**The History of Strategic Thought**

**Course description**

This course provides historical familiarity, theoretical knowledge, and practical analytical tools that enable the exploration, design, and management of military-security stategy in the context of national security policy. The students will have an intellectual and practical experience of dealing with the history, theory and practice of strategic-military thinking in the context of national security through three didactic efforts that complement each other.

The course introduces participants to the field of "strategy studies" as an academic discipline of political science. This section examines the place of the war institution in international relations, tracing the evolution of military thought in modern times, with a shift in the nature of warfare in conventional, Non-conventional and sub-conventional contexts. Also, in this section, students become aware of the intellectual history of intelligence diagnosis, Net Assessment and strategic planning, and the establishment of these professional areas as the pillars of national security policy in strategic communities around the world.

Later in the year, participants will be presented with a variety of approaches and schools of strategic thinking on the military level, and analytical tools that support the national security decision-making process in general, and in designing and executing a military strategy in particular. Concretely, this part of the school year will review the cognitive complexities of the strategy design process, introduce basic concepts in systemic thinking, and provide participants with an intellectual foundation that enables systemic inquiry, which is at the core of strategic thinking.

**Course requirements**

* Reading academic material in preparation for the lessons (**highlighted compulsory material)**
* Lead and participate in the discussion based on the reading material
* Writing concluding work

**Course structure**

The development of military-strategic thought

**First subject: The evolution of the war institution, the development of modern strategic thinking, and the establishment of strategy studies in the academic world**

**Required Reading**

# John Baylis and James Wirtz, “Introduction,” in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin Gray, and Eliot Cohen, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 1-15.

# Reading permission

# Michael Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 43-66.

# Thomas G. Mahnken, “Strategic Theory,” in *Strategy* *in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 66-81.

# John Garnett, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” in *Strategy* *in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 19-41.

# Collin Gray, *Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict* (US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).

**Second subject: History of strategic thought and conventional combat development**

**Required Reading**

# 6. Dima Adamski, Strategic Culture and Military Innovation, Modan Publishing (2012), Introduction, p. 13-32.

# Reading permission

# John Ferris, “Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 253-273.

# Daniel Moran, Geography and Strategy, *in Strategy the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 122-140.

**Third subject: The history of strategic thought in the hybrid warfare era**

**Reading permission**

1. Itai Baron and Carmit Valencia, "The Revolution in the Military Matters of the Radical Axis," Systems 432, p. 4-17.
2. Dima Adamsky, “Jihadi Operational Art: The Next Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, no. 1, 2010.
3. James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), pp. 163-191.
4. Alex Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2011.

**Fourth issue: History of strategic thought in the nuclear age**

**Required Reading**

1. **Lawrence Freedman, The Rise and Fall of Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 6-25.**

**Reading permission**

1. Yossi Bidz and Yadima Adamsky, The Development of the Israeli Approach to Deterrence - A Brief Discussion of Its Practical and Theatrical Aspects, Atsonot 8 (2014).
2. T.V. Paul, “Complex Deterrence: An Introduction,” in T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James, J. Wirtz, *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 1-27.
3. C. Dale Walton and Colin S. Gray, “The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), pp. 209-227.
4. John Baylis and Mark Smith, “The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), pp. 228-252.

**Topic Five: The Intellectual History of Intelligence Diagnostics, Net Assessment, and Strategic Planning as the Core Areas**

**Required Reading**

1. **Mark Lowenthal, “What is Intelligence?” in *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy* (CQ Press, 2008), pp. 1-12; “The intelligence process,” pp. 73-90.**

**Reading permission**

1. Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” *Parameters* (Spring 2006), pp. 90-100.
2. Dima Adamski, Strategic Culture and Military Innovation, Modan Press (2012), Summary Chapter, pp. 217-231.
3. Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), pp. 82-99.
4. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspective* (Georgetown University Press, 2008), pp. 1-13.

# Colin Gray, “Why strategy is difficult?”, in Thomas Mahnken and Joseph Maiolo, *Strategic Studies: A Reader* (Routledge, 2008), pp. 391-398.

1. Eliot Cohen, “Technology and Warfare”, in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), pp. 141-159.