jeffersons’s elite republican aristocracy considered as essential to successful democracies.[[40]](#footnote-40) **Realists argue for separation of normative desires from analysis of international relations and argue against** **democratic preference of distribution of wealth and individual’s moral autonomy as a priority**, treating it as a luxury, **vis-à-vis quest for survival, power and security due to the anarchic nature** of international relations.[[41]](#footnote-41) In contrast, Dan Rieter and Allan C.Stam advocate that democratic **citizens are likely to display better individual initiative and leadership** than those from autocratic regimes and the **soldiers rise to the challenge and outperform their counterparts and, thus**, **can better protect themselves vis-à-vis other forms of governance**. The institutional framework of democracies in the vote, separation of power and free press provide it with an inherent strength and likely to make it more successful in the conduct of affairs and foreign policy.

Dan Rieter and Allan C.Stam have **summarised that democracies are more likely to win wars, particularly if initiated by them and suffer fewer casualties**. Chances of victory is proportional to **public support and mounting casualties restrains use of force**. Moreover, greater **chances for success are attributed to better leadership and greater initiative**. Foreign policy choices of democracies have been distilled as follows:[[42]](#footnote-42)

(a) Rarely go to war with other democracies, but could use covert force against them.

(b) Not likely to ally with or assist other democracies.

(c) Choose to initiate wars against nondemocracies, including indulging in extreme and at times primitive behaviour.

(d) Preference for short duration and early termination of war, committing resources commensurate to expected gains by prudent choice of strategy.

(e) Carefully considered choice to go to war, heavily dependent on public consent.

Two models of differing foreign policy incorporating domestic politics in democracies have been postulated:[[43]](#footnote-43)

(b) **Normative Model**. This model proposed that foreign policy differs because democracies forge international liberal communities characterised by norms of peaceful conflict resolution. However, the propensity of democracies to initiate wars, particularly in furtherance of national interests and not necessarily as a last resort when diplomatic efforts have failed, and the absence of an international community of shared liberal norms refutes this model.

(a) **Consent Model**. It proposes that foreign policy of democracies differ because democratic governments have to answer to their public constituencies. These are further conceptualised with a common theme of public approval or disapproval, due to aversion to loss and casualties, but differentiated on timing of leadership’s concern of public concern.

(i) **Contemporary Consent Model**. Subject to constraints of current nature public mood at the time of decision. Thus, it serves to represent the will of the people constantly. Wars will only be initiated if public consent is generated at the time of decision eg. Wilsons decision of American entry in WW I in 1917 as a result of sufficient popular support due to the Zimmerman telegram and threats to American shipping. The advent and exponential growth of the information age makes this model greatly relavent.

(ii) **Electoral Consent Model**. Evaluates impact of policy after completed and specifically at the time of re-election. The calculation of the policy choice being currently unpopular but will eventually be seen as wise or if results are successful places the will of the people as a narrow instrument of re-election akin to an almost Jeffersonian model. Such a model is likely to flourish in a political system where window between re-election is sufficiently long

**Domestic Compulsions and Escalation**. It is argued that domestic compulsions impel hostile military actions. In September 1966 and February 1967, Colonel Salah Jedid had faced two armed revolts in Syria, underscoring the Ba’ath regimes unpopularity. Recourse to the universally popular war of liberation against Israel was the convenient distraction.[[44]](#footnote-44) On the Israeli side, the economic crisis was attributed to the Arab trade boycott, necessitating war to break the boycott and force peace on Israel’s terms. Thus, according to Yaniv Avner, domestic exigencies may have some element in the strategic calculus with internal instability increasing propensity to adopt a more militant posture.[[45]](#footnote-45)

A sustainable trend of democracy is attributed to enhanced global prosperity, growth and success of fledgling democracies and autocratic inability to manage information. ### However, this aspect needs to be carefully guarded against###. Democracy guarantee distributive justice and protects human rights. Advocates of democracy, such as Robert Dahl, attribute democratic process being agreeable to human nature in three ways:[[46]](#footnote-46)

Promotes freedom.

Promotes human development in exercising self determination, moral autonomy and responsibility of one’s choice.

Protect and advance the goods and interests they share with others

**Public Consent and Wars of Intervention**. Interventionist ideology advocated by the Albright do-ability doctrine allows wider conditions including protection of human rights and advancement of democracy as casus belli, but needs to be weighed against national interests. Advocates of the Defensive Peace Theory (DPT), a refinement of Woodrow Wilsons Liberalism, argue that democracies are inherently peaceful and they rarely fight one another. The belief that the spread of democracy could spur a stable world order which in turn spurs economic growth, and hence in national interests from a security and economic viewpoint, became the cornerstone of US policy during Clintons presidency. It justified interventionism on grounds of advancing human conditions, protecting freedom and directly served US national interest with a stable prosperous world. It can be argued that transition to democracy requires collective faith in rule of law, freedom and fairness in participatory political competition and a sufficiently large middle class to build upon. The track record of intervention on grounds of advancement of democracy is unlikely to generate public consent in Israel. Powell’s Doctrine advocated use of force only when conditions of clear objective and high probability of attaining it are met. Thus, intervention will surely need careful consideration before embarking upon the endeavour.

1. Kautilya is also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta. I will spell him as Kautilya (and not Kautalya) and his work as Arthasastra (and not Arthashastra). Spellings from quotes and titles from reference will appear as they are. All references to the Arthasastra are based on R.P . Kangle, The Kautilya Arthasastra, Part II, Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Second Edition, Bombay University, 7th Reprint, 2010. Dates for the work vary according to historians from end 4th century BC to 3 AD. There is also an unresolved debate on authorship. This paper will not go into these debates except inviting attention to it. Literature on this exists and is well documented and articulated. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Kajari Kamal (2018): Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 2018, pp. 33, <https://idsa.in/jds/jds-12-3-2018-kautilya-arthashastra-kajari-kamal> referring to Manjeet Singh Pardesi, ‘Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives’, Working Paper 076, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, April 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Kajari Kamal (2018): Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 2018, pp. 33, <https://idsa.in/jds/jds-12-3-2018-kautilya-arthashastra-kajari-kamal> referring to Kanti Bajpai, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, in Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: A Reader, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. P.K.Gautam, One Hundred Years of Kautilya's Arthasastra, IDSA Monograph Series No. 20, July 2013, p. 52

   referring to R. Bhaskaran, “The Four Upayas of Hindu Diplomacy”, in Charles Henry Alexandrowicz (ed.), The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, Vol.III, 1954, Madras, The Indian Study Group of International Affairs/ University of Madras, pp.126-130. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. P.K.Gautam, One Hundred Years of Kautilya's Arthasastra, IDSA Monograph Series No. 20, July 2013, p. 52

   referring to Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Calcutta, Scientific Book Agency, 3rd Indian edition, 1966, pp.178-203. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. SETH J. FRANTZMAN, QATAR, THE ‘ISRAEL LOBBY,’ AND THE SECRET LIST OF 250 WITH INFLUENCE, SEPTEMBER 3, 2018 05:22, <https://www.jpost.com//Middle-East/Qatar-the-Israel-lobby-and-the-secret-list-of-250-with-influence-566365> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 410. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 399-406. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, xiii. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 204-205. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 267. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Avi Shavit, My Promised Land : The Triumph & Tragedy of Israel, 330. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p 59 referring to Dayan, Story of My Life, pp. 115-116; Teveth, Moshe Dayan, pp. 389-396. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p27. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p27. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p29 referring to Tom Segev, 1949 – The First Israelis (Jerusalem, Domino Press, 1984), part 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p48. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, pp 40-41 reffering to Bell, The Long War, pp. 253-254. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb : The Politics of Israeli Strategy, p 82 referring to Allon, A Curtain of Sand, pp 343-348. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
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